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How the Winter War Ended: A "Compromised Peace" Ends the Ukraine War?

Tomoyuki Hanada

Introduction

The Russian invasion of Ukraine (the Ukraine War) began on February 24, 2022. Ukraine lost no time in fighting back with the support of Western countries. Both sides have since engaged in fierce battles, the developments of which are still unforeseeable. In June last year, Ukraine launched a counteroffensive to recapture lost territories. This move unleashed full-scale offensives by both forces in four oblasts in eastern and southern Ukraine (Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson). The war is now in a stalemate. Ukrainian President Volodymyr O. Zelenskyy dismissed Commander-in-Chief Valerii F. Zaluzhnyi on February 8 of this year and appointed as his replacement Oleksandr S. Syrskyi. Zelenskyy announced a policy emphasizing an "active defense" strategy to exhaust Russian forces while maintaining the battle lines.

Zelenskyy stated that the recent battle in the Donbas region would go down in military history as one of the fiercest battles in Europe.1 His remarks make sense when considering that (1) Russia, a supposed "responsible superpower" as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, committed aggression; (2) an all-out war is unfolding between Russia and Ukraine, which share a common history as Slavic peoples―the Kiev-Russia and the Pereyaslav Agreements;2 (3) with military support from the West, the Ukrainian military is pursuing the war not in coordination with the armed forces of other countries; (4) Russian President Vladimir V. Putin is using from time to time nuclear intimidation as the war situation worsens for Russia, and (5) neither Russia nor Ukraine chose a swift ceasefire immediately after the war began.

Under these circumstances, the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine is under discussion among the two warring parties and the international community. However, no end is visible. On June 14 of this year, Putin mentioned the possibility of peace negotiations contingent on the complete withdrawal of Ukrainian troops from the four eastern and southern oblasts that Russia unilaterally annexed on September 30, 2022, and the abandonment of Ukraine's accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Meanwhile, the "Summit on Peace in Ukraine" in Switzerland on June 15-16 failed to draft a joint statement calling for the complete withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine.3 The Joint Communiqué on a Peace Framework mentioned only three topics: (1) that the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant should be run under IAEA supervision; (2) that free navigation in the Black and Azov Seas, crucial for global food security, should be secured; and (3) the exchange of prisoners of war and the repatriation of Ukrainian children unlawfully detained.4 On the other hand, the NATO summit on July 10 declared Ukraine's path to membership in the organization to be irreversible.

In this paper, we will discuss "What will end the war in Ukraine?" from the perspective of Russian/Soviet history by focusing on how the Winter War (Soviet-Finland War, November 1939-March 1940) terminated. More pointedly, we will examine why, in the Winter War, a "compromised peace" was adopted to end the war rather than a "complete solution to the causes of conflict."5 To this end, we will draw on previous studies on the histories of Russia/USSR and Finland and published historical materials.6 Immediately after the outbreak of the Ukraine War, several researchers wrote articles comparing the Russian invasion of Ukraine to the Winter War, presumably because the fact that Finland, a small country, resisted the aggression of the Soviet Union, a great power, is reminiscent of the contemporary Ukrainian situation.7

To begin with the conclusion, the ongoing war in Ukraine and the Winter War are analogous in five points: (1) the wars did not end in a short time despite a wide discrepancy in military strength between the warring states; (2) the invaded Ukraine and Finland decided to resist without establishing a government-in-exile; (3) the Russian/Soviet invasions were initiated based on defective strategic estimates; (4) pro-Russian and pro-Soviet political forces had a significant influence on the conduct of the wars, and (5) the international community had a harsh reaction to Russia and the Soviet Union. In considering a "compromised peace" that would end the war in Ukraine, the Winter War provides historical insights into homeland defense, casualties, and the international community's reaction.

We aim at understanding the Ukraine War from the perspective of Russian/Soviet history. However, we clearly distinguish between understanding and approving of the war and never justify the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. Rather, we criticize easy resonance with Russia's reasoning based on Russia-centrism and "value relativism." In passing, the "Red Army" (officially known as the "Red Army of Labor") changed its name to the "Soviet Army" in February 1946 after World War II. This paper dealing with the 1939-40 Winter War mentions "Soviet Army" alongside "Red Army," for it uses "Soviet Army" as meaning the Soviet Union's armed forces.

The Soviet-Finland Relationship before the Winter War

The Non-Aggression Treaty between Germany and the Soviet Union (Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) was signed between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union on August 23, 1939. Its secret additional protocol stipulated that "in case of territorial and political reorganization of the territories belonging to Poland, the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San shall constitute the approximate boundaries" and that the Soviet Union should have a sphere of influence over eastern Poland, the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania), Bessarabia, and Northern Bukovina. On September 17, the Soviet Union launched an invasion of eastern Poland "to protect the inhabitants in western Ukraine and western Belorussia (now Belarus)." It concluded mutual assistance pacts with the Baltic states―Estonia on September 28, Latvia on October 5, and Lithuania on October 10. These pacts allowed the Soviet Union to construct military bases and to station its troops in each of the countries, expanding the Soviet sphere of influence.

Against this backdrop, on October 5, 1939, the Soviet Union demanded Finland to conclude a mutual assistance pact and to exchange territories. The Soviet move not only aimed at checking the possible recurrence of hostilities such as the "East Karelia Expedition" (the "Greater Finland" idea)8 into Soviet territory by the White Guard Volunteer Army during the 1918 Finnish Civil War and the anti-communist, fascist movement (Lapua movement) in Finland during the interbellum. The Soviet Union also worried that the conclusion of the June 1935 Anglo-German Naval Agreement and military cooperation between Nazi Germany and Finland could enable the Wehrmacht to invade the Soviet Union by passing through Finnish territory.

In negotiations beginning on October 12, 1939, the Soviet delegation demanded, in exchange for ceding Repola and Porajärvi in the Soviet territory of Karelia, (1) a 30-year lease of the Hanko peninsula (2) ceding all islands in the Gulf of Finland; (3) moving westward the borderline of Petsamo, located in the Arctic, and (4) moving northward the borderline of the Karelian Isthmus.9 Regarding (4), the entire Karelian Isthmus historically constituted part of "Old Finland (Staraya Finlandia)," an area that the Russian Empire acquired from Sweden through the signing of the Treaty of Nystadt in 1721. Afterward, the Grand Duchy of Finland came into existence in 1809 under the rule of the Russian Empire, and in 1812, the "Old Finland" was returned to the Grand Duchy.10

Previously in July 1932, the Soviet Union and Finland concluded a non-aggression pact; with an additional protocol dated April 1934, they agreed to extend its term until December 31, 1945. On the other hand, Finland decided to align itself with the Nordic states' neutralism. For this reason, the country rejected the Soviet Union's demand for the conclusion of a mutual assistance pact and territorial exchange on the grounds of "neutrality and sovereignty." In the November 4 talks, the Soviet delegation demanded the cession or lease of the Gulf of Finland islands instead of the Hanko peninsula. Finland again refused, and the bilateral diplomatic negotiations failed on November 13.

On November 26, 1939, Soviet People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav M. Molotov sent a memorandum of protest to the Finnish government alleging that Finnish artillery shelled and killed Soviet troops in the border village of Mainila on the Karelian Isthmus. It has been revealed that the Soviet forces fired first in the incident. It seems that the Soviet side worried that through military cooperation with Finland (including the construction of an air base), the Nazi regime tried to transform Finnish territory into a bridgehead for an invasion of the Soviet Union.11

The Course of the Winter War

On November 30, 1939, the Soviet forces invaded the Karelian Isthmus and air-bombed Helsinki. The main force of the Soviet armies comprised the Seventh Army (nine rifle divisions, one tank corps, and three tank brigades) on the Karelian Isthmus, the Eighth Army (four rifle divisions) north of Lake Ladoga, the Ninth Army (three rifle divisions) in northern and central Karelia, and the Fourteenth Army (two rifle divisions) in Petsamo in the Arctic. At the earliest stage of the invasion, the Soviet strategic objectives included the break-through of the Finnish defensive line on the Karelian Isthmus and the north-south division of Finland by capturing Suomussalmi in central Karelia, and air strikes were carried out against cities on the Karelian Isthmus and the Gulf of Finland coast, in addition to Helsinki.

On December 1, the day following the invasion, the Soviet Union established a pro-Soviet puppet government called the "Finnish People's Government" in the Karelian Isthmus town of Terijoki (now Zelenogorsk) and appointed Otto V. Kuusinen, a Finnish civil war exile, as prime minister. He had played a central role in the formation of the Communist Party of Finland in Moscow, and his partner, Aino Kuusinen, like Richard Sorge, was an intelligence officer in the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces (GRU).12 On December 2, the same government announced the foundation of the "Finnish Democratic Republic of Finland" and signed a mutual assistance pact with the Soviet Union. The latter declared the "Finnish People's Government" as the only legitimate government representing the Finnish people.

Grigory F. Krivosheev, a former professor at the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, noted on the force disparity between the two belligerents in the Winter War that the Soviet forces numbered 450,000 troops and 2,600 tanks; the Finnish forces numbered 300,000 troops and 60 tanks.13 Additional mobilizations in January 1940 enabled the Soviet Union to put the 13th and 15th Armies into the war, raising its troop level to 916,613 at maximum. Nonetheless, the Soviet forces could not conduct the war to their advantage. We can see three reasons for this.

First, the credit belongs to the Finnish army tactics utilizing "home-field advantage." In particular, the Mannerheim Line, a Finnish defense line on the Karelian Isthmus, was not a vast, permanent fortification like the Maginot Line but a field fortification. It was constructed not as one strong defense line but as an in-depth defense position comprising frontal, intermediate, and final defense lines. The Mannerheim Line was 135 km long and 90 km deep, and concrete bunkers and trenches served as a barrier against tank forces.14 Barbed wire and obstacles were positioned before the defensive lines in a way to entice Soviet tanks and rifle units into minefields. The Karelian Isthmus, only 32 km from Leningrad (present-day St. Petersburg), was a massive barrier against the Soviet forces. Moreover, surprise attacks by the Finnish Army's 9th Division at the Battle of Suomussalmi and road blockades to stop Soviet tank units were all effective. These were called "motti" ("siege" in Finnish) tactics.

Second, the Soviet military's strategic estimates of the Winter War were defective. Since their operational plans assumed swift victory, the Soviet forces lacked a good supply of winter clothing and equipment such as winter coats and arctic boots, food, ammunition, and fuel. In short, the whole range of logistics was flawed. Furthermore, they lacked enough experience fighting for long in great piles of snow. The Soviet forces could not adapt to fighting in the severe winter (Moroz) of minus 40-45 degrees.15 This situation was widely different from the Soviet invasion of western Ukraine and western Belorussia (Belarus), which began on September 17, 1939, about two months before the Winter War.

Third, the international community's harsh reaction to the Soviet invasion of Finland. On December 3, 1939, the day after the Soviet Union signed a mutual assistance pact with the "Finnish Democratic Republic of Finland," Finland requested the League of Nations to hold a Council meeting to hear about the Soviet aggression of Finland. In response, the League of Nations set up a committee on the Finnish appeal and, on December 14, decided to expel the Soviet Union. This was an action based on Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which stipulates, "Should any Member of the League resort to war…, it shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League… Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon." The Soviet Union refuted that the "Finnish People's Government" was the only legitimate government, but the rebuttal was not listened to. The Soviet Union increasingly distanced itself from Britain, France, and the international community.

That said, the international community did not provide Finland with military assistance or dispatch troops after the Winter War began. The Finnish military carried on war without the cooperation of the armed forces of other countries. Sweden demonstrated strong solidarity with Finland but behaved cautiously due to concerns about worsening relations with the Soviet Union. Eventually, it chose the position of a non-belligerent country.16 Meanwhile, peace negotiations began at the end of January 1940 through the Soviet envoy to Sweden, Alexandra M. Kollontai.

On March 12, 1940, the Soviet Union and Finland eventually signed a peace treaty to end the Winter War―which signified that the Soviet Union changed its foreign policy and agreed to peace negotiations with the Finnish government instead of the "Finnish People's Government." The Soviet Union is alleged to have agreed to a "compromised peace" because Britain and France were mobilizing some 50,000 troops to rescue Finland. The peace treaty provided the Soviet Union with new territorial gains, including the entire Karelian Isthmus and the Gulf of Finland islands, accounting for 10% of Finland's territory. Finland also agreed that the Soviet Union would lease the Hanko peninsula for 30 years to station Soviet troops there. The "Finnish Democratic Republic of Finland" was annexed to the Karelo-Finn Republic in the Soviet Union. In 1956, the latter was incorporated into the Russian Republic as the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, which, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, became the Republic of Karelia, a subdivision of the Russian Federation. It is still a Russian territory.

Various statistical data are available regarding the number of casualties during the Winter War. Professor Krivosheev's estimates put the number of Soviet deaths and wounded at 126,875 and 264,908, respectively, while Shinji Yokote, professor emeritus at Keio University, estimates the Finnish dead at 23,000 and the wounded at 43,000.17 If the total mobilized strength of the Soviet forces in the Winter War had been 916,613 men, the number of casualties, 391,783, would account for more than 42.7% of the total, indicating that the Soviet forces suffered tremendous damage.

A Comparison with the Ukraine War

When discussing a "compromised peace" as a war-termination mode for the Ukraine War by examining the end of the Winter War as one of the war-termination cases that chose a "compromised peace" rather than a "complete solution to the causes of conflict," the following three points are relevant.

The first point is whether Ukraine's homeland defense efforts could lead to war termination. As noted above, Finland ceded the entire Karelian Isthmus and the Gulf of Finland islands to the Soviet Union after the Winter War, losing areas equivalent to 10% of its national territory. Seen from another angle, despite a wide discrepancy in military strength between the Soviet and Finnish forces, Finland succeeded in defending 90% of its territory through resistance to the bitter end. According to Professor Yuko Ishino of Kokushikan University, the Finnish people share the view that the Finnish army desperately defended the homeland during the Winter War; they still commemorate the war as "105 Glorious Days."18 In the current war in Ukraine, the areas unilaterally annexed by Russia since February 2022, including the Crimean Peninsula, are said to account for 18% of Ukraine's national land. Whether or not Ukraine's defense of 82% of its national land would make sense as a "compromised peace" needs careful assessment, taking into account perception gaps between Russia and Ukraine on war-termination behavior.

The second is the question of the number of casualties. The Winter War incurred heavy casualties on the Soviet forces' side. When it comes to the Ukraine War, exact figures on casualties are not available for either the Russian or the Ukrainian army. On February 25 of this year, President Zelenskyy announced at a press conference that Ukrainian military casualties in the current war amounted to 31,000, while the British public broadcaster BBC reported that Russian military casualties have exceeded 50,000. Yet, neither of the figures has been verified.19 In considering a "compromised peace" as a war-termination mode for the Ukraine War, the focus will be on the extent to which Russia and Ukraine can tolerate "present sacrifices." Given Russia's authoritarian regime and the historical topology of Russia, Crimea, and Novorossiya, there is concern that the Putin administration's adherence to the historical Russian empire20 may divert his judgment regarding "present sacrifices" and "future dangers" from rational choices. Victory in war is winning a contest between warring parties not over the number of casualties but the achievement of strategic objectives.

The third point is reactions from the international community. Unlike the Winter War, the Ukraine War has been transformed from a bilateral war between Russia and Ukraine into a global war where Ukraine is receiving military support from the West to continue its resistance. In this context, the forthcoming US presidential election may also be vital in considering how the current war should end. Nonetheless, we must not forget that this war is one between two sovereign states, Russia and Ukraine, and whether or not a "compromised peace" will be chosen to terminate it will ultimately be determined by the willingness and capabilities of the two belligerents to continue warfare.

Conclusion

The Winter War lasted 105 days, while the Ukraine War is unpredictable on when it will end. Yet, as of this writing, five common points are found between the two wars: (1) they did not end in a short time, despite a great discrepancy in military strength between the belligerents; (2) the invaded Finland and Ukraine did not create a government-in-exile but, rather, decided to resist; (3) the Soviet/Russian aggressions were defective in strategic estimates; (4) pro-Soviet and pro-Russia political forces had a significant influence on the conduct of the wars, and (5) the international community demonstrated harsh reactions to the Soviet Union and Russia. Russia's recent aggression against Ukraine is an attempt to "unilaterally change the status quo by force" and has shaken the very foundation of the international order based on the rule of law.

On August 6 of this year, Ukrainian troops crossed the border into the Russian Kursk region, and President Zelenskyy declared, "We must force Russia into a peace process." It remains to see whether the war in Ukraine will take a new turn and whether a "compromised peace" will lead to its termination.

(Chief Research Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies)

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