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North and South Korea Enter a New Phase of Competition

Narushige Michishita

Introduction

There are signs that North and South Korea are entering a new phase of competition. While North Korea continues to develop nuclear weapons and missiles, build up its conventional forces, and strengthen its ties with Russia, South Korea strengthens its ties with the United States and Japan, expands its military capabilities, and exerts socioeconomic and diplomatic pressures on North Korea.

The history of inter-Korean relations can be summarized as follows: the 1950s was the period of the Korean War and reconstruction from the war; the 1960s through the 1980s was a period of acute competition in all areas, including military, diplomatic, economic, and ideological fronts; and the 1990s through the 2010s was a period in which South Korea dealt with North Korea from a position of strength. Regarding military capabilities, North and South Korea were equal in the 1960s; North Korea gained the upper hand in the 1970s; the balance was restored in the 1980s; and South Korea began to gain the upper hand in the 1990s. After 2000, while South Korea maintained its superiority in conventional forces, North Korea offset that with its nuclear, missile, and other asymmetric capabilities. By 2024, however, North Korea has acquired nuclear and missile capabilities at a level unacceptable to South Korea. It has also started to receive significant support from Russia. In response, South Korea has begun competing aggressively with North Korea.

Both Koreas are taking offensive and defensive measures. North Korea has adopted new offensive tools such as cyberattacks while taking defensive measures to protect its society from the influence of South Korea's cultural products. South Korea has launched a diplomatic offensive against North Korea while making efforts to enhance the credibility of the extended nuclear deterrence provided by the United States. We will see what that intensified inter-Korean competition will bring about.

1 Kim Jong-un's Two-Korea Policy

Recently, North Korea began referring to South Korea by its official name––the Republic of Korea (ROK)––and announced that it would not pursue reunification between North and South Korea. While Kim Jong-un's speech in January 2024 sounded generally defensive, he also made statements that heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula.1 What do these seemingly contradictory messages suggest? Let us examine Kim Jong-un's speech.

(1) Kim Jong-un's speech

In January 2024, Kim Jong-un said that:

  • (a) He acknowledged the existence of "two states" on the Korean Peninsula
  • (b) South Korea had adopted a hostile policy of "all-out confrontation," aiming for the collapse of the North Korean government and unification by absorption
  • (c) North Korea would cut off the North-South communication line and block the inter-Korean railway
  • (d) North Korea's military capabilities were a means of self-defense instead of armed unification.

Kim Jong-un's message was, overall, defensive.

In addition to those statements, however, Kim Jong-un also made the following statements that heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula:

  • (a) He intended to amend North Korea's constitution to define its territorial land, air, and water
  • (b) The "illegal" Northern Limit Line would not be tolerated
  • (c) Any infringement on North Korea's territory would be regarded as a war provocation
  • (d) If war broke out on the Korean Peninsula, North Korea would occupy, subjugate, and reclaim the southern part of the peninsula and annex it as a part of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).
(2) Defying South Korea's Cultural Influence

Despite Kim's aggressive statements, North Korea is, overall, on the defensive. Kim is attempting to solidify the division of the Korean Peninsula and prevent the influx of South Korean culture into North Korea as a means of ensuring the maintenance of his regime.

Compared to North Korea, South Korea has about twice the population, 60 times the gross domestic product, 890 times the trade volume, and 10 times the defense spending. The average life expectancy of people in South Korean is 8 years longer for men and 7.3 years longer for women than their North Korean counterparts. Considering this, a significant number of people in North Korea have expressed a desire for Korean unification. In a survey of North Korean defectors conducted by the Institute for Peace and Unification Studies at Seoul National University between 2011 and 2020, when asked, "To what extent do you think North Korean residents want the unification of North and South Korea?" the number of respondents who answered "very much" remained at around 80 percent, or 84.5 percent in 2018 and 79.1 percent in 2019. The top two reasons for that positive answer were that the life of North Korean residents would improve and that North and South Koreans were the same people. Moreover, when asked how unification should be achieved, the percentage of respondents who answered, "Under the South Korean system," remained 30 to 50 percent, "Regardless of the system," ranged from 20 to 35 percent, and "A compromise between the North and South systems" from 15 to 30 percent over the target period.

Against that backdrop, North Korea's political leadership has become increasingly concerned about the influence of South Korean culture, such as K-pop music, and South Korean Korean dramas and movies, on the North Korean people. Specifically, Pyongyang is attempting to curb the influence of South Korean culture by enacting the "Reactionary Thought and Culture Exclusion Law" in 2020, the "Youth Culture Security Law" in 2021, and the "Pyongyang Standard Language Protection Law" in 2023, respectively. The "Reactionary Thought and Culture Exclusion Law" aims to prevent the influx of South Korean cultural products into North Korea; the "Youth Culture Security Law" aims to control the thoughts of youth influenced by foreign culture; and the "Pyongyang Cultural Language Protection Law" aims to eliminate the use of Korean-style language and other expressions. More recently, North Korean authorities have reportedly begun offering forgiveness to North Koreans who watched South Korean TV dramas and movies if they honestly confess to having seen them. That is an indication that the North Korean authorities are no longer able to stop the influx of South Korean culture. Against this backdrop, Kim Jong-un has positioned South Korea as "a foreign country and the most hostile state," and accused South Korea of "getting more vicious and arrogant in the madcap confrontational racket." One of the key objectives of Kim Jong-un's anti-unification policy of strengthening division is to make North Korea less susceptible to South Korean influence.

Of course, not all North Korean citizens are influenced by Korean culture. According to the survey conducted by South Korea's Ministry of Unification on North Koreans who defected to South Korea between 2001 and 2005, the number of North Koreans who had watched "visual materials from outside North Korea" has increased from 29.7 percent of those who defected between 2001 and 2005, to 67.6 percent of those who defected between 2006 and 2010, to 81.4 percent of those who defected between 2011 and 2015, and to 83.3 percent of those who defected between 2016 and 2020. However, the vast majority, or 71.8 percent, of them mainly viewed Chinese materials while 23.1 percent of them mainly viewed South Korean materials. (2.4 percent of them mainly viewed Russian materials, and 1.7 percent the materials from the United States.) That means that 19.2 percent of North Koreans who defected between 2016 and 2020 have been fairly exposed to Korean cultural products. It is not clear whether that figure should be considered large or small, or how much of an impact it will have on North Korean politics and society. What remains to be seen is whether South Korean culture will change the North Korean regime in a way that economic sanctions have not.

(3) Suggesting Possible Military Actions

While expressing concerns about South Korean influence, Kim Jong-un has also made aggressive statements towards South Korea. Of Kim Jong-un's statements, the following are particularly noteworthy.

As the southern border of our country has been clearly drawn, the illegal "northern limit line [sic]" and any other boundary can never be tolerated, and if the ROK violates even 0.001 mm of our territorial land, air and waters, it will be considered a war provocation. In this regard, I think it is necessary to revise some contents of the Constitution of the DPRK. I have already recalled at the recent plenary meeting that the so-called constitution of the ROK openly stipulates that "the territory of the ROK covers the Korean peninsula and its attached islands."

....

There is no provision specifying such definition in the existing constitution of our country. …. …it is necessary to take legal steps to legitimately and correctly define the territorial sphere where the sovereignty of the DPRK as an independent socialist nation is exercised.

The Northern Limit Line is a quasi-maritime borderline between the two Koreas first drawn by the United Nations Command in 1953. The Northern Limit Line remains disputed because while South Korea regards it as legally binding, North Korea does not. Kim Jong-un's remarks have increased the likelihood that tensions will intensify in the Yellow Sea. In January of this year, the New York Times reported that North Korea "could take some form of lethal military action against South Korea in the coming months," based on the information provided by US government officials.2

Given the extreme difficulty of predicting North Korea's actions, we cannot rule out the possibility that North Korea may intentionally lead the countries concerned to focus their attention on the Northern Limit Line and take military action elsewhere. In May, South Korea's Ministry of Foreign Affairs raised the terrorism alert level for five South Korean embassies and consulates in Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Vladivostok, and Shenyang from the fourth, lowest level to the second highest level. South Korean intelligence authorities have reportedly received information that North Korea may harm South Korean personnel at its diplomatic missions overseas. There are other possibilities to be considered. North Korea could use force in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) or Joint Security Area (JSA), carry out limited attacks against South Korea with artillery shells or rockets, or conduct nuclear tests under the sea or in the air.

(4) Cyberattacks

Cyberattacks are offensive tools of low physical intensity but highly important to North Korea. North Korea stole an estimated $1.7 billion in crypto assets through cyberattacks in 2022, more than three times the amount stolen the previous year and a record high. The following year, 2023, the total amount stolen is estimated to be about $1.0 billion.3

Table 1: Number of North Korean Cyber Attacks and Amount Acquired (In millions of U.S. dollars)
2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Number of hacks 1 4 10 9 5 9 15 20
Total value stolen 2 29 522 271 300 429 1,700 1,000

North Korea's military spending in 2019 was estimated by the US State Department at $4.31 billion, so one can assume that North Korea has been earning about a quarter to a third of its military spending through cyberattacks in recent years, which shows how important cyberattacks have become to North Korea. It was also recently discovered that North Korean hackers attacked 10 South Korean defense-related companies during at least one month from October 2022 and three months from April 2023. Those incidents indicate that North Korea's cyberattacks are becoming more active in two areas: foreign currency acquisition and military technology acquisition.

Despite those successes, it is also worth noting that the amount of foreign currency earned has decreased significantly from 2022 to 2023. If the Chainalysis' estimates are accurate, the significant decrease in foreign currency acquisition must have been a major blow to North Korea.

(5) Russo-North Korea Cooperation

Closer Russia-North Korea cooperation is also helping North Korea. Russia's procurement of ammunition and missiles from North Korea is of great benefit to North Korea. According to South Korea's Ministry of National Defense, North Korea transferred more than 6,700 containers to Russia from the end of August 2023 to the end of February 2024. The number of artillery shells provided by North Korea is estimated to be more than 3 million rounds of 152mm shells, more than 500,000 rounds of 122mm rockets fired by multiple rocket launchers, or a mixture of both. North Korea's munitions factories typically operate at a low operating rate of about 30 percent due to material and power shortages, but currently the artillery shell manufacturing plant is operating at full capacity.

In return for military supplies, North Korea has obtained foreign currency, energy, and military equipment and technology from Russia. Since August 2023, Russia has reportedly sent North Korea approximately 8,000 containers loaded with food, daily necessities, and materials and parts needed to manufacture weapons, as well as satellite-related technology. North Korea is also seeking to acquire technology related to aircraft and mobile ground equipment from Russia. In addition, according to the US government, in March of this year, Russia sent over 165,000 barrels of refined oil to North Korea, which is inappropriate in light of the UN Security Council's annual import limit of 500,000 barrels of refined oil. Moreover, in April 2024, Russia vetoed the continuation of the UN Security Council Panel of Experts that had been monitoring the implementation of sanctions against North Korea, further curtailing the implementation of sanctions.

2 South Korea: Defensive on Nuclear Issues and Offensive in Other Arenas

While North Korea is on the defensive strategically, South Korea is stepping up its military and diplomatic offensive against North Korea.

(1) Strengthening U.S.-Korea and Japan-U.S.-Korea security

South Korea's most important move on the military front has been the strengthening of security cooperation with the United States as well as with the United States and Japan. The United States agreed to strengthen the extended nuclear deterrence it provided to South Korea in the Washington Declaration in April 2023. In August, the United States, South Korea, and Japan pledged to strengthen their trilateral security cooperation in the summit meeting among their top leaders. The Washington Declaration called for the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group, and the leaders of the three countries agreed to (a) conduct combined military exercises, (b) strengthen ballistic missile defense cooperation, and (c) establish a trilateral working group on combating North Korean cyber activities. Based on those agreements, the United States, South Korea, and Japan have been working to step up their security cooperation. The three countries have conducted combined exercises on ballistic missile defense, anti-submarine warfare, and air operations, all of which are important areas that would play central roles in Korean contingencies. It is noteworthy that from the beginning the three countries are promoting cooperation in those core areas.

In the first combined formation flight exercise in October 2023, one B-52 bomber and three F-16 fighters from the United States, two F-15K fighters from South Korea, and four F-2 fighters from Japan participated. All of the aircraft had strike capabilities, and their coordinated flight sent a strong message to North Korea. At the end of 2023, the United States, South Korea, and Japan created a system with which to share North Korea's missile launch information in real-time. The establishment of the automated information-sharing system, instead of a system that involved manual operations, reduced the time required for information sharing and institutionalized security cooperation among the United States, South Korea, and Japan. Finally, in the cyber area, a trilateral working group on North Korea's cyber activities has been established, with the first meeting held in November 2023, and further meetings to be held every three months.

(2) South Korea's Defense Spending and Arms Exports

According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), South Korea's defense spending in 2023 was the 11th largest in the world at $47.9 billion, about 10 times larger than North Korea's defense spending. According to SIPRI, South Korea's arms exports in 2019-2023 were the 10th largest in the world, and its arms exports in 2023 amounted to about 600 million based on SIPRI's trend-indicator values (TIV), or about 2 percent of the world's total arms exports of about 29.1 billion TIV.4

Table 2: South Korea's Arms Exports (Unit: million TIV)
Year 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
TIV 437 702 1,049 682 772 510 204 621

Although TIV does not represent sales values of arms exports, it tends to be relatively close to the actual sales value. Therefore, it is reasonable to estimate that South Korea transferred about $204 million worth of arms overseas in 2022 and about $621 million in 2023.5 Moreover, in 2023, South Korea's arms export partners tripled to 12 countries from the previous year, and the number of types of weapons to be exported doubled to 12. Undoubtedly, South Korea is no less important than North Korea as an arms exporter.

Finally, South Korea is playing a role of supporting Ukraine though indirectly. First, while Poland provides arms to Ukraine, South Korea will provide arms to Poland to fill the gap. Second, South Korea's sale of 330,000 155 mm artillery shells to the United States has enabled the United States to provide artillery shells to Ukraine. Although North Korea's arms support to Russia has become more prominent because South Korea has not provided arms directly to Ukraine, it should not be forgotten that South Korea also plays a role in the war in Ukraine.

(3) Diplomatic Offensives

In February 2024, South Korea established diplomatic relations with Cuba, with which North Korea has long maintained the closest diplomatic ties, and in April agreed to establish diplomatic missions. South Korea will likely seek to drive a wedge in the relations between North Korea and Cuba by bolstering its business activities and providing economic assistance to Cuba.

In response to the termination of the UN Security Council's Panel of Experts to monitor sanctions against North Korea, the United States, South Korea, and Japan are working together to consider alternatives. Specifically, three options are reportedly being considered: (a) adopt a new resolution to establish a panel of experts at the UN General Assembly, (b) continue similar work outside the United Nations, and (c) have the UN Secretariat undertake similar work.6 The US State Department is also working with South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and others to impose sanctions on individuals and entities involved in the arms and refined oil trade between Russia and North Korea.

Conclusion

Relations between North and South Korea have entered a phase of heated competition again, and the future of the Korean Peninsula has become uncertain. However, it is also unclear how things will develop going forward. In that context, three points require attention. First, there is a question of whether North Korea will seek to stabilize inter-Korean relations in order to consolidate the division of the two Koreas, or whether it will take aggressive actions in order to put South Korea on the defensive. The competition between North and South Korea will intensify, but it is not clear whether it will be quiet or noisy. Similarly, we do not know whether North Korea's future coercive actions will be directed to South Korea, the United States, or to both. As Kim Jong-un mentioned the Northern Limit Line in his speech, military action could take place in the Yellow Sea. The Northern Limit Line is jointly controlled by US and South Korean forces, but there are some differences between the United States and South Korea regarding its legal status.7 If North Korea takes action to challenge the Northern Limit Line's legitimacy, it could be designed to highlight the differences between the United States and South Korea. In any case, North Korea's future actions will gradually reveal Pyongyang's intentions.

Second, how long North Korea's confrontational posture will last remains to be seen. North Korea is currently showing a confrontational stance toward South Korea and the United States, but will it continue to do so if, for example, there is a change of government in South Korea or if Donald Trump becomes president of the United States? North Korea's past behavior shows that, contrary to its hardline rhetoric, the government in Pyongyang has been extremely flexible in changing its policy directions. The two Koreas have repeated confrontation and reconciliation, and military actions and summit talks. Similarly, the United States and North Korea have engaged in confrontations and dialogues, and military coercions and high-level talks. It is also noteworthy that while North Korea has adopted a confrontational stance toward both the United States and South Korea, it has recently made overtures to Japan. North Korea might again attempt to drive a wedge among the United States, South Korea, and Japan.

Finally, the question is how South Korea will react to Kim Jong-un's new policy. If North Korea abandons unification and turns to consolidating the division of the two Koreas, it may mean that peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas will become a realistic option. In that regard, South Korean people's attitude towards unification is important. According to the public opinion poll conducted by the Seoul National University's Institute for Peace and Unification Studies in 2023, the percentage of respondents who thought that unification was unnecessary was 29.8 percent, the highest figure since the survey began in 2007. Moreover, only 28.2 percent of those aged 19 to 29 answered that unification was necessary, while 41.3 percent of them said that unification was unnecessary. The percentage of respondents who said they preferred unification to occur gradually as conditions matured was the lowest ever at 45.2 percent, while the percentage of those who said they preferred the status quo of divided North and South Korea was the highest ever at 28.2 percent. Furthermore, the largest number of respondents, or 33.3 percent, answered that unification was impossible, and 30.2 percent of them thought it would take more than 30 years. In other words, since most South Koreans no longer want a burdensome unification in the first place, it would be a realistic policy option for South Korea to move in the direction of abandoning unification as well. However, if South Korea perceives North Korea's policy shift as a sign of weakness, it might decide to exert more pressure on North Korea in order to undermine Kim Jong-un's government in Pyongyang.

(Executive Vice President and Professor at the GRIPS)

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