proposal

China’s Narrative Strategy Under Xi Jinping and Japan: Formations, Objectives, and Linkages with Behavior

Once again, many have come to learn that in China, politics and the economy are inseparable. Since Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks regarding a “situation threatening Japan’s survival” at the House of Representatives Budget Committee on November 7, 2025, many have been concerned about potential risks that could emanate from China. Initially, China exerted limited pressure by suspending people-to-people exchanges such as travel and commercial events. However, it gradually intensified criticism of Japan by using new narratives embedded with phrases such as “remilitarization” and a “new type of militarism” that it coined. Since the turn of the year, China, citing national security reasons, has tightened export controls on dual-use items destined for Japan and added 20 Japanese entities to the “Export Control List” and the “Watch List,” subjecting them to export restrictions.

Notwithstanding this, China is Japan’s largest trading partner, accounting for approximately 20% of its trade; over 93,000 Japanese residents live there. There is no question that stabilized Japan-China relations are crucial. In considering measures to secure this stability, it is above all necessary to understand the intentions of the Chinese side: What are the objectives of the Xi Jinping administration in increasing pressure on Japan?

The pressure that the Xi Jinping administration is exerting on Japan is threefold: expanding criticism of Japan through various tools; weaponizing the economy based on Chinese domestic law; and arbitrary military actions, including the activities of maritime militias. In other word, pressure through narrative; pressure through economic means; and military coercion. On top of these, there are sanctions targeting Japan’s defense industry, exploiting security exceptions in free trade.

In response to China’s pressure on the Takaichi administration, Japanese public opinion endorses it rather than criticize it, with several opinion polls showing the administration’s approval ratings hovering at as high as 60%. Given that China may continue to criticize Japan, it can be assumed that the country harbors objectives more than merely “dividing Japanese public opinion.” We should not overlook the implications of strategic narratives crafted by the Chinese government for Chinese public opinion and their effects on specific countries and the international community.1

In recent years, narratives (discourses, stories) crafted by China ostensibly assume, in many cases, a logical structure reminiscent of academic research. They are characterized by a remarkable linkage between theoretical arguments based on historical interpretations and China’s actual actions. Therefore, highly specialized counter-narratives may be necessary to hinder their permeation in Japanese society. If generative AI incorporates China-made narratives as data and then reproduces information based on these narratives, such pieces of information could prevail dramatically. This paper examines, from this perspective, the features of diplomatic narratives emanating from Beijing.

The Expansion of the International Order Initiative by the Xi Jinping Administration

Since its inception, the Communist Party of China has pursued a coherent propaganda policy to justify its actions. Within the party, there is a dedicated department (the Propaganda Department), directly under the Central Committee, responsible for propaganda policies associated with publicity, education, and enlightenment. The United Front Work Department, also directly under the Central Committee, is aimed at controlling and guiding public opinion through human and organizational networks. Since around 2013, when the Xi Jinping administration came to power, China has adopted a peculiar policy of mobilizing experts from think tanks and of producing academically theorized narratives on history and international politics. This policy line had been established back in the decision of the Third Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2013, which articulated, “To build a strong socialist cultural nation and enhance the country's soft power, we must... solidify the common ideological foundation for the unity and struggle of the entire Party and all ethnic groups across the country”, and proposed an external policy: “Enhance cultural openness. Adhere to the principles of government leadership, enterprise as the main body, market operation, and social participation; expand foreign cultural exchanges; strengthen international communication capabilities and the construction of a foreign discourse system; and promote Chinese culture to the world. Streamline the domestic and foreign publicity system and support key media outlets to develop both domestically and internationally.” The narratives thus crafted are aimed not merely at guiding Chinese citizens at home but also at penetrating third countries and the international community, linking to a diplomatic strategy to make Chinese narratives a shared understanding in the international community.23

The most distinctive feature of Chinese narratives crafted by the Xi Jinping administration is “superpower consciousness,” which is related to China’s emergence as a superpower and serves as grounds for China to gain the status of a global leader.

China used to be criticized for its inability to present an alternative vision to the US-led international order, which it criticized unilaterally. However, under the Xi Jinping administration, theorization is proceeding of an international order initiative based on the idea of ​​building a “community of shared future for mankind.” This initiative is grounded on four sub-initiatives (“The Four Major Global Initiatives”): the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and the Global Governance Initiative (GGI). In this context, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is positioned as the platform for action for this series of sub-initiatives. The BRI, proposed by Xi Jinping in 2013, is a strategy predicated on strengthening “connectivity” through infrastructure development, logistics networks, and the construction of economic corridors.

The GDI, the GSI, and the GCI are concepts aimed at China’s global leadership in three realms: the economy, military, and values; they envisage China as a state with an outstanding ruling power, or “hegemony” or “empire.” Originally, China designated these three concepts the “Three Major Global Initiatives.” At the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Plus meeting in September 2025, China added the GGI, demonstrating its commitment to engaging in shaping an international order. The GGI is a concept that premises a multipolar world and aims to magnify the voices of the Global South countries, thereby building a more inclusive international governance system. It overlaps with China’s strategy toward the United States, which will be discussed later.

Repoliticization of Historical Narratives

In Chinese politics, “history” is a crucial political tool that warrants the legitimacy of the CPC’s rule. It is no exaggeration to say that the logic of China’s superpower consciousness is supported not only by its awareness as an economic and military superpower but also by its own development theory that the Chinese nation will “stand up and grow prosperous to become strong” after overcoming “100 years of humiliation.” At the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (the 19th Party Congress) in October 2017, General Secretary Xi Jinping noted in his report that “socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a new era,” marking the beginning of an era of “becoming strong.” This report was condensed into a monograph entitled “Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.” The year 2021 marked the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party of China, and at the Sixth Plenary Session of the Central Committee in November, the “Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century” (the so-called “Third Historical Resolution”) was adopted. This document refers to the “new era” as the period following the 18th Party Congress, and states that “the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core” has achieved “historic transformations” in China.456

The Xi Jinping administration has steadily strengthened the politicization of “history.” In particular, since 2022, under the direction of Xi Jinping, the national strategy of constructing an “independent knowledge system” has been underway. China’s independent knowledge system is positioned as the “core” for the construction of a disciplinary system, academic system, and discourse system of philosophy and social sciences with Chinese characteristics. It is a political campaign to promote independent theorization in a wide range of fields, including philosophy, history, politics, and law.7

Celebrating the year 2025 as the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Chinese government proclaimed the narrative of the “three 80th anniversaries.” This political campaign emphasized the “80th anniversary of the victory in the War of Resistance against Japan,” the “80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations,” and the “80th anniversary of the liberation of Taiwan,” creating a political environment suited to spawning critical discourse against Taiwan and Japan.

Of particular note is China’s line of argument rejecting the San Francisco System. Its primary focus is the narrative competition among the United States, China, and Taiwan over the “Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan,” which led to heightened tensions in 2025. China’s policy toward Taiwan is a comprehensive approach encompassing military pressure (military drills in the waters surrounding Taiwan), economic coercion against specific Taiwanese industries, and “legal measures” that promote institutional arguments based on Chinese domestic law. Narratives justifying these Chinese actions from a discourse perspective emerged in the post-war international order debate over the San Francisco Peace Treaty.8

The beginning was marked by the “80th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet Union in the Great Patriotic War” in May 2025. On May 7, Xi Jinping, before his visit to Russia to attend related commemoration ceremonies, published an article in the Russian newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta titled “Learning from History and Creating the Future.” In it, Xi expressed his own historical perception on Taiwan, stating, “This year also marks the 80th anniversary of Taiwan’s retrocession… A series of documents with international legal force, such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, have affirmed China's sovereignty over Taiwan. These historical and legal facts are indisputable, and the authority of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 is unchallenged.”9

In response, Taiwan initially reiterated its usual counter-argument, asserting that Taiwan belongs to the Republic of China based on Article 3 of the Cairo Declaration, which states, “all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.” However, from around July, the Lai Ching-te administration promoted the “Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan,” arguing that the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not specify the status of “Taiwan and the Penghu Islands,” which Japan had relinquished, and that therefore Taiwan’s status remains undetermined. In September, the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the informal mission of the United States in Taiwan, and the US State Department also declared support for the “Theory of the Undetermined Status of Taiwan,” which intensified the US-China-Taiwan conflict involving “history.” This competition of narratives surrounding the Taiwan issue foreshadowed an intensification of China’s criticism of Japan and led to a proliferation of extreme expressions such as the “resurgence of militarism” and a “new type of militarism.”10

Preparing for the Expansion of Chinese Narratives

Chinese narratives have already taken on the character of a grand strategy for building an international order, carefully crafted, based on historical perception and strategic goals. Their logical structure is becoming more sophisticated to establish compatibility between the Chinese vision of an international order and critical discourse toward Taiwan and Japan; they appear capable of permeating the historical understanding of people in third countries. As if to attest to this, the joint statement from the May summit between Putin and Xi Jinping explicitly stated that Japan is accelerating its “remilitarization,” posing a serious threat to regional peace and stability; that the international community and regional countries are keenly concerned about this. How should Japan deal with such discourse, and how should it form and disseminate its counter-narratives? Japan will need to reconsider its narrative strategy.

(Naoko Eto, Professor, Gakushuin University)

(Translation by Tsutomu Inuzuka)

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