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PLA Military Doctrines and China’s Security Perception of Japan in the Wake of the Russo-Ukrainian War

Introduction

The Russo-Ukrainian war, which began in February 2022, has entered its fifth year. As the first major conflict in Europe since World War II, it is said to have had a significant impact on military doctrines and operations across many countries. To date, several relevant research findings have been published on this topic.1

Even the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China is not immune to the conflict’s impact; reportedly, it has learned many lessons from the war in Ukraine. Researchers from Japan, the United States, and Taiwan have published research insights into this trend. Joel Wuthnow, for example, points out that the PLA confirmed the effectiveness of its military doctrines and operational concepts through an analysis of the war in Ukraine. The present paper will also share the same conclusion with Wuthnow’s. The articles by Taiwanese researchers published in “Studies on Chinese Communism” extensively discuss the operational domains highlighted in the war in Ukraine and examine how they could influence the PLA’s invasion of Taiwan. In Japan, Masaaki Yatsuzuka, taking into account the points raised by Chinese researchers, discusses the lessons the PLA drew from the war in Ukraine, mainly in space, cyber, and cognitive domains.234

This paper draws on the foregoing research findings and clarifies how the PLA’s military doctrines, as well as related operational concepts and force management policy, have been influenced by the war in Ukraine. This paper also analyzes the PLA’s security perception of Japan in the wake of the war in Ukraine.

2. The PLA’s Military Doctrines, Operational Concepts, and Force Management Policy Impacted by the Russo-Ukrainian War

(1) Military Doctrine ― Informationized Local Wars and Intelligentized Warfare

At the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (18th Party Congress) in November 2012, Xi Jinping, who was elected Chairman of the Central Military Commission, emphasized efforts to improve integrated operational capabilities. At the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in November 2013, Xi Jinping announced the implementation of national defense and military reform. Under Xi Jinping’s direction, the PLA began to work on an integrated operational system with information warfare in mind, undertaking the largest and most thorough military reform since the founding of the People’s Republic of China.5

The military doctrine that constituted the theoretical pillar of China’s military reform efforts is “informationized local wars.” From around 2014, the Xi Jinping regime advocated “informationized local wars” as a military doctrine to replace “local war under the conditions of informationization.”67

The 2020 edition of “Strategic Studies” published by the National Defense University (NDU) of the PLA points out six features of “informationized local wars”: 1) The wars are subject to various restrictions not only from political and economic factors but also from social factors such as public opinion at home and abroad and international law; 2) Information supremacy is a prerequisite for seizing air and sea control; 3) The battlefield space tends to expand and become multidimensional or three-dimensional as intangible battlefields―electromagnetic waves, cyberspace, and the psychological and cognitive domain―are added to tangible battlefields―land, sea, air, and space; air and space battlefields will merge and integrate to become a strategic high ground; 4) “Integrated joint operations” focused on the “System of systems confrontation” will become the basic operation format; 5) War progress, strike target, and means are accurately controlled, and “informationized local wars” will shift to low-risk, low-cost small- and medium-scale precision operations with high efficiency and high cost performance; and 6) Military intelligence is progressing and becoming increasingly prominent. This initiative was not original to the Xi Jinping leadership but was inherited from the Hu Jintao era.8910

The July 2019 “China’s National Defense in a New Era” (referred from here to as the “National Defense White Paper”) mentioned “intelligentized warfare” as the next-generation mode of warfare. The “National Defense White Paper” points to the “application of advanced scientific technologies in the military field―artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information [technology], big data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things (IoT)”―as the background to the emergence of “intelligentized warfare.”11

An NDU scholar defines “intelligentized warfare” as “integrated warfare waged in the land, sea, air, space, cyber, electromagnetic, and cognitive domains using intelligentized weaponry and equipment and their corresponding operational methods, based on IoT information systems.” The characteristics of intelligentized warfare include: 1) command and control through joint decision-making by humans and machines using AI, cloud control, among other technologies, 2) the building of weapons and equipment systems featuring unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and the realization of “swarm attack,” and 3) further integration and fusion of traditional and new-type security domains (e.g., cyber, electromagnetic, and space) as well as physical (land, sea, air, and space) and non-physical (e.g., cognitive, social, and cyber) security spaces, and the need to seize the initiative and control in confrontation operations in the cognitive space.1213

The war in Ukraine highlighted the active use of drones, the significance of cyber and electromagnetic space, and warfare in the cognitive domain. As mentioned above, these are all prioritized in the theories on “informationized local wars” and “intelligentized warfare. In this sense, the PLA appears to have had the validity of these military doctrines reaffirmed by the war in Ukraine. Indeed, commentaries in the PLA Daily’s Military Forum—believed to be written with Ukraine in mind—underline the importance of “informatization” and “intelligentization.”141516

As of this writing, however, the PLA has not yet designated “intelligentized warfare” as a new military doctrine to replace “informationized local wars.” Since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, PLA Daily commentaries has referred more frequently to “intelligentized warfare.” Yet, the phrase “informationized and intelligentized warfare” also appears often.17

(2) Operational Concepts – The “System of Systems Operation” Concept and the “Integrated Joint Operation” Concept

The basic operational forms in the “informationized local wars” doctrine are the “System of Systems Operation” concept and the “Integrated Joint Operation” concept.

“System of Systems Operation” is an operational concept developed based on the evolution of the US military’s C4ISR. It has succeeded and developed the concept of “System of systems war-fighting capability based on information systems” advocated by the Hu Jintao regime. Its main characteristics are: 1) simultaneous detection of battlefield conditions and real-time information sharing, 2) integration of all military services to conduct highly efficient operations, 3) coordination and synchronization of all military services to work together as a coherent unit, 4) viewing the enemy as a complete operational System of systems and identifying and striking its critical points to dismantle the enemy’s overall structure, 5) simultaneously achieving decentralization and concentration in operational command and control, and 6) consolidating various capabilities in support activities, such as information support and logistics support, to achieve accurate support systems.181920

The “Integrated Joint Operation” concept, also proposed during the Hu Jintao era, has been fully implemented under the Xi Jinping regime. This concept is defined as “operations that employ informatized weaponry, equipment, and operational methods based on networked information systems in order to achieve integrated coordination in land, sea, air, space, cyberspace, electromagnetic space, and the cognitive domain. It is a basic form of operation corresponding to informatized warfare.” As its operational philosophies, this concept emphasizes “information leading” (placing the highest priority on information dominance), “precision operations” (operations to achieve objectives in the shortest time and with the least effort involving a careful examination of space, time, goals, means, and effects) “key-point strike” (precision strikes that combine soft- and hard-kill methods to destroy or paralyze the enemy’s core operational System of systems), and “win by integrated operations” (integrating military, politics, economy, and diplomacy to achieve victory through a combination of various means in the land, sea, air, space, information, psychological, and cognitive domains). Based on the “Integrated Joint Operation” concept, the PLA expanded its operational domains beyond the traditional security domains of land, sea, and air to include the new-type security domains of space, cyberspace, electromagnetic space, deep sea, and the cognitive domain.21222324

The operational capabilities deemed necessary to realize these operational concepts are the “joint operation capabilities based on network information systems of systems” and “all domain operations capabilities,” both of which were introduced at the 19th National Congress of the CCP in October 2017. A PLA textbook defines “joint operation capabilities based on network information System of systems” as “a System of systems operation capability that uses network information System of systems as the link and backbone, and integrates operation capabilities required for joint operations, such as real-time sensing, highly efficient command and control, precision strikes, rapid maneuver, all-direction defense, and comprehensive safeguards, thereby doubling the effect.” The operations specified are integrated operations based on networks, cloud, and terminals; multidimensional and all-domain operations; and integrated information-firepower fusion operations. They are characterized by an emphasis on precision, stealth, unmanned operations, and gaining information dominance, and by achieving strategic objectives through short, decisive wars.25

Zhang Qian-il of the Academy of Military Science (AMS) defines “all-domain operational capabilities” as “the capability of an armed force to effectively launch hostilities against an enemy and to achieve deterrence and victory in war on domestic and foreign battlefields, or in the full range of space and security domains such as the land, the sea, the air, space, cyberspace, the electromagnetic spectrum, and the cognitive domain, as well as burgeoning domains such as the deep sea, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, and biological security, by layering effects in multiple domains, controlling new domains to gain the strategic initiative, and striving for comprehensive superiority through cross-domain integration.” Here again, the expansion of the PLA’s operational domains and the fusion of various domains are emphasized.26

The “System of Systems Operation” concept and the “Integrated Joint Operation” concept have continued to be maintained even after “intelligentized warfare” was proposed. Meanwhile, The Science of Military Strategy 2020, edited by NDU, introduces the “Multi-domain Integrated Joint Operations” concept, which underscores adaptation to “intelligentized warfare.” “Multi-domain integrated joint operations” are defined as “under unified command and with unified operational objectives, various operational forces, operational units, and operational elements are integrated into a seamlessly fused operational System of systems through a network information system. Highly coordinated, integrated, and interlinked operations are conducted in many domains, including land, sea, air, space, cyber, electromagnetic, and intelligence, in accordance with a unified plan.” It is considered to be an advanced stage of joint operations.2728

Zhao Xiaozhuo evaluated the Ukrainian military’s sinking of the Moskva missile cruiser, the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, as well as the attack on the Russian military’s temporary barracks using the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS), citing them as representing “System of systems operation capabilities” with excellent detection, surveillance, information transmission, command and control, and precision strike capabilities. The PLA Daily Military Forum commentaries, published after the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict, featuring future warfare, also highlight the significance of the “System of Systems Operation” concept and the “Integrated Joint Operation” concept.2930

(3) Force Management Policy: The Integration of Combat in the Physical, Information, and Cognitive Domains

The war in Ukraine has drawn attention to the importance of warfare in the cognitive domain, centered on information warfare and psychological warfare. The PLA is considered to have learned lessons from warfare in the cognitive domain in Ukraine. The PLA has traditionally accorded importance to warfare in the cognitive domain and has incorporated the “Three Warfares”―public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare―into its military operations. The PLA assumes that warfare in the cognitive domain is integrated with warfare in the physical domain (land, sea, air, and space) and the information domain (cyberspace and the information dimension). Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between the main elements and military forces in the physical, information, and cognitive domains of warfare.31323334

Fig. 1 The PLA’s Concept of Military Forces and Operational Domains

Warfare in the physical domain, a kinetic space, is the use of force accompanied by destructive activities on land, at sea, in the air, and in outer space. The primary forces used are mechanized forces (firepower + mobility), comprising traditional military assets (including missile forces) in the land, sea, and air, along with intelligentized forces, such as UAVs. Nonkinetic space can be divided into the information and the cognitive domains. In the information domain, the main activities include offense and defense over C4ISR capabilities and the creation and dissemination of information. The primary forces consist of informatized forces, such as information systems, cyberattacks, space assets, and electromagnetic operations, as well as intelligentized forces, including AI, UAVs, and quantum encryption technologies. In the cognitive domain, the activities are mainly the “Three Warfares,” and the primary forces are informatized forces, such as media, social media, and information control, along with intelligentized forces, including AI used to spread information.

The PLA is not willing to conduct warfare separately in each of the physical, information, and cognitive domains; it assumes integrating its operations across the three domains to maximize outcomes. The PLA seeks to combine mechanized, informatized, and intelligentized forces to inflict destruction and paralysis on the adversary in the physical and information domains. To maximize these effects, it aims to combine informatized and intelligentized forces, thereby overwhelming the adversary in the cognitive domain.

(4) The PLA’s Assessment of the US blitzkrieg in Venezuela

These military doctrines, operational concepts, and force management policy of the PLA are reflected in the PLA’s assessment of the US blitzkrieg in Venezuela. The February 2, 2026 issue of the PLA Daily published several commentaries analyzing recent examples of special operations, including the US blitzkrieg in Venezuela.35

A commentary by an AMS researcher points out that with the development of unmanned and intelligent technologies, special operations have evolved in terms of precision, intelligence, unmanned operations into the whole domain encompassing tangible (land, sea, air, and space) and intangible (electromagnetic waves, cyber, and cognitive domains) spaces; that prominent features of recent special operations are “System of systems support and victory by elite forces.” The commentary analyzes that the success or failure of special forces operations depends on the organic integration of information, command, firepower, and logistical support within the overall operational System of systems. The author highlighted the importance of cognitive warfare, arguing that by crafting precise narratives, steering the focus, and applying psychological pressure, tactical actions can be transformed into cognitive shock, thereby securing strategic initiative.

Another AMS scholar’s commentary points out that the mode of warfare is rapidly evolving toward intelligentization, and that special operations are “won by intelligence.” Specifically, it notes that new technologies―artificial intelligence, big data, and cloud computing―are demonstrating superiority and potential in such realms as battlefield situational awareness, operational command and control, and comprehensive logistical support, and that special operations now require a foundation consisting of “think tanks, cloud storage, and physical military arsenals.” The author argues that special operations concern not merely destruction in the physical realm but also involve strategic maneuvering in the information and cognitive realms.

A commentary by an NDU researcher noted that, given the length of the planning period, the large number of participating units, and the high operational requirements, the US blitzkrieg in Venezuela embodies many features of special operations conducted as part of a joint operation. The author enumerates its key characteristics as follows: 1) Establish a strategic posture and seize opportunities for advantageous operations; 2) Achieve one-sided battlefield transparency through intelligence dominance; 3) Neutralize power and communication networks by cyberattacks, and open pathways for penetration through coordinated electromagnetic and missile strikes; 4) Execute rapid attacks and withdrawals to ensure a three-dimensional assault and lightning-fast arrests.

(5) Summary

The war in Ukraine convinced the PLA that it was right about its existing military doctrines and operational concepts―the “informationized local war” theory; “System of Systems Operation” and “Integrated Joint Operation” concepts, serving as the theoretical basis of the theory; and “intelligentized warfare” considered as future warfare―and about the PLA’s force management policy of integrating combat in the physical, information, and cognitive domains. In this sense, it is unlikely that there will arise a situation similar to the Gulf War in January 1991, which shocked the PLA and drastically changed its military doctrines.36

Although the impact of the war in Ukraine on the PLA’s military doctrines and operational concepts was limited, this does not mean that the PLA has not learned any lessons from the war. The PLA is expected to reaffirm the validity of its current guiding policy and then be obliged to make necessary adjustments at the strategic, policy, and operational levels, based on the lessons learned from the war in Ukraine.37

3. China’s Security Perceptions Regarding Japan

(1) Military Balance Between China and the Japan-US Alliance

The “DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2025” (referred from here to as the “Defense White Paper”), published in August 2025, describes the security environment in the Indo-Pacific as follows: “Japan is facing the most severe and complex security environment since the end of World War II. Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has easily breached the very foundation of the rules that shape the international order. The possibility cannot be precluded that a similar serious situation may arise in the future in the Indo-Pacific region, especially in East Asia. Across the globe, historical changes in power balances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region, are occurring.” It presents the military balance situation as shown in Figure 2.38

Fig. 2 Main Military Forces Surrounding Japan (Approximate Strength)

Source: The Defense White Paper, p. 35.

In March 2026, the Japanese Ministry of Defense published a document titled “Status of Discussions on the Transformation of Defense Capabilities, etc.” This document included a comparison of the military strength of China and the Japan-US alliance in conjunction with the revision of the so-called “three strategic documents”: the “National Security Strategy,” the “National Defense Strategy,” and the “Defense Buildup Program.” According to the document, China has 1 million ground troops (Army + Naval infantry), 1,668 modern (fourth and fifth generation) fighter jets, three aircraft carriers, 94 modern destroyers and frigates, 55 modern submarines, and 219 bombers, while Japan has 130,000 ground troops, 330 modern fighter jets, no aircraft carrier, 51 modern destroyers and frigates, 22 modern submarines, and no bomber (Figure 3). The figure below includes the US military’s global strength: 620,000 ground troops (Army + Marine Corps), 2,204 modern fighter aircraft, 11 aircraft carriers, 111 cruisers and destroyers, 66 submarines, and 120 bombers.39

Fig. 3 The Security Situation Surrounding Japan

Source: “Status of Discussions on the Transformation of Defense Capabilities, etc. (March 10, 2026),” p. 13.

On the other hand, these forces analyses are no more than the comparison of various assets and do not take into account the C4ISR capabilities essential to operating those assets as a single System, which China emphasizes in association with “informationized local wars.” They do not reflect the capabilities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and AI, which are crucial forces in “intelligentized warfare.”

(2) Strengthening Deterrence Against China as Proposed by the “2022 Strategic Three Documents”

In December 2022, Japan published the so-called “three strategic documents”—the “National Security Strategy,” the “National Defense Strategy,” and the “Defense Buildup Program”—for the first time since 2013. Of these, the “2022 National Security Strategy” explicitly states that “China’s external stance and military trends are a matter of serious concern for Japan and the international community, and represent the greatest strategic challenge to date in ensuring Japan’s peace and security, the peace and stability of the international community, and strengthening the international order based on the rule of law. This should be addressed through Japan’s overall national strength and cooperation with allies and like-minded nations.”40

Based on this understanding of China, the “National Defense Strategy 2022” outlined the following three approaches to Japan’s defense policy. The first approach called for a fundamental strengthening of Japan’s own defense capabilities. Specifically, it called for strengthening “stand-off defense capabilities,” “integrated air and missile defense capabilities,” “unmanned asset defense capabilities,” “cross-domain operational capabilities,” and “command and control and information-related functions.” The second approach called for further strengthening of the Japan-US alliance. Specific items pointed out included “strengthening joint Japan-US deterrence and response capabilities,” “strengthening alliance coordination functions,” “strengthening the joint response base,” and “initiatives to support the presence of US forces in Japan.” The third approach called for cooperation with like-minded countries based on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Concept (FOIP). This explicitly stated the active promotion of multifaceted, multilayered defense cooperation and exchanges with many countries, including Australia, India, European countries, South Korea, and ASEAN countries. The “2022 Defense Buildup Program,” based on the “National Defense Strategy,” specifies future defense spending, equipment for the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces, and policy measures to strengthen C4ISR.414243

(3) The PLA’s Strengthening Wariness Toward Japan

In December 2022, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Tan Kefei alleged that Japan’s three strategic documents intentionally exaggerated the threat from China, stating, “We firmly oppose this move.” He criticized that “Japan has seriously violated the peace constitution and the ‘defense only’ policy in recent years, using so-called ‘external threats’ to significantly increase defense spending, strengthen military technology research and development in space, missile defense, hypersonic weapons, and other fields, deepen US.-Japan military cooperation, seek to develop so-called ‘counterattack capabilities,’ advocate ‘nuclear sharing’ with the US., and form targeted ‘small circles’ behind other countries, which have become real ‘challenges’ to regional peace, security, and stability.” He also added that “When Japan launched its war of aggression against China, it brought deep disaster to the Chinese people, including compatriots in Taiwan… There is no room for Japan to intervene on the Taiwan issue; what Japan should do is remember history, reflect on its crimes, keep its promises, and act with caution.”44

Since then, the PLA Daily has repeatedly expressed its wariness toward and criticism of Japan’s security policy measures set forth in the three strategic documents. This criticism targeted almost the entire gamut of Japan’s security policies.45

The March 30, 2023, PLA Daily editorial criticized Japan’s establishment of a joint command, and condemned its defense of the Southwest Islands, the deployment of surface-to-ship missiles, the modification of the destroyer “Izumo,” and efforts to further develop hypersonic and ballistic missile technology. The April 20 issue of the PLA Daily criticized the Japanese government’s Official Security Assistance (OSA) as military aid to countries Japan recognizes as “like-minded nations,” seriously harmful to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. The May 8th issue of the PLA Daily criticized trilateral security cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea, stating that it would “lead to the formation of blocs and conflict lines among regional countries, dealing a serious blow to the regional security situation.” Some of those criticisms entangle Japan’s security policy with historical issues, arguing that “Japan’s new militaristic move has not only instilled fear and anxiety in the Japanese people, but has also increased wariness and concern about Japan’s future direction among neighboring Asian countries and the international community.”46474849

In November 2025, during the House of Representatives Budget Committee Q&A session, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated regarding a Taiwan contingency, “If it involves the use of force, it could undoubtedly be deemed a survival-threatening situation.” Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks did not deviate from the successive Japanese governments’ long-standing position.5051

However, China backlashed against Takaichi’s remarks. At a press conference on November 10, 2025, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs criticized Takaichi’s remarks, stating, “The Japanese leader recently made erroneous remarks related to Taiwan in the Diet, implying the possibility of military intervention in the Taiwan Strait and gross interference in China’s internal affairs, which seriously violates the one-China principle, the spirit of the four political documents between China and Japan, and the basic norms governing international relations.” On November 14, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of National Defense echoed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ statement regarding Takaichi’s remarks, stating, “The remarks have challenged the post-war international order, and sent very wrong signals to the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces. Such words are egregious in nature and have caused very negative impact. They are extremely irresponsible and dangerous.” The spokesperson added, “Should the Japanese side fail to draw lessons from history and dare to take a risk, or even use force to interfere in the Taiwan question, it will only suffer a complete failure before the steel-willed PLA and pay a heavy price.” He regarded Takaichi’s remarks as a challenge to the post-war international order and criticized Japan for not reflecting on historical issues. Following this, China intensified its criticism of Japan. The PLA Daily also began to carry more critical commentaries against Japan than before.525354

Against this backdrop, at a press conference on December 26, 2025, a spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated, “China will work together with all peace-loving countries to resolutely curb any dangerous acts that revive militarism and shape a ‘new type of militarism,’ and jointly safeguard the achievements of World War II’s victory.” Thus, China launched criticism of Japan, employing the phrase “new type of militarism.” On February 28, 2026, a spokesperson for the Ministry of National Defense also stated at a press conference, “The international community should remain highly vigilant and resolutely resist Japan’s ‘new type of militarism’ recklessness, joining hands to defend the achievements of World War II victory and the postwar international order.”5556

It has been pointed out that the phrase ‘new type of militarism’ serves as a conceptual tool for China to reframe and unify Japan’s historical revisionism, crisis narratives, military expansion, and engagement with Taiwan into a single systemic trend. However, as mentioned above, since Japan released the three strategic documents in December 2022, the PLA has consistently criticized almost all of Japan’s security policies, linking such criticism to historical issues. Given these facts, it can be said that the PLA is not necessarily using this phrase simply as a criticism of Takaichi’s statement, but rather as a culmination of its previous wariness and criticism toward Japan.57

4. Conclusion

The war in Ukraine highlighted the active use of drones, the significance of cyber and electromagnetic space, and warfare in the cognitive domain. The war testified to the validity of the military doctrines that the PLA has pursued since around 2014: “informationized local wars” and “intelligentized warfare,” which it will continue to develop in anticipation of future conflict. The PLA also confirmed the validity of its “System of Systems Operation” and “Integrated Joint Operation” concepts, which are considered fundamental operational modes in the theory of “informationized local wars.” The PLA concluded that its force management policy, which integrates warfare across physical (land, sea, air, and space), information (cyberspace and the information dimension), and cognitive domains, is appropriate. In this sense, it is unlikely that the PLA will encounter the kind of drastic changes in military doctrines seen following the Gulf War.

China, based on these military doctrines, operational concepts, and force management policy, has leveraged its abundant funds and superior technological capabilities to develop its military force. As a result, many estimate that historical shifts in the balance of power are taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.

Against the backdrop of these power shifts, the Japanese government is currently pursuing its security policy in line with the three strategic documents formulated in December 2022. These documents position China as the “greatest strategic challenge” and stipulate that Japan should address these developments through (1) a fundamental strengthening of its defense capabilities, (2) further strengthening of the Japan-US alliance, and (3) cooperation with like-minded nations based on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept.

In response, the PLA has denied and criticized almost all of the security policy measures set forth in the three strategic documents. Some of China’s criticisms entangle Japan’s security policy with historical issues.

Prime Minister Takaichi’s November 2025 remarks regarding a Taiwan contingency did not deviate from the successive governments’ long-standing stance. Nevertheless, these remarks triggered a sharp backlash from China. Since January 2026, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has enhanced its criticism of Japan, using the phrase “new type of militarism.” Since February 2026, the PLA has also launched criticisms of Japan by using the same phrase. It is important to note that for the PLA, this phrase serves a dual purpose: first, as a criticism of Takaichi’s remarks; second, as the culmination of a growing trend of wariness and criticism against Japan.

China’s burgeoning military power will remain the greatest strategic challenge for Japan. To address such an expansionist China, Japan must continue to closely monitor how China will further deepen its military doctrines, operational concepts, and force management policy; what specific military capabilities it will strengthen based on these; and how it will deploy those capabilities.

(Yasuyuki Sugiura, Chief, Asia and Africa Division, Department of Area Studies, NIDS)

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