France and the Ukraine War
―The Logic Behind Macron's Security Policy―
The Ukraine war, which began at the end of February 2022, shook many countries including France. It has become the first massive war waged on the European continent after an interval of many years; its implications are far-reaching and broad-ranging, from the military to the economy to society. It naturally became a major campaign issue in the French presidential election in April of the same year, in which the reelection of President Emmanuel Macron was at stake.
This article focuses on the political leadership of President Macron and examines what has or has not changed in France's security policy as a result of the Ukraine war. To succinctly provide background, France's position toward Russia appears ambiguous compared to that of the United Kingdom or the United States—not to mention the invaded Ukraine—taking a relatively distinct hardline stance toward Russia. France's position is at times hardline like those countries but at other times seemingly pro-Russian with the result that its position can be unintelligible. Specifically, Macron held more than 20 rounds of French-Russian summits, including some over the phone, before and after the outbreak of the Ukraine war, and attempted to "mediate" between Russia and Ukraine. He took continued care not to drive Russia into a corner and was, as a result, suspected to be excessively "conciliatory." On the other hand, France, which held the presidency of the EU Council for the first half of 2022, worked to organize sanctions against Russia and support for Ukraine, confronting Russia, as one of the leading countries in the international community.
In this paper, we want to consider why France's security policy is intelligible and what the underlying logic is. In doing so, we will adopt a historical approach and occasionally delve into the social context. In what follows, we will first examine the historical aspects of France's unique policy line, extract the logic of its relations with Russia, look back at the relationship between Macron and Putin, and then summarize French foreign and security policy toward the ongoing war in Ukraine.
2. The Ostinato Bass of French Foreign and Security Policy: Strategic Autonomy, Great Powerism, and Europeanism
"A country's ally is another country." This is said to be the words of General de Gaulle, the symbol of WWII French resistance, the founder of what later became the Fifth Republic, and the first French president. His distrust of allies stemmed from his wartime, historical experiences.
The defeat of France by Germany, known as the "shock of 1940," accompanied by the French surrender and armistice, was viewed as a tragedy of national destruction and division for France. But the attack on Mers-el-Kébir that followed left a deep scar in the French leader's mind. 1 It was a pathetic incident in early July 1940, in which 1,295 French servicemen perished from an attack from the naval forces of the United Kingdom, which had been a French ally until shortly before WWII. Although, now that France was brought under the occupation of Nazi Germany and became its ally, French armaments were military assets that could be used to attack the Allies, France sensed some "betrayal" by Britain, which, under the cool-headed Churchill administration, attacked the French military facilities and soldiers. As the French nation was in due course split into the Nazi-occupied north, the pro-German Vichy government in the south, and the governments-in-exile in London and Algiers, US President F. D. Roosevelt was sending a relentless gaze of hatred toward General de Gaulle, who moved from London to Algiers and became the de facto head of the unified government-in-exile. Understandably, these experiences of the French people contributed to their deep-seated distrust of the Anglo-Saxon allies.
With this history of humiliation in mind, postwar France has been obsessed with securing the great power status it believes to historically deserve through maintaining its seat on the UN Security Council, its nuclear arsenal, and its colonies (or their networks). With these policy resources, it has sought to become a world-class great power. A similar thing may be said about France's position on European integration. The French-led rally of European countries in support of integration is nothing more than the creation of a platform to secure influence that any single country could not exert. French-style Europeanism thus shares a similar trajectory with Great Powerism.
This French way of thinking may often be represented in the concept of strategic autonomy. 2 The term, which first appeared in the 1994 French White Paper on National Defense, has long constituted the mainstream foreign and security policy line in post-war France. A popular lexicon defines it as "the capability to act in an autonomous manner, using peculiar resources in key strategic areas, or in cooperation with partner countries when necessary or desirable."
The most important of those "peculiar resources" in this context is nuclear weapons. France conducted its first nuclear test in 1960, becoming a nuclear weapon state, and since then, its thinking about nuclear weapons has evolved along the following three lines. The first is the capability of unleashing a nuclear counterattack when attacked, thereby constraining a potential adversary's willingness to attack. The second is to extend this capability to a European-wide scale. By making an adversary believe that France might counterattack with nuclear weapons (the only ones on the European continent except for Russia) when the adversary attacks its neighbors (with nuclear weapons), France aims to secure its leadership in Europe and to restrain the potential adversary's will to attack the country. However, the European-wide dimension is strategically ambiguous—to France and to an adversary alike. Likewise, the definitions of "Europe," "neighboring countries," "attack," and "counterattack" all lack clarity.
The most controversial is the third role of France's nuclear arsenal, which serves as an instrument for controlling an ally—the United States; in other words, France's nuclear armaments aim to complement mutual nuclear deterrence between the United States and the Soviet Union (Russia). France never trusts the concept of "extended deterrence." It doubts whether any nuclear state could continue to demonstrate its readiness to use nuclear weapons for the sake of other countries when the nuclear state itself is likely to be subjected to a nuclear attack in exchange for its efforts to protect other countries. Consequently, concerning the role of its nuclear forces in safeguarding its neighbors, France does not go beyond mentioning a European-wide dimension; it avoids articulating that it will provide extended deterrence to any particular country. Meanwhile, the United States pledges to extend its nuclear umbrella to its allies. Through maintaining its nuclear capabilities, France attempts to have its will respected by the leading nuclear power—the United States. What France ultimately does with its nuclear weapons is a matter of French sovereignty. This fact makes even its allies feel uneasy and, as a result, endows France with leverage and bargaining power. In other words, France wants the United States to guarantee a counterattack against an aggressor about to overwhelm France with a nuclear attack. This is the logic of French nuclear armaments.
In this way, strategic autonomy, Great Powerism, and Europeanism are the main motif that runs through French foreign and security policy.
3. France and Russia: Russia as a European State
It is beyond the scope of this paper to systematically discuss the relationship between France and Russia, but this section will give an overview to the extent necessary for discussion.
First of all, it should be noted that in the eyes of France, Russia is a transcontinental European country that has territory in both Europe and Asia. It was Russian soldiers as occupiers that strutted through the streets of Paris after the Napoleonic Wars. Russia under Peter the Great had a military power unrivaled by any other European country; its contiguous geography helped to make it an entity demanding others' respect.
Of course, the gaze focused on it is also mixed with a sense of otherness. As Kissinger describes it, "[E]verything about the country—its size, ambitions, absolutism, and insecurities—contradicted the traditional European notion of an international order based on restraint and equilibrium." Russia was the object of "awe and apprehension." 3 Thus, when Duc de Sully worked out the "Grand Design" in the 17th century, Russia, alongside Turkey, was the object of wariness and was excluded from the vision. 4
However, it is also a historical truth that Russia constituted an element in France's many international political initiatives. Saint-Pierre's "Theory of Perpetual Peace" in the 18th century is a typical example. 5 In the 20th century, President de Gaulle's vision of a pan-European order, "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals," was an attempt to promote stability in the geographical space containing Russia and the East European bloc for France's strategic autonomy. His visit to Moscow during the Cold War was a message to the United States about his same vision. With the end of the Cold War, President Mitterrand's concept of a European Union of States also contained the Soviet Union/Russia.
It is also true that Russians traditionally looked to France. The court language in the Romanov dynasty had long been French. It was Sergey Witte, known for his mastery of French, who represented Russia at the Portsmouth Peace Conference after the Russo-Japanese War. During the Russian Revolution and subsequent disturbances many members of the Russian nobility fled to Paris. A typical example of the two-way relationship between France and Russia may be the project of the Trans-Siberian Railway. Many French people participated in its construction; necessary funds were raised primarily in France. As is well known, the Franco-Russian alliance concluded at the end of the 19th century, with both sides aware of a rising Germany, opened the way for subsequent bilateral cooperation.
In the 21st century, France maintains a close relationship with Russia in its core policies. It is well known that France, which has no fossil fuel resources, has sought energy sources in nuclear power generation; Russia is a principal recipient of nuclear fuel waste from France. In other words, Russia has become an indispensable partner in France's energy policy, on which the survival of the French nation depends. There is no sign that this bilateral relationship has been canceled in the wake of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. French industry, reluctant about the post-invasion economic sanctions, was more attached to Russia than that of other developed countries.
The pro-Russian inclination of French politics is probably related to France's reservations toward Germany and the United States. But this inclination is more related to the country's domestic political base. Looking at the major candidates in the last two presidential elections, all of them, from the extreme left to the extreme right—Marine Le Pen, François Fillon, Jean-Luc Mélanchon, and Éric Zemmour—did not hide their pro-Russian feelings. After the Russian invasion of Ukraine, they distanced themselves from Putin's brutality to varying degrees, but Fillon took several months to give up his executive position at Gazprom; Mélanchon appears even after the Russian invasion to prioritize his sense of vigilance against Germany undergoing significant changes in its military policy; Zemmour presented the historical view that France's alliance with Russia was more than once frustrated by the Anglo-Saxons. As for Le Pen, it was revealed that she received financing from Vladimir Putin during the 2017 election. Macron, who contested with Le Pen once again in the runoff during the 2022 election, mocked her bitterly, "You talk to your banker when you talk to the Russian leader"—one of the highlights of their public debate. 6 In his youth, Macron voted for leftist Gaullist Jean-Pierre Chevènement in the 2002 presidential election, a candidate who was so pro-Russian that he received a medal from Putin. Although Macron did not vote for Chevènement because of the latter's pro-Russian stance, his tolerance for the latter's Russophilia is evident.
4. Macron and Putin
After becoming French president, Macron sought to reset relations with Russia, which had deteriorated following Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in the Donbas. For example, he surprised many by inviting Putin to the Palace of Versailles in May 2017, shortly after his election, given that Russia had disseminated massive disinformation about Macron's homosexual tendencies and offshore bank accounts. His campaign office had been the target of Russian cyber attacks. In addition, Macron invited Putin and Trump to attend the 2018 commemoration of the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I. In the summer of 2019, Macron invited Putin to the French presidential retreat at the Fort de Brégançon in southern France and told him, "Russia is a European nation embracing European values." 7
Behind Macron's empathy for Russia, there seems to be his firm conviction that as Europe and France share the same continent with Russia, without its stability, their security would not be guaranteed nor could their strategic autonomy be maintained. After the 2019 G7 Biarritz summit that he chaired, Macron told French ambassadors, "Pushing Russia from Europe is a profound strategic error... The European continent will never be stable, will never be secure if we don't pacify and clarify our relations with Russia." On his return from a visit to Syria in December 2022, when the Ukraine war was at a standstill, he mentioned the possibility that the United States would lose interest in Europe, stating to the effect that without a gradual confidence-building with Russia, no defense/security project by European citizens would be realized. 8
President Macron's international agendas 9 center primarily on strengthening France's strategic autonomy and global influence under "European sovereignty" that will come after the integration of the EU with Germany and France at its nucleus. The Atlantic alliance naturally comes next, but independence from the United States is also an agenda to pursue in parallel. In Macron's vision, Russia has always been an indispensable piece. That is the reason for his search for improved relations with Russia. Incidentally, the priority is given in the order of the Franco-German relationship, Europe (EU), and the Atlantic community; these may be followed by France's former African and Middle Eastern colonies and their networks, and then by the Indo-Pacific.
Meanwhile, unique harmonies and tensions are found embedded between France's strategic autonomy, European integration, and Atlanticism or NATO. A naïve interpretation that France aims at achieving its autonomy from the United States by using the framework of the EU may be a fundamental mistake because France is dependent on the power of the United States and the NATO framework, especially in restraining Germany (plus Russia); it is only by using this framework that France could pursue autonomy. A British international political scientist William Wallace cynically and rhetorically stated, "France's independence depends upon its interdependence with the United States." 10 On the other hand, France's attempt to use the EU as a platform for its strategic autonomy gives rise to tension: not all continental European countries have nuclear weapons nor can they maintain and secure their independence on their own like France, and many of them, including the three Baltic states and Poland, are dependent on the United States and NATO in this regard. Therefore, if France forcibly demanded the integration of the EU in the area of military and security, these countries would leave the EU and join the United States, or, in other words, such a move would contribute to the division of the EU instead of its integration.
5. Macron and the Russia-Ukraine War
On the eve of the Ukraine war, Macron, sometimes alone and sometimes with German Chancellor Scholz, worked hard to dissuade Putin from attacking Ukraine. 11 This reminds us of former German Chancellor Merkel's shuttle diplomacy efforts toward the Minsk Agreements I and II (2014-15).
Reportedly, some US government officials became "convinced" of the Russian invasion as early as October 11, 2021. 12 It seems that from that time to the end of the year, the United States launched a fairly in-depth disclosure of information to Ukraine and its allies. In addition to his phone talks with Putin, Macron, accompanied by the outgoing Chancellor Merkel, met with Putin on October 10. He also held a bilateral meeting with Putin on November 16 as the Russian military buildup proceeded. In December, Macron attempted similar meetings with Putin on the 14th and 21st. The December 21 meeting, in particular, was held under an already sufficiently tense situation after Russia had delivered its demands to the West and NATO the week before. At the end of the year, however, Macron made it clear that he would not give up compromising with Russia.
In January 2022, France took over the rotating six-month presidency of the EU, and in his diplomacy, Macron came to use both his French and EU presidential status. Following a telephone conversation with Putin on January 28, Macron held a five-hour face-to-face summit with the Russian leader in Moscow on February 8; and immediately after that, he flew to Kyiv to attend a Franco-Ukraine summit. Macron, who had worked hard as a "mediator," explained that "he has achieved his objective" and that he and the leaders of the countries concerned discussed "concrete security assurance measures for all the parties involved." According to AFP, on February 8, Macron said, "The objective of stopping bargaining and of preventing the intensification of warfare has been achieved." According to the French presidential office, the French and Russian leaders "agreed not to take any new military action near the Ukrainian border." 13 However, this last point was denied shortly by the Russian presidential office. A press leak suggested that France had proposed the "Finlandization" of Ukraine, which invited a barrage of criticism. Presumably, Macron sought to maintain Ukraine's sovereignty and independence while dismissing the invaded country's early accession to NATO and tacitly acknowledging Russia the right to have a certain say.
US President Biden issued an extraordinary date-specific warning that Russia would launch an invasion on February 16. The Japanese government may also have obtained some information and awaited the news of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. If so, it is hard to believe France was ignorant of the looming crisis. Aware of the criticism he would face, Macron attempted last-minute persuasion in telephone talks with Putin, once on February 12 and twice on February 20. Macron's attempts failed when Russia recognized the independence of two eastern Ukrainian provinces on February 22, which obliged the EU countries, including France, to impose sanctions against Russia. But just before that day, Macron held a summit meeting with Putin over the phone.
After the Russian invasion began on February 24, many accusations were directed to Russia, resulting in additional sanctions against it. Four days later, on February 28, Macron had a telephone talk with Putin and demanded a halt to attacks on Ukrainian civilians, the protection of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, and the security of roads south of the capital Kyiv. But these demands failed to receive any attention at all. On March 3, Macron held another telephone summit with Putin. However, the Russian leader, reacting to Macron's statement the day before designating Russia as the aggressor, declared that Russian attacks would continue until the completion of the demilitarization of Ukraine. Without regard for appearances, Macron was worried that the worst thing would happen. Still refusing to give up, he telephoned Putin again on March 6. Furthermore, on March 29, he repeated the proposal he had made just before the date of creating a humanitarian corridor in Mariupol, but Putin rejected it. Their talks went nowhere.
Macron, who won reelection as president of France in late April, was quick to resume diplomatic negotiations with Russia. On May 3, he held a telephone summit with Putin, his 20th since the previous December. In parallel, early that month, he stated, "We must never give in to the temptation either of humiliation or of a spirit of revenge." After another phone call to Putin on May 28, Macron made a well-known statement to the Parisian and other French regional newspapers on June 4: "Russia must not be humiliated. When the fighting stopped, it would be necessary to build an exit route by diplomatic means." "I am convinced that France has a role as a mediating power." "It is one thing to become isolated, but it is difficult to get out of it." "I told Putin that he had made a historic and fundamental mistake for his people, for himself and for history."
A strong reaction came from Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba, who criticized Macron by name, saying that Russia deserves the humiliation it brought on itself. President Zelensky said he could not understand Macron's calls to avoid humiliating Russia. Presumably, Macron spoke from a long-term perspective of how to bring Russia, which launched brutal aggression against Ukraine, back into order as a European state after the war. Therefore, it is not a contradiction, at least for him, that France increased support for Ukraine from that time. On June 9, in a telephone conversation with Zelensky, Macron pledged to provide heavy weapons to Ukraine. A week later, on June 16, he visited Kyiv, with the leaders of Germany and Italy, for a summit meeting. The French president also attended the Madrid NATO summit at the end of June. A strategic document unanimously adopted then defined Russia as a "threat." Afterward, Macron held sporadic telephone summits with the Russian president on, among other dates, August 19. Yet, there have been no talks since September 11, when the two leaders reportedly discussed nuclear threats and Russia's attacks on nuclear power plants.
We have so far reviewed President Macron's mediating diplomacy toward Russia. Mediation, however, is not all that he did. We should not forget that France strongly condemned the Russian aggression, led sanctions against Russia as the EU presidency, and provided support for Ukraine, including military assistance. As for French support for Ukraine, its total amount, including aid on a commitment basis offered via the EU budgetary system, is the third largest after the United States and Germany and slightly higher than that of the United Kingdom. Looking at its military aid alone, its total amount ranks ninth, below even Nordic countries. Yet, the weapons France has so far supplied include anti-aircraft guns, howitzers, and anti-ship missiles; France is the first country to provide light tanks. France has also deployed 3,000 French soldiers to Romania and trained 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers since shortly after Russia invaded Ukraine. French arms exports in 2014-2020 exceeded €1.6 billion, one of the largest in scale. In December 2010, France presided over an international conference in Paris in support of Ukraine and pledged its continued aid.
France's engagement in the Ukraine war, which Macron publicized on December 21, 2022, may be recapitulated as follows: (1) Ukraine must decide ceasefire/truce terms; (2) Security of Ukraine and Russia: Priority should be accorded in the order of Ukraine's victory, territorial integrity, and long-term security, and then security guarantees for Russia; and (3) above all, a restoration of the pre-invasion status quo. At first glance, the French perception of the Ukraine war is not so different from that of the major Western countries. But it differs in Macron's way of adding security guarantees for Russia after those for Ukraine. His design is, as we have already detailed, to stabilize relations with Russia, a transcontinental European nation, without which France and Europe would be unable to ensure their security and strategic autonomy. Russia must be "defeated," but its "destruction" is not wanted. 14
France has been consistent on this last point since the beginning of the recent war. However, France does not overlook Russia's ongoing brutal assault but, with its other allies, has positioned Russia as a "threat." As a result, Macron's initial diplomatic efforts were wasted. After the Russian invasion began, he stepped up sanctions against Russia and endorsed Ukrainian interests without abandoning the long-term goal of incorporating Russia. Here we find the continuity and discontinuity of his diplomacy.
(Professor, The University of Tokyo)
(Translation by Tsutomu Inuzuka)
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- August, 2020, "The Coronavirus Pandemic and Japan's Infectious Disease Control" written by Takashi Mihara, Senior Research Fellow, NLI Research Institute
- August, 2020, "Infectious Disease Crisis Control in Japan- Recommendations on an Exit Strategy -" written by Kazumasa Oguro, Professor, Hosei University
- August, 2020, "Security against Infectious Disease Threats --- Policy Responses Abroad" written by Takashi Sekiyama, Associate Professor, Kyoto University
- June 2020,"Transformation of the International Order in the Middle East--- Varying Degrees of "Stateness" and Three Directions of the New Order" written by Satoshi Ikeuchi, Professor, Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology, The University of Tokyo
- June 2020,"Destabilization in the Middle East and its Impacts on Japan's Energy Security" written by Amane Kobayashi, Research Fellow, The Institute of Energy Economics
- May 2020: Urgent Recommendations "Toward a V-shaped Recovery after the Novel Coronavirus Pandemic "Coronavirus Testing for All" --- the First Step of the Next Phase"
- May 2020: "US Diplomacy toward Iran: Economic Sanctions as a Diplomatic Tool" Hiroki Sugita Columnist, Kyodo News
- "Russian Factors in the Middle East" Taisuke Abiru Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- "The SDF Dispatches to the Middle East --- History and Significance" Ippeita Nishida Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- March 2020, "Space and Security" Kazuto Suzuki Professor, Hokkaido University
- March 2020, "The US Security Space Policy --- With a Focus on the Establishment of Two Space Forces" Yasuhito Fukushima Chief Researcher, The National Institute for Defense Studies
- March 2020, "China's Recent Activities in Space and Cyberspace" Bonji Ohara Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- March 2020, "Environmental Security and Japan" Takashi Sekiyama Associate Professor, Kyoto University
- March 2020, "Changes in Global Environment and Security --- US Security Strategy" Hideshi Tokuchi Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
- February 2020, "Cyberspace Security" Motohiro Tsuchiya Professor, Keio University
- February 2020, "Japan's Space and Cyberspace Policy" Yukinari Hirose Former President of the National Institute for Defense Studies
- December 2019, "The US-China Confrontation --- Where Will Hegemony Reside Next?" Akio Takahara Professor, the University of Tokyo
- December 2019, "Challenges Facing the Chinese Economy" Osamu Tanaka Chief Senior Researcher, Institute of Developing Economies, JETRO
- December 2019, "US Strategic Perception on China: Implications for US Allied Partners" Tsuneo Watanabe Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- November 2019, "The Xi Jinping Administration's View of the International Order– China's emphasis on United Nations diplomacy and liberal economic policies−" Shin Kawashima, Professor, the University of Tokyo
- November 2019, "The Future of China's Security Strategy" Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- November 2019, "China --- Its Confidence and Anxiety" Bonji Ohara, Senior Research Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- August 2019: Several Perspectives on the Korean Peninsula Issue--- The Deteriorating Japan-South Korea Relationship and the Uncertain Denuclearization of North Korea --- By Masahiro Akiyama Chairman, the SSDP
- July 2019, "An Outlook on the Denuclearization of North Korea--- What is the Stance of North Korea?---", Junya Nishino, Professor, Keio University
- July 2019, "An Outlook on the Denuclearization of North Korea --- How will the US move?", Narushige Michishita, Vice President, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- July 2019, "Discussion on Denuclearization of North Korea", SSDP Discussion Meeting on May 8, 2019
- May 2019: "Current Status and Prospects of South Korea and Japan's Frictions over History: How to address the Judicial Problems", Masao Okonogi, Professor Emeritus, Keio University
- May 2019: "South Korea and Japan's Frictions over History" (Comments), Junya Nishino, Professor, Keio University
- May 2019: Japan and South Korea Relationships (Question & Answer)
- March 2019: "The Present State and Prospects of the Indian Economy and Economic Policies" written by Koji Kobayashi, Senior Economist Mizuho Research Institute Ltd.
- March 2019: "The "Modi diplomacy" in the History of Indian diplomacy--- Departure from or maintenance of the traditional diplomacy? ---" written by Toru Ito, The National Defense Academy of Japan
- February 2019: Dynamics of Indian Politics and the 2019 General Elections, written by Chiharu Takenaka, Professor of Rikkyo University
- February 2019: "Cooperative Strategy" to Realize "Competitive Strategy"--- The composite structure of Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy (vision) ---, written by Matake Kamiya, Professor at The National Defense Academy of Japan
- January 2019:, A paper, "How will the US midterm elections results affect the Trump administration's foreign policy for 2019?" written by Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- January 2019:, A paper, "The Present and Future of the International Trade Order" , written by Akihiko Tamura, Professor, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- December 2018: The US-China Competition and Japan, written by Ryo Sahashi, Professor at Kanagawa University
- December 2018: An Outlook for the US-China Trade War―What makes the two economically interdependent superpowers confront each other?―, written by Takashi Sekiyama, Associate professor at Toyo University
- September 2018: Proposal, "The Denuclearization of North Korea and the Restoration of Peace in the Korean Peninsula― Correct Perceptions and Eight Proposals on Japan's North Korea Diplomacy－" edited by the Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies
- September 2018: "The Taiwan Policy of the Xi Jinping Administration in its Second Term: An Outlook on Cross-Strait Relations in the New Era" written by Yasuhiro Matsuda, Professor of the Tokyo University
- July 2018: "The EU States and Russia on North Korea Issues- Expansion of Influence through Diplomacy: Attempts and Limitations -" lectured by Yuichi Hosoya, Professor of Keio University
- "An Assessment of the US-North Korea Summit and an Outlook for the Future of the Korean Peninsula" lectured by Junya Nishino, Professor of Keio University
- "Korean Peninsula Issue and Japan's Future Security Policy" written by Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow of National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies
- July 2018: "US North Korea policy affected by personnel changes in the Trump administration" lectured by Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow of the Sasakawa Peace Foundation.
- "China-North Korea relationship under Xi Jinping" lectured by Shin Kawashima, Professor of the Tokyo University.
- "North Korean Denuclearization and Russia" lectured by Nobuo Shimotomai, Professor of the Hosei University.
- March 2018: "The Network Hegemony Theory for a Security Architecture in The Asia Pacific Region" lectured by Masahiro Akiyama, Chairman, the Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies
- January 2018: "A Destabilized Middle East" lectured by Koichiro Tanaka, Professor, Keio University
- December 2017: "Problems in Sino-Japanese Relations, 1992-2042" lectured by Ezra F. Vogel, Professor of the Social Sciences Emeritus at Harvard University
- November 2017: "The Future of the Asia-Pacific Region" written by Yoriko Kawaguchi, Fellow, the Meiji Institute for Global Affairs, Former Minister Foreign Affairs
- October 2017: "A New Trend in India's Foreign Policy and Japan" Written by HIROSE,Takako, Professor, Senshu University
- August 2017: "The Shocks that shook the Transatlantic World and their Implication for Japan's Foreign Policy" written by HOSOYA, Yuichi, Professor, Keio University
- August 2017: "Does Economic Interdependence not Encourage Collaboration? ―Thinking Japan-China Relations from an Economic Perspective―" written by Takashi SEKIYAMA, Ph.D., Toyo University
- July 2017: Proposal article "The Trump Administration's Impact on the Cross-Strait Relations" written by Yasuhiro Matsuda, Ph.D.
- June 2017: Proposal article "The outlook for the relationship between two great powers and implications for Japanese diplomacy" written by Professor Shin Kawashima
- May 2017: (Emergency Proposal) Facing the Inconvenient Truth: Re-examining Policy for Peace and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (Chief author, Masao Okonogi)
- March 2017: "Economic Influences of the Trump Administration" written by Professor Motoshige Ito
- February, 2017: Proposal article "Trump's Foreign and Security Policy - Unpredictable President, Realistic Secretaries - " written by Mr. Tsuneo Watanabe is posted on the website of SSDP.
- December, 2016: Proposal article "Reconsidering North Korea Policy: How to Deal with a Nuclear Armed Divided States" written by Professor Masao Okonogi is posted on the website of SSDP.
- Japan-Korea Political Leaders Dialogue was held on February 10th,2023 at International House of Japan
- March 2022, A remembrance seminar "Remembering Professor Ezra Vogel" held on January 17, 2022
- March 2021, Japan-ROK Parliamentary Dialogue -Japan-ROK Cooperation in the Era of US-China Competition- held on March 11, 2021
- December 2020: The report of the Japan-ROK Future Dialogue held on November 21 to discuss "Japan-ROK Cooperation in the Post-Covid-19 Era
- October 2020: "Responses to COVID-19 and Agendas for the Post-COVID-19 Era", A Brief Overview of the Japan-Korea Experts Dialogue held on July 29,30, 2020
- October 2020: "The China-Taiwan Confrontation over Corona Response and Taiwan's Security" written by Makoto Ogata, Former Chief of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei
- May 2020: "Rivalries in the Middle East in New Security Dynamics", Written by Sayed Ghoneim, Major General (retired) of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Chairman, Institute for Global Security & Defence Affairs
- March 2020: The Japan-South Korea Relationship in a Cul-de-Sac--- Where is an Exit ? Masao Okonogi Professor Emeritus, Keio Universit
- December 2019: The Hong Kong Upheaval and the Future of Cross-Straits Relations－The 2019 Japan-Taiwan Strategic Dialogue Report OGATA, Makoto Former Chief of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei
- August 2019: Report; 2019 FUTURE CONSENSUS DIALOGUE --Sustainable Prosperity and Future of Korea-U.S.-Japan Cooperation-- By Future Consensus Institute (Yeosijae)
- June 2019: Report on India – Japan Security Dialogue 2019 by Ms. Vindu Mai Chotani, Ph.D Student, The University of Tokyo
June 2019: Four papers on Japan-India Cooperation submitted to India-Japan Security Dialogue 2019
Japan's Rationale for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision
Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, The Sasakawa Peace Foundation
The Significance and Possibilities of India-Japan Cooperation in the Concept of the Indo-Pacific
Toru ITO Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan
Japan-India Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Context - Operationalizing the Security Aspect of the Indo-Pacific Vision –
Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS)
India-US-Japan Defense Cooperation: What's next?
Dr. Satoru Nagao, Hudson Institute
- Japan's Rationale for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision
- November 2018: "The Present State of the Japanese Economy and Policy Issues" lectured by Motoshige Itoh, Professor Emeritus at the University of Tokyo.
- November 2018: "Expanding Social Security Expenses and Fiscal Reforms" lectured by Kazumasa Oguro, Professor at Hosei University.
- September 2018: "Taiwan Identity and Cross-Strait Relations and Trump's Taiwan Policy and the Future of Taiwan-US Relations-Discussion at The Second Japan-Taiwan Strategic Dialogue (June 21, 2018, Taipei)-" written by OGATA, Makoto
- September 2018: "Japan-Taiwan Dialogue 2018 Minutes", 21st June 2018, Taipei, Taiwan.
- July 2018: Report on The Second Japan – Philippines Strategic Dialogue prepared by Ms. Vindu Mai Chotani, Ph.D. Student, Graduate School of Public Policy, Tokyo University.
- May 2018: "Civilian Control "at Crisis"? – Perhaps Not, for the Case of the Field Sit-reps from SDF's South Sudan Mission" reported by Ippeita Nishida, Research Fellow, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation
- January 2018: "Fukushima, Genki？Project－Young Taiwanese volunteers introduce the facts on Fukushima's revival through documentary films－" reported by OGATA, Makoto, Former Chief of the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association in Taipei
- December 2017: "Commemorating a Quarter Century of Dispatches of the JSDF's PKO Units: Challenges and Possibilities in the Post South Sudan" written by Takayuki Shoji, Lecturer, Nihon University
- November 2017: "19th CCP National Congress" written by Mr. Bonji Ohara, Senior Research Fellow, the Sasakawa Peace Fondation
- October 2017: "What is Japan's Role in the Indo-China border conflict?" written by Dr. NGAO,Satoru, Research Fellow, Institute for Future Engineering
- July 2017: "Overview of the Current Situation in Taiwan-" the Naturally Independent Generation" will affect the Taiwan"s politics-" written by Makoto Ogata MGE.(Ret.)
- June 2017: "Japan-U.S. Economic Dialogue" written by Mr.Takaaki Asano
- March 2017: "The Japan-Philippines Strategic Dialogue" written by Mr. Hideshi Tokuchi
- February, 2017: Current topic "The Importance of Japan's Security Role Under Trump" written by Dr. Satoru Nagao is posted on the SSDP website.
- December, 2016: Current topic "Widening Security Task: Will SDF do the Job?" written by Mr. Ippeita Nishida is posted on the SSDP website.
- March 2023,Research journal "Security Studies vol5 no1" (What Will Happen to European Security?―Facing the War in Ukraine) in English edition was published.
- January 2023, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 4 no 4)" - Defending Our Country – Defense Policy in a "New Cold War Era - was published.
- October 2022, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 4 no 3)" - Xi Jinping's China - Politics, Economy, Society and Diplomacy - was published.
- Jun 2022, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 4 no 2)" -The Russia-Ukraine War and Its Global Impact- was published.
- March 2022, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 4 no 1)"-What is Economic Security?- was published.
- December 2021, Research Jounal "Security Studies (vol 3 no 4)"-Korean Peninsula Situation- was published.
- September 2021, A research journal "Security Studies vol03 no03" -Asia's Security II- (English edition)
- June 2021, A research journal "Security Studies vol03 no02" -Asia's Security I- (English edition)
- March 2021: Research journal "Security Studies (vol3 no1) "- US Foreign Policy in the Biden Administration / The 2020 US Presidential Election and American Democracy -(English edition)
- December 2020: A research journal "Security Studies (vol2 no4) "- Normalize Japan-South Korea Relations trough Dialogues -(English edition)
- September 2020: A research journal "Security Studies (vol2 no3) "-The Novel Coronavirus and Security-(English edition)
- July 2020: A research journal "Security Studies (vol2 no2) - Middle East Situation and Japan's Security - " (English edition) was published
- May 2020: A research journal "Security Studies (vol2 no1) - Cyber, Space, Environment and Security - " March 2020 (English edition)
- February 2020, "A research journal "Security Studies (vol1 no4) " (English edition)"
- September 2019: A research journal "Security Studies (vol1 no3) " (English edition)
- August 2019: Korea-Japan Joint Seminar: FUTURE CONSENSUS DIALOGUE
- April 2019: "Security Studies (vol1 no2) April 2019"
- March 2019: A research journal "Security Studies vol1 no01" just published
- February 2019: The Denuclearization of North Korea and the Takeshima Issue
- December 2018: Former Vice Defense Minister Masahiro Akiyama's Memoirs (An Ad)
- November 2018: Participation in the Future Consensus Forum held in Beijing
- September 2018: "2018 Indo-Pacific Security Dialogue" reported by Masahiro Akiyama
- 2017 December: "The Butterfly Project-A possibility of showing a solution to the North Korea problem-"
- October 2017: Campaign on the problems with North Korea
- August 2017: A New Containment Policy Strategy
- June 2017: Korean peninsla
- March 2017: President Duterte
- February, 2017: Kazakhstan
- November, 2016: Participated in Astana Club 2016 held in Kazakhstan on November 14- 16, 2016.