proposal

Military-Civil Fusion in China’s
“Maritime Superpower” Strategy

China’s Maritime Strategy as Seen in the New Five-Year Plan

Thirty years have passed since Japan, China, and South Korea ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1996. As a result, an UNCLOS-based maritime order emerged in East Asia; the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan, previously shared by the littoral countries concerned, became subject to demarcation to establish exclusive economic zones (EEZs). The importance of islands, which serve as the legal basis for demarcation, increased, and inter-state conflict over their possession intensified.

China has a long-held national desire to avenge the “century of humiliation” or subjugation to the enemies coming to its shores. Therefore, with the advent of the UNCLOS-based maritime order, it held fast to securing as much maritime area as possible within its territory. China escalated its rhetoric regarding the “nine-dash line” in the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyu Islands in Chinese) in the East China Sea. In November 2012, it officially announced its goal of building a “maritime superpower.” China’s seaward drive spilled out of its own “jurisdictional waters.” In June 2025, China dispatched the aircraft carrier Liaoning to the EEZ of Minamitorishima and the aircraft carrier Shandong to the EEZ of Okinotorishima, conducting large-scale military exercises and launching military operations beyond the second island chain. In late May 2026, China deployed the Liaoning southeast of Okinotorishima and conducted as many as 170 fighter jet/helicopter landing-and-takeoff drills over three days starting on 26. China’s “maritime superpower” construction has entered a phase of expanding its influence into the Pacific.

However, understanding China’s “maritime superpower” strategy solely from a military perspective risks misinterpreting its true nature. In March 2026, China announced its 15th Five-Year Plan. Its Section 3 of Chapter 32 on the development, use, and protection of the ocean discusses the goals for the next five years to “protect national maritime rights and interests.” The full text appears as follows:

Actively promote the building of a maritime community with a shared future, expand blue partnerships, and promote the construction of a just and reasonable international maritime order. Proactively participate in the international ocean governance and rulemaking, and actively fulfill the agreement on Marine Biological Diversity of Areas beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ). Strengthen international cooperation in areas such as marine scientific research and investigation, disaster prevention and mitigation, and the blue economy; continuously improve multilateral and bilateral cooperation platforms and mechanisms in the maritime field; and promote the establishment of a specialized international maritime organization in our country. Enhance maritime awareness, strengthen situation analysis, risk prevention, and legal struggle; improve the system and mechanisms for safeguarding maritime rights and interests; and enhance maritime law enforcement and maritime judicial capabilities.1

This section is intriguing because it presents the Chinese leadership’s unique thought process related to maritime rights and interests. Given the section’s title, the goals presented here should aim at “safeguarding national maritime rights and interests.” However, to achieve this, China proposes “the building of a maritime community with a shared future” in the international society; proactive participation in “the international ocean governance and rulemaking,” and the establishment of “a specialized international maritime organization” in China. Furthermore, it seeks to expand its international influence by strengthening international cooperation through “marine scientific research and investigation, disaster prevention and mitigation, and the blue economy.” These efforts are based on the assumption that such international actions will ultimately help safeguard China’s “national maritime rights and interests.” In short, China is advancing non-military efforts to protect its maritime rights and interests and is attempting to seize control of global ocean governance.

In its 13th Five-Year Plan announced in 2016, China designated the ocean as a military-civil fusion domain alongside space and cyberspace.2 Since then, China’s construction of a “maritime superpower” has progressed under the framework of military-civil fusion, both in terms of objectives and methods. Given this situation, this paper will discuss how China has linked military and non-military activities to its “maritime superpower” strategy, and how it will utilize non-military initiatives to achieve its national goals. Finally, this paper will explore what measures are necessary to address China’s “maritime superpower” strategy.

Advancing Military-Civil Fusion Seen from Maritime Militia Mobilization

In January 2026, ingeniSPACE, an American geospatial intelligence house based in Taipei, announced that China had mobilized a four-digit number of fishing boats in the East China Sea since the end of previous year, deploying them in lines over 400 km from north to south. The company used AIS (Automatic Identification System) data to bring this analysis. US and Japanese media reported this as a large-scale mobilization of Chinese maritime militia.3 By that time, the activity of Chinese maritime militia in the South China Sea had already been widely observed. However, the scale of recent mobilizations in the East China Sea were much larger, indicating that China is expanding the area of operation northward.

Japan is slow in responding to this sort of gray-zone operations. Based on the division of jurisdiction within the Japanese government, dealing with fishing vessels engaged in the economic activity is a responsibility of the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) and the Fisheries Agency, not the Self-Defense Forces. However, the JCG appears to have justified the above rallying of the fishing boats as “for the purpose of avoiding inclement weather.” There is no sign that the JCG considered a responsive action even at the sight of Chinese authorities demonstrating their ability to mobilize thousands of fishing boats. The JCG’s optimistic assessment is helpful to China: If Japanese responsible organizations are not wary of its potential mobilization of maritime militia, China could delay Japan’s initial response in the event of actual mobilization. In April, the Global Times of China published an article specifically attacking ingeniSPACE and the foreign media that cooperated with it. It quoted fishermen from Zhoushan, Zhejiang Province, the home port of the mobilized fishing boats, as mocking the allegations of maritime militia as “a fairy tale,” and concluded that the alleged militia mobilization is an “intentional slander” against China.4

Notwithstanding, local media across China have reported in recent years that the Chinese authorities are eager about “national defense mobilization” of ordinary citizens; the existence of maritime militia is common knowledge in coastal areas. In May, the Asahi Shimbun published an article based on an interview with a fishing boat captain in Zhoushan who identified himself as a militiaman. According to the reporter who boarded his ship, there was a panel displaying the Communist Party of China’s (CPC’s) membership oath on a wall, and in a corner of the cockpit was a large, locked iron box that the captain called “military secrets.” He refused to show its contents but said, “This will only be used when the country is in chaos (due to war). I don’t think it will happen, but we must prepare for anything.” He also testified that participants in military training will receive daily compensation of 200 to 300 yuan and fuel costs.5

In China, militias are one of the official armed forces, alongside the active-duty and reserve units of the People’s Liberation Army and the Chinese People’s Armed Police Force. By mobilizing fishermen who conduct economic activities at sea as maritime militia, the Chinese military can create asymmetrical arrangements such as “fishermen vs. warships” or “fishermen vs. government vessels,” thereby gaining advantages in interdiction and cognitive warfare. Reportedly, the Chinese military is training maritime militias in piloting drones; it is undeniable that China would attempt to conduct reconnaissance or destroy submarine cables while engaging maritime militia in deceptive operations against adversary countries.6

What is important to note in this context is that the path China followed until realizing the recent large-scale mobilization was anything but smooth. This path well illustrates the process of military-civil fusion propelled by the Xi Jinping administration. When the administration came to power, such large-scale mobilization as seen at present was virtually impossible. When it seized the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974, China employed its maritime militia, but the recruiting was conducted via state-owned fishing unit. In the 1980s, the collectivization of fishing and agriculture was abolished, and more fishermen came to own boats privately. In the 1990s, state-owned enterprise reforms were carried out, and by around 2000, state-owned fishing enterprises had virtually disappeared in China. In short, as the market economy permeated the fishing sector, temporarily, China became almost incapable of mobilizing ordinary citizens as maritime militia.

Xi Jinping appeared to have concerns about this situation personally. He assumed the state presidency in March 2013, and the following month, on the occasion of his attendance at the Boao Forum for Asia, he also visited Tanmen Town in Qionghai City, Hainan Province and visited militia organizations there. Xi boarded fishing boats about to sail to the South China Sea, and asked fishermen about their living conditions, catches, and how to use the Xingtong maritime communication system reliant on the Beidou satellite.7 In 2021, Wang Shumao, Party Branch Secretary of the Tanmen Village Committee and a long-serving member of the Tanmen Maritime Militia Unit, was awarded the prestigious July 1st Medal by Xi Jinping for his contributions to the construction of islands and reefs in the Spratly Islands.8 These suggest that Xi began strengthening maritime militia organizations immediately after assuming the supreme leadership.9

To that end, however, the Xi Jinping administration had to take many measures not directly related to the military. In December 2016, the administration published a document entitled the “National Informatization Program for the Thirteenth Five-Year Period,” which proposed the construction of “Land-Sea-Air-Space Integrated Information Infrastructure (hereafter ‘LSAS network’).” The latter aimed to integrate satellite-based space networks, submarine fiber-optic cable-based marine networks, and traditional land networks to create a seamless space-ground integrated information system covering the entire globe, and to develop service capabilities based on it.10 As mentioned earlier, the implementation of a military-civil fusion strategy in new domains, including maritime one, had already been decided in March of the same year. This document initiated the construction of the physical information infrastructure to make this possible.

In 2017, the Xi Jinping administration embarked on fisheries reforms, fundamentally changing the way domestic fishing vessels are managed, and established a system where fishing vessels operating in disputed waters are strictly controlled by the central government (effectively the China Coast Guard) rather than by local governments. The fishing vessels were restricted to use their home ports only; port reforms that started in 2018 established a system to digitally manage the entry and exit of fishing boats to and from ports, making it easier for the central government to politically control fishermen through the local governments supervising the home ports. In addition, data on catches were automatically collected and merged with satellite-captured data to accumulate oceanic big data, encouraging the development of applied services using it.11 Since 2017, efforts have also been made to restructure the national defense mobilization system in the provincial military districts; through the 2018 institutional reform, the China Coast Guard was placed under the command of the Central Military Commission, effectively placing disputed waters under military control. These moves were followed by the enactment of the China Coast Guard Law (2021) and the amendment to the Marine Environmental Protection Law (2017, 2023) as well as the Maritime Transportation Safety Law (2021). As a result, the China Coast Guard assumed administrative supervision duties, strengthening supervision of fishing vessels.

To realize a large-scale mobilization of ordinary fishing boats as maritime militia ships, Xi Jinping built a large physical, technological platform linking the central government and fishermen; implemented various administrative reforms; advanced legal reforms; restructured cooperation between the military and local governments, and reorganized the China Coast Guard. Since the People’s Liberation Army belongs to the CPC, cooperation between the government and the military is difficult without the CPC’s mediation. As the panel displaying the CPC’s membership oath, shown by the captain who allowed the Asahi Shimbun reporters to tour his ship, suggests, the Xi Jinping administration has implemented these reforms with the CPC’s strength, or as all-out efforts of a socialist state. Consequently, China’s “maritime superpower” strategy should be understood not from a limited military perspective, but in light of the political idea of military-civilian fusion propelled by the CPC or its leadership.

Rebuilding Global Ocean Governance Through “Three Networks and Four Industrializations”

China has strengthened its maritime militia from the perspective of how to utilize the people’s power for national defense. Meanwhile, in China, it is considered natural to adapt the latest technologies and systems developed for military purposes to civilian purposes. This idea is linked to China’s global strategy.

The LSAS network, mentioned in the previous section, adopts the Beidou satellite system (a positioning system), often called the Chinese version of GPS, as its core technology. The Chinese military has played a pivotal role in its development from the outset. China has thus far launched numerous remote sensing observation satellites (including various observation satellites and synthetic aperture radar [SAR] satellites) and communication satellites (including GuoWang [GW] satellites, often called the Chinese version of Starlink), and is connecting these with land, sea, and underwater information networks to improve the entire scheme.

The LSAS network features a broad range of integrated operations. While similar technologies were developed in the West ahead of China, Western networks are built and operated in fragments by various government agencies and private companies. Because these networks have different owners, comprehensive and integrated operation remains difficult to achieve. On the other hand, China has leveraged the political power of the CPC, its large population, and the magnitude of its markets to integrate individual networks and plan and operate them as a unified whole, aiming to win competition with the West. Since technologies associated with the LSAS network have matured, China is using them to launch―across oceans and even the globe―new services such as climate change countermeasures, smart fishing and agriculture, autonomous navigation systems, and shipping insurance. To this end, China is also developing various marine equipment and accumulating physical technological capabilities.

The United States began to view China’s technological capabilities as a threat when China announced the “Made in China 2025” industrial plan in 2015, which included marine equipment developments. Afterward, China, perhaps to avoid tensions in bilateral relations, has ostensibly not emphasized “Made in China 2025.” However, the goal of building a “manufacturing powerhouse” proposed in that plan was pursued and achieved by the end of fiscal year 2025 (precisely, March 2026). China’s industrial planning entered a new phase in April 2026.

According to the China Strategy Institute of Ocean Equipment Engineering, China’s marine equipment (civilian use) is broadly categorized into ten categories with 33 subcategories. Regarding China’s development of maritime order, teams from the US Naval War College and others have pointed to its prominent shipbuilding capabilities. However, ships account for only a portion of the ten major categories, or only seven subcategories. China is also improving the capabilities to manufacture equipment for offshore oil/gas development, fishing, scientific survey, renewable energy (including various power generators), construction (civil engineering), deep-sea mineral resource development, deep-sea biological resource development, maritime administration (including rescue/emergency and environmental protection), and motor systems for use with these.12 Through these technological developments, China has dramatically increased its freedom of action in sea areas over the past decade, successfully expanding the potential for the economic use of sea areas. An emblematic project in this relation is a manned deep-sea space station to be installed on the seabed 2,000 meters deep in the South China Sea by 2030.

Why is China investing massive subsidies in developing such marine equipment? A research report authored by a military-civil fusion team at the Chinese Academy of Engineering suggests China’s intentions. The report begins by emphasizing the 2021 UN initiative, “United Nations Decade of Marine Science for Sustainable Development (2021-2030),” pointing out that the ownership of scientific data now influences how the international ocean governance and maritime order are formed. The report argues that China can respond to this international trend by promoting its “Three Networks and Four Industrializations” initiative.

The “Three Networks” refer to: 1) Marine IoT (Internet of Things using drones, submarine fiber optic cables, and distributed acoustic sensing cables), 2) Marine Energy Network (power generation using wave power, tides, offshore wind power, and floating solar panels), and 3) Marine Information Network (marine monitoring using satellite remote sensing and underwater information sensors). The “Four Industrializations are to be achieved in: 1) Modern Marine Agriculture (deep-sea aquaculture, fishing), 2) Modern Marine Engineering (exploitation of mineral resources, oil and gas), 3) Modern Marine Services (transportation, information, seawater utilization, biologics), and 4) Modern Ocean Governance (maritime rescue, maritime law enforcement, marine ecological environment). In short, the military-civil fusion team argues that China should collect scientific data from sea areas using the “Three Networks,” generate electricity, establish a platform for activities in sea areas, and then promote various use of the ocean by advancing the “Four Industrializations.”13 According to the team, much of the marine equipment developed by China will be used above all to realize these “Four Industrializations.”

Assuming that its scientific and technological capabilities and industrial strength will help it gain international political power, China is endeavoring to develop a new blue economy, particularly with a view to expanding its influence at the United Nations. This corresponds to the content of the 15th Five-Year Plan mentioned at the beginning of this paper: China is attempting to protect its maritime rights and interests, in the long term, by using its economic, scientific, and technological power to take the lead in global ocean governance.

How to Address China’s Cross-Sectoral “Maritime Superpower” Strategy

As noted earlier, analysis of China’s “maritime superpower” construction chiefly from a military perspective is insufficient, or even inappropriate. The feature of China’s construction plan lies in its comprehensiveness utilizing the “socialist” political system, or its “military-civil fusion.” By shifting perspective, the goal of China’s “maritime superpower” construction will look different. China’s goal will not be achieved so simply as by seizing the Western Pacific from the United States by military force. Unless it rebuilds the global ocean governance, including science and the economy, into one based on Chinese-style technological standards and value systems, and eliminates its challengers, China will not feel secure that it has successfully protected its maritime rights and interests; consequently, its goal will remain unfulfilled. The competition between China and the West over the ocean will likely continue for a considerable time.

In response to these large-scale movements, what measures should Japan take in addition to strengthening its defense capabilities? First, it should form cross-sectoral teams to analyze China’s actions attentively. The Japanese government has taken every opportunity to express concern about the threat posed by China. In reality, however, its China studies fall short of adequacy. In Japan, there is no governmental research institute dedicated to China studies, and no large-scale research projects on China have been conducted for the past 20 years.  However, to grasp the whole picture of China’s maritime programs based on military-civil fusion and analyze their weaknesses, experts from various disciplines, including China studies, science and technology, marine engineering, legislation, and UN agencies, must collaborate, combining their expertise with geospatial data analysis to improve analytical accuracy. Along with the inauguration of a national intelligence agency, the Japanese government should build a framework to advance such analyses by leveraging private sector resources.

Next, Japan must maintain and develop international cooperation on ocean governance. As discussed in this paper, China is strenuously analyzing the global technological development and the socio-economic needs of developing countries. By presenting developing countries with more advanced solutions to their problems, China has sought to bring those countries under its influence and expand its power in the international community. In April 2026, as Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te was preparing for a visit to Eswatini—Taiwan’s sole remaining diplomatic ally in Africa—three Indian Ocean island nations (Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar) cooperated with Beijing to revoke his flight permissions. All three countries have been strengthening their partnerships with China, with a primary focus on the blue economy. In other words, in international competition with China, Western countries are facing the question of how they can provide tangible cooperation to developing countries. The United States did not ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and therefore does not join organizations such as the International Seabed Authority, and has further reduced its cooperation with international organizations. In this context, all these US actions are advantageous to China. Needless to say, it is not realistic for Japan to stand against China alone in this situation. However, it would serve the interests of many countries to maintain and advance international cooperation over the oceans, ensuring that a contradiction should not arise where China, which dismissed the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s ruling on the “nine-dash line” as mere “waste paper,” takes the lead in global ocean governance. As US influence is declining abroad, Japan should maintain its technological capabilities, explore international contributions, and actively exercise leadership in international politics by collaborating with other nations.

(Chisako T. Masuo, Professor, Kyushu University)

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