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Can Japan-China Relations Be Normalized?
―Japan’s Strategy Under Structural Constraints

Introduction

This paper discusses the question, “Is there a tangible path to normalization of Japan-China relations?” given the current state of bilateral relations. To state the conclusion upfront, “normalization” in the traditional sense—that is, the restoration of Japan-China relations where political, economic, and people-to-people exchanges are stably maintained and expanded—is extremely difficult, at least in the immediate term.

The reason is that the current deterioration of Japan-China relations is not merely a temporary friction but stems from a structural phenomenon resulting from a combination of China’s strategy toward the United States, domestic politics, the Taiwan issue, and Japan’s policy constraints. Consequently, Japan is required not to expect too many improvements in the bilateral relations, but to reshape a realistic strategy toward China, on the assumption that any swift improvement is not in sight.

The following will first examine the current state of Japan-China relations, clarify its characteristics, consider the factors on the Chinese and Japanese sides that have brought about the present situation, and lastly discuss the conditions for improvement and Japan’s options.

1. Current State and Characteristics of Japan-China Relations: A Complex State of Tension

Current Japan-China relations have explicitly entered a deteriorating phase, triggered by Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks at a Diet session in November 2025 regarding an existential threat to Japan. The Chinese government appears to view her remarks not as a temporary statement but in the context of Japan’s recent security policy, pro-Taiwan stance, and strengthening alliance with the United States. China tends to assess Japan’s individual policy measures not in the domestic and legal contexts but in a broader historical and security narrative.

In this thinking, China is concurrently enhancing suppression of people-to-people exchanges, economic pressure, and security demonstrations; China’s pressure is mounting on Japan across multiple areas. In short, current Japan-China relations are not a stand-alone issue but a “complex state of tension” accompanied by multiple frictions that interact with one another.

The first problem is stagnation in people-to-people exchanges. In recent years, we have witnessed an asymmetry in people-to-people exchanges between Japan and China, with the number of Chinese visitors to Japan significantly exceeding that of Japanese visitors to China. However, since November of last year, measures taken by the Chinese government have effectively halted group tours to Japan, leading to a slowdown of private and local exchanges. People-to-people exchanges have traditionally helped uphold bilateral relations even during periods of political instability. Currently, however, they are treated as political signals, and their reduction is leading to fixing mutual distrust.

The second problem is China’s economic-security linkage strategy. Economic intimidation through rare earth elements, dual-use materials, and the entity list system is becoming imminent. Japan-China economic relations, once described as “politically cold, economically warm,” can no longer be considered a stabilizing factor. China is employing economic measures as a security tool, creating an “upending” situation in which high dependence on China directly increases vulnerability. As a result, economic relations with China are simultaneously a foundation of stability and a source of risk.

The third problem is the normalization of security tensions. Beijing’s moves aimed at changing the status quo around the Senkaku Islands and the Taiwan Strait do not cause temporary frictions but constitute part of a continuous strategic action. The Taiwan issue, in particular, is an emblematic issue for China. It connects domestic governance with external legitimacy; Japan’s moves are frequently interpreted in that context.

Fourthly, there is a conflict of perception/narrative between Japan and China. China tends to construe Japan’s actions with such a stock phrase as a “challenge to the postwar order” and a “revival of militarism,” while Japan tends to perceive China’s actions as economic coercion and cognitive warfare. This conflict in mutual perceptions is hard to resolve only by strengthening bilateral exchanges or adjusting individual policy measures.

As such, current Japan-China relations are in a complex state of tension characterized by a stagnation in exchanges, the use of economic power for security purposes, security tensions, and differences in perception—all of which are intertwined.

2. Factors Contributing to the Current Situation—Structural Problems of the Chinese Side

In considering the current deterioration of Japan-China relations, we must note that, due to the relative decline in Japan’s national power and changes in the international environment, China’s policy toward Japan is no longer focused on the bilateral relationship itself. For China, the central axis of its foreign policy is practically its relationship with the United States; it regards Japan, which heavily depends on the alliance with the United States, as a dependent variable within its foreign policy framework. China believes that if it adjusts its foreign policy toward the United States, Japan will follow suit.

In China’s foreign policy outlook, the United States represents a principal contradiction in the long term and an entity with which to maintain tactical stability in the short term. China’s other foreign relations are evaluated in this overriding context. Therefore, its relations with Japan tend to be primarily considered in relation to the US-China strategic framework (struggle and stability), the situation in the Taiwan Strait, and the dynamics of the US-Japan alliance. For China, relations with Japan are not viewed as an independent strategic issue but rather as a component of its broader strategy toward the United States.

What is noteworthy next are reasons attributable to China’s domestic politics. Amid the emergence of structural challenges—such as the turmoil following the lifting of COVID-19 restrictions, the recent economic slowdown, the real estate slump, growing job insecurity, and the deteriorating finances of local governments—the Chinese Communist Party finds itself compelled to bolster the legitimacy of its rule. Under these circumstances, patriotism is being stoked, and at the heart of this lies the historical interpretation of China’s victory in the War of Resistance against Japan. As seen in the series of campaigns marking the 80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan last year, this victory is positioned at the core of a political narrative that portrays the CPC as the savior of the nation and the driving force behind its rebirth.

At this year’s National People’s Congress, Foreign Minister Wang Yi referred to the Tokyo Trials as “another 80th anniversary,” suggesting that China might use this event as part of its efforts to exert further pressure on Japan regarding the postwar order.

Furthermore, the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” is positioned as an extension of this narrative of legitimacy, within which the reunification of Taiwan is a top priority. In this context, Japan is viewed not only as an adversary in historical disputes but also as a major obstacle to China regarding the Taiwan issue, both now and in the future. China’s distrust of the Takaichi administration is not unrelated to the fact that the administration’s conservative leanings, pro-Taiwan stance, and statements on security matters can readily be linked to this existing narrative.

Additionally, China has recently been utilizing economic measures as institutionalized policy tools. Export controls on strategic goods, the use of various entity lists, and creating uncertainty regarding access to the Chinese market are not merely temporary retaliatory measures, but rather serve as means to impose costs on the opponents and encourage their self-restraint or policy changes.

Viewed in this light, the current deterioration in Japan-China relations is not the result of isolated diplomatic frictions but rather a structural outcome arising from the strategic interplay of various factors, including China’s strategy toward the United States, the need to maintain domestic legitimacy, the Taiwan issue, and economic considerations. These factors are not independent of one another; rather, they reinforce each other and shape the direction of China’s policy toward Japan.

3. Circumstances on the Japanese Side

That said, the deterioration of Japan-China relations cannot be explained solely by China’s structural issues. The strategy design on how to handle relations with China, prepared at the inauguration of the Takaichi administration, failed to work well in devising a subsequent response to China.

First, it is important to note that the Takaichi administration did not wish to see Japan-China relations deteriorate completely. The fact that Prime Minister Takaichi refrained from visiting the Yasukuni Shrine and referred to a “strategic partnership” with China in her policy address suggests that she had no intention of severing ties with China. Yet the real question is whether her behavior demonstrated sufficient strategic consistency in terms of how such a message would be received by the Chinese side, the extent to which a backlash could be anticipated, and how the situation would be managed.

In relations with China, even when Japan acts in good faith or provides explanations reasonable from the perspective of the Japanese public, these are not necessarily perceived as such. Particularly regarding the Taiwan issue, although the Japanese government responds based on the context of Japan’s legal system and policies, the Chinese side harbors suspicions that “Japan is attempting to intervene in the event of a crisis in Taiwan,” creating a significant gap between the two sides. Even if the Japanese side believes it is providing a reasonable explanation, the Chinese side may not perceive it that way. This difference in perception is not accidental; it is a structural issue stemming from differing underlying assumptions that form the basis of mutual understanding and judgment. Unless this point is given due consideration, it will be difficult to manage bilateral relations appropriately.

On the other hand, the environment surrounding Japan-China relations is vastly different from the past, and even if some disputes were to arise, Japan’s political leeway to accommodate China’s demands is limited. China is strongly demanding that the Prime Minister withdraw her remarks, but due to restrictions from domestic politics, alliance relations, and public opinion, this is no easy task. In particular, given that China’s series of pressure tactics is further stoking anti-Chinese sentiment, there is little room for the Japanese government to make concessions to China’s short-term pressure.

Thus, constraints on the Japanese side are not merely a matter of response but are associated with structural factors that define the very scope of policy options.

4. Conditions and Limitations for Improving Japan-China Relations

Given the above, the short-term outlook for Japan-China relations is not encouraging. But this does not mean that practical dialogue and contact between the two countries will vanish at all, but that normalization in the manner of stably improving overall Japan-China relations will be hard.

On close examination of past examples of external pressure exerted by China, the paths to improving relations with it can be roughly categorized into three. The first is when the other country accepts China’s demands to a certain extent. Examples include Japan under the Democratic Party of Japan regarding the Senkaku Islands issue and South Korea after the deployment of THAAD. Secondly, China eased pressure due to its own economic and diplomatic needs. An example is China’s easing of coal import restrictions from Australia amid a worsening power shortage. Thirdly, a change of government or political shift in the other country provided opportunities for China to build new relations. Examples include a change of government in Australia and a change of prime minister in Canada.

The first scenario does not apply to Japan. It is unlikely that Prime Minister Takaichi will withdraw her remarks regarding a survival-threatening situation, as China demands. While working-level contacts between the two countries may continue in the run-up to the APEC Summit to be held in Shenzhen this November, we cannot expect to see any significant improvement in the bilateral relations. The second scenario is possible, but it would likely result only in a partial easing of pressure caused by the deterioration of the Chinese economy, falling short of a full normalization. The third scenario also seems unlikely in the short term, given that the Takaichi administration—having won the general election and possessing a stable power base—is aiming for a long-term tenure.

Meanwhile, developments in US-China relations are of critical importance. Several summit meetings are scheduled for this year. As suggested during President Trump’s visit to China in mid-May, if the two countries seek stability for the time being and begin moving toward some kind of agreement, Japan will find itself in a difficult position. A US-China rapprochement does not necessarily lead to an immediate improvement in Japan-China relations. Rather, the United States is likely to press Japan to improve its relations with China, which could result in Japan falling lower on Beijing’s list of priorities.

In recent years, China has adopted a relatively flexible stance toward Europe, Australia, South Korea, and Canada. However, Japan cannot expect the same treatment from Beijing. For China, Japan is a special case involving issues that touch on China’s national interests, such as historical disputes, the Taiwan issue, and the Japan-US alliance. Therefore, it would be overly optimistic to expect that China’s so-called “smile diplomacy” toward other countries will help improve Japan-China relations.

Given the above, it is unlikely that Japan-China relations will normalize in the near future. This is because the tensions in the bilateral relations are not merely temporary friction, but are rooted in structural constraints that cannot be resolved in the short term. Improvements in Japan-China relations will not be achieved through specific diplomatic efforts or temporary political considerations, but will instead be largely determined by changes in the long-term strategic environment.

Therefore, what is important is not to succumb to pessimism, but to face the reality that improvement cannot be achieved overnight. If Japan pursues short-term improvements in bilateral relations without this understanding, it risks undermining policy consistency and leading to strategic miscalculations. Rather, it is precisely by acknowledging this harsh reality that Japan can reject the empty rhetoric of friendship and oversimplified narratives of confrontation, and rebuild a realistic strategy toward China, maintaining strategic options at its disposal.

5. Japan’s Choice

How should Japan address the present impasse? To state the conclusion first, what is required of Japan in reconstructing its strategy toward China is to abandon emotional arguments and adopt a thorough risk management approach.

First, Japan should separate its relations with China from emotional debates. Excessive expectations or excessive resentment toward China will lead to misguided policy decisions. After calmly assessing China’s principles of action and long-term goals, Japan must clearly distinguish between the positions it must uphold and the areas where there is room for adjustment. From the perspective of not giving China undue cause for complaint, Japan should not seek to avoid confrontation entirely, but rather work to minimize friction.

Second, from the perspective of economic security, Japan must rigorously manage its vulnerabilities related to China. While completely severing economic ties with China is unrealistic, it is necessary to identify vulnerable areas and take measures such as diversifying suppliers and export markets, restructuring supply chains, and safeguarding critical technologies. In particular, regarding strategic materials—including rare earths—it is essential to prepare for the possibility of supply disruptions. The key is not to seek economic decoupling from China but to adopt a “derisking” approach to avoid excessive dependence on China.

It is also necessary to consider the fact that China depends on Japan for the supply of certain electronic components and raw materials. While Japan should be cautious about using its economic power as a means of exerting external pressure, the fact that it possesses such an option is strategically significant.

Third, Japan should strengthen its coordination capabilities within the Japan-US alliance and in multilateral cooperation. Given that China views its relationship with Japan as a variable in its relations with the United States, Japan must position its policy toward China within the broader strategic context. To prevent Japan’s stance from becoming ambiguous as US-China negotiations proceed, Japan must, as a US ally, clearly articulate its own interests and concerns to the United States, and strengthen cooperation with Europe, India, Australia, South Korea, and ASEAN to build a multi-layered diplomatic network.

Fourth, Japan needs to develop its own narrative. Given that China frames its policy toward Japan within a broader historical context, Japan must also consistently articulate the principles it must uphold, such as territorial integrity, peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region, democracy, and the rule of law.

In sum, what Japan needs is a strategy of “thorough risk management toward China, free from emotional arguments.” The key to this strategy is to control friction, manage dependence on China, and distinguish areas where bilateral cooperation is necessary. It is also necessary to clearly assert what should be asserted based on national interests while maintaining long-term options.

Conclusion

In response to the question of whether there is a concrete path toward the normalization of Japan-China relations, this paper has argued that, at least in the short term, normalization in the traditional sense is extremely difficult. The author has reached this conclusion due to the interplay of various structural factors, including China’s strategy toward the United States, its pursuit of legitimacy, the Taiwan issue, and Japan’s own policy constraints.

Therefore, it is crucial to move away from a mindset premised on “improvement” and instead formulate strategies based on the reality that immediate improvement is difficult to achieve. In doing so, Japan must avoid both the optimism that “dialogue will inevitably lead to improvement” and the pessimism that “if improvement is not expected, then control and management are unnecessary.” What is needed is strategic thinking that squarely confronts the reality that improvement is not easy. In other words, based on the premise that improvement is not easy, decisions must be made regarding how to utilize the time created by the current diplomatic vacuum, how to manage crises, and how to reconstruct Japan’s strategy toward China. This is the fundamental challenge that will determine the success or failure of Japan’s future policy toward China.

(Hideo Tarumi, Former Japanese Ambassador to China)

(Translation by Tsutomu Inuzuka)

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