proposal

The Camp David Summit and U.S.-Japan-ROK Security Cooperation:
Tasks for the "Trilateral 2.0" as the Northeast Asia Hub in the Indo-Pacific1

Yasuyo Sakata

Introduction: Integrating the Indo-Pacific and Northeast Asia

The three leaders at Camp David Summit in August 2023 heralded a "new era," a "new chapter" in the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral relationship, to bring it up to "new heights":

President Joseph Biden: "this is a new era in partnership between Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States."

President Yoon Suk-yeol: "we, the three leaders, held the very first standalone trilateral summit marking a new chapter in our trilateral cooperation."

Prime Minister Kishida Fumio: ".....to make our trilateral strategic collaboration blossom and bloom is only logical and almost inevitable and is required in this era. .....the coordination between the Japan-U.S. and the U.S.-ROK alliances will be reinforced, and trilateral security cooperation will be brought to a new height." (italics added)2

This "new era" or the Camp David era of the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral cooperation can be called the "Trilateral 2.0." If the origins for the trilateral are in the Cold War era (since the Korean War) ("0.0") and post-Cold War era is "1.0," the 2020s today can be "2.0."

The U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral 2.0 has now been embedded as part of the Indo-Pacific security network, or what U.S. officials referred to as a "latticework-like" structure3. It is a security architecture in the Indo-Pacific evolving from the U.S. "hub"-and-spokes network to the U.S.-led "hubs"-and-spokes network, in which not only the bilaterals (or spokes) with the U.S. (spokes), but other "hubs" (mini-laterals or pluri-laterals) such as the Quad, AUKUS, and the US-Japan-Australia, US-Japan-ROK, and US-Japan-Philippines are becoming integral parts of the network.

Prime Minister Kishida captured this moment in the Indo-Pacific in his speech to the Joint US Congress in April:

"Today, our partnership goes beyond the bilateral. Examples include trilateral and quadrilateral cooperation among the U.S., Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia, India, and the Philippines as well as cooperation through the G7 and with ASEAN. 4

He also highlighted the US-Japan-ROK trilateral summit at Camp David as part of the Indo-Pacific network: "The three leaders of the U.S., the Republic of Korea and Japan convened at Camp David last summer to inaugurate a new era of our partnership."5

The Camp David agreement successfully redefined the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral as an Indo-Pacific partnership. There are many new areas to engage in, from defense to economic and tech security, developmental cooperation, social and global issues fit for the "new era." This article focuses on defense and security, a traditional area for the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral cooperation. The U.S.-Japan and the U.S.-ROK alliances have focused on Northeast Asia and the Korean peninsula since the Korean War and continues to do so today. In the post-Cold War era, development of North Korea's nuclear and missile program became the priority for the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral as we see it today. But as the rise of China became top priority, the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral began to drift in the 2000's, with a little re-boot in the 2010s, and "returned" as an Indo-Pacific coalition sealed at the Camp David summit. While there are many new issues to tackle on the Indo-Pacific agenda, including maritime security and the Taiwan Strait issue, it has yet to integrate the traditional trilateral Northeast Asia agenda, namely the Korean peninsula and North Korea issue, into the Indo-Pacific construct.

How to integrate the Indo-Pacific and Northeast Asia? That is the strategic question that the Trilateral 2.0 needs to consider. The author proposes that the U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral 2.0 to be conceived as a "Northeast Asia hub in the Indo-Pacific." To do so, three strategic dimensions, the Indo-Pacific, Northeast Asia, and the Korean Peninsula -Taiwan Strait nexus, will be examined. Some institutional aspects to adapt to the strategic dimensions will also be considered.

1. U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral in the Indo-Pacific via the Camp David Summit

(1) The Camp David Agreements: Confirming the Indo-Pacific Partnership

The Camp David agreements confirmed the basic tenets of the trilateral Indo-Pacific strategic partnership. There are three documents, the Camp David Principles6 (hereafter, "Principles"), the Joint Statement ("The Spirit of Camp David")7, and the Commitment to Consult. The Principles confirmed "a shared vision for our partnership as well as for the Indo-Pacific and beyond" and as "Indo-Pacific nations," Japan, ROK and the U.S. would "continue to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific based on a respect for international law, shared norms, and common values" and "strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo by force or coercion." In the Joint Statement, the three leaders agreed to "enhance strategic coordination between the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliances and bring our trilateral security cooperation to new heights."8 Among the defense and security issues, two strategic agendas will be highlighted, maritime security and the Korean peninsula/North Korea.

(2) Maritime Order and Maritime Security Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: The South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, ASEAN and the Pacific Islands

In the context of maritime order based on the "rule of law" and maritime security cooperation, the Joint Statement highlighted the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait as well as ASEAN and the Pacific Islands.

In the South China Sea, noting the problematic behavior of China, i.e., the "dangerous and aggressive behavior supporting unlawful maritime claims" by the People's Republic of China, the three countries vowed to "strongly oppose any unilateral attempts to change the status quo in the waters of the Indo-Pacific." The three leaders also reaffirmed "the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait as an indispensable element of security and prosperity in the international community," while confirming that there is "no change in our basic positions on Taiwan, and we call for a peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues" so as not to excessively antagonize China. Furthermore, ASEAN and the Pacific Islands were noted as target areas, not only for "sustainable" development cooperation and capacity-building assistance including the maritime domain, mentioning the "new Trilateral Maritime Security Cooperation Framework."

(3) North Korea and the Korean Peninsula issue

North Korea and the Korean peninsula issue came after the maritime issues in the Joint Statement. Previously, joint statements started with North Korea and the Korean peninsula, so this is a new pattern as an Indo-Pacific partnership. It shows that the trilateral is no longer a local, Korea-focused partnership but a regional, strategic partnership.

Several issues were highlighted in the Joint Statement. First and foremost, the North Korea nuclear and missile issue, in which the three countries reaffirmed their commitment to the "complete denuclearization of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)" and full implementation of the relevant UNSC sanctions resolutions. Cyber activities of the DPRK were another key issue, and a "new trilateral working group" was established. In parallel with sanctions, reestablishing dialogue with North Korea "without preconditions" was reconfirmed. Working toward resolution of North Korea human rights issues, including abductees, detainees and unrepatriated POWs were noted. Finally, support for "a unified Korean Peninsula that is free and at peace," was inserted, a first of its kind in a trilateral statement, in line with Camp David Principles of upholding the "rule of law" and shared values.

In deterrence and defense, the U.S. reaffirmed extended deterrence commitments, "backed by a full range of capabilities," to its allies, Japan and the ROK, two measures were highlighted. First, expediting the "real-time sharing of missile warning data" for North Korean missile launches, agreed to at the Phnom Penh summit in November 2022, was reconfirmed at Camp David, and later operationalized in December 2023. Secondly, "annual, named, multi-domain trilateral exercises on a regular basis" was newly agreed upon, to sustain defense cooperation and enhance joint operational capabilities. At the recent U.S.-Japan-ROK defense ministerial at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore in early June, it was announced that the new multi-domain exercise (air-naval-ground-space-cyber) named "Freedom Edge" will be conducted this summer. These trilateral exercises mainly toward North Korea, but increasingly intertwined with the broader Indo-Pacific operational context. The trilateral defense ministerial at Shangri-la mentioned conducting a "trilateral tabletop exercise (TTX) to discuss how to effectively deter and respond, based on various threats on the Korean Peninsula and in the Indo-Pacific region,9" another new measure.

2. U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral in Northeast Asia via the UNC and UN-related frameworks

(1) "Northeast Asia" limited to the Korean Peninsula

While the strategic concept of the Indo-Pacific has been embedded in the Camp David agreements, the concept of "Northeast Asia" is not used. But for the US-Japan-ROK trilateral, Northeast Asia has been the strategic focus since the Korean War. But even here there are differences between Japan's or the US-Japan alliance perceptions of Northeast Asia as compared to South Korea's or the US-ROK alliance perceptions. In short, Japan and the US-Japan alliance, Northeast Asia namely the "Far East clause" or Article Six in the 1960 US-Japan security treaty (Article One in the former 1951 treaty) includes Japan and its vicinities, including the Korean peninsula, Taiwan area, north of Philippines. ROK, on the other hand, tends to limit "Northeast Asia" to the Korean peninsula and its vicinities, though the US-ROK mutual defense treaty stipulates "Pacific" security as an objective.

This is due to the Korean War. Although the Korean War in 1950~53, was potentially a double contingency, fighting in Korea, while containing conflict over Taiwan, the conflict was successfully limited to the Korean Peninsula.

(2) "Revitalization" of UNC and the Establishment of ECC

The United Nations Command (UNC) structure was, in a broader context, established to support UN military activities in the "Far East" (Northeast Asia), but specifically limited to those on the Korean peninsula based on the UNSC resolutions in 1950~51. The UNC commanded by the U.S. Far East Command (then), fought the war and maintained peace on the Korean peninsula after the 1953 Armistice, continuing to this day. The legacy structure of the Korean War era, has been "revitalized" in the past decade or so, upon the initiative of the US Forces Korea (USFK), in anticipation of the transfer of wartime operational control (opcon) from the US-ROK Combined Forces Command (CFC) to ROK forces. The transfer of wartime opcon has been delayed since 2015, while in the meantime, the UNC has been re-multinationalized, with more active participation from UN Sending States such as Canada, Australia, UK. Japan has hosted the UNC-Rear10 since 1957, now headquartered in the U.S. Yokota Air Base (USFJ headquarters) and the seven UNC designated U.S. bases11. ROK officers, who serve as UNC Military Armistice Commission Representatives, have visited UNC bases since 2007.

In parallel with the revitalization of UNC, a new UN-related minilateral framework, the ECC (Enforcement Coordination Cell) was established in 2018. In response to the North Korean nuclear crisis, Canada and the US initiated a UN conference held in Vancouver in November 2017, made up of UN Sending States members and others including Japan and ROK. The UNSC sanctions were at its peak in 2017 which included restrictions on oil exports to DPRK. To enforce sanctions, the ECC monitors illicit maritime activities, i.e., the ship-to-ship transfers, collects information in the East China Sea area, which are coordinated by and pooled in the Cell12. There has been an upsurge of UNC-related military personnel and assets coming through the UNC bases in Japan since 2018.

(3) Japan and ROK in the UNC framework

Japan and ROK are hosts to the UNC, ROK as a member of the UNC. But Japan and ROK have interacted with each other only indirectly through the U.S. and the multinational command. Japan and ROK are "hosts" but act as "guests." The UNC was established in 1950, when Japan was still under Allied occupation, Japan and ROK have not normalized diplomatic relations (normalization was in 1965), and alliances were not yet formed. In other words, Japan nor the ROK did not have agency to decide on their own matters.

However, in recent years, both Japan and ROK, respectively, have shifted their stance toward actively interacting with and utilizing the UNC or UN-related framework. Japan or MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) which is charge of affairs related to the Japan-UNC SOFA Agreement have put out position papers or fact sheets regarding "Regarding the Relationship between Korea UN Forces and Our Government (Chosen Kokurengun to Wagakuni no Kankei ni tsuite)" on the MOFA website since 2018. UNC is also mentioned in for example the Diplomatic White Paper (Gaiko Seisho), 2022 and 2023 editions. In October 2023, last year, Foreign Minister Yuko Kamikawa met with USFK Commander General LaCamera, USFK/UNC/CFC Commander when he visited Tokyo. It is a rare occasion for such high level figures to meet. The Ministry of Defense (MOD) and Self-Defense Forces (SF), on the other hand, are further distanced from the UNC, because they are in charge of managing the UNC. Some former SDF officials or those at staff colleges have advocated more involvement with the UNC, especially in light of SDF's engagements in the ECC. They see the utility of multinational security frameworks to compliment the US-Japan alliance and Japan's own efforts.

The ROK has also been reluctant in the past with the UNC, but the Yoon administration took an about-turn and have actively engaged and acknowledged the UNC and Sending States for their roles in the Korean War as well as the UNC-Rear and Japan's hosting of UNC bases, which are critical to defense of South Korea. President Yoon Seok-yeol in his speeches at the 70th anniversary of the Korean Armistice and the August 15 Liberation Day, last year, thanked and praised the role of the UNC and UNC Sending States soldiers and mentioned the critical importance of UNC-Rear and its bases in Japan. Yoon noted that "The UNC is a great example of international solidarity that has played a key role in firmly safeguarding the Republic of Korea's freedom "under one flag."13" In November last year, the first UNC Sending States Defense ministerial meeting was hosted by the ROK Ministry of National Defense.

Both Japan and ROK (the Yoon government) are beginning to see the utility of the "revitalized" UNC or UN-related frameworks. The UNC would be another conduit for Japan and ROK to interact with each other, to further consolidate trilateral cooperation. To do so, three issues are addressed. First, both parties, Japan and ROK, should be more mindful of the other sides' views on what is called the "prior consultation" on the use of bases. In this case, the issue of UNC bases. President Yoon, in his August 15 speech last year, expressed appreciation for UNC-Rear and Japan, adding that if North Korea attacks, the UNC will "automatically and promptly" intervene and retaliate, mentioning the UNC "rear-area bases" in Japan.

"The seven rear bases provided to the United Nations Command (UNC) by the government of Japan serve as the greatest deterrent which keeps the North from invading the South. A renewed North Korean invasion will trigger an automatic and immediate ［italics added］intervention and retaliation by the UNC, and the UNC-rear in Japan is sufficiently equipped with necessary land, sea and air capabilities." 14

Experts understand that the issue of whether "prior consultation" acknowledged in the US-Japan security treaty is adapted to the UNC bases is still not completely settled, but the Japanese government, ever since the investigation of the so-called "secret agreements" in 2010, requested by Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada during the Democratic Party administration, has become more conscious of the issue of sovereignty over the use of bases in its own territory15. In June 2010, FM Okada, then, said that Japan will respond "appropriately and expeditiously" based on "prior consultation" even in the case of a Korea contingency but also noted, in his memoirs, it would be unrealistic for Japan to say "no" to U.S.16 The same logic can be adapted to "counter-strike capabilities" that Japan adopted in the National Security Strategy documents in December 2022. The ROK government is sensitive about how those capabilities will be used regarding North Korea missile sites, and publicly voiced concern publicly that prior consultation will be necessary. While stating the principle of respect for sovereignty and prior consultation, the Yoon government noted that further measures will be consulted through the U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral frameworks. This was a realistic response.

At Camp David, the three leaders agreed to the Commitment to Consult: "We…commit our governments to consult trilaterally with each other, in an expeditious manner, to coordinate our responses to regional challenges, provocations, and threats affecting our collective interests and security."17 The commitment should be adapted to core issues such as the use of UNC bases and counter-strike capabilities. Understanding through "prior consultation" among the three countries will be critical in response to contingencies.

Second, the UNC/UNC-Rear should be utilized to facilitate exchange of personnel, materials, and lay the foundations for more institutionalized defense cooperation, considering the lack of visiting forces agreements (VFA) or reciprocal access agreements (RAA) between Japan and the ROK, such as those signed by Japan-Australia, Japan-UK. (Australia and UK are also UNC members and signatories to the Japan-UNC SOFA.)

Third, Japan's engagement and participation should be acknowledged and increased in the UNC framework, in order to further guarantee Japan's place as a stakeholder. This would depend on Japan's will, but can only be facilitated by the U.S., ROK and UNC members. Japan is not a UN Sending State, so it cannot participate in UNC defense ministers conferences such as that held by ROK last November. But it is a supporting state, including the UNC-Rear, thus it can participate in UNC member-related conferences such as the Vancouver conference hosted by Canada in November 2017. Through increased personnel exchanges, POL-MIL, through institutional measures, it will, in turn, create incentives to facilitate "consultations" as mentioned above.

3. Complex Contingencies, The Taiwan Strait and The Korean Peninsula: The Nexus of the Indo-Pacific and Northeast Asia

Finally, on the issue of the Taiwan Strait and the Korean peninsula. As experts have noted, previously the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral focused on the Korean contingency, but that is not the case for Trilateral 2.0 in the Indo-Pacific security environment. The trilateral must deal with both the Korean contingency and the Taiwan Strait contingency, at the same time. A "two-front operation" or what some call "complex contingencies." For Japan and U.S., the Taiwan Strait contingency is a top priority concern, but for ROK, the top priority is North Korea/Korea contingency, and the Taiwan Strait, a second priority. But that perceptual divide can no longer be afforded, given PRC rhetoric and actions in recent years. The Taiwan Strait contingency is an Indo-Pacific agenda especially disrupting maritime security in the region, and it has and will continue to be a Northeast Asia contingency. The Taiwan Strait is the nexus of the Indo-Pacific and Northeast Asia security. The Korean peninsula will be affected by the Taiwan Strait contingency.

The ROK government and security experts, though still cautious, have changed their mindset. Notable changes in tone and perception can be discerned, especially since the adoption of the ROK Indo-Pacific Strategy in late 2022.18 First of all, diplomatic rhetoric and messaging have been aligned among the three countries. South Korea has caught up and redefined the Taiwan Strait issues as a matter of its own security. The ROK's Indo-Pacific Strategy mentioned the Taiwan Strait, in the context of "maritime security cooperation." It acknowledged that "the Indo-Pacific is a region inter-connected by oceans, thus rendering it essential that nations work closely together to protect sealanes, counter piracy, and secure safety of navigation.19" In this context, the ROK mentioned "peace, stability and freedom of navigation in the South China sea," and reaffirmed " the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait for the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula and for the security and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific.20"

The tone of President Yoon Suk-yeol's comments also changed. Before the Indo-Pacific strategy, his comments were defensive. In September 2022, responding to an interview with CNN, Yoon said, "(i)n the case of military conflict around Taiwan, there would be increased possibility of North Korean provocation. Therefore, in that case, the top priority for Korea and the U.S.- Korean alliance on the Korean peninsula would be based on our robust defense posture, we must deal with the North Korean threat first.21" Asked further if he supported U.S. actions to help Taiwan if China attacked, Yoon replied very carefully, "(i)t wouldn't be appropriate to reply about a U.S. priority because both the Korean Peninsula and Taiwan are very important for the U.S., I suppose and are to be defended by the U.S. together with their allies and partners. So therefore, I would say that both issues have significant importance.22" But in April 2023, Reuters asked about Chinese diplomatic and military pressure on Taipei, and Yoon replied, more forcefully emphasizing principles, opposed "attempts to change the status quo by force" and "we together with the international community absolutely oppose such a change.23" He went further to say, "(t)he Taiwan issue is not simply an issue between China and Taiwan but, like the issue of North Korea, it is a global issue."24 At the Camp David summit in August 2023, the three leaders, including President Yoon, confirmed the "the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait" in the context of maritime order and security, as mentioned previously.

But what kind of action can be expected from ROK in a Taiwan contingency? What kind of division of roles can be worked out among the three countries and other partners? The ROK government and the military are very cautious and have avoided public comments, but security experts have become more forthcoming on South Korea's role in a Taiwan contingency, especially after the adoption of the Indo-Pacific strategy and Camp David. The working scenario is an interlocked or synchronized Taiwan-Korea scenario, that if a Taiwan contingency occurs, North Korea may move to take advantage, or help PRC to keep the USFK on the Korean peninsula. In that case, South Korea, while placing priority on deterring North Korea and holding the "northern front," it should, in the "southern front" (Taiwan Strait), (1) facilitate "strategic flexibility" (out-of-area deployments) of US Forces Korea (USFK), specifically US Air Forces, (2) provide rear-area support (including ammunition, etc.), warning and surveillance, space and cyber capabilities.

South Korea has inched closer in its thinking about the Taiwan Strait contingency. Facing a Taiwan Strait - Korean Peninsula complex contingency or the two-front operation scenario, the U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral should consider some further steps to promote defense and security cooperation. Four suggestions are made here. First, engage in joint contingency planning/joint operational planning. US think tank reports suggest, for example, rear area support such as logistics, sustainability operations, civilian evacuation (starting with a Taiwan scenario.) This can be done not only in trilateral, but also UNC-related multinational settings. Second, joint exercises, as agreed to at Camp David, should be implemented. Multi-domain trilateral exercises, the first of which will be conducted this summer, as announced at the recent US-Japan-ROK defense ministerial at Shangri-la Dialogue25. A Japanese expert suggested that it may not be realistic to envisage Japan and ROK forces fighting together, but cooperation on North Korea-related missile real-time data sharing, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities will be useful. Third, strengthening maritime security measures, promoting maritime domain awareness, using the new US-Japan-ROK maritime security cooperation framework to engage ASEAN (including the Philippines) and Pacific Island countries, and continuing the ECC maritime surveillance and information sharing will be useful. Fourth is defense supply chain cooperation. This would be another new area trilaterally and bilaterally for Japan and ROK. But in light of the Ukraine War and its implications for the Indo-Pacific, Taiwan contingency or Taiwan-Korea contingency scenarios, tightening cooperation in defense supply chain from ammunition to missiles to high-tech systems, is a necessary measure. The Biden administration's National Defense Industry Strategy advocates constructing a defense production network and defense supply chain in the Indo-Pacific and globally. 26 Security experts in Japan and ROK are keen about this development. Japan and ROK signed the Security of Supply Arrangement (SOSA) with the United States in January and November 2023, respectively27. Former SDF officials have also suggested signing Japan-ROK ACSA and also sharing ammunition, and other defense equipment.

Conclusion

The U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral has entered a "new era," i.e., "Trilateral 2.0, " after the Camp David summit. The three leaders agreed to strengthen strategic cooperation between US-Japan and US-ROK alliances and bring the trilateral cooperation to "new heights." The three countries face a complex strategic front: new issues in the Indo-Pacific, legacy issues in Northeast Asia surrounding the Korean Peninsula and North Korea, and a nexus of legacy and new issues on the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Straits.

The trilateral relationship has started to evolve, strategically and institutionally, albeit slowly and incrementally, to adapt to the new Indo-Pacific environment. New intelligence data sharing schemes at the operational level, new joint exercises have started. Legacy structures such as the UNC framework are being revived and re-tuned to adapt to new realities. New avenues in the evolving defense supply chain network might be explored.

Mindful of the political and legal constraints and obstacles, the three countries should carefully explore new venues to weave together the Indo-Pacific and Northeast Asia and consolidate the Trilateral as a Northeast Asia hub in the Indo-Pacific. The Japan-ROK, US-Japan-ROK defense ministerials at the Shangri-la Dialogue in early June, is a small but significant turning point. The breakthrough made at the Japan-ROK defense ministerial regarding "preventive measures" for incidents at sea, overcoming the radar-lock on incident in 2018, have paved the way for more serious thinking on defense cooperation, albeit carefully, continuing with confidence re-building28.

(Professor, Kanda University of International Studies)

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