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The Second Trump Administration and Japan-US Relations:
Viewed by a Former Practitioner of Diplomacy

Koji Tomita

Former President Donald Trump won the US presidential election on November 5, 2024 (local time). His second administration will be inaugurated in January next year. In this article, I will discuss the challenges of building a relationship with the new administration from the perspective of a diplomat involved in managing Japan-US relations. The following discussion is an inference based on my experience as a diplomat and does not reflect the current position of the Japanese government.

1. Practical Issues of the Transition of Power

During my tenure at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I was involved in the work associated with the transition of power in the United States on more than one occasion. I experienced this work in the relevant department of the MOFA at the inauguration of the Clinton administration in 1993 and the Obama administration in 2009 and as the Japanese ambassador to the United States when the Biden administration took office in 2021.

Through these experiences, I have keenly felt that while there is a fundamental continuity in US policy toward Japan, there are no identical administrations. Each administration is led by a different leader and faces domestic and international issues within varying policy environments and priorities. Although the decision-making process appears to work under the same system, the dynamics driving it differ from administration to administration.

For this reason, building a relationship with a new administration must start from scratch with each change in administration. There are "essential actions" that must be taken when dealing with any administration. Specifically, they include:

  1. Build personal relationships and open lines of communication at all levels of government, including the summit level.
  2. Align the fundamental concerns of both sides in managing the relationship and identify issues to address as priorities.
  3. In conjunction with a policy review by the new administration, coordinate views on individual key policies.

The contents of the above "essential actions" are self-evident, but how smoothly they will proceed will depend on the speed at which the new administration builds its setup and the level of concerns it has in the relationship with Japan. In my experience, the smoothest progress was possible when the Biden administration took office. There are several reasons for this.

The foremost factor was the appointment of former Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell as the newly established National Security Council (NSC) Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs. It became a great asset for the Japanese side to have secured a counterpart with profound expertise in Japan-U.S. relations at the nucleus of the US government's policy-making section instantaneously as the new administration took office. I arrived in Washington as a new Japanese ambassador about a week after the presidential inauguration. Only a few days later, I could begin discussions with Mr. Campbell on major guidelines for managing the bilateral relationship. Much of the credit belongs to him that a cooperative relationship started at an unprecedented speed, such as Prime Minister Suga's visit to Washington shortly after the Biden administration started.

The second factor was a coincidence between the two governments on fundamental policy concerns. The Biden administration's biggest concern on the diplomatic front was the management of relations with China and the restoration of diplomatic engagement with the country, which had receded during the Trump administration. In addressing these challenges, it was natural and consistent with Japan's interests that the Biden administration emphasized partnership with Japan, a major country and ally in the Indo-Pacific region. It is against this backdrop of shared interests that, from an early stage following the start of the Biden administration, the two partners were quick to establish a framework not only to strengthen the alliance cooperation but also to propel cooperation in regional initiatives such as QUAD.

2. The Trump Administration's Policy Concerns and Japan's Basic Goals

Meanwhile, President-elect Trump will begin his second administration with policy concerns that may be significantly different from those of the Biden Administration.

The incoming Trump administration's support base is a constellation of diverse interest groups, including the MAGA movement, a mass organization supporting Trump, supporters in the business world represented by Elon Musk, and various stakeholders and organizations pursuing conservative agendas. Consequently, the policy goals that the new administration is to pursue are not necessarily consistent, but they can be roughly summarized as follows.

  1. Pledges to MAGA, the source of the President-elect's political power (Forced deportation of illegal immigrants, protection of domestic industries through the construction of tariff barriers, etc.)
  2. Rollback of progressive policies such as DEI and climate change (Abolition of progressive deregulation such as administrative reform through the so-called DOGE process, etc.)
  3. Creation of a business-friendly policy environment (Making permanent the 2017 tax cuts, deregulation in the energy sector, etc.)
  4. Promotion of "America first" diplomacy (Appropriate burden of alliance cooperation, withdrawal from multilateral cooperation not instrumental to the national interests, etc.)

It is unforeseeable at this point how these policy goals will affect Japan-US relations. The administration has just begun nominating cabinet candidates; congressional approval is also unpredictable; the administration's setup is still not visible. It is also unclear how the new administration, which will call for breaking the status quo, will reconcile with other stakeholders (Congress, bureaucracy, the justice). We must keep in mind the time limitations associated with the fact that this administration cannot continue beyond a single term.

With these reservations, I believe that the basic goals Japan should aim for in its relationship with the incoming Trump administration may be found in the following five points.

First, maintain the fundamental soundness and resilience of the Japan-US alliance. This should be a priority in any relationship with any US administration. Yet, it is especially significant now that the incoming administration, under the banner of "America first," has demonstrated an attitude of not taking previous commitments for granted.

Second, ensure that the US commitment to security in East Asia be maintained. US engagement with regional destabilizing factors such as China, the Taiwan Strait, the Korean Peninsula, and Russia, as well as its commitment to building a "free and open Indo-Pacific region," continues to be of vital importance to Japan.

Third, ensure that the rights and interests of our people and businesses are appropriately protected. Similarly, it is crucial to ensure that unilateral and unjust measures against Japan's trade and investment interests are not taken under the banner of "America first" and that if the incoming administration takes such measures, we must strive to remove them swiftly.

Fourth, persuade the United States to continue its global diplomatic engagement. For Japan to maintain a favorable international order, it is crucial that the United States continues to play a leading role. In cooperation with other like-minded countries, we should strive to ensure that the second Trump administration does not withdraw from diplomatic engagement by deepening its isolationist trend.

Fifth, prevent the momentum of multilateral cooperation from being lost due to the regression of US engagement. Multilateral collaboration will continue to be essential to resolve global issues, including climate change. Even if the new Trump administration distances itself from multilateral frameworks, Japan should join forces with other countries to ensure that international cooperation does not stagnate.

3. The Immediate "To Do" List

Before the second Trump administration takes office, it is too early to discuss specific measures to achieve the above basic goals. However, from a practical perspective, it is significant to craft a "to-do" list of specific measures to be taken in the future, which may include the following:

(1) Building personal relationships (opening communication channels)

When commencing practical relations, the primary prerequisite is to build personal relationships and open communication channels practically at all levels between the governments and with the broad network of people surrounding the administration. The progress of this task will depend on how quickly the new administration's setup emerges. We should swiftly establish institutional relationships with the government departments primarily responsible for managing bilateral relations (the White House, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, etc.).

In this context, one of the significances of establishing the National Security Secretariat (NSS) in 2014 is the creation of an organization that will serve as a counterpart to the US National Security Council (NSC). As a result, a continuing and stable line of communication has been established between the Secretary General of NSS and the US National Security Advisor and between their respective staff. Following the advent of the second Trump administration, cooperation between the NSS and the NSC will continue to play a central role in policy coordination.

Establishing a personal relationship between the leaders is also essential for the smooth management of bilateral relations. In particular, since the new administration will likely be a "top-down" one led by President Trump, it is crucial to arrange as soon as possible an opportunity for Prime Minister Ishiba and President Trump to meet face-to-face and build a personal relationship of trust.

On the other hand, it is neither realistic nor appropriate to rely entirely on the personal relationship between the leaders to manage the relationship. It is of primary importance to improve a cooperative system to support the leaders.

(2) Crafting a narrative to set the tone for bilateral relations

In building personal relationships with the new Trump administration, including one between the leaders, discussions will be necessary to set the tone for managing bilateral relations. In this regard, the Japanese side should prepare a narrative elaborating on the importance of bilateral relationships to both sides without taking it for granted, given that the new administration's policy concerns are changing significantly. In doing so, it is vital to avoid abstract language as much as possible and to concretely demonstrate the practical benefits that bilateral relations bring to both sides, given that the new administration aims for an "America first" and "deal" diplomacy.

For example, regarding Japan-US economic cooperation, it is necessary for the Japanese side to craft a narrative that helps the second Trump administration deepen its understanding of the contributions of Japanese businesses to the US economy, given the possibility that the new administration may unilaterally implement trade measures such as tariffs to protect domestic industries. The narrative should emphasize in particular that while US corporations have been moving their production bases overseas since the 1990s, Japanese companies have, on the contrary, promoted local production in America, playing a substantial role in halting the decline of the US manufacturing industry—they are still actively making direct investments across the country. During the days of the first Trump administration, Japan took various opportunities to explain these things to President Trump and his administration officials. It will be necessary for the Japanese side to continue efforts to persuade them.

Trump has effectively returned to power after a four-year hiatus. The "institutional memory" in bilateral diplomatic relations about the close dialogue and cooperation that evolved under the first Trump administration may be fading. Both governments' efforts regarding the issue of North Korea's nuclear development and economic security are concrete examples of such cooperation; both governments also held in-depth discussions on the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" initiative. Japan should recall the UN side of these achievements through future dialogues and impress upon the new administration that Japan is a trustworthy partner.

(3) Bracing for "frictions"

While striving to set the tone for bilateral relations as described above, Japan should also consider how to deal with potential "frictions" that may arise with the new administration.

One of the "frictions" foreseeable now is the likelihood that the new administration will make specific demands regarding Japan's defense efforts. As mentioned above, if we seek understanding on the US side regarding our efforts of expanding defense capabilities as we set a tone for bilateral relations, the new administration may assert that the Japanese government should secure a minimum of 2% of GDP for defense spending to bear the burden of security costs equitably with other US allies, since the new administration aims to secure an appropriate burden sharing with a broad array of its allies, including NATO member states. In that case, we cannot exclude the possibility that the US side will ask for a further increase in our defense budget, or otherwise, a minute examination of the content of the "2%."

What Japan should avoid in this context is to allow this issue to turn into a "matter of numbers." To that end, we should create a discussion foundation highlighting the importance of the Japan-US alliance in Japan's defense and the peace and stability of East Asia. Furthermore, we should stress that alliance cooperation, including defense technology cooperation and equipment procurement, benefits the United States. As for the so-called "Alliance Resilience Budget" related to the stationing of US forces in Japan, the current agreement will expire during the new Trump administration; we need to consider the negotiation policy to conclude a new one.

Another area where we need to be wary of potential "friction" with the incoming Trump administration is ​​trade and investment. Trump was quick to articulate that the new administration would not hesitate to resort to unilateral trade measures, such as tariffs, to secure US interests. Many fear that the activities of foreign companies in the US market will be subject to discriminatory treatment under its "America first" policy.

At this point, there is no discernible move on the US side to introduce measures directly targeting Japan. However, President-elect Trump has already hinted at imposing 10% to 20% tariffs on goods from all trading partners. As was the case during the first Trump administration when applying Section 232 of the Trade Act on steel and aluminum product imports, sector-wise measures could also cause damage. Furthermore, when the incoming administration comes up with some measures against third countries, if they target countries such as China, Mexico, and Vietnam, where Japanese companies produce products and parts destined for the United States, Japan may also be indirectly affected.

During the first Trump administration, Japan aimed to develop amicable and reciprocal economic relations with the United States, refraining from taking countermeasures in the steel and aluminum product issue while successfully concluding a bilateral trade agreement with the United States to minimize the impact of the US withdrawal from the TPP treaty. Japan, assumingly, will aim to maintain a peaceful relationship with the second administration; yet, depending on its actions, there is the likelihood that Japan will be obliged to take a severe position, including resorting to countermeasures.

In dealing with the new administration, Japan should strengthen public-private cooperation more than ever to make "all-Japan" efforts. The Japanese government should upgrade its efforts to support Japanese companies.

(4) Identifying potential areas of cooperation

While bracing for the above "frictions," it is also of cardinal importance to identify areas of cooperation that will provide impetus for bilateral cooperation. In doing so, there is no need to assume that all cooperative efforts in each field promoted under the Biden administration will be suspended; Japan should call for discussions on those projects that need to be pursued depending on their significance.

Furthermore, it is also vital to explore cooperation projects that correspond to the policy concerns of the new administration. At this point, it is hard to identify specific fields, but strengthening cooperation in the energy sector may be one possibility. The new administration aims to increase oil and natural gas production through deregulation. But, if they fail to secure sales channels commensurate with new investments, the response from the industry side may remain weak. In this situation, should a cooperation project that enables Japan to secure a stable energy supply from America at a fair price be realized, it will contribute to building a "win-win" relationship with the new administration.

In addition, with competition with China for technological hegemony in mind, the new administration will likely continue to be interested in cooperation with Japan on the science and technology front. Cooperation in advanced technology areas such as AI, advanced semiconductors, quantum and biotechnologies, and space will help strengthen our relationship with the new administration.

(5) Cooperation with third countries

The advent of the second Trump administration is expected to influence international relations in general. To appropriately deal with such impacts, we must also consider cooperation with third countries. Of course, this response of ours is not intended to "gang up" on the new administration; we must be careful not to invite such misunderstandings from the US side.

In advancing cooperation with third countries, Japan must first improve communication with G7 members. This is self-evident because of the urgency of dealing with the Ukraine conflict and because the G7 is instrumental in securing US diplomatic engagement. Cooperation with the G7 will also be indispensable for Japan to deal with the supposed actions of the new Trump administration, such as demands for fair burden sharing with allies and unilateral trade measures.

However, in cooperation with the G7 countries, Japan's ultimate goal should be to maintain the unity and effectiveness of the cooperation process while securing US involvement. Consequently, if the rift between the United States and Europe becomes more serious, as was the case during the first Trump administration, Japan may be required to serve as a go-between.

As for multilateral processes other than the G7, such as the United Nations, G20, and APEC, we will likely witness a decline in US involvement and difficulties in shaping a consensus under the new Trump administration. Here, too, Japan will likely be required to endeavor to maintain the unity and effectiveness of each framework.

In addition to cooperation with the G7 countries, Japan should propel cooperation with US allies in the Indo-Pacific region, such as Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. In this regard, maintaining defense cooperation, which improved under the Biden administration, will be a crucial theme. The legacy of the Biden administration—QUAD and the Japan-US-South Korea summit process—is also an important step toward realizing the FOIP, and it will be likewise important for Japan to cooperate with related countries to ensure their continuation.

Regarding Japan's relations with the so-called Global South, if US involvement recedes, Japan should play a complementary role.

China, Russia, North Korea, and others could make various approaches to Japan with the ulterior motive of driving a wedge between Japan and the United States. Japan does not have to reject dialogue with them. However, it must behave cautiously, trying to identify their true intentions.

(6) Key Policies Coordination

The issues discussed above are "initial responses" from the Japanese side toward the start of the second Trump administration. As the new administration's setup emerges and the policy review progresses, Japan must coordinate key policies with them. Specific priority areas include China (including the Taiwan Strait), the Korean Peninsula, Russia, and the Middle East (including Iran and Middle East Peace). It will be beneficial to deepen dialogue in other areas while building personal relationships between government ministries or bureaus responsible for policy-making.

Specific guidelines for such adjustment are beyond the scope of this article. The important thing is to articulate our country's views on each policy issue and create an atmosphere of working together on various challenges. In this way, we could lead the cooperative relationship with the new administration to a more constructive one.

(Former Ambassador to the United States)

(Translation by Tsutomu Inuzuka)

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