proposal

Kamala Harris and Factors Behind Her Defeat: Can the Democrats Make a Comeback?

Masahito Watanabe

Introduction

Whether Donald Trump's victory in the 2024 presidential election should be considered a landslide victory or a close one varies in nuance depending on the definitions of these words and what his victory this time should be compared with. Looking at recent presidential elections since 2008 from the quantitative point of view, only Obama won a clear landslide victory; the scale of Harris's defeat was smaller in the public vote than those of Trump in 2020 and Romney in 2012 (also smaller in electoral votes than Romney). If we trace the US election records back 30 years to the 1980s, the Democrats' defeats in the presidential elections were more sizable. For example, in 1988, Democrat Dukakis lost to Republican Bush by 315 electoral votes and as many as seven million votes in total votes. In 1984, Democrat Mondale, who challenged Republican President Reagan, lost at 13 to 525 electoral votes, victorious only in his home state of Minnesota and the capital of Washington.

Compared to Democratic presidential candidates in the 1980s, Harris's defeat may not be a "big" one given the number of votes she garnered, that is, in terms of quantity. She lost in the swing states by a small margin in percentage, which, however, represents a large number of votes given the population scale of the United States. Although the Democratic Party and Kamala Harris did not allow Trump to win a landslide victory in terms of quantity, they suffered a "decisive" or "complete" defeat qualitatively.

Trump Missed a "Landslide" Victory; Harris Suffered a "Decisive" Defeat

Among the primary implications of the recent presidential election result is the Democrats' loss of dominance in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. It is a bitter setback for the Democrats that the Republicans will control the White House and the upper and lower houses. In the Senate, where one-third of 100 seats are up for re-election every two years, each party enjoys advantages or suffers disadvantages in each election year. If fewer seats are up for re-election, there is less risk of being judged by voters, and the party can maintain its current members; therefore, the party with more seats up for re-election is at a disadvantage. In the last midterm elections in 2022, since there were many Republican seats up for re-election, the Democrats were able to win. This time, the Democrats, including independents, had to open more seats than the Republicans by about ten for re-election or election due to retirement.

However, this does not mean that the Harris campaign is not responsible for the results of the recent elections that deprived Democrats of dominance in Congress. In an era of polarization, likes and dislikes of presidential candidates affect the elections of federal and state legislators, known as "down-ballots," and, first of all, they adversely affect voter turnout. Even during the Reagan administration, when the Democrats suffered consecutive losses in the presidential elections, the Democrats held the majority in the House of Representatives under the leadership of the prominent Speaker O'Neill. With the loss of the three sources of power―both houses of Congress and the White House, the Democrats will be unable to take the lead in formulating policies during the first half of the term of the new Trump administration.

The second of the primary implications of the recent presidential election is a potential prolongation of a conservative Supreme Court. If a Democrat Supreme Court Justice, who holds a lifetime tenure, refuses to retire, the timing of his/her death could provide an opportunity for the incumbent president―if he is a Republican―to nominate a Republican Supreme Court Justice. The case of Democratic Justice Ginsburg is a typical example. At present, Democratic Justice Sotomayor has a chronic illness; there are concerns about the condition of her health. Likewise, attention is focused on whether Republican justices Alito and Thomas, free from health concerns but elderly, will step down. If Trump gets one or more opportunities to nominate one or more justices during the next administration, the conservative trend of the Supreme Court will last for long in the future. Past presidents of both parties nominated a new Supreme Court Justice from centrist judges with ample legal experience. However, Trump will likely nominate conservative, young judges, regardless of their career, to court his support base of Christian conservatives. The US presidential election is accompanied by the nomination of federal judges. Since, however, they are appointed by the president, not elected by the people, voters' interest in the nomination is not necessarily high because, in many cases, past presidents nominated moderate legal heavyweights. Yet, Trump "walked the talk" and made partisan nominations regardless of the evaluation of nominees in the legal field. At the time of the 2016 presidential election, he published a list of federal judges he planned to nominate. As a result, Christian conservatives are more enthusiastic about supporting Trump than they were for George W. Bush, a devout born-again Christian. If Trump were to make nominations that would accelerate the conservativeization of the judiciary, Harris would be responsible not only for the Democrats' defeat this time but also for having created a serious source of trouble for American liberal politics.

Of course, if the Republican Party loses its majority in the Senate, Trump's nominations will not pass Congress. Unless conservative judges retire early in 2025, additional nominations will hinge upon the results of the 2027 midterm elections. Justice Stevens once stayed on the court until he retired at age 90, and Justices Alito and Thomas could remain in their positions for nearly another 10 years. However, the populism that Trump's support base expects of the Supreme Court and the president has changed. The Democratic Party will have to remain concerned about the possibility of Trump-style nominations in the event of an unavoidable "unforeseen event."

Third, Harris is the first and only of the three Democratic presidential candidates, including herself, who ran against Trump, to lose in both the electoral and popular votes. In the 2016 presidential election, Hillary Clinton beat Trump in the popular vote. The Democratic Party, which should have learned much from the past two battles with Trump about his character and support base, nonetheless suffered a crushing defeat in the third contest with him. This roused, in the party, criticism of the Harris campaign leadership.

Fourth, the Democratic Party lost some of its voting bases to the Trump campaign. Trump won 46% of Latino voters; as far as male Latino voters are concerned, more than 50% of them voted for Trump. Approximately 20% of black men also chose Trump. Trump gained more votes than Harris from married women.1

Fifth, Harris lost in all of the swing states. The US presidential election is determined by the outcomes in populous swing states, where both parties compete closely. Each party dedicates its campaign resources to these swing states, and media outlets provide extensive coverage of the rival campaigns. Losses in swing states impress voters with the loser's strategic errors and misjudgments more disproportionately than the actual scale of those losses when viewed nationwide.

Kamala Harris as Biden's Pinch Hitter and Primary Election Factors

The Democratic Party attempted two experiments with Harris. First, "To what extent can a candidate weak in elections shine as ‘artificial turf' with the strongest campaign possible?" Second, "To what extent can the candidate grow and transform during the election?" The former was an attempt to support Harris, who has never won a victory single-handedly outside California, with a machine; the latter was a necessary step to nurture capabilities of good governance, administration, and leadership. The vice president under an elderly president should have been "trained" rather than left without a portfolio; Biden is to blame for failing to give Harris a vital role after her mismanagement on the immigration issue.

The fundamental problem for the Democratic Party in 2024 is that Kamala Harris was a temporary stand-in for Biden, who withdrew from the presidential election. As a result, she became a presidential candidate without undergoing any primary election. In the United States, election campaigns go hand-in-hand with social movements. Presidential candidates undergo discipline by participating in primaries to make known their ideas and claims in areas with different demographics and industries and by being exposed to harsh criticism from the media. In the primary elections, through door-to-door canvassing, the candidate listens to voters' demands and incorporates them into big data. The primary elections also offer opportunities for the candidate to explore grassroots support, such as eager volunteers, to hold in-depth policy discussions with voters, and to recount the candidate's personal history, such as his/her background. The Harris campaign's "anti-Trump" strategy to stir up fear of the Trump administration has, as a result, made her beliefs and key policies invisible to voters. At the same time, her lack of experience in primary elections served as a negative factor.

Harris was also limited by being vice president of the Biden administration. What concerned the Harris campaign most was the influence of cultural factors on religious votes―three policies under the Biden administration: a bill to legalize abortion by the federal government, measures to promote transgender rights, and support measures for Israel, which has been attacking the Gaza Strip in Palestine since the Hamas terrorist attacked the country.

Concerning women's rights to abortion, voters' support was almost even between Trump and Harris among those who answered in exit polls that "abortion should be legal in most cases." Meanwhile, pro-Democratic Catholics think that the legalization of abortion by the federal government that the Biden administration aims for goes too far. They are closer to Trump's position that it should be up to the states to decide. What is intriguing is the attitude of religious voters toward transgender people. A member of a pro-Democrat Catholic organization says to the following effect: "The biggest issue is transgender surgery. Among LGBTQs, the question of gay people and their sexual orientation, such as preferring the same sex, does not matter so much. Sex change surgery for children that the Biden administration approves is an artificial manipulation that interferes with a God-given state and is not permissible. Rumors spread that Kamala was trying to promote this measure, and Catholic swing voters switched to vote for Trump."

Reportedly, devout black people also showed negative reactions to transgender people; the Republicans adopted a strategy to incite fear of LGBTQs, which is analogous to the one they adopted during the 2004 presidential election to oppose same-sex marriage. The Republicans were not unanimous about the aid to Ukraine, but support for Israel united them. In contrast, an intra-party rift grew in the Democratic Party over widespread student demonstrations on university campuses criticizing Israeli attacks. Since the Biden administration's foreign policy of supporting Israel is unwavering, all that Harris could do was to distinguish her Middle East policies from those of President Biden by mentioning support for Palestinians in her election manifesto. However, her attitude was perceived as hypocrisy and misinterpreted as needlessly helping to prolong Israeli attacks. To their dismay, the Harris campaign lost, among other support, one from Arab voters in Michigan.

Federal Senate Elections and Gender Issue in Swing States

In the 2024 Senate elections, the swing states where the senators were up for re-election were Arizona, Michigan, Nevada, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. In Arizona, the incumbent Democratic/independent/moderate Senator Sinema retired, and a newcomer ran. Eventually, the Democrats won a close contest there. The only democratic candidate to lose in these swing states was incumbent Senator Casey of Pennsylvania, a Catholic. He was under fierce attack from the Republicans regarding abortion and transgender issues. Given that the Democratic senate candidates secured re-election in all swing states where Harris lost, except for Pennsylvania, we cannot ignore the fact that the liking or disliking of the presidential candidate as an individual influenced the election results. In other words, at least in the swing states, there is the likelihood that Harris (and the Biden administration, for which she is responsible as the incumbent vice president) was rejected, rather than the Democratic Party. Discrimination against a woman candidate? Not necessarily so. The Democratic Senate candidates who won in the swing states of Wisconsin, Nevada, and Michigan are all women. As an aside, apart from the fact that women have been and will be elected governors and senators, a segment of conservatives still hesitate to choose a woman as commander-in-chief. Yet, to avoid a hasty conclusion, this question requires in-depth discussion in a separate article.

The responsibility for the Democrats' defeat in the swing states lies not with the joint campaign headquarters for the senatorial and presidential elections, supported and run by the party's state committees, that scored almost impeccable victories in the senate elections, but with the Democratic National Committee, the former Biden campaign, and the newly formed Harris campaign that followed suit. This is why, immediately after Harris's defeat in the presidential election, the high-paid consultants hired by the Harris campaign spent all their time "looking for culprits" by naming others so as not to hurt further business. It is undeniable that many of the scapegoat narratives in the US media tend to be created by consultants involved in the election campaign.

Economic Populism as a Scenario for the Revival of the Democratic Party

Currently, the Democratic Party is upset by its transforming into a "San Francisco-based party"―a dilemma that its line of identity politics, such as racial justice and LGBTQ rights, fails to synchronize with redistribution politics for the working class, and there is no way in the short term to stop the working class from being won over by the Republicans. A survey by the American Democracy Fund noted three trends when the first Trump administration took office. First, Republican supporters became protectionist regarding economic issues, symbolized by the US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) treaty. Second, many Democratic supporters became more leftist regarding social and cultural issues; the Democratic Party took up the line of identity politics, which emphasized the rights of racial minorities such as blacks and LGBTQs. Third, nearly 30% of voters were economically left-wing but, at the same time, socially and culturally conservative. These trends overlap with the characteristics of the core Trump supporters, who are tough on immigrants, value gun rights, and hold devout Christian faith. In other words, the divide among voters is not only evident over economic issues but is more distinct over social and cultural issues in a uniquely American way.2

The main challenge for the Democratic Party is reconciling its culturally liberal stance with policies that support the working class. This is not a conflict between moderates and liberals as in the past but symbolized by two splits among the left-wing Democrats. Bernie Sanders, who advocates challenging inequity, is different regarding the priority of challenges from a group of young identity-oriented people such as Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, who calls for racial justice.

It is becoming a common understanding among the liberal wing of the Democratic Party that the root cause of the defeat in the recent presidential election is the failure to emphasize prioritizing the working class.3 There is a view that the Harris campaign executives' avoidance of class-war rhetoric in fear of offending the feelings of major corporate donors backfired. Robert Creamer, who has served as a consultant to the Democratic National Committee, points out as follows: "[T]he most important factor was a feeling by many ordinary Americans that "the system" and the American economy were not delivering for them… To a given voter, the "economy" is their economy. And if you try to convince them to the contrary, they simply think you are out of touch with their lives… Finally, many working-class people feel disrespected by what they consider the college-educated costal elites… In the November elections, many of those voters blamed the incumbent party for their economic struggles and saw Trump as someone who would blow up that system."

He also suggests the following guidelines regarding priorities for the Democratic Party for the next four years, especially the next two leading to the mid-term elections. "Hardening democratic institutions against the coming right-wing attack," "Messaging: Progressives must lead with the economy―with a sharp populist frame," "Using the Economic Battles Ahead to Drive Our Narrative," "Standing Firm to Protect the Most Vulnerable from Harm," "Defending Democracy (major battles to prevent the confirmation of new right-wing appointees to the Supreme Court)," "Other Major Issue Battles (Gun Violence Prevention, Climate, Foreign Policy: Middle East and Ukraine)," "Emphasis on State and Local (Mobilizing our allies in government at the state and local level―Governors, legislators and especially Attorneys General)," "Progressive Unity: Avoid the creation of a circular firing squad looking for other progressives to blame for the Democratic defeat," "Organizing (Most especially union organizing)," and "Messengers and Media (Improvement of social media infrastructure)." His proposals are please-everybody measures, revealing an attitude of preventing division within the Democratic Party that cannot fully address choosing identity politics or economic populism.4

Conclusion

The Democrats may already share something like the analysis made by this article as a form of self-reflection for its defeat in the 2024 presidential election. However, they have not concluded whether to win back white working-class voters with economic populism alone or to adopt a combination of it and identity politics. Among liberals who are critical of the Biden administration and the Harris campaign, the theory of economic populism is gaining ground. The primary reason for this trend is a realistic recognition that "identity politics only divides people." Indeed, many white working-class people hold fast to gun rights; they may be devout Christians. The discourse that if the Republican Party were to try to indirectly capture the working-class votes by including these cultural issues, the Democratic Party would have no choice but to focus on economic policies for the working class and to not talk about culture has a certain degree of cogency. To ultimately regain the House of Representatives, the Democrats aim to win back working-class voters before the 2026 midterm elections in the belief that those voters would begin, until then, to become discontent with the Trump administration's economic policies. However, it is not likely that a new generation of left-wingers pursuing identity politics, the so-called "wokes," will fully sympathize with this idea. Efforts to repair the rifts in the Democratic Party's left-wing will face many difficulties ahead.

proposal
current topics
letter