proposal

Russia's Prolonged Military Invasion of Ukraine and Ukrainian Public Opinion: Focusing on Perceptions of Negotiations, Territory, and Sovereignty

Tsuyoshi Goroku

Introduction.

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, which marked the beginning of a new phase in the Russo-Ukrainian War that had been underway for eight years since the Russian invasion of Crimea and the outbreak of conflict in eastern Ukraine (Donbas) in the spring of 2014. As of this writing (August 2024), two and a half years have passed since then, but attrition warfare is still raging mainly in eastern Ukraine, and the front lines have remained deadlocked for long.

Many government officials and experts, including President Volodymyr Zelensky, predicted, from early this year, that 2024 would be a difficult year for Ukraine. Due to the failure of its counteroffensive attempt in 2023, Ukraine is now facing many difficulties on the battlefield and in areas distant from the front lines.

On the front lines, Russian troops are launching offensives at the cost of their soldiers; Ukrainian troops, short of soldiers, artillery shells, and air defense missiles, are on the defensive. In addition, in major cities, including the capital of Kyiv and Kharkiv, Russian missile and drone attacks destroyed numerous houses, hospitals, and energy and power infrastructure; civilian casualties continue to increase. In these cities, living in fear of air strikes is a new "everyday" life for citizens, and Ukrainian people are plagued by a sense of exhaustion from the war, mixed with anger toward Russia.

From the beginning of 2024, uncertainty increased about support (especially military assistance) from the United States and European countries, which had been a consistent source of hope for Ukrainians. In America, a bill on support for Ukraine was not passed for more than six months from the end of 2023; during this period, the US supply of artillery shells and ammunition stumbled. In Europe, except a few countries, declining interest in the war and "support fatigue" have been repeatedly pointed out, and pessimism prevails as to what extent Ukraine and European countries can hold back Russia, which is adopting a wartime economy.

What impact has this prolonged war had on the awareness of the Ukrainian people, particularly on their thinking of "negotiations with Russia," "territorial compromises," and "compromises on sovereignty"? This paper aims to answer these questions, drawing on the outcomes of several public opinion polls conducted in Ukraine.

1. Ukraine's Will of Resistance1

As two and a half years have passed since the Russian full-scale invasion began, we should recall that President Putin's original goal was to complete a "special military operation" in a short time and to turn the entire Ukraine into a vassal state of Russia. Russia planned to capture the capital city of Kyiv in three days, complete the operation in ten days, establish a puppet government headed by a man with the Kremlin's backing, and then conquer all of Ukraine.2 The premise of this plan was the assumption that Ukraine would not make any particular resistance to Russian forces but immediately surrender or that it would welcome Russians as its "liberators." However, as subsequent developments have revealed, Putin misjudged Ukraine's willingness to resist.

It was not Putin alone that underestimated Ukraine. The United States and European countries also believed that the fall of Kyiv was only a matter of time, given Russia's overwhelming military strength. The United States and European countries had provided Ukraine with military equipment, limited in amount as it was, before Russia's full-scale invasion. During some time after the war began, they refrained from providing weapons that could enable Ukraine to confront the Russian army squarely. The West offered support on the assumption of Ukraine's military defeat, such as to help evacuate Zelensky and other key government officials to establish a government-in-exile. Ukrainian presidential advisor Mykhailo Podolyak recalled that time: "They didn't comprehend what was going on. The first impression seemed that everyone was shocked but also trying to distance themselves from the war, disbelieving Ukraine's ability to defend itself."3

However, Zelensky decided to stay in Kyiv, demonstrating his willingness to resist and appealing to friendly countries for full-fledged military assistance. The Ukrainian military and the Ukrainian people also chose the path of thorough resistance in defiance of the massive Russian military that was approaching. Due to the presence of pro-Russian informers, some areas (especially in southern Ukraine) were occupied by the Russian army before fierce fighting broke out. Nonetheless, the Ukrainian people demonstrated their willingness to resist in all of Ukraine at the initial stages of the war; the Ukrainian military also proved its ability to expel the Russian army from the outskirts of the capital in a month. These decisively contributed to eliciting full-fledged support from the United States and Europe. Military assistance from the West, which initially focused on providing mobile anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles, was upgraded to include heavy weapons such as howitzers and HIMARS (High Mobility Rocket Artillery System). In parallel, information sharing with the Ukrainian military and the training of Ukrainian soldiers commenced in full, bolstering their capabilities.

Viewed from a long-term perspective, however, the Ukrainian will to resist had not always been present. According to an August 2012 Rating survey of Ukrainian citizens that asked whether they were ready to defend their territory with arms in hand, more than half of the respondents (54%) answered "no," while only 33% answered "yes."4 Another survey conducted around that time showed similar results. According to previous research, Ukrainian respondents who declared their readiness to fight for their country were about 30% fewer than Polish respondents answering the same question, whose homeland is in a similar geopolitical situation to Ukraine.5 Around that time, Ukrainian public sentiment toward Russia was favorable, with 70% or thereabout of citizens believing that the two countries should maintain independence but have open borders (visa- and tariff-free) and be friendly.6 Such public awareness seems to reflect that it was hard for many Ukrainians to imagine an invasion by Russia as a reality.

When did this awareness begin to change? The turning point was Russia's invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the subsequent Donbas war. In another Rating survey conducted in September 2017, respondents willing to fight for their country became the majority for the first time; their percentage gradually increased in consecutive rounds of the same poll survey. When Russia launched a full-scale invasion in 2022, the figure rose rapidly, reaching 80% in March immediately after the invasion.7

The situation in the penultimate year leading up to Russia's full-scale invasion may have had some influence on people's awareness: as ceasefire violations increased in eastern Ukraine from early 2021, Russia amassed large-scale troops along the border area from winter to spring and from autumn to winter of the same year, inflicting tension on Ukraine. According to an April 2021 Razumkov Centre survey, 52.9% of Ukrainian citizens said they were ready to defend their country "with weapons" or "by joining the volunteer movement." Many were pessimistic about external assistance from the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), or the United States in the event of a military invasion, believing they would have to fight alone.8

Furthermore, according to a survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) two weeks before the Russian full-scale invasion, 57.5% of respondents said they were "ready to resist Russian interventions in one way or another (armed resistance, civil resistance such as demonstrations, protests, marches, boycotts, strikes, civil disobedience, or both)." The percentage increased from the previous December.9 Arguably, from 2014, Ukrainian public awareness of the need to somehow resist Russian interventions intensified in the lead-up to the 2022 Russian full-scale invasion.

2. Ukrainian Military Feats and Public Opinion

How did the willingness of the Ukrainians to resist change in the wake of the Russian full-scale invasion? At least during the first year and a half from the outbreak of the war, most of the population shared an attitude favoring thorough resistance and rejecting compromises.

First, let us examine the Ukrainian attitude toward ceasefire/peace negotiations with Russia. Immediately after the Russian full-scale invasion, the two belligerents held ceasefire talks in Belarus and Turkey from February through March 2022. However, their ceasefire conditions were so widely apart that they never found common ground. Furthermore, after Russian troops withdrew from the suburbs of Kyiv and other areas they had temporarily occupied, their inhumane acts against Ukrainian civilians during the occupation, such as the so-called "Bucha massacre," came to light one after another. Under these circumstances, ceasefire momentum rapidly dwindled.

In this regard, according to a periodic joint survey by the National Democratic Institute (NDI)/KIIS (Figure 1), 59% of Ukrainian citizens answered the question, "Do you think that Ukraine should engage in negotiations with Russia to try to achieve peace?" in affirmative as of May 2022. However, the percentage dropped to 44% in August of the same year and 29% in January 2023, scoring the lowest figure. In May 2023, the affirmative percentage increased slightly to 33% but still at a low level.

Figure 1 Negotiations with Russia (%)

Prepared by the author based on: NDI and KIIS, "Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine's Democratic Transition: Nationwide Telephone Survey, May 8-25, 2024" July 23, 2024.

https://www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/May%202024%20Opportunities%20and%20Challenges%20Facing%20Ukraine's%20Democratic%20Transition%20%28English%29.pdf

Second, as for how Ukrainians thought of compromises on territory (territorial integrity), they maintained a consistent non-compromising stance from May 2022 to May 2023. As a periodic KIIS survey (Figure 2) indicates, during this period, the percentage of respondents who answered that "under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territories, even if because of this, the war will last longer and there will be threats to the preservation of independence," lingered around 85%, while the percentage of those who answered that "in order to achieve peace and preserve independence as soon as possible, Ukraine can give up some of its territories" stayed around 10%. There were no stark region-wise differences in this trend. Although the percentage of respondents who were opposed to territorial concessions was relatively low in eastern Ukraine but was well over 50%—in May 2023, for example, 86% of respondents opposed territorial concessions in the western region, 84% in the central region, 86% in the southern region, and 75% in the eastern region.10

Figure 2 Readiness for territorial concession (%)

Prepared by the author based on: "Dynamics of Readiness for Territorial Concessions and Attitudes Towards Separate Packages of Peace Agreements," July 23, 2024.

https://www.kiis.com.ua/?lang=eng&cat=reports&id=1421&page=1

Third, a similar trend was visible in the Ukrainian public attitude toward giving up NATO membership, which is, in a sense, equal to compromises on sovereignty. As is well known, Putin has long been hostile to NATO and has vehemently opposed Ukraine's accession to NATO. Given that Ukraine has been at war with Russia since 2014, but the accession process has made no progress, it is hard to believe that preventing Ukraine from joining NATO was the direct motive of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. That said, "Ukraine's neutralization" was one of the vital issues in the March 2022 ceasefire talks; Zelensky was initially ready to accept abandoning its NATO membership on condition that Russia and China, in addition to the United States and European countries, would offer binding guarantees for Ukraine's security.11

On the other hand, the Ukrainian public opinion on this question changed dramatically in the wake of the Russian full-scale invasion. Originally, the option of NATO membership was unpopular in Ukraine, and even during the 2005-2010 period, when the Ukrainian government first moved proactively toward NATO membership, the approval rating for that policy was around 15-25%. Matters changed in 2014; support for and disapproval of the policy reversed for the first time, which continued as such.

Even so, until Russia's full-scale invasion, the approval rating for Ukraine's NATO accession was around 60% at the highest point and 40% at the lowest. After the Russian full-scale invasion, about 80% of Ukrainians endorsed the accession policy. Even in the eastern and southern parts of the country, where many residents had previously opposed Ukraine's NATO membership, supporters of the accession policy far exceeded the majority.12 For many Ukrainians, it was out of the question to abandon NATO membership, even to realize peace. As shown by the NDI-KIIS joint survey (Figure 3), the percentage of respondents who said they could not accept abandoning Ukraine's NATO membership rose to 76% by November 2023, continuing to far exceed the percentage of those who said they could.

Figure 3 Readiness for concession on NATO membership (%)

Prepared by the author based on: NDI and KIIS, "Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine's Democratic Transition: Nationwide Telephone Survey.

https://www.ndi.org/publications?country=1076

There may be various reasons for these poll results, but one possible explanation is the war situation coupled with Ukrainians' confidence in and anticipation of their war effort. In this context, let us review the war situation, from its outbreak to the start of Ukrainian counteroffensives in 2023.

During the first month of the war, Ukrainian forces expelled Russian forces who attempted to conquer principal cities such as Kyiv and Kharkiv. In April 2022, the Russians concentrated their combat units in eastern Ukraine and took the initiative on the battlefield, backed by their fire superiority. Ukrainian forces lost the port city of Mariupol in Donetsk Oblast in May, and by early July, the Russians had taken control of almost all of Luhansk Oblast. At the end of August, however, the Ukrainian army regained the initiative, launching counteroffensives, and restored most of the occupied territory in Kharkiv Oblast during September. In November, they succeeded in recapturing the western Dnipro River area, including Kherson, the capital of Kherson Oblast. As a result, the Ukrainian army regained about 40% of the territory yielded to the Russians after February 2022.13

The success of counteroffensives intensified the Ukrainian public's confidence and anticipation. For example, according to a November 2022 survey by the Kharkiv Institute for Social Research, 95% of the Ukrainian people believed in the possibility of retaking all territories, including those occupied by Russia before its 2022 invasion (Crimea and parts of Donbas).14 The counteroffensives coincided with the time that, as described above, public support for negotiations with Russia declined, and voices rejecting territorial concessions became dominant.

In 2023, warfare became deadlocked, whereas US and European military assistance to Ukraine took a new turn. Announcements were made, in succession, of the provision to Ukraine of Western battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and air defense systems such as the Patriot, none of which had previously been offered to Ukraine to avoid escalation of the conflict. As military assistance began in the spring of 2023 in expectation of Ukrainian counteroffensives, the Ukrainian people's anticipation of further military gains underpinned their consistent, uncompromising stance.

Another reason is the Ukrainian people's persistent distrust of Russia based on the "lessons of history" they learned that ceding territory to Russia would not lead to a ceasefire, much less peace. As the Donbas war intensified from April 2014, Ukraine signed the Minsk Agreements in September 2014 and February 2015, along with the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), Russia, and pro-Russian armed groups patronized by Russia. The series of agreements specified a roadmap for a ceasefire and peace. However, Russia continued fighting even after the ceasefire start date stipulated in the February Agreement, and large-scale fighting did not stop until three days later. For the seven years that followed, the "Minsk Process," based on the string of agreements, stagnated, and ceasefire violations were repeated.15 Eventually, on February 21, 2022, three days before Russia's full-scale invasion, Putin abandoned the Minsk Agreements. The eight years of 2014-2022 brought home to Ukrainians that Putin would not abide by any ceasefire agreement and that a ceasefire with Russia would not lead to peace straightforwardly. The Russian "full-scale" invasion also clarified that Putin's goals were not limited to the territory of eastern Ukraine. These "lessons from Minsk" may lie behind the uncompromising stance of the Ukrainian people.16

3. Ukrainian Public Opinion Following the 2023 Counteroffensives

As seen in the previous section, expectations for a spring counteroffensive increased among Ukrainians after the year 2023 began. However, counteroffensive operations in southern and eastern Ukraine, which started in June, did not proceed from the outset as Ukraine had anticipated. Although the Ukrainian military deployed tanks and infantry fighting vehicles newly provided by the United States and European countries, they were hindered in their movement by the solid defense lines the Russians had built during the wintertime and failed to achieve anticipated results. In the fall of 2023, the Commander-in-Chief of Ukraine's armed forces General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, an admired war-time hero among the Ukrainian people, admitted in an Economist article that the war in Ukraine became deadlocked—the effective failure of counteroffensive operations.17 When a disagreement between the president and the general over the assessment of the war situation and mobilization to meet the shortage of soldiers was made widely known through media reports, Zelensky made an unpopular decision to dismiss Zaluzhnyi in February 2024.18 To make matters worse, a stagnant influx of military assistance from the United States; the ever-worsening shortage of artillery shells, air defense missiles, and soldiers; the Russian re-invasion of Kharkiv accompanied by intensified air strikes, and the increased mobilization to meet the shortage of soldiers―all have combined to cast a choking atmosphere over Ukrainian society.

Did the failure of the 2023 counteroffensives change the awareness of the Ukrainian people sketched in the previous section?

First, Ukraine's attitude toward ceasefire negotiations with Russia changed. As noted earlier, following the outbreak of the war, the number of poll survey respondents appreciating bilateral negotiations dropped to the smallest ever in January 2023. However, as Figure 1 illustrates, it increased again by 9 points between May 2023 and November 2023. The latest survey, conducted in May 2024, shows that the percentage of respondents in favor of negotiations with Russia rose by 15 points to 57%, thus exceeding 50% for the first time since May 2022, shortly after the outbreak of the war.

Next, a change was also noted since the same period in respondents' attitudes to the territorial question. As Figure 2 shows, until October 2023, more than 80% of poll respondents had answered that "under no circumstances should Ukraine give up any of its territories." However, by May 2042, the percentage of such respondents dropped to 55%. On the contrary, respondents who answered that their country could "give up some of its territories to achieve peace and preserve independence as soon as possible" has gradually increased; 32% of respondents supported territorial concessions as of May 2024. Moreover, in any region of Ukraine, those supporting territorial concessions increased.19

Thus, since the winter of 2023, voices have increased, calling for territorial compromises for negotiations and peace with Russia. Nonetheless, it should be noted at the same time that even as the war drags on and the circumstances, including the war situation, are not favorable to Ukraine, a majority of its citizens are opposed to ceding territories.

In this regard, it is also significant to understand what "specific conditions" the Ukrainian people could accept if ceasefire negotiations were to take place. As Figure 4-1 shows, a May 2024 NDI-KIIS joint survey found that 60% of Ukrainian citizens did not want to give up Crimea and parts of Donbas, which the Russians had occupied before 2022, as the "price of peace," while 35% of them could accept the deal. On the other hand, 77% of the population opposed ceding the areas currently occupied by the Russians. In other words, for many, it is still unacceptable to define the front lines as new borders at the time of a peace agreement.

As Figure 4-2 shows, in a survey that asked respondents to choose "the minimum (condition) necessary for a peace agreement with Russia" from the options of (1) "Liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops within the 1991 borders," (2) "Liberation of Ukraine from Russian troops along the demarcation line in early 2022," and (3) "Borders along the front line at the time of the agreement," half of respondents still preferred (1), 26% chose (2), and 10% supported (3). Article 73 of the Ukrainian Constitution mandates a nationwide referendum on territorial changes. Since May 2022, many Ukrainian citizens have consistently asserted to put negotiation results (the content of compromises) to a referendum (65% of the population in June 2024).20 Since the outbreak of the war, Zelensky has consistently stated that any war termination proposal should be decided by a referendum, presumably with this public opinion and the constitutional provisions for territorial changes in mind.21

Figure 4-1 Readiness for territorial concession (%)

Prepared by the author based on: NDI and KIIS, "Opportunities and Challenges Facing Ukraine's Democratic Transition: Nationwide Telephone Survey, May 8-25, 2024" July 23, 2024.

Figure 4-2 Readiness for territorial concession (%)

Prepared by the author based on: "Війна чи мир. Українці хочуть повернути кордони 1991 року, але чиїми руками? Результати соціологічного дослідження" Дзеркало тижня, July 15, 2024.

Meanwhile, unlike the Ukrainian public attitude toward negotiations with Russia and the territorial question, their attitude toward giving up NATO membership has not changed significantly since the winter of 2023 (Figure 3). 71% of respondents to a May 2024 survey were negative about this option―five points down from November 2023 but 10 points higher than in August 2022, the same as in January 2023. Another survey (a March 2024 joint survey by Carnegie Endowment International Peace and Rating), which associated "ceasefire negotiations" with "NATO membership," found that among respondents who "do not support" negotiations, the percentage of those who accept that "Ukraine will no longer seek NATO membership" was as low as 10% as expected, while among supporters of negotiations, the percentage of those who accept giving up Ukraine's NATO accession was 32%.22

These Ukrainian public attitudes stem from their long-standing distrust of Russia's intentions in proposing ceasefire negotiations and their anticipation of NATO guaranteeing Ukraine's security.

Figure 5 Distrust of Russia's motives for negotiations

Prepared by the author based on: CEIP/Rating "Social expectations regarding the end of war: First wave, March 7-10, 2024."

As Figure 5 illustrates, 86% of Ukrainian citizens believe in "the possibility of Russia attacking Ukraine again if there is a signed peace treaty." As for Russia's motive for entering negotiations, 91% of the respondents viewed it as "to buy time to prepare for a new attack."23 For Ukrainians who distrust Russia, it will be essential to prevent another Russian attack or re-invasion, no matter how the current warfare will end. Therefore, even for the sake of peace, Ukraine would have to be cautious about abandoning the option of NATO membership.

There seems to be a sense against repeating the mistake of the "Budapest Memorandum" concluded in December 1994. This political document, in exchange for Ukraine's denuclearization and accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), was to have had Ukraine's political independence, territorial integrity, and security "assured" by the United States, Britain, and Russia. The Memorandum, lacking legally binding force, did not work at all to deal with Russian invasions in 2014 and 2022. Consequently, Ukraine desires to join NATO, seeking "security guarantees" based on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (the collective defense clause), which has a higher level of commitment. In other words, to the Ukrainians, "security guarantees from other states" as an alternative to NATO accession "look less convincing" for preserving Ukraine's sovereignty and security. Such an attitude reflects Ukraine's historical experience or a bitter lesson from the Budapest Memorandum.24

Conclusion

As the military invasion by Russia drags on and victims continue to increase in Ukraine, it is not surprising to note a change in Ukrainian public opinion. As we have so far seen, the Ukrainian people are exhausted by the war, as reported daily by the media and are raising voices calling for negotiations with Russia and peace even at the cost of territorial concessions.

However, what is relevant in considering future ceasefire talks is what acceptable "territorial compromises" mean to the Ukrainian people as a price for peace. There is a big difference between admitting the Russian-occupied territories as such and ceding them to Russia. On this point, many Ukrainians still oppose ceding territory as a price for peace. It will also be crucial to consider under what specific conditions territorial compromises are possible or not.

In June 2024, on the eve of the first Ukrainian-led "Peace Summit" held in Switzerland, Putin suddenly announced, in Moscow, conditions for starting ceasefire talks.25 These included the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the four southern and eastern oblasts that Russia unilaterally declares to have annexed and the abandonment of Ukraine's NATO membership. These are not conditions for a ceasefire but only for the "start" of talks. Putin went so far as to demand the withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from areas that Russia had not yet taken control of.

A poll conducted immediately after the Summit meeting showed that 82.8% of the Ukrainians found Putin's conditions to be unacceptable; 83.6% were opposed to Putin's demand that Crimea, Sevastopol, and four other oblasts become Russian territories internationally.26 In other words, as noted in this paper, around 30% of the Ukrainians think that the cession of Crimea and parts of Donbas would be acceptable; yet, since the conditions Putin proposed are more exacting than that, most Ukrainian citizens cannot accept them.

It is also noteworthy that despite the failure of Ukrainian counteroffensives, no notable change occurred in people's thinking about the abandonment of NATO membership as compromises on sovereignty. Although a more detailed analysis will be needed to examine the trend and background of the public perception of this question, taking into account the outcomes of future opinion polls, it can be inferred that this is due to the public awareness that NATO membership is essential, no matter how hostilities stop, to protect territories then controlled by Ukraine as well as its sovereignty.

There is no doubt the likelihood that the Ukrainian public opinion will further change depending on the future war situation. If the war situation worsens for Ukraine, calls for negotiations and a ceasefire with Russia will likely increase, or vice versa. In addition, depending on the outcome of the US presidential election, if support from Ukraine's primary military donor is reduced or suspended, Ukrainian society is likely to be impacted.

However, it is unforeseeable whether Putin would be satisfied with some territorial concessions from Ukraine or whether this would induce Russia to end the attack against Ukraine for good. As discussed earlier in this paper, at least in Ukrainian society, there is a strong distrust toward Putin in these respects. Judging from his initial plans and his words and deeds since the outbreak of the war, it seems that Putin's design is to deprive Ukraine of its "sovereignty" and "identity" rather than its "territory," and that at this stage of warfare, there are no signs that his war goals have been lowered. At the June 2024 press conference, Putin emphasized once again that Russia's goals of "de-Nazification," "demilitarization," and "neutralization" of Ukraine should remain intact; he has thus far shown no interest in any ceasefire/peace proposals focused on "territory," which are discussed on various fronts.

Meanwhile, as the adverse situation continues on the front lines and public opinion changes, Zelensky is stepping up his diplomatic offensive, such as planning a series of "peace summits." In an interview with the BBC in July 2024, he stated, "It doesn't mean that all territories are won back by force. I think the power of diplomacy can help." Zelensky has increasingly stressed the significance of diplomatic pressure as a ‘means' to regain territories.27 He has also stated that the second "Peace Summit" scheduled for sometime in 2024 should be attended by Russia, which was not invited to the first meeting. He is more positive than before toward negotiations with Russia. On the other hand, his "objective" of regaining all territories (i.e., not ceding any territory) has so far remained consistent. It will be necessary to keep a close eye on how public opinion will change and whether this policy will also change in the future.

At this point, although the word "ceasefire" is mentioned by everyone and everywhere, the time is not ripe for a ceasefire or peace negotiations. Even if ceasefire talks resume at some point, it will not be easy to fill the gap between the two warring countries over specific conditions; it is not hard to imagine that negotiations will not go smoothly. Ukraine will likely continue to engage in tough "battles" on the front lines and the diplomatic front for a while.

(Associate Professor, Nishogakusha University)

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