proposal

The 22nd National Assembly Election and South Korean Politics:
Judgment on the Yoon Administration and an Outlook on Japan-ROK Relations

Hideki Okuzono

In South Korea, the presidential term of office is five years; a second term is not allowed. On the other hand, members of the National Assembly serve a four-year term, and there is no provision for the dissolution of the National Assembly. The gap in the timing of presidential and parliamentary elections due to the difference in the presidential tenure and the tenure of the lawmakers has considerably affected the government's operations.

The general election, held on April 10, 2024, almost two years after the Yoon Suk-yeol administration took office, was considered a mid-term assessment of the administration. Since President Yoon had a hard time dealing with the National Assembly, where the opposition enjoys an overwhelming majority, it is quite natural that he wanted to gain the necessary number of seats to implement his policies with the support of the nation and to run a stable government during the remaining three years of his term.

While the conservative ruling party, the People Power Party (PPP), put two opposition representatives involved in pending judicial cases on trial and appealed not to allow criminals to engage in politics, the leading progressive opposition party, the Democratic Party of Korea (DPK), and the newly formed Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP), formed by former President Moon Jae-in's confidant Cho Kuk, campaigned on the platform of judging the Yoon administration.

The result was a landslide victory for the opposition, which won 192 out of the 300 seats, while the ruling party decreased its seats to 108. If the opposition had succeeded in winning another eight seats, they could have demanded voting on the impeachment of the president or the amendment of the Constitution―a much harsher result for the ruling party.

How to Assess the 22nd National Assembly Election

South Korean politics followed, reflecting society, the course of deepened division and confrontation between the conservative and progressive camps, highlighted by the impeachment and dismissal of President Park Geun-hye, the daughter of ex-President Park Chung-hee, a prime symbol of conservatism, and an attempt to change the country's course propelled by former President Moon Jae-in―the right-hand man of ex-President Roh Moo-hyun, a man embodying progressive values―under the slogan of liquidating accumulated vices. The conflict between the two camps began from differences in ideology and policy and went headlong to a confrontation dominated by the partisan logic of ‘friend or foe'―each camp denying the argument of the other without listening; thus, the division in Korean society became increasingly serious.

While the conservatives and the progressives, vying for power, were engaged in a vicious cycle of revenge and reprisals, the reality of life and the economy, which showed no signs of amelioration, increased public dissatisfaction with and distrust of old-fashioned, dysfunctional politics. The recent general election took place amid such a stagnant social atmosphere; public attention initially focused on how much support third-force parties, anticipated to demolish the existing political framework dominated by the sterile confrontation between the two major parties, would gain and herald the opening of a new sphere in South Korean politics. However, the rallying of third force parties, anticipated to eclipse the two largest parties, vanished soon, and the attempt to defeat the political dominance of the top two parties failed. As a result, the recent election was as ever a clash between conservative and progressive forces.

(1) The Recent General Election by Voter's Ideology and Generation

The political orientation of South Korean voters can be summarized as follows: there is a nearly equal split between conservative and progressive voters, with the largest segment consisting of floating independent voters who make up almost half of the electorate. Additionally, there is a distinct generational trend influencing the electorate.1

The 60s and above generation, proud that they lived through the period when Korea emerged from poverty and achieved affluence, are overwhelmingly conservative and largely support the ruling People Power Party. Those in their 40s are proud of having witnessed the country's democratization, fought authoritarianism, and contributed to establishing democracy in Korean society. They demonstrate a clear progressive political leaning and largely support the opposition Democratic Party of Korea. Those under 20 belong to the generation of digital natives born and raised in the information society of Korea, which achieved both economic growth and democratization and became an IT superpower. They have lived in a low-growth, ultra-competitive society that survived the IMF financial crisis and the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Their majority consists of floating independent voters―non-ideological, non-regional, lifestyle-oriented, and sensitive to questions of equity. The ratio of floating independent voters outnumbers PPP/DPK supporters. As for those in their 30s, the ratios of PPP/DPK supporters and floating independent voters are almost even. As for those in their 50s, PPP and DPK supporters are on par, while the ratio of supporters of independent candidates is low. The trend in favor of PPP or DPK almost remains unchanged among those in their 40s, 50s, and 60s and above. On the other hand, those in their 20-30s show a high percentage of support for independent candidates; therefore, they are the target voters for the Korean political parties in the election campaign.

It should also be noted that in Korean society, where the birthrate is declining and the population is rapidly growing old, a significant change is taking place in the age pyramid of voters, which could have a political impact.2 The proportion of voters in their 20s and 30s has dropped significantly over the past 20 years from 47% in 2004 to 28.6% in 2024, while the proportion of voters aged 60 or older has increased sharply from 16.9% to 31.9%.

The proportion of voters in their 30s and younger, including 18 and 19-year-olds, is still over 30% (30.7%). It is apparent that this generation, dominated by independent voters, holds the key to the election result. Meanwhile, as the recent election was dubbed a "grey election," the proportion of voters in their 60s and older exceeded for the first time that of voters in their 30s and younger. This trend is likely to continue. It is a change hard to ignore, given that middle-aged and older voters have consistently scored high turnout rates of 70-80%, regardless of the electoral climate; the turnout rates of voters in the 20's and 30's age range between 40% and 70%, depending on the electoral trend and level of interest.3

These generation-wise trends and changes in the age structure will serve as a tailwind for the conservative ruling PPP, which has an unwavering support base among the over-60s generation, whose presence is increasing as its proportion in the electorate rises and whose turnout is consistently high. On the other hand, it was apparent that people in their 20s and 30s, mostly independent voters were inclined to prioritize practical interests and whose voting behavior is unpredictable, could influence the election results as swing voters. Quite understandably, losing their support would cause enormous damage to each party's election strategy.

(2) The PPP's Electoral Strategy and Its Limits

According to a pre-election poll survey, approval ratings for the two largest parties were neck and neck, which led some to predict a close match. However, once the election campaign began, the combined approval ratings for both parties were estimated at less than 70%. What mattered for both the ruling and opposition was how to win over the remaining 30% or more of independent voters. According to the same poll survey, negative evaluations of President Yoon Suk-yeol consistently outnumbered positive ones by more than 20 percentage points; "voting for the opposition party to check the government" outnumbered "voting for the ruling party to support the government" by more than ten percentage points. This suggested that the recent election would be a tough battle for the ruling party, while the opposition party could anticipate an increase in support.4

Following the crushing defeat in the by-elections in October last year, the ruling PPP faced the general election by adopting a one-top regime in which Han Dong-hoon, who had been appointed chairman of the People's Power Emergency Measure Committee, served as general election committee chairman. Han Dong-hoon, like President Yoon, came from the prosecutor's office. He had no political career but has been a competent aide to President Yoon since his prosecutor days.

The biggest weakness of the PPP was none other than President Yoon Suk-yeol himself. Calling for a "trial against the Yoon administration," the opposition party targeted Yoon's way of governance, not his policies. President Yoon does not pay any attention to public opinion, listen to opposing opinions, nor advice from people standing by him. Rather he pushes through whatever he deems necessary regardless of the backlash. His arbitrary and rigid administration, combined with the president's career as prosecutor general, made him the target of criticism; he was blamed for being arrogant and one-sided. In particular, for people in their 40s and 50s who are proud that they opened the way to the democratization era and played a role in establishing democracy in Korean society, President Yoon's way of governance was authoritarian, reminiscent of the former dictatorial governments, and therefore offensive.

Furthermore, since his prosecutor days, Yoon spoke that he would not pledge allegiance to any humans, and would deal strictly with cases involving persons of power, respecting the law and principles. He firmly abided by his beliefs. However, once he became president and gained power, he displayed a different attitude, frequently exercising his veto against allegations involving his family and close aides, such as his wife, Kim Kun-hee, and Defense Minister Lee Jong-sup. This damaged President Yoon's reputation for "fairness," who had severely criticized the double standards of the previous Moon Jae-in administration during the recent presidential election campaign. Korean citizens in their 20s and 30s, who are sensitive to authoritarianism and injustice from people in positions of power, deemed this act by the president to be unpardonable. President Yoon aroused their anger and antipathy.

What the general election committee chairman Han Dong-hoon was required to do as a priority was to first change the tone of the ruling party, which meekly followed President Yoon's self-righteous administration, which ignored process and tried to realize its objectives by force, and then to demonstrate to the nation the party's willingness to change. To this end, the ruling party needed to show the readiness to, if necessary, disagree with the Yoon administration's position, distinguish itself by controlling its distance from President Yoon, and show that it is not at the beck and call of the president. Yet, in reality, because of the absence of such an attitude, it was hard for the ruling party to win over the middle class and their support by only engaging in negative attacks to discredit the two opposition leaders, who faced several pending judicial cases.

Under the leadership of general election committee chairman Han Dong-hoon, the PPP selected candidates who were sure to win. But ultimately, most of its official candidates were people close to the president. Han Dong-hoon was criticized for prioritizing pro-Yoon candidates out of concern for the president. Furthermore, when Han Dong-hoon mentioned the need for an explanation to dispel the public's distrust regarding different allegations about Kim Kun-hee, the presidential secretariat, sensing the president's anger, tried to suppress Han's move by threatening dismissal. As a result, Han was silenced. In addition, when asked about his view on the allegation that the appointment of former Defense Minister Lee Jong-seop as Korean ambassador to Australia was designed to cover up the investigation into the death of a Marine Corps corporal, Han avoided commenting, revealing the reality that actions and words that go against the president's wishes are suppressed.

Furthermore, over the government's policy measures to increase admissions to medical schools to alleviate the doctor shortage, quite a few medical doctors who were against the measures resigned en masse in protest during the election campaign, contributing to further confusion in the medical profession, which in turn threatened the lives and health of the people. While South Koreans favored the government's policy, they understood that the president's stubborn response of showing no sign of compromise prolonged the situation, causing anxiety in the lives of citizens. Gradually, criticism turned to President Yoon's stubbornness and the ruling party, which could not admonish such a president.

These events exposed the actual state of the ruling party under President Yoon's control and the limits of Han Dong-hoon's power, who could not distance himself from the president by criticizing him or distinguish himself from the president's other followers.

In the end, the ruling party's election strategy by Chairman Han Dong-hoon ended up with a negative campaign against the opposition leaders, failing to meet public expectations for a change in the Yoon administration. Han could not quash the opposition's strategy, which defined the recent general election as a ‘judgment' against the Yoon administration.

(3) The DPK and the RKP's Strategy to Judge the Yoon Administration

Meanwhile, the biggest concern for the leading opposition DPK was strife and division within the party. In particular, in the process of selecting official candidates, the blatant attempt to turn it into "Lee Jae-myung's party" by giving by every means possible preferential treatment to people close to Lee Jae-myung was even called a "massacre of official candidacy." This exacerbated friction between the Lee Jae-myung faction and the non-Lee Jae-myung factions―the Moon Jae-in and the Roh Moo-hyun faction―that kept their distance from Lee Jae-myung.

To realize a change of government in the coming presidential election in 2027 and to restore a progressive government, the DPK had to win the general election and pass judgment on the Yoon administration. On the other hand, Korean people hesitated to vote for the DPK, ruled by Lee Jae-myung, who continues to run the party in a self-righteous and forceful manner while being involved in different legal challenges. If internal conflicts within the DPK cause these supporters to leave and lead to the split of the progressive forces, the Yoon administration and the PPP may then benefit. The greater the discord becomes within the DPK, the more the party will disappoint and alienate the indecisive independent voters. Should such a development lead to a decrease in the turnout rate, it will be advantageous development for the PPP, which enjoys solid support from seniors. If non-Lee Jae-myung factions rebel against Lee Jae-myung and split off from the DPK, resulting in the ruling PPP's victory, Lee will inevitably be held responsible for the defeat.

Among the influential figures of non-Lee Jae-myung factions, Lee Hae-chan and Kim Boo-kyum, who served as prime ministers in the Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in administrations, respectively, accepted the position of co-chairman of the standing joint election committee. Im Jong-seok, who served as Chief of Staff to President Moon Jae-in, also decided to remain in the DPK after losing his official candidacy, distinguishing himself from former Prime Minister Lee Nak-yon, who left the DPK to form the New Future Party. As a whole, to pass judgment on the Yoon administration, measures were taken to temporarily contain internal conflicts that arose during the nomination of official candidates.

Former Minister of Justice Cho Kuk, a close associate of former President Moon Jae-in, publicly displayed his anti-Yoon Suk-yeol position. He formed the Rebuilding Korea Party (RKP) pledging the immediate termination of the prosecutorial dictatorship and declared that he would lead those judging the Yoon administration. After serving as President Moon's Chief Secretary for Civil Affairs, Cho Kuk led the prosecutorial reform―the Moon administration's flagship policy―as Minister of Justice. He had a deep feud with President Yoon. Due to his fierce conflict with then Prosecutor General Yoon Suk-yeol, he was forced to resign in the face of multiple allegations involving himself and his family. His wife is currently serving a prison sentence after being found guilty in connection with their daughter's fraudulent admission to university; Cho himself received a prison sentence and is currently appealing the sentence. In both public and private life, Cho is a person who is genuinely a nemesis of Yoon Suk-yeol.

In the run-up to the recent general election, Representative Cho Kuk adopted the strategy of ‘DPK for constituencies; RKP for proportional representation'―the RKP would concentrate on proportional representation, not run candidates in regional constituencies, and not become an enemy of the DPK. According to an analysis, the RKP not only attracted progressive voters, who were anti-Yoon Suk-yeol but, at the same time, could not help feeling a sense of resistance to Lee Jae-myung, as well as independent voters skeptical about the person of Yoon Suk-yeol. The RKP is also viewed to have provided a tailwind for the DPK in its campaign in regional constituencies, thereby contributing to its victory.

(4) The General Election Results and Their Implications

Before his presidential term reached the halfway point, it became inevitable that President Yoon Suk-yeol's centripetal force would decline. In response to his crushing defeat in the recent election, which the opposition defined as a judgment about his way of governance, the question of whether the president would change his politics during his remaining term of three years will now become a focal point. At any rate, it is hard to stop the trend away from Yoon Suk-yeol. With the PPP's starting from scratch in view, the internal strife between pro-Yoon and anti-Yoon factions will likely intensify over President Yoon's departure from the party. Also intertwined with the designs of the promising candidates for the next presidential election, the confusion over the decoupling of President Yoon is likely to intensify.

One of the keys to the PPP's recovery is how to regain the support of young male voters who have given up on the party.5 In the previous presidential election and unified local elections, former representative Lee Jun-seok, then an inexperienced member of the National Assembly in his 30s, played a critical role in leading the party to victory by widely gathering support from people in their 20s and 30s who were opposed to the DPK's gender support policies in the light of equity and possessed by some victim consciousness, while getting rid of the image of an old-fashioned party of aged politicians coming chiefly from the Yeongnam region. If the PPP were to fight the general election under the leadership of Lee, what the pro-Yoon Suk-yeol mainstream feared most was a generational change in the party that would inevitably happen through the selection of official candidates. The pro-Yoon mainstream effectively ousted Lee from the party, but along with this, it lost the support of young male voters.

Meanwhile, it is apparent that the PPP could not advance without addressing the issue of how to overcome the current situation in which female voters from young people to those in their 50s have turned their back on the party due to the anti-feminist gender-critical strategy developed by Lee Jun-seok. There is a need to create a system to gain female voters' support.6 In addition, how to garner the support of young people who are suffering from gender issues is a sensitive question that resembles handling a double-edged sword requiring a careful approach based on a meticulous strategy.

In any case, the PPP will be obliged to fundamentally review its strategy for re-establishing a conservative government during the run-up to the forthcoming presidential election. Unless the PPP presents a new, rational conservative image suited to the realities of contemporary South Korea, attractive to young anti-vested interest voters, instead of the nostalgic, authoritarian, old-fashioned image of conservatives who emphasize anti-communism and ideological conflict, the PPP as a political party may gradually lose its ability to grow and will decline from a leading party capable of running government to a peripheral one that speaks for specific conservative forces. Therefore, the PPP must start afresh with such a sense of crisis.

When it comes to the DPK, on the other hand, in the recent general election, Representative Lee Jae-myung proved his leadership by leading the DPK to an overwhelming victory; he succeeded in forming a mainstream faction within the party through the election of many of his affiliated lawmakers. He definitely strengthened his power base. Thus, he has cleared one hurdle toward the next presidential election. Nonetheless, there is no change in the fact that Lee Jae-myung still faces several legal risks; it is evident from the fact that the party's approval rating levels off even after the general election that this victory was primarily brought about by the mistakes committed by President Yoon Suk-yeol and the ruling party, not due to active support for Lee Jae-myung himself and the DPK. The victory of the DPK was won by the party's election strategy calling for judging the Yoon administration in cooperation with the non-Lee Jae-myung factions within the party and the RKP.

Lee Jae-myung's blatant majority manipulation to gain control of the DPK through the selection of official candidates gave rise to a serious internal friction. The non-Lee Jae-myung factions, chiefly the Moon Jae-in faction, who had been marginalized, remained in the party, contributed to the election victory, and as a consequence, secured a position and influence as non-mainstream factions. The RKP under Cho Kuk created a whirlwind by winning 12 seats and became the second-largest opposition party. It has come close to the DPK in proportional representation votes by a narrow margin. It surpassed the DPK in Cho's hometown of Busan and the administrative city of Sejong, also earning the largest number of proportional representation votes in Gwangju Metropolitan City, North Jeolla Province, and South Jeolla Province, which are leading strongholds of progressive forces, thus outshining the DPK. This was indeed a noteworthy achievement.7

The RKP has proven its capability to garner widespread support from progressive voters who hesitate to support the DPK under Lee Jae-myung. For Lee Jae-myung, who holds non-Lee Jae-myung and non-mainstream factions within the party, the RKP has now become a source of caution that could generate centrifugal forces depriving support from the DPK.

Ahead of the 2027 presidential election, non-Lee Jae-myung progressive forces, including the RKP, have proven their influence and presence. A feud seems inevitable between those forces and the DPK dominated by the mainstream pro-Lee Jae-myung faction.

Judgment on the Yoon Administration and an Outlook on Japan-ROK Relations

There are concerns that the defeat in the recent general election will lead to changes in the direction of the foreign policy and North Korea policy of the Yoon administration. However, since diplomacy and national defense are largely within presidential authority, their fundamental tone will likely remain intact. In particular, the move to improve the Japan-ROK relationship, which began as President Yoon's personal initiative, is progressing rapidly in multiple areas. It has also led to strengthening Japan-US-ROK cooperation with the United States at its core. In a speech to the nation on April 1, 2024 during the election campaign, President Yoon said, "We have come this far by boldly implementing even unpopular policies that we would like to avoid if they are absolutely necessary for the people and in the national interest." As an example, he referred to his personal efforts to restore the failed Japan-ROK relationship and stressed the outcomes, stating, "I was worried about approval ratings inside and outside the party. But now, close to 10 million people from both countries visit each other every year. Cooperation between companies from both countries has become more active, and competitiveness has improved."8

During a Q&A session of the May 9 "Two-year Public Report and Press Conference for Yoon Suk-yeol's Government" to mark the second anniversary of his presidency, President Yoon acknowledged that "there are discrepancies between the stances of the peoples of South Korea and Japan over historical and other issues." But he continued, "regarding South Korea-Japan ties, we should think about what to do for our future generations… Various pending issues and history may stand in our way, but we must be steadfast in our goal-oriented approach and persevere where we must, while moving forward in the direction we should go." He further stated, "Specifically, we must cooperate to respond to the North Korean nuclear threat, to promote bilateral economic cooperation, and to secure leadership in promoting our joint agenda in the Indo-Pacific region and the global community."9

President Yoon has demonstrated his leadership in restoring the failed Japan-ROK relationship based on the "Global Pivotal State" vision that the Yoon administration formulated. President Yoon judged that since it would be hard for South Korea to adequately deal with the strategic security environment, which has become more complicated and tense due to multiple global crises, without the evolution of the US-ROK alliance and trilateral strategic cooperation among Japan, the United States, and South Korea, and that consequently, the restoration of the Japan-ROK relationship is essential. Therefore, the restoration of the Japan-ROK relationship and the strengthening of Japan-US-ROK cooperation are remarkable achievements or a proud legacy for the Yoon administration, from the perspective of securing deterrence against North Korea and maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula.

(1) "Humiliating Diplomacy Toward Japan" as a Means to Attack the Yoon Administration

The crushing defeat in the recent general election will be sure to weaken the Yoon administration's centripetal force, and there is no denying that this will have a negative impact on future South Korean diplomacy with Japan. Voices from civic groups calling for Japan to settle the past and criticism from the opposition parties of the Yoon administration's diplomacy toward Japan will likely grow stronger than ever. However, it is unlikely that the Yoon administration's diplomacy toward Japan will regress for this reason; on the contrary, President Yoon will likely utilize the remaining three-year term to propel it by cutting off his retreat.

However, what concerns us most is simmering dissatisfaction not only in the Korean media but also in government: Although Japan-ROK relations have begun to move forward thanks to President Yoon's bold proposal for concessions, Japan has failed to show consideration or compromise proportionate to the Korean offer. It appears that there is actually less interest from the Japanese side regarding this matter. President Yoon's words, "Be patient where we must," may be construed to indicate that he is not necessarily satisfied with the Japanese response to the decision he made by staking his fate.

For the opposition parties, who won the general election calling for a "judgment on the administration" and gained public support, the Yoon administration's policy toward Japan was indeed a "humiliating diplomacy" and naturally the target of judgment. It was in a sense an easy target precisely because it was promoted under the robust presidential leadership and recognized as an achievement that could be considered the administration's legacy. It was a matter of course in this context that after the general election, the RKP Representative Cho Kuk, a leader of the anti-Yoon movement, who had referred to presidential impeachment, visited Takeshima (Dokdo in Korean) in the wake of the DPK members' visit to the same island. He criticized the Yoon administration's humiliating diplomacy toward Japan.10

Following the leak of personal data of users of the free messaging app LINE, the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications issued administrative guidance twice to LY Corporation, requesting that as a measure to prevent the recurrence of a similar incident, the company review its capital relationship with its parent company, the Korean IT giant Naver, which was partly responsible for the leak, and implement thorough security governance. The issue has led to widespread suspicion and resentment throughout South Korea: How can a public authority possibly force a foreign company to sell its assets? Such a behavior would be a grave violation incompatible with international standards. Is the Japanese government not exerting undue pressure on Naver to sell its shares and attempting to seize the management rights of LY Corporation from the Korean firm. The opposition parties and part of the media have criticized that this resulted from the Yoon administration's weak-kneed diplomacy toward Japan, and the DPK Representative Lee Jae-myung posted on social media, "Hirobumi Ito again invades Korean territory. His descendant invades the cyber territory of the ROK, LINE," linking the recent incident to the fact that MIC Minister Takeaki Matsumoto is a descendant of Hirobumi Ito, the first resident-general of Japan-ruled Korea, fueling Korean nationalism.11 Attacks on the Yoon administration utilizing a "Japan-related quibble" will likely continue.

(2) The Enhancing Ruling-Opposition Confrontation and Concerns about Japan-ROK Relations as a Korean Domestic Issue

The Yoon administration's pragmatic and realist engagement with Japan was for the opposition forces nothing but an anti-national, humiliating betrayal—especially for those who followed the footsteps of the ideological Moon Jae-in administration, which from an ethno-historical perspective, defined the ruling party as pro-Japanese conservative forces favoring vested interests, and aimed to ascend to the mainstream by defeating the conservative and realizing a "completely new country." For them, the successive conservative forces, the forerunners of the PPP, were the pro-Japanese elements, who should first have been condemned after Korea was liberated from Japanese rule. But the fact is that they survived the period of division and the Cold War and, through ties with dictatorial powers, became the engine that propelled anti-communist policies and economic development, embodied vested interests permeating Korean society, and dominated the country without legitimacy. For the progressives, they were an incarnation of accumulated evils that should be liquidated.

As the ideological conflict between conservatives and progressives intensified, for progressive forces whose historical outlook is as described above, the fight against conservative forces was a fight against pro-Japanese factions. They fought national elections calling them "Korea-Japan wars." The scope of the battle for liquidation of accumulated evils extended beyond the elimination of pro-Japanese factions and the remnants of pro-Japanese collaborators to include the normalization of Japan-ROK relations in 1965, which was deemed diplomacy without justice forcibly carried out by a dictatorial regime lacking both legitimacy and justification. Thus, with the political division within South Korea spreading to diplomacy, Japan-ROK relations became an issue in the country's domestic politics. We witnessed diplomacy turned into a domestic political issue.

President Yoon initially presented a new outlook on the modern history of South Korea under the watchword of "Free and Prosperous South Korea." It considered the modern history of the country as a process of ceaseless struggle for freedom—regaining, defending, and expanding it. According to this view, all those who devoted and sacrificed their life to build a "Free and Prosperous South Korea," including anti-Japanese independence activists, anti-communist soldiers, workers who worked for economic development, leaders who led them, and democratization activists, are defined as independence activists. The path of the struggle for freedom, which started from the resistance against Japanese aggression during the colonial era, is still underway and will continue into the future.12 This new view of history, presented in a way that embraced rather than denied or excluded the view of history held by progressive forces, may be an attempt at national unity under the Yoon administration that aims to overcome the ideological conflict between conservatives and progressives by embracing it.

By positioning Japan within this new interpretation of modern history, Japan, which was once an arch enemy of the Korean nation to resist, fight, defeat, and liberate themselves from its rule to regain the freedom deprived by it, is now seen as a neighbor with whom South Koreans must stand on the same side, join force, and confront challenges that threaten the freedom of global citizens.13 President Yoon's presentation of the new outlook on history can be said to be his effort to prevent the Japan-ROK relationship from being shaken by the impact of the divisions and conflicts within South Korea.

However, the Yoon administration's conciliatory attempt at national unity was doomed to fail quickly. President Yoon, who had deliberately emphasized "freedom," made it clear that he would reject and fight progressive forces, using "freedom" as an anti-communist watchword.

He stated, "Whether one is conservative or progressive is based on the foundation of liberal democracy. So this is not a matter of conservatives or progressives, but a matter of protecting the identity of the Republic of Korea, a free Republic of Korea," and added, "There are so many forces that shake, threaten, and deny the identity; the opposition-dominated National Assembly and the opposition-controlled media have no choice but to fight against those forces." He also stressed, "National unity and compromise are important, but we must agree on the values and methods to achieve this. Considering our national identity, we must consent, as a premise for promoting national unity, on a clear direction along which we must lead our country."14

The opposition may have felt threatened to choose between liberal democracy and communist totalitarianism. As a result, the government-opposition confrontation became decisive.

The more the government-opposition fight, dominated by ideological conflict and partisan logic, becomes acute, the more the Yoon administration's efforts to restore Japan-ROK relations will inevitably become the target of attacks from the opposition forces that won a landslide victory in the general election. This is all the more so because President Yoon himself has been actively promoting the restoration of the bilateral relations, well aware of the accompanying risks. There is undeniable concern that Japan-ROK relations will again become a domestic issue that reflects the political division and social conflict in South Korea, spurring the trend of making diplomacy a domestic political issue.

The current situation where the Yoon administration is in a difficult situation at home, and its policy toward Japan receives criticism is unfavorable for not only Japan but also the US Biden administration, which has endeavored to strengthen Japan-US-ROK cooperation as the cornerstone of its China strategy ahead of the upcoming US presidential election. To make the improving trend in Japan-ROK relations irreversible, we must do our utmost to avoid giving the impression that South Korea gives in and Japan alone comes out victorious. Ahead of the 60th anniversary in 2025 of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea, it will be necessary for Japan, including its business community, to demonstrate leadership from a big-picture perspective, which will enable a more proactive response from the Japanese side, and to steadily accumulate specific results in a visible manner and in multiple areas toward building a strategic Japan-ROK relationship and strengthening Japan-US-ROK cooperation.

(Professor, University of Shizuoka)

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