proposal

Donald Trump's Vision of the State and the Separation
of Powers: An Analysis of His Tariff Policy

The second Trump administration took office on January 20, 2025. For a year since then, American democracy seems to have undergone a series of incessant stress tests. President Trump took aggressive policy measures one after another: the unilateral tariff policy, intervention with the executive by the leverage of personnel appointments, forceful measures against illegal immigration, the federalization of National Guardsmen, and attacks on Venezuela.

America's political system was created during the founding days to prevent a single individual from monopolizing political power and establishing an unchallenged autocracy. Power was divided between the federal government and state governments; within the federal government, it was split between three branches. The system of checks and balances among these institutions, which hold divided power, was designed to avoid the pitfall of despotism.

Did this mechanism function during the first year of Trump's second presidency? This paper focuses on the administration's tariff policy to examine this question. The reason for discussing the tariff policy is that it reveals a new pattern in the abuse of presidential powers, specifically the misuse of emergency powers. This paper examines the Trump tariffs from the perspectives of presidential authority, its restraints, and the functioning of the separation of powers mechanism. For details on the second Trump administration's tariff policy, please refer to the article by Yorizumi Watanabe included in this issue of Security Studies.

1. Donald Trump's State/Business Views

President Trump firmly believes that the US fiscal deficit shows that America is exploited. This belief is linked to his idea of equating running a state with running a business. In other words, it is the idea of understanding the state as a kind of corporate entity. This view of identifying the state and a corporation leads to understanding international relations as deals in the light of simple "wins" or "losses," or profit versus loss.

This way of thinking can be confirmed by a full-page opinion advertisement Trump placed in three newspapers—The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Boston Globe—on September 2, 1987, long before he became US president. Trump stated as follows:1

"For decades, Japan and other nations have been taking advantage of the United States."

"Over the years, the Japanese, unimpeded by the huge costs of defending themselves (as long as the United States will do it for free), have built a strong and vibrant economy with unprecedented surpluses."

"Tax these wealthy nations, not America. End our huge deficits, reduce our taxes, and let America's economy grow unencumbered by the cost of defending those who can easily afford to pay us for the defense of their freedom. Let's not let our great country be laughed at anymore."

This opinion ad targeted Japan. Trump played a part in the campaign of criticism against Japan in the 1980s. Trump not merely viewed the trade deficit as problematic but also believed that the United States was being exploited regarding defense spending. Although there was no clear mention of tariffs in this ad, he may have considered them as a means of "levying on wealthy nations."

On the day that the opinion ad ran, Trump was interviewed by ABC News.2 This interview confirms that he confused the US burden of defense costs and trade deficits, or perceived them as the same.

Trump states, "We have absolute obligations to protect freedom, but we don't have obligations to protect freedom of countries that are far wealthier than we are. This country loses $200 billion a year." He continues, "I'm only saying that when it comes to the billions and hundreds of billions of dollars that we're spending to defend other countries that are very capable of paying for that defense themselves, then we should be reimbursed for that." When the interviewer asked for confirmation, "The 200 billion, you're really talking about trade deficits," he answered affirmative, saying, "It's a huge trade deficits and we can't continue to run a company or a country and lose $200 billion a year"

However, defense spending and the trade deficit are unrelated; a national trade deficit and a corporate deficit are distinct economic concepts. A corporate deficit indicates that revenues fall below costs, leading, if sustained, directly to bankruptcy. A national trade deficit, on the other hand, represents a macroeconomic phenomenon where domestic investment exceeds domestic savings. This does not signify disruption; rather, it is the flip side of capital inflows from abroad.

Putting these distinctions aside, Trump stated in an interview, "We are losing 200―the United States is losing $200 billion a year, 200 billion. We're losing in this country as simple as that. If this were a company, they would have filed Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings years ago." Thus, it can be said that Trump considered defense spending burdens to be equal to trade deficits, while also confusing national governance with corporate management.

This interview is noteworthy in that Trump directly engaged in a Q&A with a reporter. In 1987, Trump co-authored his autobiography with Tony Schwartz, titled The Art of the Deal (a Japanese translation published with a title Toranpu Jiden [The Trump Autobiography] by Hayakawa Publishing in 1988). While this book was largely written by Schwartz, Trump's own thinking is more conceivable understandable from the above interview. One might find Trump's naïve belief expressed there. He may have carried this belief into his second term.

2. Tariff Policy of Trump 2.0: Emergency Powers and the IEEPA

Tariff hikes also occurred under the first Trump administration: those on steel and aluminum based on Section 232 of the Trade Act, and those against China based on Section 301 of the Trade Act.3 Section 232 of the Trade Act authorizes the President to adjust imports due to national security threats, exemplifying tariffs as a means. However, Section 232 requires a previous investigation by the Department of Commerce to prevent immediate tariff increases. Section 301 of the Trade Act authorizes the US Trade Representative to take measures, including tariff increases, if the agency detects unfair trade practices. In that case as well, prior procedures by the USTR are required; the President cannot unilaterally raise or lower tariffs suddenly.

The recent tariff increases under the second Trump administration were based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). This law is one of several outlining presidential emergency powers. The US Constitution does not provide for emergency powers; instead, these powers have been codified in the form of statutes enacted by Congress. There are reportedly as many as 137 acts stipulating emergency powers that the President can use upon declaring an emergency.4 Since these are powers exercisable by the President in emergency situations, they take immediate effect upon presidential order. The recent tariff increases by the IEEPA were implemented in this manner. On April 2, 2025, the US government imposed "reciprocal tariffs" on exports from countries worldwide, including Japan.

Congress attempted to amend the emergency powers framework, which makes one readily envisage presidential abuse of authority. By the 1976 Emergency Powers Act, Congress instituted a system to terminate a presidential emergency declaration. However, the Supreme Court ruled the congressional veto system—which enables Congress to cancel the President's decisions retroactively—as unconstitutional. Consequently, Congress today lacks any institutional means to constrain a presidential emergency declaration.

Fundamentally, the US Constitution assigns tariff-setting authority to Congress, not the President. It was only in the 20th century, when Congress delegated tariff negotiation authority to the President, that the President was enabled to negotiate tariff rates with other nations. To those who remember the President's role in the TPP negotiations, the recent unilateral tariff increases by executive order are extraordinary.

The second Trump administration used the IEEPA to implement these flexible tariff hikes, but it stretched the law. While the Act stipulates that the President can restrict imports in emergency situations, it is not specific about tariffs like Section 232 of the Trade Act. The administration was stretching the interpretation so far as to consider tariff rate changes as part of "regulating imports."

This broadened interpretation became the crux of the issue. US importers sued the Trump administration, arguing that the President exercised powers not assigned by law.

3. "Reciprocal Tariffs" Lawsuit

The tariffs lawsuit was accepted by the Supreme Court after passing through the federal district court and the appeals court. Oral arguments took place on November 5, 2025; it turned out that the odds were against the administration.5 The current composition of the Supreme Court includes six conservatives and three liberals. Therefore, the Trump administration was enjoying an ideological advantage.

However, Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Gorsuch, and Justice Barrett, all conservatives, expressed skepticism toward the administration's stretched interpretation. Roberts told Solicitor General John Sauer, who represented the administration, that these tariffs are essentially a tax on the American people, and that the power to tax has always been a core authority of Congress. Barrett also asked Sauer if there had ever been a case where tariffs were raised based on the IEEPA. Gorsuch went even to the length of asking whether Congress had explicitly granted the President the authority to impose tariffs.

Gorsuch relies on the major question theory, a theory advocated by conservative legal scholars, which states that the President and the executive should not act as if they have authority by stretching the interpretation of ambiguous provisions when Congress has not explicitly granted them that authority. This theory was employed in such cases as the Biden administration's student loan forgiveness program. It was considered to be aimed at attacking liberals. Gorsuch indicated that he would apply this theory to the Trump administration's tariff policy.

The three liberal justices also pursued the Trump administration on whether its interpretation of the IEEPA was flawed. The oral arguments revealed a split among the conservative justices, suggesting the possibility of an unfavorable ruling for the administration.

4. The 20/2/2026 Supreme Court's Ruling on the Illegality of the Trump Tariffs

Various speculations had circulated about when the Supreme Court would issue its ruling. Ultimately, however, the decision was handed down on February 20, 2026. The Court ruled that "IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs."6 It was a defeat for the Trump administration.

The absence of the wording "tariffs" in the IEEPA proved to be decisive. According to the ruling, the government "reads the words "regulate" and "importation" to effect a sweeping delegation of Congress's power to set tariff policy—authorizing the President to impose tariffs of unlimited amount and duration, on any product from any country." However, "That view would represent a transformative expansion of the President's authority over tariff policy."

The Supreme Court pointed out that the President needs "express authorization of Congress" to justify such a "transformative expansion" and that "He cannot." Consequently, the imposition of tariffs based on the IEEPA was illegal.

In addition to the three liberal justices, three conservative justices—Chief Justice Roberts, Barrett, and Gorsuch—agreed with the ruling. Their positions presented during the oral arguments were carried into the ruling. This ruling failed to determine whether the provisions of the IEEPA are unconstitutional; therefore, it is not appropriate to call it a ruling of unconstitutionality. It points to the administration's misinterpretation of the IEEPA provisions; therefore, it is more suitable to call it a ruling of illegality. Furthermore, this ruling makes no definite reference to the right or wrong of the President's judgment regarding the state of emergency or improvements to emergency powers provisions.

Nevertheless, this ruling is quite significant. During his second term, President Trump has acted as if his authority is subject to no restriction. The Supreme Court ruling was a backlash against the Trump administration. Moreover, this ruling came from a conservative-dominated Supreme Court composed of six conservative justices out of nine; it was a decision independent of politics. Furthermore, the major question theory confirmed in this ruling makes it hard for a President to claim new powers through a stretched interpretation of ambiguous provisions; the theory is highly likely to become significant in the future.

It is also important that the Trump administration accepted the Supreme Court's ruling. Although President Trump criticized the justices, he did not choose to ignore the ruling itself. The President's respect for the principles of the separation of powers is correct.

Be that as it may, the Trump administration has swiftly moved to implement sweeping tariff increases using means such as Section 122 of the Trade Act, instead of the IEEPA. The administration's tariff policy itself has not changed, or the Supreme Court ruling did not alter the Trump administration's tariff policy itself. The administration might be able to accept the Supreme Court's ruling because it was sure that its tariff policy could be maintained without the IEEPA. The Supreme Court may have issued a ruling pointing to the illegality of the IEEPA interpretation because the Court was likely aware that the administration still had room to pursue its tariff policy. Viewed this way, it might be more appropriate to discount the significance of this ruling of illegality to some degree.

For the Supreme Court, maintaining independence from politics and issuing resolute rulings is essential to demonstrate the institution's importance. However, if this is ignored by politics, the Court risks losing its footing. The Supreme Court appears to have chosen this difficult path.

The Supreme Court has shown its raison d'être over the Trump administration's tariff policy. Yet, this is merely one development within the broader push for hardline policies by the second Trump administration. It remains essential to see whether the separation of powers will function in other policy areas or if the governance structure will be distorted in favor of the President. The outlook remains unpredictable.

(Takeshi Umekawa, Professor, The University of Tokyo)

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