proposal

Considering Economic Security Focusing on Food and Energy Security1

Takashi Sekiyama

1. Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine caused great confusion to the stable supply of food and energy in the world. Japan has been compelled to recognize the importance of ensuring stable food and energy supplies.

Food security and energy security are ramifications of economic security. The meaning of economic security varies widely depending on who discusses it. However, the greatest common denominator in discussions found in literature at home and abroad from past to present is: economic security is to "safeguard the survival of a state and its people, its sovereign independence, and its economic prosperity from threats such as disruptions in the supply of vital materials, the outflow of crucial advanced technologies, and excessive dependence on other countries." (Sekiyama, 2025)

Food and energy are essential, vital materials. Undoubtedly, there are particular challenges and backgrounds involved in the stable supply of foods and energies. Yet, whether they are foods such as wheat, energy resources such as oil and natural gas, or industrial products such as semiconductors, disruptions in the supply of these goods and excessive dependence on other countries for them would uniformly threaten the survival of a state and its people, its sovereign dependence, and its economic prosperity.

There are two approaches to ensure economic security: defensive measures shielding a state from sanctions and intimidation from potential hostile states and offensive measures to deter hostile acts by other states (Sekiyama, 2025).

Defensive measures will aim to diversify the supply sources of vital materials or supply chains. Diplomatic efforts to maintain a free and open international economic system will also be a prerequisite. A certain amount of stockpiling is necessary to prepare for temporary supply disruptions. As for vital materials that are hard to stockpile or replace due to the limited supply sources, it is essential to ensure strategic autonomy without excessive dependence on other countries.

Meanwhile, as offensive measures, it is crucial to ensure strategic indispensability that would allow a state to counter or deter hostile acts from other states by developing products and services essential to the industrial structure of the entire international community. To this end, developing advanced key technologies and preventing their outflow are significant economic security measures.

This paper discusses Japan's food and energy security from the economic security perspective. Given Japan's low self-sufficiency rate in terms of food and energy, an overriding discussion will be on defensive measures to deal with the disruption of food and energy supplies.

2. Japan's Food Security

(1) Definition and Threats

The Basic Law on Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas, providing the basic guidelines of agricultural policy, was revised in May 2024. One of the cardinal points of the revision is "strengthening food security." The revised law defines Japan's food security as a state in which "a stable supply of good-quality food at reasonable prices shall be secured for the future." (Article 2)

Japan's food self-sufficiency rate is low at 38%, but in a sense, it reflects that Japan imports a great variety of food materials from all over the world, and the Japanese people enjoy sumptuous diets. In other words, the ratio of domestic products chosen by Japanese consumers is 38% (Masayoshi Homma, 2024). Therefore, if we try forcefully to increase the food self-sufficiency rate, we will have to sacrifice consumers' "food preferences" or impose unnecessary cost burdens on the people.

In developed countries like Japan, we should distinguish food security in peacetime and in times of emergency. In peacetime, it is necessary to maintain an environment where we can stably obtain various food materials from around the world at reasonable prices, in addition to domestic production of good-quality food.

Meanwhile, in preparation for emergencies in which food procurement at home and from abroad stagnates for some reason, we must prepare a food supply system separate from one in peacetime. In addition to a certain amount of stockpiling, we must also have a system to realize food self-sufficiency in times of emergency.

In the following, we will summarize challenges to food security in peacetime and in times of emergency, focusing on securing stable imports, stockpiling, and maintaining self-sufficiency from the perspective presented at the outset, common to all ramifications of economic security.

(2) Securing Stable Imports: Food Security in Peacetime

In peacetime, we must maintain an environment where we can obtain a necessary variety of food materials from overseas at reasonable prices. For this purpose, it is essential that global food production and food trade function in a stable manner. Regarding production materials, such as fertilizer and feed, Japan depends heavily on imports from overseas.

Maintaining the free trade system is essential for the stability of food trade. The World Trade Organization (WTO) has long been dysfunctional; Japan must endeavor to maintain free trade in cooperation with the WTO and other international organizations and through trade negotiations.

We must also maintain close and friendly economic relations with major food-exporting countries. In 2022, Japan's imports of agricultural, forestry, and fishery products came from, among other countries, the United States (18.2% of total imports), China (12.3%), Australia (6.1%), Canada (6.0%) and Thailand (5.5%); these five countries alone account for about half of total imports (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2023). To lessen the risk of intentional export restrictions by potentially hostile states or of reduced harvests and catches due to natural disasters, it is desirable to diversify import partners as much as possible.

No substantial change in global food production will occur in the next 5 to 10 years. The countries exporting grains to Japan, such as the United States and Canada, produce 200% to 300% of domestic demand; it is unlikely that their exports to Japan will cease.

To import the necessary amount of food from overseas at a reasonable price over the mid- to long-term (20 to 30 years), Japan should, as a premise, maintain sufficient economic power. However, Japan's economic power may relatively decline over the next 20 to 30 years. If that actually happens, coupled with the weak yen due to Japan's declining economic power and the increase of poor households, Japan will face difficulties importing the necessary amount of food from overseas at a reasonable price (Inagaki, 2024).

Among the conditions for stable food production is adaptation to climate change. According to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the unit yield of crops (harvest amount per unit area) may decrease by 2.3% for corn, 3.3% for soybeans, 0.7% for rice, and 1.3% for wheat over the next 10 years. Due to climate change, those unit yields may decrease by 1-3% per decade, but, on the other hand, recent technology improvements have achieved a unit yield increase of 1-2% per year. Consequently, there is much likelihood that global food production could adapt to climate change through improvements in crop varieties and technology (OECD, 2023).

However, if climate change causes more severe and frequent meteorological disasters such as droughts, food production may become unstable in much of the world, and international food prices may rise frequently. Under such circumstances, if Japan's economic power were to decline, the country could face a severe food situation.

(3) Stockpiling and Maintaining Food Self-Sufficiency: Food Security Measures in Preparation for Emergencies

To prepare for emergencies where food is temporarily not procurable, stockpiling and maintaining food self-sufficiency are essential safeguards.

Today, Japan has a government rice stockpile of about 1 million tons. In recent years, the annual domestic demand has been lingering at about 8 million tons; the current government stockpile corresponds to about 1.5 months' demand. In addition, about 2.3 months of food wheat and about 1 million tons of feed grains (corn, etc.) are also stockpiled (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2024a). Even if food imports to Japan stopped, domestic demand would be satisfied by these stockpiles for one to two months.

Estimating the appropriate amount to stockpile is challenging. However, given that energy stockpiles will last more than 90 days, it is advisable to stockpile food for over 90 days.

The Act on Countermeasures for Situations of Difficulty in Food Supply, enacted in 2024 in conjunction with the amendment of the Basic Law on Food, Agriculture, and Rural Areas, allows the government to instruct agricultural producers to increase production in the event of a worldwide crop failure or emergencies that would make it extremely difficult to secure food (ex. rice and wheat). If producers do not comply, they will have their names publicized or be subject to fines.

That said, agricultural production cannot be increased responsively to address an emergency. Increasing it would involve more farmland, more agricultural materials, and more agricultural workers. Maintaining and securing agricultural productivity is also essential to ensure food security in the event of an emergency.

Another alarming issue is the significant decline and aging of the agricultural workforce. The number of core workers (mainly engaged in family-operated farming as their daily job), which was 2.4 million in 2000, has decreased to 1.16 million in 2023, and more than 70% of them are aged 65 or older. (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2024b)

The decline and aging of the agricultural workforce also lead to the degradation of farmland. As of 2022, the utilization rate of the approximately 4.3 million hectares of cultivated land was 91%―nearly 10% of the farmland is left unused (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2024c). Once abandoned and degraded, it takes about five years to restore farmland to a state suited to growing crops. To ensure the productivity of Japanese agriculture, the maintenance and preservation of farmland is a priority issue.

It would pose no problem if the decline in agricultural workers and farmland could be offset by increased productivity. However, Japan's agri-labor productivity has been declining on average at minus 1.1% since 2010. During the past two decades, rice and wheat unit yields in Japan did not increase; soybean unit yields tended to decline. During this period, the United States has increased rice and soybean unit yields; Brazil has increased soybean unit yields; and China has increased wheat unit yields.

As many have noted, one of the factors behind these differences is that Japanese agricultural workers have a lower willingness to improve productivity and a lower cost-consciousness to increase profits compared to those in other countries where agriculture is performed as a corporate business. (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2022). To increase entrants to agriculture and to attract productivity-raising investment in advanced agri-technology and new crop varieties, it is necessary to have more motivated and capital-rich entities, including corporations, participate in agricultural business.

To improve agricultural management, the government should mitigate control measures for rice cultivation and regulations on farmland ownership. For example, imagine all paddy fields across the country being planted with varieties with unit yields comparable to those of California rice; then, it would be possible to produce about 17 million tons of rice annually (Yamashita, 2023). During the Pacific War, a period of food scarcity, the standard daily rice ration per adult male per day was two ‘go' and two ‘shaku' (330 grams). Imagine again this amount of rice each provided for the current Japanese population of 120 million; even in that case, the total rice amount would not reach 15 million tons. It is also vital to increase the proportion of domestic wheat and soybean production in the total amount of these crops, of which supply depends heavily on imports from overseas; possible solutions in this context may include converting paddy fields for the cultivation of these crops and increasing their production in Hokkaido. Increasing rice unit yields and domestic production of wheat and soybeans would enable the people to avoid starvation in times of emergency.

3. Japan's Energy Security

(1) Definition and Threats

The 2010 Annual Report on Energy by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry defines Japan's energy security as "being able to secure energy in the ‘quantity' necessary for people's lives, economic and social activities, and national defense, etc. at affordable ‘prices.'" With low energy self-sufficiency, Japan relies on imports for much of its energy supplies; there is no guarantee for Japan to be able to secure sufficient amounts of energy. Japan must make constant efforts to secure energy in all eventualities.

A decade or two from now, Japan's home energy demand is likely to decrease due to population decline and progress in power saving and energy conservation technology. In the industrial sector, on the other hand, a significant increase in energy demand is predicted due to the construction of new data centers and semiconductor factories.

Japan's self-sufficiency for oil, coal, and natural gas is nearly nil. If it becomes unable to import sufficient amounts of energy at affordable prices, first, the prices of electricity, city gas, gasoline, etc., which use those items as fuels and raw materials, will rise; then price hikes will result for all goods and services, adversely affecting the people's lives and economic and social activities.

Then, how could Japan secure the necessary amounts of energy at affordable prices? Let us discuss this question from the perspective presented at the outset, common to all ramifications of economic security.

(2) Diversification of Import Partners

First, it is significant to diversify import partners to avoid the situation in which a contingency in an import partner country would result in trouble. Japan's diversification of energy sources and import partners has progressed much compared to the past. According to the 2024 Annual Report on Energy, the proportion of oil in primary energy has dropped significantly from 75.5% in 1973 to 36.1% in 2022; in particular, oil accounts for only 8.2% of power sources. Instead, coal and natural gas account for 25.8% and 21.5%, respectively, of primary energy. Regarding these two energy items, Japan's main import partners are Australia (66.0% of coal and 42.9% of natural gas), Indonesia, Malaysia, the United States, and Canada.

As for crude oil import sources, Japan's dependence on the Middle East reached 95.2% (FY2022). Their diversification has been a long-standing challenge for Japan's energy security, but there are few alternative options.

Besides the Middle East, alternative sources of crude oil imports are Indonesia and other oil-producing countries in Southeast Asia. However, since oil demand in these countries is increasing as their economy develops, Japan's crude oil imports from the region have sharply decreased in recent years.

The United States, which has become the world's top oil producer thanks to its shale oil production, lifted its ban on oil exports in 2015. However, US shale oil is different in properties from Middle Eastern crude oil used by many Japanese refineries, causing a mismatch in crude oil properties required by Japanese refineries. US shale oil is not necessarily a promising alternative for Japan (Kutani, 2019).

Before it invaded Ukraine, Russia was one of Japan's sources of crude oil imports, accounting for about 10% of its total imports. Russia possesses untapped crude oil resources in Eastern Siberia and its Far Eastern region; crude oil imports from Russia could increase if circumstances permit (ibid). For Russia, the Asian market overweighs the European market, which used to be Russia's chief destination for its crude oil exports. But now, in Europe, there is a decline in fossil fuel demand due to decarbonization and a move to avoid dependence on Russian crude oil. Importing Russian crude oil benefits Japan because of its cheap transportation costs and shorter transportation time. However, under the current international situation featuring the division between the US/Europe and China/Russia, Japan must carefully consider whether increasing dependence on Russia will contribute to Japan's security, including energy security.

(3) Stockpiling

A certain amount of stockpiling helps prepare for possible temporary disruptions in energy supplies. In Japan, stockpiling of oil and LPG is mandatory by law. As of the end of May 2024, there is a total of 239 days' worth of oil reserves, consisting of 142 days' worth of national stockpiles, 89 days' worth of private ones, and 8 days' worth of joint stockpiles with oil-producing countries. There is also a sum of about 110 days' worth of LPG stock, consisting of 53.1 days' worth of national stockpiles and 58.6 days' worth of private stockpiles. (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 2024a, b)

Natural gas is impossible to store for long periods due to its volatility; there is no obligation to stockpile it. Japan's LNG stock as of the end of March 2024 was 3.95 million tons; over the past 10 years, it has changed between 3 million and 6 million tons (JOGMEC, 2024). Since LNG imports in fiscal 2022 were 70.55 million tons, the stock was equivalent to approximately 15 to 30 days' worth of imports.

There is no obligation to stockpile coal; Japan's coal stock is approximately 30 days' worth (Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, 2018). Likewise, there is no obligation to stockpile uranium fuel for nuclear power generation. Uranium fuel in a reactor can generate electricity for over a year without needing replacement; it has a certain effect of stockpiling.

It is difficult to answer how many days' worth of stockpiles should be available in preparation for an emergency, but the IEA requires member countries to hold more than 90 days' worth of oil stock. Given this, it would be desirable to hold stockpiles comprising oil, non-oil energy resources, and their alternatives to provide for more than 90 days' worth of primary energy.

(4) Reducing Excessive Dependence on Other Countries

However, as long as the current energy supply structure continues to rely on overseas sources for a large part of energy supplies, Japan's energy security will be at the mercy of international price hikes and exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, Japan will conceivably be unable to secure necessary energy supplies in an emergency. The only way to overcome this situation is to drastically increase energy production at home.

Renewable energies―solar, wind, hydroelectric, and geothermal―are energy resources not dependent on imports from overseas. A wide use of renewable energies is desirable not only as climate change countermeasures but also for ensuring energy security. The 2024 Annual Report on Energy also points to the significance of further introducing renewable energies in light of energy security.

It is not that solar and wind power energies, which will spread on a large scale in the future, are free from concerns. They are unstable due to their dependence on weather conditions. The utilization rates of power generation facilities (2022) using these renewables were low: 16% for solar energy (land-based facilities for business use) and 28% for wind power energy (Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, 2024b). If unstable renewable power sources increase, the balance between electricity usage and supply will collapse, leading to voltage and frequency disturbances and sometimes causing adverse effects on equipment and power outages.

To use these unstable renewables for power generation, we should always balance power supply and demand by storing electricity. However, with current technology, it is hard to store large quantities of electricity at low costs. Therefore, for the time being, a stable backup power source will be needed to compensate for electricity shortage stemming from unstable renewable energy generation.

As a stable backup power source with a fuel storage effect, nuclear power generation is a worthwhile option, with the proviso of regular safety checks. The operation of nuclear power plants will entail efforts on the government side to dispel local concerns about their safety, thereby obtaining local consent. Following the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant accident, the Nuclear Regulation Authority made nuclear-plant safety standards stricter to include counterterrorism measures and preparations for volcanic eruptions and other unpredictable major accidents. For resource-short Japan's energy security, nuclear power is something not to dispense with.

4. Summary

This paper has discussed Japan's food and energy security from the economic security perspective. Food security and energy security are positioned as economic security ramifications. Since Japan relies on imports for a large part of its food and energy supplies, disruptions in those supplies and excessive dependency on other countries could threaten the survival of the state and its people, its sovereign independence, and its economic prosperity. Consequently, we must ensure a stable trade system from peacetime and in preparation for emergencies, diversify import sources, achieve a certain amount of stockpiling, and create a self-sufficiency regime. Japan depends on maritime transport to carry most of its imports; its sea lanes are the country's lifeline. Securing the safety of sea lanes is, therefore, an important theme, which this paper did not discuss due to space limitations. Ensuring Japan's food and energy security necessitates cooperation with related countries and a nationwide discussion on improving the ability of the domestic economy and society.

(Professor, Kyoto University)

References

  • Economist Impact. (2022). Global Food Security Index 2022.
  • FAO. (2006). Food Security, FAO Policy Brief, June 2006 Issue 2.
  • IEA. (2024). Glossary.
  • IPCC. (2023). Report of Working Group II of the Sixth Assessment Report.
  • JOGMEC (2024). Trend of Natural Gas and LNG Prices (July 2024).
  • OECD. (2023). OECD-FAO Agricultural Outlook 2023-2032.
  • Kimio Inagaki (2024). "Risk Scenarios Threatening ‘Food Security,'" Mitsubishi Research Institute Inc. ed., The Future of Food and Agriculture, June 5, 2024.
  • Ichiro Kutani. (2019). "Changes in the Environment Surrounding Japan's Energy Security," Overseas Investment, May 2019 issue, p.14-17.
  • Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. (2010). 2010 Annual Report on Energy.
  • -----. (2024). 2024 Annual Report on Energy.
  • -----. (2024b). Opinions on Procurement Prices etc. from FY2024 Onwards.
  • -----. (2022). Trends Surrounding Raw Fuels for Electricity and Gas.
  • Hiroto Kobayashi. (2024). "Geoeconomics of the North-South Sea Lanes as the Focus of Japan-US-Australia-Philippines Defense Cooperation," Foresight, April 25, 2024.
  • Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. (2024a). Current Status of Oil Stockpiling.
  • -----. (2024b). Current Status of LP Gas Stockpiling.
  • -----. (2018). Reconsidering the Role of Coal in Japan.
  • Takashi Sekiyama. (2025). "How to Balance the Economy and Safety in Economic Security?" Masahiro Akiyama et al. (eds.), Japan's National Security, Nikkei Publishing, p.313-331.
  • Kunio Tsubota. (2022). "Food Security: Rethinking the Trends in the International Community," Bulletin of the Nippon Agricultural Research Institute, 35, p.25-76.
  • Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 2024a. On Japan's Agricultural Product Stockpiles.
  • -----. (2024b). Annual Report on Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas in Japan FY 2023.
  • -----. (2024c). Aggregate Planted Area of Crops and Arable Land Utilization Rate in FY2022.
  • -----. (2023). Overview of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Product Imports and Exports in FY2022.
  • -----. (2022). Changes in the Situation Surrounding Japan's Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas.
  • Masayoshi Homma (2024). "Abolishing Farmland Restrictions to Improve Efficiency," Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 5, 2024.
  • Kazuhito Yamashita (2023). "Food Security―Japan's Fragility: Critical Situation Revealed by the Russian Invasion of Ukraine," Jiji.com, February 23, 2023.
proposal
current topics
letter