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The Denuclearization of North Korea and the Restoration of
Peace in the Korean Peninsula

— Correct Perceptions and Eight Proposals on Japan's North Korea Diplomacy—

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I. An Assessment of the US-North Korea Summit

(Agreement on a large framework)

There are varied assessments of the June 12, 2018 US-North Korea Summit and of the Joint Statement (“Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit”) derived from the Summit. The most predominant views are that the Summit and the Joint Statement fell short of expectations that the US and North Korean leaders could reach some concrete agreement on the denuclearization of North Korea, and that CVID (complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization) might be referred to in the text of the Statement. As for the most focal issue of North Korea’s denuclearization, the Summit barely included a short statement, “Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” The Joint Statement maintains complete silence about the definition of “denuclearization,” a possible road map, or a specific timeline.

Although the Joint Statement does not include any reference to concrete procedures for North Korea’s denuclearization, its significance lies in the fact that the document specifies a large framework for the US-North Korea deal. The Joint Statement draws attention to its four commitment clauses.* However, the most important part of the document is the statement in a preceding paragraph, “President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” This represents a scheme of trading “security guarantees” with “complete denuclearization.” Also important is that the Joint Statement specifies the continuation of negotiations to implement the outcome of the bilateral Summit.

*Four Clauses of the US-North Korea Joint Statement

1. The United States and the DPRK commit to establish new US-DPRK relations in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity.
2. The United States and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula.
3. Reaffirming the April 27, 2018 Panmunjom Declaration, the DPRK commits to work toward

complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

4. The United States and the DPRK commit to recovering POW/MIA remains, including the immediate repatriation of those already identified.”

The Singapore Summit was unprecedented and historic in the sense that the leaders of the two states met for the first time and signed a joint statement. The United States and North Korea concluded some agreements in the past --- the Geneva Agreement in October 1994 and the “Leap Day” Agreement in February 2012. Unfortunately, however, since those agreements lacked the commitments of the state heads of the two nations, the contents of the agreements were not implemented. Considering these past experiences, it is of a special significance that the US and North Korean leaders signed the Joint Statement in Singapore --- particularly that the North Korean supreme leader himself signed the document.

(Time-consuming denuclearization process)

The Joint Statement suggests the trading of “complete denuclearization” with “security guarantees,” but includes no reference to any specific procedures to achieve the goal. However, if, as reported by the June 13 issue of “The Rodong Sinmun,” the United States and North Korea shared the recognition of the importance of abiding by the principle of step-by-step and simultaneous action, the future process of denuclearization would span long periods of time. It is largely up to relevant political leaders including President Trump to judge the completion of North Korea’s denuclearization. There is much likelihood that the Trump administration will be driven by a US domestic political timetable into declaring the achievement of denuclearization with a certain progress in a certain period of time. Secretary of State Pompeo said the denuclearization of North Korea would be completed by January 2021 --- the end of the first term of the Trump administration ---, and that the denuclearization would be followed by a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula --- a US-North Korea peace treaty or the normalization of diplomatic relations between the two nations.*

*Secretary of State Pompeo’s press statement of September 19, 2018

The third paragraph of the Joint Statement reads: “(the two leaders recognize) that mutual confidence building can promote the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.” In other words, both sides share a common recognition that the realization of the Peninsula’s denuclearization

would be difficult without confidence-building between the United States and North Korea.

(Security guarantees and peace regime)

The two leaders share the awareness that they have made “a new start” at the June 12 Summit, but there is a discrepancy in recognition between them about how to proceed with the future process. For the international community including the United States, the issue of North Korean denuclearization is the focal point of the process. For North Korea, on the other hand, the primary issue is peacebuilding in the Korean Peninsula inclusive of security guarantees.

Concrete measures for North Korean “security guarantees” may be discussed in three different dimensions --- a political guarantee, a military guarantee, and an economic guarantee. Principal measures under each of the three categories may be summed up as below.* In the future process of North Korea’s denuclearization, these measures will be implemented along with the denuclearization efforts of North Korea. When “security guarantees” are realized, the “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” will also be completed --- North Korea seems to envisage such a development of events as the establishment of a “peace regime” in the Korean Peninsula.

*North Korean Security Guarantees, according to the categorization by Moon Chung-in, South Korean Special Advisor on Unification, Diplomacy and National Security Affairs

Political guarantee:

Normalization of the US-North Korea relations (Step-by-step measures from the creation of a liaison office to the establishment of diplomatic ties) / Step-by-step multilateral measures from a declaration of ending the Korean War to a peace treaty

Military guarantee:

Suspension of US-ROK joint military drills / Non-deployment of strategic weapons around the Korean Peninsula / a US-North Korea non-aggression agreement / a downward review of the USFK presence

Economic guarantee:

Relaxation and cancellation of economic sanctions (both United Nations Security Council resolution sanctions and member states’ independent sanctions) / Economic cooperation and support by foreign countries / North Korea’s admission to international organizations (IMF, World Bank, etc.) and relevant support to that end

(The Joint Statement and the Panmunjom Declaration --- an inseparable set)

In the process of implementation of the Joint Statement, the Panmunjom Declaration signed by the two Korean leaders on April 27, 2018 is to also be implemented. We can learn this from the fact that the US-North Korea Joint Statement refers to the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula by reaffirming the Panmunjom Declaration.

The content of the Panmunjom Declaration consists of the following three pillars.*

- (1) Promote common prosperity and reunification of Korea through dramatic improvement and development of inter-Korean relations.
- (2) Elimination of military tension and substantial elimination of war risk.
- (3) Establishing a permanent, solid peace regime for the Korean Peninsula.

Particularly, the third pillar, or the building of a permanent, solid peace regime, encompasses gradual disarmament, a declaration of ending the Korean War, and a peace treaty --- the most vital topics related to the North Korean relations with South Korea and the United States.

*Three Pillars of the Panmunjom Declaration

- (1) Promote common prosperity and reunification of Korea through dramatic improvement and development of inter-Korean relations.

1) Implement all existing agreements and declarations adopted between the two sides thus far. 2) Hold dialogue and negotiations in various fields including at high level, and take practical measures for the implementation of the agreements reached at the inter-Korean summit. 3) Establish a joint liaison office in the Gaeseong region. 4) Encourage more active cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts at all levels. 5) Resolve the humanitarian issues that resulted from the division of the country, and to solve various issues including the reunification of separated families. 6) Implement the projects previously agreed to in the October 4 Declaration (issued from the 2007 inter-Korean summit), in order to promote balanced economic growth and co-prosperity of the nation.

- (2) Elimination of military tension and substantial elimination of war risk

1) Transform the DMZ into a peace zone. 2) Devise a practical plan to turn the areas around the Northern Limit Line in the West Sea into a maritime peace zone. 3) Ensure active mutual cooperation, exchanges, visits and contacts, and hold frequent meetings between military authorities.

- (3) Establishing a permanent Korean Peninsula peace regime

1) Reaffirm the Non-Aggression Agreement. 2) Carry out disarmament in a phased manner, as military tension is reduced and substantial progress is made in military confidence-building. 3) Pursue during the year 2018 trilateral meetings or quadrilateral meetings with a view to declaring an end to the Korean War, turning the Korean Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty, and establishing a permanent and solid peace regime. 4) Confirm the common goal of realizing, through complete denuclearization, a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula.

The Pyongyang Declaration issued on September 19, 2018 after the third 2018 North-South Korea Summit went further than the Panmunjom Declaration. President Trump made favorable remarks on it.

(Japan's Response 1 – Engage in North Korean security guarantees to solve the denuclearization issue by diplomacy)

The meaning of “complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” has yet to be defined. The states concerned share a recognition that it would take North Korea a considerable length of time to dismantle its nuclear program. The current process, if destroyed prematurely without reaching the goal, would bring about the danger of allowing North Korea to make their possession of nuclear weapons an accomplished fact. The longer time elapses without completing the North Korean denuclearization, the more danger we will face of eventually neighboring with a nuke-armed North Korea, never being free from the main source of our security anxiety. Above all, it is necessary to immediately take actions for denuclearization against North Korea's nuclear developments past and present.

It is difficult to realize the denuclearization of North Korea by means of sanctions and pressure alone; it could not be realized unless combined with North Korea's security guarantees. Japan should actively engage in North Korea's security guarantees depending on its behavior, and seek the solution of the problem through diplomacy. We will have to collaborate not only with the United States but also with South Korea, China, Russia, etc., and pursue diplomatic efforts, foreseeing a direct dialogue with North Korea.

II. From the Viewpoint of Japan's National Security

(Keep watch over North Korea's further actions)

The denuclearization of North Korea should be discussed from the viewpoint that it is one of the

most urgent issues concerning Japan's national security.

Many people point out the ambiguity of the June 12 Joint Statement. However, the largest problem is that the leaders of the United States and North Korea came up with an agreement which represents a substantial regression from the previous agreements. Noteworthy is the fact that the agreement was reached after North Korea's declaration of her "completion of nuclear power." A few years after a North-South leaders talks in 2000, North Korea declared her withdrawal from the NPT; and in the year following the Six-Party Talks in 2005, North Korea conducted its first nuclear test. Such painful experiences in the past lead us to keep a closer watch over North Korea's future actions.

(The importance of the USFK)

What is of utmost importance in relation to the Japan-US alliance and with the regional security structure is the USFK (United States Forces Korea) issue. It is quite clear that the mission of the USFK is to serve as deterrence against North Korea. We should note two things in this context. First, the USFK is the only US military presence in the continental Asia, and it has a major impact on the balance of power in East Asia as a whole. Second, the Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea extends its coverage to the Pacific area and is not confined to the Korean Peninsula. This is why Japan's awareness about the importance of the USFK military is serious.

In this sense, Japan's recognition that "the security of South Korea is vital for the safety of Japan itself" in Article 4 of the Japan-US Joint Statement between Prime minister Sato and President Nixon dated November 1969, and Japan-US bilateral recognition that "the security of South Korea is critical for maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula and the maintenance of peace on the Korean Peninsula is essential to the peace of Asia including Japan" in Article 3 of the Joint Announcement to the press issued from the Miki-Ford talks in August 1975, are all still valid today.

(Japan's Response 2 - Address the changing security environment of the Korean Peninsula and transition to a peace regime)

In addition to paying attention to North Korea's denuclearization process, Japan should focus more than ever its concern on the process of establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. If the state of armistice from the Korean War comes to an end and a peace treaty

is concluded to replace the present Armistice Agreement, the current order in the Korean Peninsula lasting for 65 years will shift to a new one. Although this is basically a desirable move, we will face yet another question of addressing the state of instability and uncertainty accompanying an orderly transition period. Furthermore, turning the Korean Armistice Agreement into a peace treaty would entail a complex process of coordinating interests involving South and North Korea, the United States and China. There is a possibility that during the transition period, international politics in Northeast Asia will be characterized by tension.

To safeguard its security, Japan should prepare for the following three developments:

First, if the military tension in the Korean Peninsula is reduced in the mid- to long-term, the United States and South Korea will eventually have to consider a downward review of the USFK's quantitative and qualitative presence. The downsizing of the USFK presence might not only entail the instability of the regional situation but an increase in Japan's security expenses.

Second, the conclusion of a peace treaty between South and North Korea is highly likely to result in the dismantlement of the United Nations Command (UNC), which oversees the implementation of the Armistice Agreement. In that case, the role and raison d'être of the seven UN-designated bases in Japan, including UNC-Rear at Yokota Air Base, will undergo a review.

Third, a transformation of the ROK-US Combined Defense System will take place along with the above. The latter half of 2000s witnessed full-scale preparations for transferring OPCON (wartime operational control) of the Korean army to the Korean side. Once the OPCON transfer has been realized, the chain of command of the US and South Korean armies will alter a great deal, and the ROK-US Combined Forces Command will likely be dissolved as parts of reform efforts.

These three changes can be said to represent a major transformation of the security mechanism in Northeast Asia which has been in existence for nearly 70 years. The transformation will call for a full review of Japan's security policy. In addition, if a Korean Peninsula peace regime has the possibility of becoming a reality, Japan will be asked a difficult question on how to help build the regime or, in other words, what contribution it

will make toward peace on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia. It is time that Japan should prepare her answer to this question and be ready for action at any time.

(Continuance of deterrence and sanctions)

At the China-North Korea summit held in May 2018, Chairman Kim Jong-un said that if hostile policies toward North Korea and threats to its security are dropped, there will be no need for North Korea to retain nuclear weapons and that North Korea wishes that the countries concerned should take step-to-step and concurrent measures. It is unimaginable that North Korea will accept the denuclearization unconditionally; nonetheless, it is necessary to carefully and patiently observe whether these remarks of Kim Jong-un suggest a fundamental change in North Korea's position. Japan should continue to maintain pressure through deterrence and sanctions, without loosening her basic policy.

If North Korea had really "completed" its nuclear force and furnished itself with ICBMs, the time left for us to respond to a potential crisis would be extremely limited. And we cannot be optimistic about the possibility of a short-time solution to the North Korean nuclear problem. Japan, the United States and the international community will have to fight a "cold war" with North Korea over a long period of time. Effective sanctions of a kind should be implemented that would make North Korea aware that nuclear weapons will not guarantee its existence. Japan should prepare her own contingency plan to address contingencies in the Korean Peninsula, which should be construed as part of deterrence efforts in the sense that it represents Japan resolution.

(Japan's Response 3 - Strengthen the Japan-US alliance and the US extended deterrence)

The most fundamental point in this context is to strengthen the Japan-US alliance. Then following three points should be taken into consideration.

First, policy coordination between the United States and Japan is a must. In other words, some input from Japan will be essential to help the United States to formulate a proper North Korea policy. There was an increase in an almost excessive expectation around the world for the US-North Korea Summit, because there had been expectations for the United States as a sensible nation --- not for Trump. Some concrete measures should be taken to dissuade the United States under the spell of the America-firstism from weakening its soft power; from jeopardizing the alliances, and from destabilizing the world.

Secondly, the improvement in the credibility of the US extended deterrence is required more

than ever. It is a truism that the United States and Japan are important allies for each other, but they are different, independent states. How could Japan ever possibly entirely depend upon the US extended deterrence? Now that North Korea has virtually succeeded in its ICBM development, the Japanese government should help improve the credibility of the US extended deterrence through measures intelligible to the public.

Thirdly, what is necessary to improve the reliability of the United States from the Japanese viewpoint is to enhance the deterrence of the Japan-U.S. alliance through strengthening the Japan-US joint defense posture by increasing the role of Japan. As long as the threat of North Korean missile attacks is hanging over us, we must not relax efforts of upgrading our own critical functions including missile defense. Regarding Japan's counter-attack capability, we should conceptualize it as a medium- to long-term challenge, while concurrently pursuing efforts to acquire the capability.

These efforts will eventually support diplomatic solutions.

(Japan's response 4 – Moratorium of military options)

The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 obliged the United States to consider the containment of the Soviet Union primarily in military terms, but in today's international community, a similar idea would not be endorsed even in the case of North Korea. In addition, military options are not readily rewarded by expected achievements, nor do they fail to have a quite serious impact not only on Japan's security but on the United States'. For this reason, Japan is in a position to dissuade the United States from exercising military power in the last resort.

We should recognize the limitations of a policy based on pressure, as well as the likelihood that pressure-based diplomacy will function instead. The present developments can be viewed as such.

(Japan's response 5 - Establishment of Japan-South Korea cooperative relations)

South Korean President Moon Jae-in stated that he has pursued his efforts so that Japan and South Korea can overcome their historical issues in a sensible manner; meanwhile, he has consistently adopted a position to promote a future-oriented cooperation, separately from their historical issues. It is Japan that has so far advocated such a two-track approach. Amidst the current movements surrounding the North Korean problem, Japan and South

Korea should make utmost efforts to solve their long-standing historical issues. Since both countries are US allies, their coordinated efforts will lead to strengthening the Japan-US and the South Korea-US alliances as well as the US presence and its engagement in this region -- all of which will greatly help the solution of the North Korean issues.

For solution of the North Korean issues, including the abduction issue, it is imperative for Japan to strengthen ties and to establish a cooperative system with South Korea.

III. Moves in the Countries Concerned

(The Trump administration's peculiar way of decision-making)

At the White House the year 2018 began with the resignation in January of Dina Habib Powell, Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy. Director of the National Economic Council Gary Cohn, Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, National Security Advisor H. R. McMaster, and White House Staff Secretary Rob Porter, all of whom tried to bring President Trump nearer to the traditional Republican realistic line, also departed the White House. The summit meetings with DPRK Chairman Kim Jong-un and Russian President Putin were decided by President Trump without consultation with his advisors and cabinet members.

On June 12, a historic US-North Korea summit meeting took place in Singapore. President Trump and Kim Jong-un, chairman of the Korean Workers' Party, signed a joint statement. Much concern is expressed about President Trump's distinctive "deal" style of doing things, but at the same time there is also a recognition and expectation that the Trump administration has succeeded in reaching a starting point, which conventional diplomatic approaches of the past administrations could not. It should be appreciated that the United States and North Korea have actually started negotiations at the recent Summit and agreed on security guarantees for North Korea in exchange for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. President Trump's timetable for policy implementation is quite short-lived. The Trump administration has, therefore, limited the negotiating period to the end of its first term, as indicated by Secretary of State Pompeo to North Korea. This is what Japan can endorse.

On the other hand, if North Korea is capable of making a reasonable judgement, there is no reason for them to miss the offered opportunity. For North Korea, President Trump, confident of his "deal" diplomacy, is a valuable gateway to negotiations, and at the same time he might be the only person to negotiate with on the issue of security guarantees.

It is hard to imagine that President Trump will spend much time in negotiations with North Korea on denuclearization. On the contrary, there is a good possibility that he should conduct negotiations intensively within a limited space of time to achieve the goal. Realistically, however, it will be a decisive step toward the denuclearization of North Korea rather than the completion of the denuclearization.

(Japan's Response 6 – Take actions taking into account future developments including the progress of the US-North Korea talks)

It is of paramount importance for Japan not to miss the timing for a solution of the abduction issue. For Japan, the regional security balance is also another point of consideration. Japan should take into account the possibility that the US-North Korea talks will make accelerated progress, and should work out effective responses to move on to action accordingly.

Given the singularity of the Trump administration, there may emerge a possible scenario of new military tensions resulting from the suspension of negotiations. Taking broadly into account future developments, Japan should formulate effective responses to address a wide array of possible scenarios. (See Japan's Responses 1 to 5.)

(China and North Korea agree on the denuclearization and the restoration of peace in the Korean Peninsula against the background of historical amicable relations)

The following four points are important regarding the relationship between North Korea and China. First, China is North Korea's most important trading partner and donor, and this made China the chairman of the Six-Party Talks. For China, losing economic ties with North Korea means losing influence over the Korean Peninsula.

Secondly, the relationship between China and North Korea is that of Socialist states, so it is a three-part relationship of party/military/government, rather than one of normal diplomatic relations.

Thirdly, China is not against the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and United Nations resolutions, because it is one of the permanent members of the Security Council and it obtains benefits from the NPT regime. At the same time, China was a party involved in the Korean War. Lastly, it serves the national interest of China that US troops stationed in South Korea would be cut and withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula. The Chinese government supports North Korea at present because they believe its support serves China's national interest.

Since Kim Jong-un succeeded to power in 2011, North Korea repeated its missile launch experiments and nuclear tests, and China-North Korea relations temporarily stagnated. Basically, however, the friendly traditional relations of the two countries have been maintained. There gradually strategic elements were woven. When Kim Jong-un visited China in March 2018, Xi Jinping stated: “China-North Korea traditional friendship is an important legacy which former leaders of the CCP and the KWP formed and developed.” With this statement, he emphasized the tradition and the right strategy to take “based on the tradition and reality.” Xi also revealed to Kim four points to consider, which were to be referred to as “Four Principles.”*

*Four Principles: 1) to continue summit meetings, 2) effective use of the traditional legacy, the strategic communications, 3) high promotion of peace, and 4) to foster the friendship based on public opinion.

On May 8, 2018, Kim Jong-un visited China again and held talks with Xi Jinping in Dalian. Kim insisted on the importance of traditional friendship, while Xi admired Kim’s efforts toward the stabilization of the Korean Peninsula and supported the Peninsula’s denuclearization and the US-North Korean talks. Kim stated that “denuclearization is feasible, if hostile policies toward North Korea and the threat to its security disappear.” This was North Korea’s basic point of view.

The Chinese government has proposed two plans regarding the problems on the Korean Peninsula. The first plan is that the United States suspends its large scale military exercises while North Korea stops the development of nuclear weapons. The other is to advance the two processes together --- the denuclearization and the peace process. As North Korea is amenable to the Chinese proposal, the Chinese government seems to have decided to provide its active support to North Korea in terms of the denuclearization and the restoration of peace in the Korean Peninsula; economic development, and the improvement of the people’s livelihood, while emphasizing the special relationship of the two countries, employing the word ‘tradition’ to embellish the bilateral relations. After the June 12 US-North Korea Summit in Singapore, the Chinese spokesman praised the result of the summit as it was exactly what the Chinese government proposed. Regarding the United Nations’ economic sanction against North Korea, China claimed the necessity for a gradual suspension or reconsideration.

(Japan's response 7 – Explore cooperation with China)

China has been consistently claiming to concurrently advance the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the peace process. It can be said that the US-North Korea Summit and the subsequent process are in line with this claim. Although the relationship between China and North Korea was temporarily stagnant, it has been firmly maintained based on the friendly traditional relationship between the two countries. China served as the chair of the Six-Party Talks which are now suspended. If the conference be resumed, it is desirable for Japan. There are hard-to-overlook differences between China and Japan regarding recognition about the threats of North Korea's nuclear weapons and missiles. Nonetheless, to solve the North Korean problem and the abduction issue --- a top priority agenda item for Japan ---, Japan should strengthen cooperative relations with China, a key actor along with the United States.

(EU states and Russia --- Pressure and Critical Engagement --- and the Resumption of the Six Party Talks)

Currently, 26 out of 28 EU member states excluding France and Estonia have diplomatic relations with North Korea. The EU takes an approach of “Critical Engagement” toward North Korea --- an approach which requires of the North strict efforts of denuclearization, while criticizing North Korea's repeated missile and nuclear tests.

At the same time, however, the EU's continued diplomatic efforts prevent such tensions from leading to war. In September 2017, a group of seven EU member states --- the United Kingdom, Germany, the Czech Republic, Sweden, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria --- held official talks twice with the North in Pyongyang.

Given that the Korean Peninsula's nuclear problem is a non-proliferation issue affecting significantly the entire international community, the United Kingdom and France, permanent members of the UN Security Council, can be said to have a limited yet a noticeable influence over the situation. While welcoming the US-North Korea Summit, the UK categorically emphasizes the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula based on CVID.

The French government which does not have diplomatic relations with North Korea has been consistently harsh toward North Korea because of, among other things, the abject human rights situation in North Korea. Wary of an easy compromise with the North, President Macron said, “The international community must maintain its unity for tough talks with North Korea to pave

the way for a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”

Along with Japan, Russia as a member of the Six-Party Talks has agreed to CVID. Mikhail Galuzin, Russian Ambassador to Japan, expressed clearly that CVID is desirable. He remarked as follows: Russia demands complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The Six-Party Talks is the optimum venue to hold concrete discussion to realize CVID, because all the stakeholders --- North and South Korea, the United States, China, Russia and Japan --- participated in the talks and achieved some positive results in the past. It is not until the Six-Party Talks are held following the US-North Korea talks that peace and stability will be established in the region. The Russian government shows some understanding to the Japanese government position of taking a hard-lined attitude toward North Korea, but prefers to take a more moderate approach.

(North Korea and Russia)

North Korea was established as a state amidst the anti-Japan warfare of the Soviet Red Army (the 25th Division) and the Soviet occupation of the portion of the Korean Peninsula north of the 38th parallel. The Korean War was initiated on June 25, 1950 by Kim Il-sung with the approval of Stalin and Mao Zedong. Since the Soviet Union did not participate directly in the war, it did not become a signatory country to the ceasefire agreement. The Soviet Union had the intention of acquiring uranium resources in North Korea that were then in short supply at home. After the downfall of the Soviet Union, China and the Soviet Union recognized South Korea. However, Japan and the United States did not agree to a cross-recognition of North Korea. Moreover, as the then Yeltsin administration adopted a pro-South Korea policy, the North resorted to the development of nuclear weapons and missiles. This eventually led to a nuclear crisis in 1994. Subsequently, Russia came to advocate a North-South balance of power in the Korean Peninsula, and concluded with the North a Good-Neighborly Friendship, Cooperation Treaty in 2000, to replace an alliance treaty that had already expired.

Russia heightened its eastward shift after the 2004 border demarcation with China. Seeing that the United States would not exclude military options from its responses to the North Korean nuclear crisis, China and Russia have jointly proposed a step-by-step solution and called for the resumption of the six-party talks (July 2017). Now that the United States and North Korea have agreed to the complete denuclearization of North Korea, the next step will be CVID of North

Korea's nuclear program --- verification of nuclear warhead dismantlement. On the other hand, it will be necessary for the international community to provide economic aid for North Korea. In such a situation, Russia's engagement will be meaningful, for Russia may be able to play an important international role in, among other areas, the control of warheads. The framework of economic cooperation agreed upon in the Japan-North Korea Pyongyang Declaration will be of importance for Russia to become involved in the solution of the North Korean energy problem and in the reconstruction of the North Korean economy. If it becomes possible for Japan to be involved in pipeline transportation of energy resources that is Russia's specialty, and in North-South Korean cooperation in the railway project, Japan will contribute to the rapid elimination of the North-South gap and the development of infrastructure such as railroads, ports and harbors.

(Japan's Response 8 – Resumption of the Six-Party Talks in tandem with human rights diplomacy)

The major actors addressing North Korea's nuclear development are indisputably the United States, China, North and South Korea. Both Russia and Japan are also member states of the Six-Party Talks, and historically they have been concerned with and involved in issues in the Korean Peninsula. However they actually exert no more than limited influence. Japan needs to be deeply involved with this problem. The best option for Japan is to restore the Six-Party Talks. In this respect, since Japan's interests basically coincide with those of Russia, Japan should explore a close cooperation with Russia by narrowing their differences concerning the denuclearization process. The two countries' effective cooperation would also be indispensable to advance security guarantees for North Korea.

Since Japan is aligned with EU countries, especially the UK and France, as for North Korea strategy of "pressure and critical engagement," Japan should strengthen cooperative relations with those countries. In particular, France has been consistently harsh toward North Korea because of, among other things, the abject human rights situation in North Korea. Wary of an easy compromise with the North, President Macron said, "The international community must maintain its unity for tough talks with North Korea to pave the way for a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula." Regarding the abduction issue, relying on President Trump's deal diplomacy alone is not rational. Rather, cooperation with countries that emphasize human rights like France would be extremely effective. To promote the denuclearization of North Korea, the unity of the international community is important,

and to this end Japan should advance cooperation with the EU countries and Russia.

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