proposal

China’s Vision of International Order Under
the Xi Jinping Administration: Key Characteristics

Introduction

While the Xi Jinping administration inherited some of the Hu Jintao administration’s policies, it has also introduced new perspectives and policies. This trend reflects shifts in China’s national strength and responds to the new international landscape. It can also be viewed as an attempt by China, as an emerging superpower, to exert its influence in this new world.

Specifically, how has the Xi Jinping administration transformed its worldview, its conception of international order, and its foreign strategy? In Japan, many analyses have thus far been undertaken on this topic, including my own writings. This paper examines the content and process of the transformation while reviewing the US-China summit in May 2026.1

1. Fundamental Principles of Chinese Diplomacy

China’s international outlook and its foreign policy have undergone tremendous changes since October 1949.

They have been transformed in response to historical events such as the Cold War, the Sino-Soviet split, the normalization of US-China relations, the end of the Cold War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union―though with a stretch of observable continuity.

The primary example of such continuity is the maintenance of principles associated with the legitimacy of the People’s Republic of China as a sovereign state: the unification of the Chinese nation, the integrity of its territory, and the emphasis on sovereignty. In a sense, China is a dynamic entity that constantly redefines the scope and content of “China” while striving to maintain and transform that “China.” As China’s national power evolves, its borders and content undergo constant changes, and its “ideal image” is always reoriented and justified in tandem with collective memory. Concrete achievements are also emphasized. The movement to reclaim national sovereignty, which began before World War II, has continued even after the founding of the People’s Republic of China. Achievements have been made visible by the recapture of southeastern China from the Kuomintang regime, the “victory” over the Soviet Union in the Damansky Island conflict, the recapture of the Xisha Islands from South Vietnam, and the return of Hong Kong and Macau. Alongside Taiwan, the final target, issues such as the Senkaku Islands and the Nansha Islands fall under efforts of reclaiming national sovereignty.2

Second, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence adopted in the 1950s remain intact. The Xi Jinping administration holds fast to the stance of identifying itself as a developing country; the country is often referred to as “the largest developing country” or “a developing superpower.” China’s self-identification as a developing country underpins its UN-centered approach. Interpreting the UN Charter in a way convenient to it, China criticizes the order created by developed nations like the United States as wanting equity. The Chinese worldview divides the world into developed and non-developed nations, positioning itself as a representative of the non-developed nations and the Global South. On the other hand, the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence generally refer to mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence. Up until the Xi Jinping administration, Chinese leaders had fundamentally upheld this principle while selectively adjusting its specifics as circumstances dictated. For example, regarding mutual non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, as China has become a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations, it coined the phrase “creative intervention,” designed to justify China in deploying the People’s Liberation Army to other countries under certain conditions.34

Third, the foreign policy line of “independence and self-reliance,” adopted in the early 1980s, has also been relayed to the Xi Jinping administration. This principle is understood to have been proposed as the Chinese leadership’s reflection on the many problems caused by the Sino-Soviet alliance. While its relations with North Korea need separate discussion, China has no ally at the moment. Even Russia is not designated as an ally but positioned as a “partner” (huoban) country. There is a clear hierarchy among China’s partner nations, and honors for the top place go to Russia.

These historical principles remain intact, albeit with frequent adjustments to their definitions, as mentioned above. The priorities and applications of these principles have also changed. For example, although Russia is its highest-ranking partner, China does not fully endorse Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which many developing nations oppose. What the Chinese administration in power at any given time must consider is the relation between their policy measures and these principles. For the Xi Jinping administration, which has declared as an objective to catch up with the United States, Russia is a crucial country in countering the US-led NATO. Consequently, even if China cannot fully endorse the Russian invasion of Ukraine, on the whole it supports Russia.

In addition, successive Chinese administrations have adopted various principles. Some of them survive, whereas others are eventually abandoned. Revolutionary diplomacy based on the ideology of class struggle during the Mao Zedong era became obsolete with the abandonment of class struggle during the Deng Xiaoping era. Deng Xiaoping’s “Taoguang Yanghui” (Hide your strength, bide your time) and “Yousuo Zuowei” (Do what needs to be done) were employed until the Hu Jintao administration. But there is no mention of them under the Xi Jinping administration, although “Fenfa Youwei” (Strive for great achievements) was used.5

2. Changes in Perceptions of the International Order During the Xi Jinping Administration (1) 2012-2017

The Xi Jinping administration, which took office in the fall of 2012, did not make a complete shift in the Chinese government’s perceptions of the international order or foreign policy. As mentioned earlier, while concepts such as “Taoguang Yanghui” and “Yousuo Zuowei” receded into the background, the concept of a “new model of major-country relations,” for example, survived; it had been used by the Hu Jintao administration before the inauguration of the Xi Jinping administration in 2012. To trace its origin, however, it was based on the statement Xi Jinping had made during his visit to the United States as Vice President.6

Xi Jinping proposed fundamental policies in succession, such as “Chinese Dream” and “Holistic Approach to National Security.” These were employed under the premise that US-China relations were governed by the “new model of major-country relations.” Yet, as US-China relations became increasingly strained toward the end of the Obama administration due to issues such as the South China Sea dispute and China’s alleged cyberattacks, maintaining bilateral relations based on the “new model of major-country relations” gradually became difficult. It is believed that, as US-China relations became increasingly strained toward the end of the Obama administration, the Xi Jinping administration came to more clearly demonstrate, both at home and abroad, that it had revised its perceptions of the international order and foreign policy.

One emblematic message from China regarding its vision of the international order was a speech delivered by Chinese diplomat Fu Ying at Chatham House on July 6, 2016. Suggesting that her remarks mirrored Xi Jinping’s views, Fu Ying made the following point. She began by stating that the existing world order—often referred to as the Pax Americana—rests on three pillars:7

　　This order, as I see, contains three pillars: first, American or western values; second, the US led military alignment; third, the UN and its institutions. This world order has its roots in the history of international politics and also has its modern contributions. The United States, as the leader for this order system has also reaped great benefit from its leadership role.

How does China view this order? Fu Ying articulated that “China is never fully embraced by this order system.” She added that China does not uphold either of the two pillars: Western values or the US-led military alignment. What China can support, she said, is:

　　What you hear from the Chinese leaders is that, China is part of the international order. One need to note that the term used here is “international order” and what it refers to is the UN and its institutions, including the principles of international law.

In short, Fu noted that China could support the third pillar: “the UN and its institutions, including the principles of international law.” She rejected the term “world order”—a synonym for the Pax Americana—and proposed the term “international order” instead. The Xi Jinping administration’s foreign policy focused on placing the United Nations and its Charter at the nucleus of the international order and establishing a “new model of international relations” based on that foundation. The phrase “new model of international relations” refers to building win-win relationships with countries around the world based on economic cooperation and to developing these relations into a “community with a shared future.” It is said to have been proposed by Xi Jinping at the United Nations in September 2015.89

In July 2016, China strongly objected to a ruling on the South China Sea issued by the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Concerned by this, US National Security Advisor Susan Rice visited China and met with Xi Jinping. At that time, Xi Jinping reportedly stated, “When China grows strong, it will never seek hegemony. China does not intend to challenge the current international order or rules either.” Here, Xi Jinping used the term “international order” instead of “world order” to criticize the US-led order. However, perhaps because Rice was not informed of Fu Ying’s speech at Chatham House regarding the meaning of this term, she did not appear to offer any particular rebuttal to President Xi Jinping.10

In January 2017, as the first Trump administration took office and adopted increasingly stringent policy measures toward China, the Xi Jinping administration entered its second term following the 19th Party Congress. In his speech at that Party Congress, Xi Jinping stated that the Chinese nation’s dream of rejuvenation would be realized by 2049 and that China could effectively catch up with the United States. The year 2035 was mentioned as an intermediate goal. He proposed again the “new model of international relations.” This is definitely the overriding policy concept in the Xi administration’s foreign policy; it has come to be used alongside the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and the foreign policy line of independence and self-reliance. In a speech delivered at the beginning of 2018, Xi Jinping described China as “a responsible major power” and as “a builder of world peace, a contributor to global development, and a defender of the international order.” Here, too, the term “international order” was used instead of “world order.” 11

3. Changes in Perceptions of the International Order During the Xi Jinping Administration (2) 2018-Present

The direction set forth in Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th Party Congress in 2017 has been largely maintained to the present day. China fundamentally views the world as becoming multipolar, with US “hegemony” wavering and in decline: the order led by the United States and other developed nations is retreating, while an order led by China and comprising developing nations is becoming dominant. Amid the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic that began in 2020, as global sentiment toward China worsened, China designated its response to domestic and international challenges as a “war.” While strengthening national security at home, it tightened social control and asserted the regime’s legitimacy. Although China criticized the United States, it did not seek conflict with it but consistently sought dialogue and cooperation.

In January 2021, the Democratic Biden administration took office in the United States. That same month, Xi Jinping published an article in the CPC journal Qiushi titled “Jointly Building a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind.” Xi expressed his hope to revive the “new model of major-country relations” that China believed had already been established during the Obama administration. The fact should be considered that Biden had served as vice president under the Obama administration. Xi Jinping stated as follows in his Qiushi article:12

Hundreds of years ago, even when China was strong enough to account for 30% of the world’s GDP, it never expanded or invaded abroad. For more than a hundred years after the Opium War in 1840, China suffered frequent invasions and ravages, suffering greatly from the ravages of war and turmoil… China’s development from a poor and weak country into the world’s second-largest economy is not due to external military expansion and colonial plunder, but rather on the hard work of its people and the maintenance of peace. China will always unswervingly follow the path of peaceful development. No matter how far China develops, it will never seek hegemony, expansion, or the scope of its influence.

China, while uttering that it will never seek hegemony, uses the term hegemony in reference to the United States. In February 2023, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Xinhua News Agency went so far as to officially release a report titled “The American Hegemony, Bullying, and Its Harms.”13

Although Xi Jinping’s article in the January 2021 issue of Qiushi generally followed the Xi administration’s traditional worldview and foreign policy, it nevertheless called for the reconstruction of the “new model of major-country relations” with the United States. But the Biden administration was one that emulated the policy shift toward China since the end of the Obama administration, and it was anything but ready to revive the Obama administration’s policy measures formulated before the tensions in US-China relations or any semblance of a “new model of major-country relations.” Ultimately, US-China relations under the Biden administration were represented as “competition” with the provisos such as “avoiding conflict,” “cooperating on transnational issues like climate change,” and “managing relations.” This represented a new “configuration” of US-China relations, but phrases like “avoiding conflict” could also be seen as inheriting the terminology of the “new model of major-country relations.”1415

In February 2022, when Russia invaded Ukraine, criticism of China—particularly from developed nations—intensified due to its support for Russia. Since criticism of China had already been mounting over issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, relations between China and developed nations gradually became strained. As Japan and South Korea joined sanctions against Russia and enhanced their alignment with US allies and like-minded nations in the Western Pacific, as well as with NATO, China moved to further solidify its relationship with Russia. From China’s perspective, the dichotomy between developed and developing nations became more manifest, a situation which was barely short of a “Cold War.” This trend became even more pronounced during Xi Jinping’s third term, which began in the fall of 2022. The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine helped accelerate the foreign policy direction China had pursued.

The obvious fact was that China’s worldview was not universally accepted and that its policies did not proceed smoothly. Criticism of China emanated from the Baltic states and Eastern European nations exposed to Russian threats, and concerns grew globally about excessive economic dependence on China. Despite China’s consciousness of its membership of the developing world, it was not invited to the Global South Summit hosted by India in January 2023. China initially disliked using the term “Global South,” which originated in the West; however, as more and more leaders of developing nations began using the term, China decided to officially adopt the term “Quanqiu Nanfang (Global South)” and, furthermore, defined it as synonymous with “developing nations” and began referring to itself as a member of the Global South.16

The inauguration of the second Trump administration in January 2025 presented China with a new opportunity. Admittedly, the Trump administration demonstrates unpredictability in its behavior, and the “configuration” of US-China relations established under the Biden administration temporarily vanished. Indeed, the Trump administration imposed harsh conditions on China and other countries regarding tariffs and issues over advanced technologies. On the other hand, the Trump administration also adopted policy measures favorable to China, such as defunding USAID and discontinuing support for RFA, which had been critical of China’s human rights record.

Recently, while global public opinion toward the United States has been deteriorating, sentiment toward China has been improving; as a result, world leaders—including those from developed nations—are beginning to recalibrate their relations with China given tensions with the United States. Against this backdrop, the United States also began to adjust its policy toward China, with the latter’s rare earths in mind. Of particular importance was the US-China summit held in Busan on the sidelines of the APEC meeting in the fall of 2025. The two leaders made a major shift toward preventing further exacerbation of economic and trade issues and managing their relationship. The summit was followed by a series of ministerial-level meetings on diplomacy, defense, and trade, laying the groundwork for another US-China summit in Beijing in May 2026. The phrase “a constructive relationship of strategic stability” is the outcome of this process and indicates the “configuration” of US-China relations under the second Trump administration. During this summit, China’s logic regarding national unification was reaffirmed, signaling that if anything were to disrupt this “configuration,” it would be the Taiwan issue. Additionally, China picked up the topic of Iran, behaving as a representative for developing nations. Ultimately, however, America remains the absolute top priority for China’s foreign policy.17

Thus, adjusting its relations with the United States in this manner, the Xi Jinping administration maintains the worldview, conception of international order, and foreign policy principles formulated in 2010. From China’s perspective, if anything were to undermine these three, it would be US-China relations.

Conclusion

This paper examines the transformation of the Xi Jinping administration’s worldview, its conception of international order, and foreign policy strategy, including an analysis of the US-China summit in May 2026.

From the above discussion, I conclude: first, while the Xi Jinping administration has essentially inherited the Hu Jintao administration’s worldview, conception of international order, and foreign policy principles, it has made significant shifts in several areas. In particular, the Xi Jinping administration declared that it would establish an order distinct from that of developed nations and that it would catch up with and surpass the United States, scrapping the phrase “Taoguang Yanghui” (Hide your strength, bide your time). To maintain and pursue this direction, the Xi Jinping administration demonstrates a willingness to manage relations with the United States in a practical manner.

Second, the worldview, concept of international order, and foreign policy principles revised by the Xi Jinping administration are as follows: (1) China definitely opposes the US-centered order and envisages an order based on the UN Charter, seeking to realize a “new model of international relations” as the embodiment of that Charter. This “new model of international relations” is focused on “economic cooperation” and is intended to evolve into a win-win “community with a shared future.” (2) China recognizes that the world is in an era of multipolarity and that China constitutes one of those poles. Amid this once-in-a-century transformation, China’s self-perception is that the axis of global conflict lies between “developed nations vs. developing nations,” and that China represents the developing nations.

Although this article has not elaborated on the significance of “Taiwan,” it grows under the Xi Jinping administration. Since the establishment of the Tsai Ing-wen administration in 2016, China has shifted its policy toward Taiwan; it is particularly concerned about the formation of the Lai Ching-te administration in May 2024. If President Lai enters his second term in January 2028 and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration continues for a fourth consecutive term, the Xi Jinping administration might not idly stand by.

Finally, allow me to add a few words on Japan’s position in light of the Xi Jinping administration’s worldview, concept of order, and foreign strategy discussed in this paper. From China’s perspective, Japan is structurally a “hostile” country due to its status as a developed nation and a US ally supporting the US-led international order, the weakening of its economic ties with China, and its close relationship with the DPP administration in Taiwan. As the Chinese government emphasizes national security, the Chinese public’s sentiment toward Japan is rapidly worsening, which in turn makes it even harder for the Chinese government to change its policy toward Japan. Viewed in this way, if superficial adjustments to bilateral relations are to occur in the future, China’s hardline stance toward Japan is unlikely to change structurally.

(Shin Kawashima, Professor, The University of Tokyo)

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