proposal

Is Trump 2.0's Foreign and Security Policy Strategic?

1. Significant Contradictions in Trump 2.0's Foreign and Security Policy

One year has passed since the Second Trump Administration started in January 2025. Most, if not all, may agree that it has dramatically changed US foreign and security policy and significantly altered the international order. However, understanding the direction of the Trump Administration's foreign and security policy is extremely difficult. Is this dramatic policy shift aimed at transforming the existing international order to be advantageous to the United States? Or is President Trump behaving as he desires, not knowing that his behavior might ultimately change US policy and cause significant damage to the international order?

The underlying cause of this interpretative difficulty lies in that the Trump Administration's foreign and security policy is characterized by profound internal contradictions.

First, there is a contradiction between Trump's aspirations for "peacemaking" feats worthy of a Nobel Peace Prize and the "America First" aspirations of his core supporters, the MAGA (Make America Great Again) crowd. Trump wants a Nobel Peace Prize for his role as a "peacemaker" in Ukraine and the Middle East. MAGA supporters are dissatisfied with Trump's involvement in peace negotiations in global conflicts because they want to have the USA's limited resources devoted to domestic purposes.1

The second problem is the contradiction between Trump's non-ideological, deal-oriented approach and the benefits that come from allies who share democratic values. The Trump administration criticizes past US diplomacy, which emphasized values such as democracy and human rights. Now, Trump is pursuing a deal-oriented diplomacy that focuses on energy and economic interests. This has widened the gap with European allies. During the war on terror in Afghanistan after the 2001 9/11 attacks, European allies dispatched troops. They declared collective self-defense in accordance with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. These allies viewed the attack on the United States as an attack on the entire NATO alliance. Worsening relations with such allies, who are willing to act with the United States in emergencies, will ultimately weaken America's influence over non-aligned countries like China and Russia. It could also undermine the diplomatic deals that Trump seeks.

The third problem is the contradiction between Trump's pursuit of personal and family/relatives-related economic interests and the concerns of Republican Congress and non-MAGA Republican supporters about potential conflict of interest. Special Envoy for the Middle East, Witkoff, and Trump's son-in-law, Jared Kushner, are pivotal figures in the Middle East and Ukraine peace talks, but the prioritization of their personal and business interests complicates diplomatic channels and agendas. Their behavior will ultimately have an adverse effect on the achievement of US diplomatic goals and raise concern not only among Democrats and independents but also among Republican Congressmen and non-MAGA supporters.2 The Trump administration is facing the risk of losing Republican support, with the November 2026 midterm elections and the 2028 presidential election in view.

This paper aims to help achieve a deeper understanding of Trump 2.0's foreign and security policy and predict its future direction by analyzing the multiple factors responsible for these contradictions.

2. Overview of the Trump 2.0's Foreign and Security Policy

(1) China Policy

Trump wants to eliminate the trade deficit with China, which appears to explain why he does not seem to be concerned with deterring China's unification of Taiwan or its expansionist stance in the East and South China Seas. Meanwhile, the Trump administration's cabinet and staff, as well as the Republican Congress, want to win the geopolitical competition with China. These contradictions are evident as such in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and other documents.

At the US-China summit in October 2025, the two leaders agreed to a temporary truce in the US-China trade war. Both sides shared the same goal: the Trump administration needed to avoid an economic slowdown before the November 2026 midterm elections, while China needed to avoid a further economic downturn at home.

To play up Trump's deal with China ahead of his April 2026 visit to Beijing, language likely to provoke China was removed from, for example, the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The President stated that the administration's goal is not to dominate or humiliate China, and made no direct mention of the Taiwan issue, which China claims as a "core interest."3

John Bolton, former National Security Advisor during the first Trump administration, noted that Trump believes good relations between national leaders will lead to good relations between the nations.4 It is highly likely that the current administration staff chose restrained language out of consideration that they should not hinder Trump's China deal. As a result, allies and neighboring countries fear that Trump might seek a compromising deal (a grand bargain) with China for his political gain during his upcoming visit to China in April.5

(2) Russia-Ukraine Peace Negotiations

Some point out regarding the Ukraine ceasefire negotiations that there is no consensus within the US policy community, but that Trump's self-appointed peacemaking mission and his relatives' business interests are prioritized. In US mediation diplomacy in Ukraine during 2025, the following pattern was repeated6 but no progress was made toward an effective ceasefire or peace.

  1. The Trump administration announces a pro-Russia ceasefire/peace plan and pressures Ukraine to compromise. ⇒
  2. Ukraine and European allies revise the pro-Russia plan and draft a compromise. ⇒
  3. Europe and Ukraine agree on the compromise with the United States. ⇒
  4. Russia rejects the compromise. ⇒ 1).

The European and Ukrainian game plan is to fully cooperate with Trump in his goal of achieving a ceasefire and of ending the war, distinguish their stance from Putin's hesitant one, and prevent a unilateral handling of the Ukraine crisis by Trump and Putin.

In February 2026, at the latest UAE-hosted talks with Ukraine and Russia, the US government proposed that June of this year should be the deadline for ending the war and demanded a clear process to that end. However, the future outlook remains uncertain.

(3) Middle East Policy

The Trump administration is approaching Gulf countries, with an ideology that distances itself from human rights and democratic values, different from that of the previous Biden administration. Notable is the move aimed at promoting investment in the United States from oil-producing countries and at expanding business opportunities for Trump's family businesses.

As a self-appointed "peacemaker," Trump negotiated a ceasefire with the militant group Hamas in Gaza—a preliminary step toward the expanded Abraham Accords. The agreement was barely reached, and the ceasefire is now in effect. Trump has involved his son-in-law, Kushner, in negotiations to benefit businesses with Qatar. Therefore, an Israeli airstrike attempting to assassinate Hamas negotiators in Qatar angered Trump, resulting in the making of his 20-point Gaza peace plan.7

However, in that process, Trump failed to exert enough influence to stop Israel from attacking Iran's nuclear facilities, but rather joined Israel in carrying out airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. The result was no more than a one- to two-year delay in Iran's nuclear development; the United States will be obliged to risk another military action against Iran in the future. Exploiting the disturbances in Iran due to the Iranian government's crackdown on anti-government protests, the Trump administration suggested the possibility of military intervention and proposed denuclearization negotiations. If the US military attack on Iran further expanded and the US government were obliged to send ground troops, it could face even greater difficulties than in the Iraq War.8

(4) Detention of Venezuelan President Maduro

The US military operation of detaining Venezuelan President Maduro blatantly ignored the international order which the international community had believed the United States to be the last country to ignore; Trump's declaration that international law has nothing to do with the operation sparked international concern. Trump likely hoped that the military action would boost his domestic approval ratings, but an Ipsos Reuters poll conducted on January 4-5 found that the Trump administration's approval rating increased by only 3 points, with only 33% of respondents supporting the attack on Venezuela. 72% expressed concern about excessive US military involvement in Venezuela.9 Non-MAGA Republican lawmakers are concerned that a company with a close relation to Trump has acquired an oil concession in Venezuela.

The recent US military operation has succeeded in decreasing the influence of China and Russia in Central America. Other challenges, such as exerting effective pressure on the current Cuban regime, dependent on Venezuela's oil revenues, will hinge on the stability of the Venezuelan government.

(5) Conflict with Europe over Greenland

Trump has seriously undermined the trust of European allies in the United States by pressuring Denmark to agree to America's acquisition of Greenland, stating that he would not rule out the use of military force to this end if necessary. On January 9, Trump declared the additional tariffs on several European countries that oppose the US acquisition of Greenland. However, the market reacted to the EU's preparations for counter-tariffs; on the 20th, a "US sell-off" spread across US financial markets, resulting in a "triple sell-off" in which stocks, bonds, and currencies fell simultaneously. Trump withdrew his tough stance on acquiring Greenland and on imposing additional tariffs. As a result, Trump was mocked with the acronym "TACO" (Trump Always Chickens Out). Eventually, this was good news for NATO member states. Trump's actions aimed at undermining NATO solidarity have caused serious concerns among European allies, while Russia and China, which favor a multipolar world, also welcomed the news.

3. Factors Influencing the Trump Administration's Foreign and Security Policy

The foreign and security policy of Trump 2.0 outlined above and the guidelines described in the NSS and the NDS coincide only in their emphasis on the slogan of restraint, "America First," the consistent theme shared in the administration. In reality, policy measures are implemented by coordinating different views and policy orientations within the administration. The most influential factor is Trump's will. Under Trump 2.0, staff and cabinet members who, if under Trump 1.0, would have sought to restrain or change Trump's policy direction have been eliminated.

(1) The Ideology of Restraint

The element most widely shared within the Trump Administration is the vision of restraint and the emblematic "America First" slogan. The NSS links a policy of "strategic stability with Russia" with European security. The policy prioritizes preventing military escalation with Russia and reducing excessive US military engagement in Europe.10 This stems from the reflection that the "long wars" in Afghanistan and Iraq eroded the United States' national power. Trump excluded neoconservatives who led the Iraq War from his first and second administration that is dominated by the ideology of restraint. This faction is criticized for being "deep engagers." There are concerns that long-term US military involvement abroad could provoke hostile countries and drain the nation's resources. For this reason, in Trump 2.0's regional balance of power strategy, the idea of ​​"offshore balancing" is dominant, which asserts minimizing US involvement and relying on regional allies for balancing power.11 The NSS and the NDS emphatically call on allies to help themselves.12

(2) Indo-Pacific Priority

As for the vision of restraint that appears to be broadly agreed upon within the administration, there are differences in policy direction between conservatives and realists. They share the understanding that China is the only nation capable of challenging the United States, and believe that allies should seek to check China. However, given China's strong national power, those pessimistic about allies' capability of checking China adamantly advocate an engagement policy to contain China and defend Taiwan. Conversely, those optimistic about the potential of allies are negative about US engagement in the Indo-Pacific.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, and Under Secretary of War for Policy Elbridge Colby value their relationships with Vice President J.D. Vance and Whaite House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephan Miller, who are conservative and restraint-oriented, and are aligned in efforts to reduce US support for Ukraine and military engagement in Europe, which the latter two do not want. However, the former three take a more proactive stance toward engagement in the Indo-Pacific. For example, the NDS inherits the long-standing US geopolitical goal of maintaining a balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region, which has been consistently pursued since President Theodore Roosevelt, not allowing for the emergence of a dominant nation there.13 Although prioritizing the Indo-Pacific over Europe is not shared by all people in Trump 2.0, it is an important factor.

(3) Anti-Liberal Conservative Nationalism

American conservative nationalists vehemently oppose the social reform policies previously pursued by liberal Democrats. Also imbued with anti-immigrant nationalism, they form Trump's core support base, known as the MAGA crowd. Conservative nationalists prioritize domestic policy and are reluctant to engage in international politics. This forms the core of their restraint-based ideology. Their ideology is rooted in social conservatism that advocates protecting the "American way of life," rejecting progressivism that embraces social diversity and the global economy.14

The NSS excludes the liberal value of DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) from the overall foreign and security policy of the United States. The document mentions the American way of life, in addition to the homeland, people, territory, and the economy, as the things that the United States must protect from hostile forces. The phrase referring to European allies, "democratic allies," which appeared in previous government documents, has been obliterated.15 Conservative nationalists are suspicious of allied nations' free-riding on the security provided by US military power; they tend to require an increase in the burdens that must be shouldered by allies.

(4) New Imperialism/Western Hemispherism

The NSS's Western Hemisphere section includes the "Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," which calls for the exclusion of Chinese and Russian influence from the Western Hemisphere and justifies military engagement in the US territory without being bound by international rules.16 Trump's willingness to acquire Greenland was similarly perceived as a challenge to the international order and shocked European allies. This is because, in both instances, the administration of the United States, a nation aspiring to be the guardian of the international order, behaved disrespectfully toward international rules without providing valid reasons.

The Trump administration's diplomatic stance toward Venezuela and Greenland, which seeks to acquire resources or territory through force, has been described by experts as a "new imperialism" recalling the era of colonial competition between major powers in the 19th century.17

Regarding Western Hemispherism, people's stances are not alike even in the Trump administration. White House Deputy Chief of Staff Miller stated that the Trump administration's official position is that Greenland should be US territory, and when asked about the possibility of US military intervention in this connection, he questioned Denmark's claim to sovereignty in the Arctic and stated that for the United States to ensure Arctic security and to protect NATO and its interests, Greenland should naturally be part of the United States.18 This stance is undoubtedly indicative of "neo-imperialism."

On the other hand, Secretary of State Rubio mentioned Greenland, stating that any American president has the option of military means whenever they must address a security threat. He respected Trump's intentions but emphasized negotiation over military pressure.19 Compared to Miller, his remarks are more considerate of alliances and international law. Rubio appears to value allies to win in the competition with China and Russia. Meanwhile, regarding US engagement in Central America, a region which is bound to have a vital impact on US security, Rubio endorses a traditional US security stance of acting not subject to international rules. This cannot be described categorically as "neo-imperialism."

In 1990, President George Bush (Sr.), in response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, formed a multinational force with the consent of the Soviet Union and China, emphasizing the UN Security Council process, and then fought the Gulf War. Just a few months earlier, on the other hand, the Bush administration had launched a military invasion against Panama, detained General Noriega, and tried the Panamanian dictator in a US court, not bound by international law. Rubio's stance may be seen as an extension of traditional US conservative diplomacy.

(5) Neo-Royalism

The above elements are considered to determine the Trump Administration's foreign and security policy, but the administration's specific policy measures sometimes contradict these elements. For example, the US airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 21, 2025, at the request of Israel, are inconsistent with the America-first ideology of restraint.

Trump's decision to authorize this attack was likely influenced by his desire to do a favor for Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, extract advantageous conditions for a Gaza ceasefire, and claim the achievement as his own, as well as from the influence of his son-in-law, Kushner, who has close relations with Netanyahu.

One element of Trump's foreign and security policy that cannot be overlooked is his personal interests and motives. Regarding the nature of Trump's diplomacy, which revolves around his own interests and those of his associates, Wellesley College professor Stacie Goddard and Georgetown University professor Abraham Newman have come up with a "Neo-Royalist" hypothesis, recalling royal diplomacy during the era of absolute monarchy in the 17th century. This theory argues that the current Trump administration's foreign policy can be seen as a tool to gain money and status for Trump himself and a group of stakeholders around him. The two experts also point out that to achieve these personal interests, the Trump administration could collude with rival countries whose national interests do not align with those of the United States.20

Trump states that US control of Venezuela will contribute to America's prosperity, but it remains unclear whether it will benefit the United States in the future. As an aside, last year, Amber Energy Inc., backed by a prominent Trump supporter Paul Singer, won an auction for a controlling stake in CITGO, a subsidiary of Venezuela's state-owned oil company, by paying nearly half of its market value.21

Neo-Royalism, which prioritizes Trump's wishes above all else, is also influencing the NSS and the NDS. Since Trump hopes to achieve diplomatic success through a major deal with Xi Jinping, the NSS no longer mentions China's problematic behavior disregarding international rules. It also avoids mentioning Taiwan. This is considered to be due more to the consideration not to hinder Trump's deal with China, which would be his personal achievement, than to the ideology of restraint or an appeasing stance toward China. Eliot Cohen makes the point that the NDS is not strategic because it contains 47 compliments to Trump and five photos of him, and that loyalty to Trump takes precedence over national strategy.22

4. In Lieu of Conclusion: Concerns about Implications for the Future

How will the direction of Trump's foreign and security policy affect US security? The achievement of persuading NATO member nations to agree to increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP by 2035 (including 1.5% for infrastructure and other areas) is regarded as a success of Trump's diplomacy. However, this should not be construed as a definitive diplomatic triumph, as it is due not only to Europe's proactive stance in maintaining the alliance but also to its emphasizing self-reliance, motivated by concerns about US commitment. The growing distrust among European allies, due to, among other things, Trump's comments about Greenland, could have serious long-term implications for US defense and security.

The Trump administration prioritizes its commitment to Indo-Pacific security over Europe. The Biden administration succeeded in deepening US-European cooperation on support for Ukraine and in involving European allies in efforts to check China. But Trump 2.0's underrating of Europe is a cause for concern, for it is pushing Europe toward improving relations with China.23

Under the Trump administration, which is characterized by strong anti-liberal conservative nationalism, Secretary of War Hegseth dismissed top military officials who endorsed liberal values, creating tension in the civil-military relationship that has traditionally respected military professionalism and independence. This could pose a long-term risk of discouraging military solidarity and morale.24

Neo-Royalist spending and investment in such plans whose military rationality is questionable not only lowers military morale but also poses a risk to the United States' ability to build effective military power. Projects like the military parade staged on Trump's birthday, and the "Trump-class battleship initiative" estimated to cost around $9 billion, are being questioned on grounds of fiscal and military rationality.25 In addition, Trump's so-called "dole-out policy" to US troops—the $1,776-worth "Warrior Dividend" funded by tariff revenues—is justified as honoring America's founding year (1776). Estimated at a total cost of $2.57 billion, such irrational spending highlights the lack of strategy in the defense budgets under the Trump administration rather than encouraging troop morale.26

Despite championing "America First," the second Trump administration's foreign and security policy appears to be dominated by elements that could undermine US security and prosperity in the long term.

(Written as of February 28, 2026, Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation)

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