China's Strategy toward the U.S.
1 Factors Influencing China's Diplomacy with the U.S.
1.1 Introduction - Another "Actor" in Chinese Politics: "The Public Sentiment Inside the Regime"
Recent media articles in Japan make it seem like President Xi Jinping decides every policy in China. This is an overly simplified view. Regarding diplomacy, nowadays, Chinese diplomats are famous for their harsh "wolf warrior" remarks. As the Communist Party of China (hereafter referred to as "CPC" in this article) has tightened its guidance and control over the Foreign Ministry through personnel changes, it has become more prominent. It is generally viewed that diplomats have come to make such remarks in response to the wishes of the CPC, especially its head, President Xi Jinping.
At times, however, remarks raise questions about whether they align with President Xi's intentions. One example is the April 2023 televised remark by Chinese Ambassador to France Lu Shaye that " These ex-Soviet Union countries (such as Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) do not have effective status under international law because there is no international accord to concretize their status as a sovereign country," which immediately provoked intense anger throughout Europe.
China, which is in serious confrontation with the United States, is working hard to gain support from other countries. While relations with the countries of the "Global South" are generally not bad, China faces problems with Europe, where relations have deteriorated over Taiwan and security issues over the past few years, and China is eager to recover it. Just two weeks before the ambassador's remarks, President Xi invited French President Macron and E.U. President von der Leyen to Beijing to check the "decoupling" move and urge Europe to remain neutral in the U.S.-China confrontation. It was no wonder that the ambassador, whose completely unnecessary remarks had put a damper on President Xi's efforts, angered President Xi and was dismissed from his post. But in reality, he was not dismissed, nor was he punished or reprimanded in any way.
The key to solving this enigma may lie in Chinese public sentiment. Regarding the war between Ukraine and Russia, the government is appealing for "neutrality" because it does not want it to be seen that "China is leaning toward Russia." Still, the domestic media and social networking sites are clearly "pro-Russia and anti-Western" in their headlines. Ambassador Lu is also quite popular in China, having made a number of "wolf warrior" statements. He probably made his remarks on T.V. with the confidence that he would not be punished even if he displeased President Xi Jinping. The current CPC, which upholds a "democratic centralized system," is indifferent to the rights and opinions of the minority but is very much concerned about the views and feelings of the majority. Public sentiment has that much power even in China.
In this way, even President Xi cannot move everything as he wishes. Although this is a mere hypothesis, it is not the case that "China has only one actor, President Xi," but there is another potential actor, "the public sentiment inside the CPC regime," which is usually elusive, but when this sentiment has a clear direction on an issue, it may have a power that even President Xi cannot easily overturn.
Recently, Chinese intellectuals have voiced their alarm and concerns about the "narrow nationalism" directed toward the West, especially the United States. In the past, the nationalist left was viewed as a formidable force in China, albeit not a majority one. Still, it has been gaining strength since the US-China confrontation and the COVID-19 incident that heightened tension with the West, and now it constitutes the mainstream of "the public sentiment inside the regime." Chinese diplomats have been "cozying up" to this popular sentiment to save their face and to get further promoted. Therefore, we can take their "wolf warrior" comments as a good "window of observation" into the regime's mood.
1.2 China's Changing View of the United States
Relations between the United States and China have been tumultuous over the past several years. The first significant change in relations with the West, especially with the United States, which in the previous century had been the object of fear and admiration, or in other words, of "ostentation," occurred in 2008 when the Lehman Shock hit. China witnessed the mistakes made by the West, which had been the undisputed "teacher" of the economy up to that point, and changed its perspective: "Teachers are no big deal either." Since then, an assertion of "core interests" in diplomacy and "internationalization of the Chinese yuan" in the economy arose with its growing national power.
The next major catalysts of change were two events in the West in 2016. One was the passage of Brexit in the U.K. in a referendum, and the other was the election of Trump as president. Both were criticized worldwide as "own goals" detrimental to their national interests. Having seen these events, China came to believe that "the Western democratic political system is defective, causing fatal errors," its perspective on the West changed to one of looking down on the West. The confident declaration at the party congress in 2017 that "China's solutions will be spread throughout the world" may have been a sign of this change.
Then came the decisive change in 2020 with COVID-19. A strict blockade contained the outbreak in Wuhan for a short period. The Chinese people, basking in a sense of accomplishment, were shocked to hear the finger-pointing of the "China virus" from abroad. They heard with surprise that more than 200,000 people had died in the U.S. in six months and felt that the U.S. was like a developing country. They also thought that Trump was shifting the responsibility for his inaction onto China. In the same year, while China's economy was rapidly recovering, 30% of the U.S. public refused to accept Trump's defeat, claiming that the results of the presidential election had been "stolen." The Chinese people scoffed, "Denying the result of the election that they did, then what is the meaning of such a Western democratic political system?"
Also, during this period, a "rule of thumb" was heard and widely circulated in China that "when a foreign country's GDP reaches 60% of the U.S.'s, the U.S. sees it as a rival that threatens its hegemony and begins to crush it," as seen in the examples of the former Soviet Union and Japan. As the U.S. sanctions against China became more and more severe after then, the idea that "the rule of thumb was correct, and the U.S. intends to crush China" became firmly established.
It is said that both the government and the people in China have now given up hope of "restoring relations with the U.S." and that a mood of "fighting a long-term struggle against the U.S." is emerging with the narrative that "China has been attacked and abused by foreign countries in the past but has always rebounded." 1
This paper offers a hypothesis that China's policy toward the U.S. is now heavily weighted toward the hard-liners in the Party, who are in a "wolf warrior" mood, and that the Xi Jinping administration gets support from the hard-liners if it adopts a hard line toward the U.S. and is subjected to criticism and pressure if it takes an appeasing stance.
1.3 Changing Perceptions of "the Period of Strategic Opportunities."
One keyword that describes China's view of "diplomacy" is "the Period of Strategic Opportunities." It was officially documented at the 16th Party Congress in 2002. It is the view that the world conditions at the time presented "a unique opportunity for China's development that must be grasped and utilized to the fullest extent possible. The "unique development opportunity" refers to the fact that, on the economic front, China had gained institutional guarantees in terms of trade and investment by joining the WTO, and that, on the political front, there was no possibility of a major upheaval like a world war in the foreseeable future. In addition, since the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. has shifted its foreign policy focus to anti-terrorism and sought cooperative relations with China.
Later, however, as China's national power grew and its self-esteem strengthened, its friction with the U.S. increased. As a result, the theory of a "period of strategic opportunity" came to be discussed with the reservation that "on the other hand, there are also risks and challenges." In the years that followed, "risks and challenges" gained more and more weight. And at the 20th Party Congress in 2022, they were given equal importance as "strategic opportunities and risks/challenges coexist."
At the same time, however, "opportunity" was rephrased as "new opportunity." Chinese diplomatic researchers describe this change as a shift from "opportunity as a gift" to "opportunity that must be created and won proactively." 2 Having become a "superpower," China now has the power to adapt and change to its environment.
The "risks/challenges" at the time of the 20th Party Congress were still considered to be controllable. On the economic front, the report predicts that no matter how much the West advocates "decoupling (from China,)" it cannot afford to move away from China in terms of supply and demand (market). On the political front, despite the increased tension in U.S.-China relations, the likelihood of a major military conflict is extremely low, as evidenced by President Biden's statement that "there should be 'guardrails' to prevent unforeseen events from occurring in U.S.-China relations.
As described above, the official document of the October 2022 Party Congress still shows confidence and optimism. Under the surface, however, the Party's perception of the situation may have taken a dark turn since then. One reason is that the Chinese economy has been under solid downside pressure since 2021 due to an unprecedented recession in the real estate sector, and the harsh "zero-corona" measures led to a dismal 0.4% GDP growth rate (y/y) in the second quarter of the same year. In addition, in October, the U.S. issued a regulatory measure of unprecedented severity stating that it would not hand over advanced semiconductors to China, which began to have an enormous impact on China's semiconductor industry. Although the Party has not announced any official change in its position on the "strategic opportunity period" since the Party Congress, the Xi Jinping administration's perception of the situation may have become even more critical under these changes 3 .
1.4 Preparing for a long endurance battle?
In the second quarter of 2023, the Chinese economy showed signs of stalling, spreading pessimism among public and private enterprises. However, since the economic stimulus package announced on July 24 was small and did not involve the expected sizable fiscal stimulus, experts are increasingly concerned that the economy will further cool down toward the end of the year if nothing is done.
At the party congress the year before, in which it elected President Xi for the third term, he pledged to "raise GDP per capita to the level of a 'moderately developed country' by 2035. To achieve this goal, the country must maintain an average growth rate of around 4.5% for the next dozen years. However, fulfilling this pledge can quickly become complicated if the economy cools significantly in 2023. Nevertheless, why has the administration yet to develop a significant economic stimulus package?
Worrisome media commentaries have recently appeared on this question. According to them, the Xi Jinping administration;
1 "(desires to) shift the country's priorities away from rapid growth at all costs toward steps that help gird China for possible future conflict with a more hostile world" (2023-07-14 Wall Street Journal) 4
2 "pursues global leadership in advanced technology and other strategic areas of the economy, such as a transition to green energy (and or "tech self-sufficiency")" (2023-7-17 Financial Times) 5
3 "believes that the (post-WWII) global architecture is becoming irrelevant and that attempts to preserve it are futile. Instead of seeking to save the system, Beijing is preparing for its failure "(2023-6-20 Foreign Affairs) 6
4 Aims for Multi-polarization and Building a Non-U.S. Economic Bloc" (Xi Jinping's Philosophy of Action, Endo Homare) 7
Even if national security is given higher priority, the Xi Jinping administration will be held accountable if it fails to achieve the economic growth pledged at the party congress, and it will probably respond by saying, "Now is a time of national crisis, so we will ask the people to bear economic difficulty." If this happens, the pessimistic mood in the general public and private enterprises will become even stronger. In contrast, "the public sentiment inside the regime" will probably become even more hostile toward the U.S., and the "wolf warrior" mood will intensify.
Moreover, if China were to assume that the international order is collapsing and aims for regime survival, the means would be to build a "sphere of influence" in which China can feel secure in both economic and political terms and to "exercise 'superpower' that can change the environment" toward this end.
2 China's Economic Security Policy
2.1 Early Policy: "Mirror Attack" on the U.S.
Successive Chinese administrations, including the Xi Jinping administration, have tried to ensure China's economic security and have implemented various policies in areas such as energy, food, and resources. However, as the growing feud between the U.S. and China has raised concerns among Western countries about economic security, and as economic measures targeting China have been introduced, China's awareness of its economic security has also strengthened.
As shown in the table below, China's first response to the number of sanctions imposed by the U.S. was to launch a "mirror attack"-style countermeasure, mimicking the "Unreliable Entity List System" enacted in September 2020, which became the pioneering one. In response to the U.S. "High-Tech Cold War" policy, the Chinese government rapidly began enacting economic and security-related laws and regulations.
A series of Chinese laws and regulations related to economic security were initially passive in opposition to the U.S.'s but have since "evolved," on one hand by following the U.S. legal system and on the other hand by actively pursuing China's economic security.
In particular, the Export Control Law that went into effect in December 2020 made "deemed exports" and "re-exports" of all goods, technologies, and services subject to regulation. As a result, domestic transactions that provide goods, technology, or services to foreign-funded companies or their employees in China are also regulated as "deemed exports," focusing on nationality. Third-country transaction in products and services containing Chinese parts and technology is also considered "re-export" and subject to the same extraterritorial application, the approach of which was to imitate the U.S. If these regulations are implemented as written, there will be a significant impact on trade and the activities of foreign-invested companies in China. However, while the legislation is in place, the Chinese government has been cautious about the actual implementation and enforcement at an early stage.
The enforcement began in 2023 (see table below). Why was the operational policy changed? The author can point to the following three points.
First, on October 7, 2022, the United States announced sanctions that would profoundly impact China's semiconductor industry. These measures are far more severe than the previous sanctions against China. And the Chinese government must have felt that their semiconductor industry was being "strangled" by the sanctions.
Second, there may be growing pressure from "the public sentiment inside the regime" that there is no reason to get hit and not fight back. The hard-line statements of former government officials against the U.S. October 7 sanction 8 seem to be a mirror of such a mood.
Third, the author believes the Chinese government has developed a comprehensive view of ensuring economic security, including supply chain policies, which will be discussed in the next section.
2.2 President Xi Jinping's view of the "supply chain."
Before this, in April 2020, President Xi gave a speech to the Party's Central Financial and Economic Affairs Commission in preparation for the "14th Five-Year Plan" to be enacted the following year, in which he stated the following regarding supply chains.
To protect industrial safety and national security, focus on establishing supply chains that are independently controllable, safe, and reliable, ensure at least one alternative source for critical products and supply routes, and form necessary industrial backup systems.
In the future, we will strive to rebuild new supply chains and fully expand technological innovation and import substitution. We will increase the dependence of the international supply chain on our country to form a strong countermeasure and deterrent force against artificial supply disruptions by foreign governments.
The 20th Party Congress in October 2022 refrained from being overly direct about the supply chain, but instead noted that the supply chain is positioned as an essential part of "national security," which is the most crucial priority of the Xi Jinping administration. Since then, China's supply chain policy has developed under this philosophy.
2.3 Deepening and Covert Chinese Supply Chain Policy 9
Over the past three years, China's supply chain policy has been taking shape, identifying choke points (China's weak spots) in crucial industries and commodities and promoting the acquisition of technologies aimed at eliminating them in a systematic and comprehensive manner.
It is said that the National Security Commission of the Party determines the basis of policy. The various departments of the State Council, such as the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), and Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), are responsible for the execution of the policy set by the Party. Recently, these offices have begun to issue instructions to Chinese companies not in writing but verbally and covertly, resulting in a significant lack of transparency in the execution of policies.
The " choke points" to be resolved used to be vaguely defined as "semiconductor chips," but after repeated interviews and surveys of related domestic companies, Chinese agencies began to delve deeper and identify which parts and components are the actual "choke points" (in the case of batteries, the "separator").
Aiming to eliminate the weak points by "Indigenization" with emphasis on nationality ("defense")
The typical approach to "indigenization" of identified "choke points" begins with (1) encouraging foreign companies with the relevant technology to establish joint ventures (requiring a majority (51% or more) by Chinese partner from the outset or after establishment) and (2) at the same time demanding that the domestic user industry "increase the ratio of domestic products used (sometimes "don't use foreign products). However, "indigenization" is not completed simply by foreign capital building factories in China. (3) When technology diffuses to Chinese firms through joint ventures, a wave of capital investment that far exceeds the scale of immediate demand (overcapacity phenomenon) usually occurs. As a result, foreign firms become unprofitable and are eliminated, and (iv) this accomplishes supply chain "indigenization."
In other words, China's "indigenization" policy emphasizes "nationality," and foreign-funded companies are not regarded as members of a complete supply chain, even if they have factories in China. This "emphasis on nationality" is a depressing reminder of China's deep-rooted distrust of foreigners, but at the same time, we also need to reflect on whether we, too, are viewing Chinese companies and Chinese scientists with skepticism based on their "nationality."
China also aims at making the world hold the choke points ("offense")
China's supply chain policy aims not only to eliminate China's "choke points." There are signs that China has also begun seeking an "offensive" (offensive) in the international supply chain. In industrial areas where conditions are met, China tries to force foreign countries to hold "choke points" and to rely on Chinese products and technologies by building a dominant position in the international market by developing overseas markets, expanding factories overseas, and seizing claims to overseas raw materials. （This move is reminiscent of President Xi's speech in April 2020 in which he stated that China would "increase the dependence of the international supply chain on our country" (see above speech).
The areas in which China aims to move in this direction include solar panels and E.V.'s. In these areas, China aims to seamlessly control the entire supply chain upstream and downstream, from raw materials (mines) to finished products. For essential commodities (rare-earth and polycrystalline silicon) in which China has an overwhelming market share, China is taking steps to restrict exports of goods and related technology.
On the other hand, it seems that China has given up on acquiring the much-talked-about high-end chip (single-nano-class) technology for the time being and instead aims to foster "legacy"(middle/low-end) chips (including power and gallium semiconductors) that are several generations behind of the state-of-the-art chips and can be produced solely using domestic (Western-free) technology, with large industrial subsidies.
China is the largest market, accounting for 1/3 of the world's semiconductor consumption. 10 In particular, many "legacy" chips are used in automobiles and home appliances, and this is the "volume zone" of the semiconductor market. At present, China's self-sufficiency rate for semiconductors is low at 16.7%, even including those produced by foreign-funded factories in China. 11 But the country is improving its capabilities in "legacy" semiconductors. Suppose the Chinese government instructs its user industries to use domestically produced chips instead of imported or foreign-made chips. In that case, foreign companies, both the chip makers and the user industries, will be significantly affected. Furthermore, if China, after occupying the domestic market with domestically produced chips, begins to penetrate the "volume zone" of the international market with its high-cost performance, the semiconductor industry in the West could be severely affected. Because less than a handful of Western semiconductor companies can survive on high-end chips alone.
2.4 The author's Findings on China's Supply Chain Policy
A strong sense of crisis that "threatens the very existence of the regime"
Two keywords show up frequently in Chinese supply chain policy, namely and " (to strive for self-reliance)." "卡脖子" originally meant "to be strangled," but it has since been translated to mean "to be hit on the choke point. The blocking of access to high-end chips by the U.S. is a typical example of "卡脖子." What can be seen from "卡脖子" is a strong sense of crisis that "if we do not resist, our regime will be strangled." Japan, too, strongly reacted to China's restrictions on rare earth exports in 2010. Having faced the U.S. sanctions after another, the sense of crisis China is experiencing may far exceed that of Japan at that time.
The phrase " to strive for self-reliance " is almost synonymous with Mao Zedong-era ‘s "自力更生（self-reliance）," which was advocated by Mao Zedong when the former Soviet Union cut off aid to China, and relations between the two countries deteriorated dramatically in the 1950s. This phrase is imbued with the memory of China's past, in which China has been buried and invaded by the imperial powers since the 19th century, and with pride that China has always been able to bounce back.
Asymmetry between the U.S. and China Part 1 - Asymmetry of Motives and Means
The U.S. has taken a hard-line approach to stop the supply of high-end chips to China because it believes that high-end chips and A.I. are directly related to the military or in the narrow sense of "national security." The reason for the narrowing of the range of chips to be restricted ("small yard high fence") may be because "legacy" semiconductors have little impact on the military.
In this way, the U.S. has invoked the chip restrictions as a "narrowly-defined security" measure, but China has taken this measure with a strong sense of crisis, as if the "very existence of the regime" were at stake. As a result, China is now launching a broad-based counterattack that is not limited to "narrowly defined security," here we can see a significant "asymmetry of motivation" between the two countries.
The reason why China is not stopping at eliminating its choke points but is trying to hit back at other country's choke points is that it believes that a " nonaggressive defense" is insufficient against a U.S. attack and that it can only stop an attack when it can hit back at the enemy's choke points.
Asymmetry between the U.S. and China Part 2 - "Asymmetry in Policy Measures"
Although "industrial policies" that heavily subsidize vital industries are now flourishing in Western countries, there is still a significant difference between China's "industrial policies" and Western countries. In the West, the final decision is based on the company's profitability, while China can ignore profitability.
In the West, the rush in the building of factories in the advanced chip industry occurs for now. Experts are concerned that this will result in an oversupply that will disrupt the profits of semiconductor companies and prevent the "Moore's Law (cycle)" that has been in place until now from working (turning). 12 Western countries, which provide billions of dollars in subsidies for factory construction, will not be able to provide tens of billions of dollars in subsidies to keep the Moore's cycle working. The Chinese semiconductor industry is being hit hard by new U.S. regulations in October 2022, and the technological gap with the West may widen. Still, the Chinese government will be willing to subsidize even unprofitable companies to ensure self-sufficiency in "legacy" semiconductors. Herein lies another asymmetry between the two sides.
3 Where the World Economy is Headed
3.1 The "Chinese Counterattack" has come
The rapid growth of Chinese-made EVs has recently brought about several significant changes in the domestic and international automobile markets. One is the dramatic increase in China's automobile exports (see table on the right; exports are up almost 100% year-on-year this year, may exceed 4 million units per year, and are on track to overtake Japan as the world's largest exporter this year).
The other is that while new energy vehicles represented by BYD are making rapid progress in China, sales of cars made by foreign automakers are decreasing. In June, the market shares (YoY) of German automakers went from 22.7% to 21.1%, Japan's went from 21.5% to 17.8%, and U.S. automakers from 10.1% to 9.2% (according to data from the Passenger Car Market Information Association). In particular, sales of Japanese-affiliated automakers in the January-May period showed a slight increase of 0.1% for Toyota, a sharp decline of 23.5% for Nissan, and a sharp decrease of 22.6% for Honda.
Chinese E.V.'s not only demonstrated a high level of perfection at the Shanghai Motor Show in April 2023 but are also seizing the world's most pressing supply chain choke points, such as batteries, high-performance magnets, and rare earths, and are likely to make rapid progress across the globe in the future.
However, automobiles are a "very political product," as the fierce trade disputes of decades past have shown. France quickly demanded dumping measures in response to the surge in Chinese E.V. imports. Chris Miller, author of the popular book "Chip War," cites the possibility of heightened security concerns over the data collection of connected cars in his article posted to the F.T. and goes on to offer the outlook that protectionist trade will spread to the auto industry, and in turn, China will prevent selling cars with foreign-made chips in the Chinese market 13 .
Western countries can protect their markets by adopting measures to keep Chinese cars out. Still, there is an intense fear that China will dominate the "Global South" market. The impact on the Japanese and European auto industries, which are highly dependent on exports, will be enormous.
Western automakers, having learned from the supply disruption brought about by 2022 "Zero-Colona" measures, have also begun "siloing (intra-decoupling inside a corporate group)," using Chinese-made parts for cars sold in China but not using them for cars sold outside China. If both the West and China emphasize economic security, further decoupling will likely occur at the supply chain level.
China has already taken over the critical mass of solar panels, from raw materials to finished products. If Chinese chips can attack at lower prices through overcapacity tactics in the "legacy" semiconductor industry, the entire ecosystem of the global semiconductor industry will be severely affected.
At the Hiroshima Summit in May 2023, the G7 adopted a "de-Risking, not decoupling" stance. This can be taken as a call to continue to pursue mutually beneficial economic development with China in areas that do not lead to an increase in economic and military risk (and the most prominent business that Japan, the U.S., and Europe want to maintain in China is automobiles).
China, however, is unlikely to buy this offer. It has become increasingly alarmed with the changing situation over the past few years and is moving to resolve its choke points and, instead, to push back on the choke points in the future so that the West will not be able to hit China again like a high-end chip.
While we cannot discuss this in detail due to the paper's length, the future of the Chinese economy is quite bleak. 14 The bottom line is that China will never surpass the United States in economy. But even such a China has the power to shake up the Western economy, and we may have underestimated it.
What do the Chinese think is the "ideal development" in the future? According to the author's understanding of the thinking patterns of the Chinese people, it would be foolish for the two sides to harm each other seriously. Ideally, China would show the West its power, and the West would realize that there would be no benefit to either side if they proceeded to harm each other further, and a compromise would be reached to stop the current sanctions against China. But will the West, especially the U.S., think as the Chinese expect?
3.2 The Chaotic Future of 21st Century
Over the past few years, the global economic trend has shifted from "a combination of globalization and neoliberalism (small government)" to "a combination of protectionism and big government (increased government intervention). This is the first cyclical shift in 90 years, from the 1930s, when a similar trend occurred.
In particular, the free trade regime with the WTO at its core, has recently been dissolving. Following Trump's series of tariff hikes in violation of WTO concessions, there have been violations of rules and disciplines by major countries one after another, including import and export bans on the grounds of security exceptions and rampant industrial subsidies that discriminate against imported goods, while the WTO's dispute settlement function to remedy disciplinary violations remains broken due to the U.S. sabotage. On the Chinese side, the abovementioned countermeasures are about to be adopted. These whole things make us realize the magnitude of this change in trend's impact on the global economy.
We must avoid the rut of protectionism in the 1930s, which led to a sharp decline in world trade and eventually to a massive catastrophe that took countless lives. Still, if the change in trend is rooted in structural causes, such as the U.S. unipolar hegemony that began in the 1990s and is now starting to recede, it won't be easy to turn the tide.
Free trade may only be maintained with a trusted partner. If there is an overwhelming gap in national power, even if a country is dissatisfied with the other country's bad behavior, it is not necessary to say, "So we stop maintaining international order." However, when national power becomes closer, and especially when the other (country) can no longer be trusted, it isn't easy to maintain free trade.
I suggested the view that "China, anticipating the collapse of the international order, intends to survive by building a "sphere of influence" that will allow it to assert itself both politically and economically. If this is the case, will the world finally be heading toward an era of a "veritable jungle" (the dreaded "G-zero") with no leader?
(Adjunct Researcher, the Japan Institute of International Affairs)
- October, 2023, " Political and Social Divide in the United States and Challenges for Democracy" by Kazuhiro Maeshima, Professor, Sophia University
- October, 2023, " Has US Foreign Policy Doctrine Changed? " by Tsuneo Watanabe, senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- October, 2023, " America's Journey to Hegemony and Its Challenges" by Koji Murata, Professor, Doshisha University
- September, 2023, " A Medium- to Long-Term Outlook for the US Economy―Can America Win the Competition with China?―" by Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki, Chief Economist, Sojitz Research Institute, Ltd.
- September, 2023, " China's Strategy toward the U.S " by Toshiya Tsugami, Adjunct Researcher, the Japan Institute of International Affairs
- September, 2023, " The Deepening Security Dilemma in US-China Relations " by Ryo Sahashi, Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo
- July, 2023, "How Would North Korea and China Use Nuclear Weapons? -- Scenarios for Discussion" by Narushige Michishita, Professor at the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- July, 2023, "Japan's Nuclear Strategy" by Nobukatsu Kanehara, Visiting Professor at Doshisha University
- July, 2023, "G7 Hiroshima Summit and Efforts for a Safer World Without Nuclear Weapons" by Nobushige Takamizawa, Visiting Professor at the University of Tokyo
- July, 2023, "Roundtable Discussion—Let's Talk Frankly About Nuclear Issues" by SSDP Discussion Members
- June, 2023, "Exploring the Possibility of Nuclear Attacks on Japan－Nuclear Simulations in the Era of "Three-Front Nuclear Threats" by Hiroyasu Akutsu, Professor, Heisei International University
- June, 2023, "China's Aim to Become a Nuclear Superpower" by Masafumi Iida, Head of China Division at the National Institute for Defense Studies
- June, 2023, "Challenges for Nuclear Arms Control in the Era of Strategic Competition Among Major Powers" by Nobumasa Akiyama, Professor, Hitotsubashi University
- June, 2023, "Mechanisms and Functions of Nuclear Deterrence－Development of US Nuclear Strategic Theory" by Masashi Murano, Research Fellow of Hudson Institute
- April 2023, "Changing NATO's "Achilles Heel"—Security in the Baltic Region" by Sanshiro Hosaka, Fellow,The International Centre for Defence and Security, Estonia
- April 2023, Evolution of European Security System - Visualization of Deterrence by NATO and the "Russian Problem" by Michito Tsuruoka, Associate Professor, Keio University
- April 2023, "An Expanded NATO's Nuclear Strategy" by Yoko Iwama
- March, 2023, "Germany's Civilian Power Model—Modification or Termination?--Germany Struggling with the War in Ukraine" by Toshiya Nakamura, Professor, Nagoya University
- March, 2023, "France and the Ukraine War―The Logic Behind Macron's Security Policy" by Ken Endo, Professor, The University of Tokyo
- March, 2023, "The Russo-Ukrainian War and the British Response: 2014-2023" by Yuichi Hosoya, Professor, Keio University
- March, 2023, "Where is America Heading—Implications and Challenges for the Allies" by Koji Murata, Professor, Doshisha University
December 2022, Proposal "Defending Our Country – Defense Policy in a New Cold War Era" was announced
- Front Cover
- Changes in the Security Environment Surrounding Japan - Shifting Power Balance and the Three Front Threats Ken Jimbo
- How Will "Japan Contingencies" Emerge? Osamu Onoda
- The Japan-US Alliance Revisited: Is it Dependable? Chikako Kawakatsu Ueki
- A New Phase of Defense Diplomacy and Defense Production and Technology Base Ippeita Nishida, Tsuneo Watanabe
- Intelligence Activities in the Post-Ukraine War Era Jun Nagashima
- Responding to the Nuclear Threat Masashi Murano
- No Time to Lose for Improving Japan's Defense Capabilities - Can the JSDF Defend the Homeland? - Ryoichi Oriki
- Toward the Formulation of a New "National Security Strategy" Hideshi Tokuchi
- October 2022, "Japan-China Relations under the Long-term Administration of Xi Jinping: Current Status, Prospects, and Expectations" written by Kazuyuki Suwa, Professor, University of Shizuoka
- October 2022, "China's Policy on the Global South --- China's World View and the Configuration of the US-China Confrontation " written by Shin Kawashima, Professor, the University of Tokyo
- October 2022, "Military Strategy of Xi Jinping's China" written by Bonji Ohara, Senior Fellow, Sasagawa Peace Foundation
- September 2022, " Social Governance by the Communist Party of China: The Present State and the Future Prospects " written by Kazuko Kojima, Professor, Keio University
- September 2022, "The Relationship between Domestic Politics and Diplomacy under the Xi Jinping Administration- Why Were the Large-Scale Military Exercises Decided?" written by Chisako T. Masuo, Professor, Kyushu University
- September 2022, "Xi Jinping's China--- Prospects for Its Climate Change Policy ---" written by Takashi Sekiyama, Associate Professor, The University of Kyoto
- August 2022, " Current Assessment of the Xi Jinping's Rule and Prospects for the Third Term of the Xi Administration " written by Takashi Suzuki, Associate Professor, Aichi Prefectural University
- August 2022, " Economic Challenges Awaiting the Xi Jinping Administration As it Enters its Third Term" written by Toshiya Tsugami, Director, Tsugami Toshiya's Works
- July 2022, "The Russian Invasion of Ukraine and the Future International Legal Order" written by Masahiro Kurosaki, Associate Professor, National Defense Academy
- July 2022, "The Ukraine War and Security in East Asia" written by Narushige Michishita, Vice President, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- July 2022, "How Will the Ukraine War Change the New US-China Cold War?" written by Yasuhiro Matsuda, Professor, the University of Tokyo
- July 2022, "Impact of the Ukraine War on the Global Economy" written by Tatsuhiko Yoshizaki, Chief Economist, Sojitz Research Institute, Ltd.
- June 2022, "Why War Occurs in Europe?--The Structural Transformation of the European Security Order in the Post-Cold War Era --" written by Yuichi Hosoya, Professor, Keio University
- June 2022,"The Russia-Ukrainian War and the Behind-the-Scenes Stance of the United States" "On Economic Security" written by Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- June 2022, "The Russia-Ukraine War and NATO", written by Michito Tsuruoka, Associate Professor, Keio University
- June 2022, "The Ukrainian War Viewed from Theories of International Politics" written by Matake Kamiya, Professor, National Defens Academy
- March 2022, "Economic Security Challenges and Cyber Security" written by Jun Osawa, Senior Research Fellow, Nakasone Peace Institute
- March 2022, "On Economic Security" written by Matake Kamiya, Professor, the Ntional Defense Academy
- March 2022, ""Economic Security" and the Review of the 2013 NSS and the Related Strategy Documents" written by Nobushige Takamizawa, Visiting Professor, the University of Tokyo
- March 2022, "The US-China Rivalry and Economic Security" written by Yuzo Murayama, Professor, Doshisya University
- March 2022, "Japan's National Security Policies and Science and Technology" written by Nobukatsu Kanehara, Professor, Doshisya University
- March 2022, "Economic Security in the Free Trade Regime" written by Kazuto Suzuki, Professor, the University of Tokyo
- January 2022, "The 2022 South Korean Presidential Election and the Next Administration's Foreign and Security Policy" written by Junya Nishino, Professor, Keio University
- January 2022, "North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Development and Japan's Defense" written by Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, GRIPS
- January 2022, "What will Become of Japan-South Korea Relations? The 1965 Japan-South Korea Treaty System in Jeopardy" written by Masao Okonogi, Professor Emeritus, Keio University
- December 2021, "Economic and Social Conditions in North Korea and its Relations with South Korea" written by Mitsuhiro Mimura, Chief Research Fellow, The Economic Research Institute for Northeast Asia.
- December 2021, "China's Korean Peninsula Policy and North Korea" written by Shin Kawashima, Professor, the University of Tokyo.
- December 2021, "China's Korean Peninsula Policy and North Korea" written by Shunji Hiraiwa, Professor, Nanzan University.
- December 2021, "What to Do with the Relations with North Korea?" written by Hitoshi Tanaka, Chairman for Institute for International Strategy at the Japan Research Institute.
- October 2021, "Strategic Implications of North Korea's Enhanced Nuclear and Missile Capabilities" written by Narushige Michishita, Vice President, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
- October 2021, "The Biden Administration's North Korea Policy: Its Low Priority and Looming Crises" written by Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
- October 2021, "The Evolution of the US-ROK Alliance: Tasks in the Biden Era" written by Yasuyo Sakata, Professor, Kanda University of International Studies.
- September 2021, "The Development of Regional Security Architecture: From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific" written by Ken Jimbo, Professor, Keio University.
- September 2021, "The Strategic Development of Japanese Security Cooperation under Superpower Competition and the Development of the FOIP and its Operationalization" written by Nobushige Takamizawa, Visiting Professor, Graduate School of Public Policy, The University of Tokyo.
- August 2021, "Security Perceptions of Central Asian Countries--- From the Perspective of China Studies ---" written by Shin Kawashima, Professor, the University of Tokyo.
- August 2021, "Security in the Indian Ocean Region---Implication of the Galwan Incident for QUAD in the Indo-Pacific" written by Dr. Satoru Nagao, Fellow (Non-Resident), Hudson Institute.
- August 2021, "Easternization and Security in Asia" written by Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
- July 2021, "The Ideas of "Autonomy" and "Self-Reliance" in Contemporary India's Foreign Strategy" written by Kazutoshi TAMARI, Associate Professor,Chukyo University.
- July 2021, "Thailand's Security Policies and Threat Perceptions" written by Saya Kiba, Associate Professor, Komatsu University, Faculty of Intercultural Communication.
- July 2021, "Myanmar's Security Perceptions and the February 1 Coup d'Etat" written by Yoshihiro Nakanishi, Associate Professor, Kyoto University.
- July 2021, "Australia's Security Perceptions and the "Asia Threat"" written byTomohiko Satake, Senior Fellow, Defense Policy Division, Policy Studies Department, NIDS .
- June 2021, "The Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture: Its Future--- Multipolar Order Beyond US-China Relations ---" by Tsutomu Kikuchi, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University
- June 2021, "The Quad Plus in the Security of Asia: Its Significance and Outlook" by Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- June 2021, "Indonesian Views and Perceptions on National Security" by Nobuhiro Aizawa, Associate Professor, The Graduate School of Social and Cultural Studies, Kyushu University
- June 2021, "Normalized Tensions in the Cross-Strait Relations--- Structural Changes in Taiwanese Society and the Xi Jinping Administration's Strategic Shift ---" by Yasuhiro Matsuda, Professor, The University of Tokyo
- June 2021, "China's Maritime Strategy and Responses of the United States and Japan" by Yoji Koda, Former Commander in Chief, Self Defense Fleet
- June 2021, "The South China Issues from the Perspective of the International Law Order",by Shigeki Sakamoto, Emeritus Professor, Kobe University
- May 2021, "Indonesian Views and Perceptions on National Security" by Nobuhiro Aizawa, Associate Professor, Kyushu University
- May, 2021, "The Philippine Foreign and Security Policy Perspective" written by Yusuke Takagi Associate Professor,National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
- May, 2021, "Vietnam's Security: Challenges and Responses" written by Tomotaka Shoji Head, Asia and Africa Division, Regional Studies Department, National Institute for Defense Studies
- March, 2021, "Can the Biden Administration Restore America as a Global Leader?" written by Matake Kamiya, Professor, the National Defense Academy of Japan.
- March, 2021, "The Biden Administration and Japan's Security Strategy" written by Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies.
- February,2021, "US Foreign and Security Policy Direction Viewed from the Biden Administration's Lineup" written by Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- February,2021, "Trade Policies of the Biden Administration" written by Takaaki Asano, Senior Analyst, Sumitomo Corporation Global Research Co. Ltd.
- February,2021, "The Biden Administration's Policy toward Russia" written by Taisuke Abiru, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- January,2021, "Will US Policy Toward China Change?" lectured by Ryo Sahashi, Associate Professor, the University of Tokyo
- January,2021, "How will China View the Biden Administration?" written by Bonji Ohara, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- January,2021, "An Assessment of the 2020 US Presidential Election－American Democracy Now－" lectured by Fumiaki Kubo, Professor, the University of Tokyo
- January,2021, "Two Trumpian Mysteries－Why did Trump win over 70 million votes? Why is his outrageous behavior unchecked?－" lectured by Kazuhiro Maeshima, Professor, Sophia University
- September, 2020, "The Novel Coronavirus (COVID-19) Pandemic and Internationa Relationsl" by Matake Kamiya, Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
- September, 2020, "The Policy Agenda for the Xi Jinping Administration- COVID-19 Countermeasures and China's International Relations -" by Shin Kawashima, Professor, The University of Tokyo
- "Control in the United States and International Relations" by Koji Murata, Professor, Doshisha University
- September, 2020, "The EU's Response to COVID-19 and International Relations" by Yuichi Hosoya, Professor, Keio University
- August, 2020, "The Corona Crisis Seen from a Macroeconomic Perspective" written by Motoshige Itoh, Professor Emeritus, The University of Tokyo
- August, 2020, "The Coronavirus Pandemic and Japan's Infectious Disease Control" written by Takashi Mihara, Senior Research Fellow, NLI Research Institute
- August, 2020, "Infectious Disease Crisis Control in Japan- Recommendations on an Exit Strategy -" written by Kazumasa Oguro, Professor, Hosei University
- August, 2020, "Security against Infectious Disease Threats --- Policy Responses Abroad" written by Takashi Sekiyama, Associate Professor, Kyoto University
- June 2020,"Transformation of the International Order in the Middle East--- Varying Degrees of "Stateness" and Three Directions of the New Order" written by Satoshi Ikeuchi, Professor, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo
- June 2020,"Destabilization in the Middle East and its Impacts on Japan's Energy Security" written by Amane Kobayashi, Research Fellow, The Institute of Energy Economics
- May 2020: Urgent Recommendations "Toward a V-shaped Recovery after the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic "Coronavirus Testing for All" --- the First Step of the Next Phase"
- May 2020: "US Diplomacy toward Iran: Economic Sanctions as a Diplomatic Tool" Hiroki Sugita Columnist, Kyodo News
- "Russian Factors in the Middle East" Taisuke Abiru Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- "The SDF Dispatches to the Middle East --- History and Significance" Ippeita Nishida Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- March 2020, "Space and Security" Kazuto Suzuki Professor, Hokkaido University
- March 2020, "The US Security Space Policy --- With a Focus on the Establishment of Two Space Forces" Yasuhito Fukushima Chief Researcher, The National Institute for Defense Studies
- March 2020, "China's Recent Activities in Space and Cyberspace" Bonji Ohara Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- March 2020, "Environmental Security and Japan" Takashi Sekiyama Associate Professor, Kyoto University
- March 2020, "Changes in Global Environment and Security --- US Security Strategy" Hideshi Tokuchi Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
- February 2020, "Cyberspace Security" Motohiro Tsuchiya Professor, Keio University
- February 2020, "Japan's Space and Cyberspace Policy" Yukinari Hirose Former President of the National Institute for Defense Studies
- December 2019, "The US-China Confrontation --- Where Will Hegemony Reside Next?" Akio Takahara Professor, the University of Tokyo
- December 2019, "Challenges Facing the Chinese Economy" Osamu Tanaka Chief Senior Researcher, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
- December 2019, "US Strategic Perception on China: Implications for US Allied Partners" Tsuneo Watanabe Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- November 2019, "The Xi Jinping Administration's View of the International Order– China's emphasis on United Nations diplomacy and liberal economic policies−" Shin Kawashima, Professor, the University of Tokyo
- November 2019, "The Future of China's Security Strategy" Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- November 2019, "China --- Its Confidence and Anxiety" Bonji Ohara, Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- August 2019: Several Perspectives on the Korean Peninsula Issue--- The Deteriorating Japan-South Korea Relationship and the Uncertain Denuclearization of North Korea --- By Masahiro Akiyama Chairman, the SSDP
- July 2019, "An Outlook on the Denuclearization of North Korea--- What is the Stance of North Korea?---", Junya Nishino, Professor, Keio University
- July 2019, "An Outlook on the Denuclearization of North Korea --- How will the US move?", Narushige Michishita, Vice President, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- July 2019, "Discussion on Denuclearization of North Korea", SSDP Discussion Meeting on May 8, 2019
- May 2019: "Current Status and Prospects of South Korea and Japan's Frictions over History: How to address the Judicial Problems", Masao Okonogi, Professor Emeritus, Keio University
- May 2019: "South Korea and Japan's Frictions over History" (Comments), Junya Nishino, Professor, Keio University
- May 2019: Japan and South Korea Relationships (Question & Answer)
- March 2019: "The Present State and Prospects of the Indian Economy and Economic Policies" written by Koji Kobayashi, Senior Economist Mizuho Research Institute Ltd.
- March 2019: "The "Modi diplomacy" in the History of Indian diplomacy--- Departure from or maintenance of the traditional diplomacy? ---" written by Toru Ito, The National Defense Academy of Japan
- February 2019: Dynamics of Indian Politics and the 2019 General Elections, written by Chiharu Takenaka, Professor of Rikkyo University
- February 2019: "Cooperative Strategy" to Realize "Competitive Strategy"--- The composite structure of Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy (vision) ---, written by Matake Kamiya, Professor at The National Defense Academy of Japan
- January 2019:, A paper, "How will the US midterm elections results affect the Trump administration's foreign policy for 2019?" written by Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- January 2019:, A paper, "The Present and Future of the International Trade Order" , written by Akihiko Tamura, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- December 2018: The US-China Competition and Japan, written by Ryo Sahashi, Professor at Kanagawa University
- December 2018: An Outlook for the US-China Trade War―What makes the two economically interdependent superpowers confront each other?―, written by Takashi Sekiyama, Associate professor at Toyo University
- September 2018: Proposal, "The Denuclearization of North Korea and the Restoration of Peace in the Korean Peninsula― Correct Perceptions and Eight Proposals on Japan's North Korea Diplomacy－" edited by the Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies
- September 2018: "The Taiwan Policy of the Xi Jinping Administration in its Second Term: An Outlook on Cross-Strait Relations in the New Era" written by Yasuhiro Matsuda, Professor of the Tokyo University
- July 2018: "The EU States and Russia on North Korea Issues- Expansion of Influence through Diplomacy: Attempts and Limitations -" lectured by Yuichi Hosoya, Professor of Keio University
- "An Assessment of the US-North Korea Summit and an Outlook for the Future of the Korean Peninsula" lectured by Junya Nishino, Professor of Keio University
- "Korean Peninsula Issue and Japan's Future Security Policy" written by Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow of National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- July 2018: "US North Korea policy affected by personnel changes in the Trump administration" lectured by Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
- "China-North Korea relationship under Xi Jinping" lectured by Shin Kawashima, Professor of the Tokyo University.
- "North Korean Denuclearization and Russia" lectured by Nobuo Shimotomai, Professor of the Hosei University.
- March 2018: "The Network Hegemony Theory for a Security Architecture in The Asia Pacific Region" lectured by Masahiro Akiyama, Chairman, the Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies
- January 2018: "A Destabilized Middle East" lectured by Koichiro Tanaka, Professor, Keio University
- December 2017: "Problems in Sino-Japanese Relations, 1992-2042" lectured by Ezra F. Vogel, Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard University
- November 2017: "The Future of the Asia-Pacific Region" written by Yoriko Kawaguchi, Fellow, the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs, Former Minister Foreign Affairs
- October 2017: "A New Trend in India's Foreign Policy and Japan" Written by HIROSE,Takako, Professor, Senshu University
- August 2017: "The Shocks that shook the Transatlantic World and their Implication for Japan's Foreign Policy" written by HOSOYA, Yuichi, Professor, Keio University
- August 2017: "Does Economic Interdependence not Encourage Collaboration? ―Thinking Japan-China Relations from an Economic Perspective―" written by Takashi SEKIYAMA, Ph.D., Toyo University
- July 2017: Proposal article "The Trump Administration's Impact on the Cross-Strait Relations" written by Yasuhiro Matsuda, Ph.D.
- June 2017: Proposal article "The outlook for the relationship between two great powers and implications for Japanese diplomacy" written by Professor Shin Kawashima
- May 2017: (Emergency Proposal) Facing the Inconvenient Truth: Re-examining Policy for Peace and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Chief author, Masao Okonogi)
- March 2017: "Economic Influences of the Trump Administration" written by Professor Motoshige Ito
- February, 2017: Proposal article "Trump's Foreign and Security Policy - Unpredictable President, Realistic Secretaries - " written by Mr. Tsuneo Watanabe is posted on the website of SSDP.
- December, 2016: Proposal article "Reconsidering North Korea Policy: How to Deal with a Nuclear Armed Divided States" written by Professor Masao Okonogi is posted on the website of SSDP.
- Taiwan-Japan Round Table on August 24th, at Capital Tokyu Hotel
- Japan-Korea Political Leaders Dialogue was held on February 10th,2023 at International House of Japan
- March 2022, A remembrance seminar "Remembering Professor Ezra Vogel" held on January 17, 2022
- March 2021, Japan-ROK Parliamentary Dialogue -Japan-ROK Cooperation in the Era of US-China Competition- held on March 11, 2021
- December 2020: The report of the Japan-ROK Future Dialogue held on November 21 to discuss "Japan-ROK Cooperation in the Post-Covid-19 Era
- October 2020: "Responses to COVID-19 and Agendas for the Post-COVID-19 Era", A Brief Overview of the Japan-Korea Experts Dialogue held on July 29,30, 2020
- October 2020: "The China-Taiwan Confrontation over Corona Response and Taiwan's Security" written by Makoto Ogata, Former Chief of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei
- May 2020: "Rivalries in the Middle East in New Security Dynamics", Written by Sayed Ghoneim, Major General (retired) of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Chairman, Institute for Global Security & Defence Affairs
- March 2020: The Japan-South Korea Relationship in a Cul-de-Sac--- Where is an Exit ? Masao Okonogi Professor Emeritus, Keio Universit
- December 2019: The Hong Kong Upheaval and the Future of Cross-Straits Relations－The 2019 Japan-Taiwan Strategic Dialogue Report OGATA, Makoto Former Chief of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei
- August 2019: Report; 2019 FUTURE CONSENSUS DIALOGUE --Sustainable Prosperity and Future of Korea-U.S.-Japan Cooperation-- By Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae)
- June 2019: Report on India – Japan Security Dialogue 2019 by Ms. Vindu Mai Chotani, Ph.D Student, The University of Tokyo
June 2019: Four papers on Japan-India Cooperation submitted to India-Japan Security Dialogue 2019
Japan's Rationale for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision
Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
The Significance and Possibilities of India-Japan Cooperation in the Concept of the Indo-Pacific
Toru ITO Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
Japan-India Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Context - Operationalizing the Security Aspect of the Indo-Pacific Vision –
Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
India-US-Japan Defense Cooperation: What's next?
Dr. Satoru Nagao, Hudson Institute
- Japan's Rationale for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision
- November 2018: "The Present State of the Japanese Economy and Policy Issues" lectured by Motoshige Itoh, Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo.
- November 2018: "Expanding Social Security Expenses and Fiscal Reforms" lectured by Kazumasa Oguro, Professor at Hosei University.
- September 2018: "Taiwan Identity and Cross-Strait Relations and Trump's Taiwan Policy and the Future of Taiwan-US Relations-Discussion at The Second Japan-Taiwan Strategic Dialogue (June 21, 2018, Taipei)-" written by OGATA, Makoto
- September 2018: "Japan-Taiwan Dialogue 2018 Minutes", 21st June 2018, Taipei, Taiwan.
- July 2018: Report on The Second Japan – Philippines Strategic Dialogue prepared by Ms. Vindu Mai Chotani, Ph.D. Student, Graduate School of Public Policy, Tokyo University.
- May 2018: "Civilian Control "at Crisis"? – Perhaps Not, for the Case of the Field Sit-reps from SDF's South Sudan Mission" reported by Ippeita Nishida, Research Fellow, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- January 2018: "Fukushima, Genki？Project－Young Taiwanese volunteers introduce the facts on Fukushima's revival through documentary films－" reported by OGATA, Makoto, Former Chief of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei
- December 2017: "Commemorating a Quarter Century of Dispatches of the JSDF's PKO Units: Challenges and Possibilities in the Post South Sudan" written by Takayuki Shoji, Lecturer, Nihon University
- November 2017: "19th CCP National Congress" written by Mr. Bonji Ohara, Senior Research Fellow, the Sasakawa Peace Fondation
- October 2017: "What is Japan's Role in the Indo-China border conflict?" written by Dr. NGAO,Satoru, Research Fellow, Institute for Future Engineering
- July 2017: "Overview of the Current Situation in Taiwan-" the Naturally Independent Generation" will affect the Taiwan"s politics-" written by Makoto Ogata MGE.(Ret.)
- June 2017: "Japan-U.S. Economic Dialogue" written by Mr.Takaaki Asano
- March 2017: "The Japan-Philippines Strategic Dialogue" written by Mr. Hideshi Tokuchi
- February, 2017: Current topic "The Importance of Japan's Security Role Under Trump" written by Dr. Satoru Nagao is posted on the SSDP website.
- December, 2016: Current topic "Widening Security Task: Will SDF do the Job?" written by Mr. Ippeita Nishida is posted on the SSDP website.
- September 2023, Research journal "Security Studies vol5 no3" (Hegemonic America: Where It's Headed) in English edition was published.
- June 2023,Research journal "Security Studies vol5 no2" (Nuclear Crisis Scenarios Facing Japan and the Outlook of Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control and Disarmament) in English edition was published.
- March 2023,Research journal "Security Studies vol5 no1" (What Will Happen to European Security?―Facing the War in Ukraine) in English edition was published.
- January 2023, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 4 no 4)" - Defending Our Country – Defense Policy in a "New Cold War Era - was published.
- October 2022, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 4 no 3)" - Xi Jinping's China - Politics, Economy, Society and Diplomacy - was published.
- Jun 2022, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 4 no 2)" -The Russia-Ukraine War and Its Global Impact- was published.
- March 2022, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 4 no 1)"-What is Economic Security?- was published.
- December 2021, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 3 no 4)"-Korean Peninsula Situation- was published.
- September 2021, A research journal "Security Studies vol03 no03" -Asia's Security II- (English edition)
- June 2021, A research journal "Security Studies vol03 no02" -Asia's Security I- (English edition)
- March 2021: Research journal "Security Studies (vol3 no1) "- US Foreign Policy in the Biden Administration / The 2020 US Presidential Election and American Democracy -(English edition)
- December 2020: A research journal "Security Studies (vol2 no4) "- Normalize Japan-South Korea Relations trough Dialogues -(English edition)
- September 2020: A research journal "Security Studies (vol2 no3) "-The Novel Coronavirus and Security-(English edition)
- July 2020: A research journal "Security Studies (vol2 no2) - Middle East Situation and Japan's Security - " (English edition) was published
- May 2020: A research journal "Security Studies (vol2 no1) - Cyber, Space, Environment and Security - " March 2020 (English edition)
- February 2020, "A research journal "Security Studies (vol1 no4) " (English edition)"
- September 2019: A research journal "Security Studies (vol1 no3) " (English edition)
- August 2019: Korea-Japan Joint Seminar: FUTURE CONSENSUS DIALOGUE
- April 2019: "Security Studies (vol1 no2) April 2019"
- March 2019: A research journal "Security Studies vol1 no01" just published
- February 2019: The Denuclearization of North Korea and the Takeshima Issue
- December 2018: Former Vice Defense Minister Masahiro Akiyama's Memoirs (An Ad)
- November 2018: Participation in the Future Consensus Forum held in Beijing
- September 2018: "2018 Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue" reported by Masahiro Akiyama
- 2017 December: "The Butterfly Project-A possibility of showing a solution to the North Korea problem-"
- October 2017: Campaign on the problems with North Korea
- August 2017: A New Containment Policy Strategy
- June 2017: Korean peninsla
- March 2017: President Duterte
- February, 2017: Kazakhstan
- November, 2016: Participated in Astana Club 2016 held in Kazakhstan on November 14- 16, 2016.