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India – Japan Security Dialogue 2019

On the 28th of February, 2019 in New Delhi, the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) hosted a delegation from the Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies (SSDP) for an India-Japan Security Dialogue. Given the deepening ties between India and Japan, panelists discussed and debated the India-Japan partnership in the Indo-Pacific. This report is a summary of the discussions that were held over three sessions.

Opening Remarks
K V Kesavan and Masahiro Akiyama

The India – Japan partnership is the most rapidly advancing partnership and today it is possible to state that it has become a truly multi-dimensional partnership. However, the region has been volatile for a long time, and the vastness of it means that no country can single-handedly ensure the its safety and prosperity. Thus, it is important to seek various dimensions and partners to govern this region. As such, it is an opportune time to ask, what is the contribution that we have made, and what is the essence of India Japan cooperation in the region?

The SSDP which is based in Japan, has been focusing on the India-Japan partnership. During the course of researching the potential of the India-Japan partnership, several meetings have already taken place in Japan. Looking to continue and deepen their research on India-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific this dialogue was proposed.

Session 1: India-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

Japan's Rationale for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision
Tsuneo Watanabe

Mr. Watanabe kicked of the first session with his presentation titled. ‘Japan's Rationale for Free and Open Indo-Pacific Vision'. There are two precise driving forces behind the rationale for Prime Minister Abe's ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific' (FOIP) strategy of Japan: the rise of China and the relative decline of U.S. influence in Asia. Through governmental and non-governmental interactions of the American and Japanese security policy community, Japan's strategic thinking has been shaped as the FOIP vision.

What is the Japan's Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision?

Mr. Watanabe highlighted that Japan's first commitment on the FOIP strategy was pledged in PM Abe's speech at the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) in Nairobi, Kenya on August 27, 2016. Here, PM Abe emphasized the importance of connectivity between the Indian Ocean, the seas of Asia and the Pacific Ocean, as well as values of freedom and rule of law. However, the speech did not include two critical strategic thoughts, i.e., balancing the rise of China and a hedge against the relative retrenchment by the U.S. as the world hegemon.

Regarding this speech, many experts have pointed out that there are two strategic goals behind the rational of the FOIP. The first goal is PM Abe's diplomatic motto as "diplomacy that takes a panoramic perspective of the world map". The second goal, is PM Abe's realist and geopolitical thinking in his essay, "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond," on December 27, 2012. In the later speech, Abe envisages a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. state of Hawaii, form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific."

Mr. Watanabe argued that in terms of realist thinking, the FOIP strategy is based on a balance of power element.

Yet, the FOIP also has a liberal approach to provide and maintain global commons in the region. With regards to this, either approach., i.e., the realist approach and liberal approach are not mutually exclusive. Rather, the liberal approach assumes two positive effects to attain the balance of power eventually.

Thus, PM Abe's FOIP strategy has two elements:

  1. Liberal elements such as Japan's cooperation with development and stability in Asia and Africa.
  2. Realist elements such as counter-balancing the rise of China, while also providing more resources to maintain the international liberal order. This becomes even more important due to the relative retrenchment by the U.S., as it pursues its "America First" policy.
Continuing to engage the Trump Administration

Mr. Watanabe pointed out that PM Abe's willingness to maintain relations with the unpredictable U.S. leader can be seen in the first official joint statement released by the U.S. and Japan in February 2018. This statement confirmed strong security ties between Japan and the U.S.

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) 2017 states that "a geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region". Along these lines, it confirms that a free and open Indo-Pacific has been and continues to be in the interest of the U.S. The NSS goes on to directly state its concern of China's regional influence through its BRI.

On November 6, 2017, prior to the release of the US NSS, President Trump visited Japan and agreed on the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy with PM Abe. According to the statement released by Japan's MoFA, the two leaders confirmed that a free and open maritime order, based on the rule of law was the cornerstone for peace and prosperity for the international community. The leaders further stressed the importance of the Indo-Pacific region as a vital region in the world. They agreed that Japan and the U.S. would work together to promote peace and prosperity in the region by developing the Indo-Pacific as free and open.

Japan and U.S. security experts happen to conclude a similar regional security strategy: Network security

Addressing a plausible strategy, Mr. Watanabe highlighted the findings from a study group headed by former Foreign Minister of Japan, Yoriko Kawaguchi (Koizumi Cabinet, 2002-04) and former administrative Vice-Minister of defense, Masahiro Akiyama (1997-98). This group conducted research and co-authored a publication, the "Future Perspective of Asia-Pacific" to explore Japan's strategic sphere in the Trump era.

The common consensus reached by the study group was that the function of the hegemon to provide the international community with public goods, should now be shared with network of the like-minded nations. The study group named this structure Pax Amicitia, and it aimed to attain peace through a "network hegemony."

As peaceful development in Asia-Pacific region cannot be attained without the U.S. and China, the group stressed that like-minded nations should create frameworks, wherein the U.S. and China can participate as well. Since Japan is the most influential country to both the U.S. and China, as well as the most influenced country by both the U.S. and China, the group proposed that it is Japan that should take the initiative and burden of the creating this network in the Asia Pacific.

Simultaneously, U.S. think-tank, Center for New American Security (CNAS) had been working on the Networking Asian Security project, and its report was released in June 2017. The report similarly shares a fundamental assumption that state power is no longer solely or even primarily defined by its individual material attributes.

Mr. Watanabe stated that both these two projects, which were simultaneously conducted in Japan and the U.S. do share a lot of common features. In addition, both sides expect and encourage Japan's pro-active role in Asia's security network.

The expectation of India's role

Mr. Watanabe stated that India is a unique and independent power, which has shared interests in regional stability of the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, India has also been improving its relations with the U.S. as an economic partner.

Japan, for its part needs a strategic partner, which shares common values of democracy, human rights, free trade and a market economy to cope with the rise of China and an unpredictable U.S. Further, Japan and India could share their experiences with regards to coping with a difficult neighbor, China and a global hegemon, the U.S.

However, Mr. Watanabe concluded by stating that the question as to how one can shape China is complex, and it cannot simply be dealt with by adopting Cold War containment policies. There needs to be wisdom and flexibility in order to shape China's future trajectory, and it has to be achieved without sacrificing the current world economic prosperity and stability.

The Significance and Possibilities of India-Japan Cooperation in the Concept of the Indo-Pacific
Toru Ito
Chemistry between Modi and Abe

Professor Ito introduced his presentation by highlighting the importance of the undeniable "chemistry" shared by Modi and Abe.

Assessing Modi, Mr. Ito stated that since becoming Prime Minister of India in May 2014, Narendra Modi has shown two different characteristics. On the one hand, he has been highly active as a business leader in aiming to achieve India's national economic growth. On the other hand, as leader of the Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP), he is also known to be a Hindu nationalist, with a pre-disposition for exclusionary policies. In terms of foreign and security policy, the former aspect is reflected in his eagerness to attract investments even from China in order to realize his ‘Make in India' initiative. The latter can be seen in the hardline measures he has adopted as a reaction to terrorist attacks from Pakistan, as well as with regards to Chinese incursions and attempts to change the status quo by force.

Professor Ito pointed out that interestingly, Shinzo Abe, a fellow nationalist and business friendly leader, found himself well received by Modi. Both leaders share a number of pertinent things in common: values of nationalism, threat perceptions posed by an assertive China, and their growth strategies - ‘Abenomics' and ‘Modinomics'. Thus, as can be seen from the above, it has been quite natural that bilateral relations between Japan and India, have expanded and deepen based on personal chemistry between Modi and Abe.

Modi's positive response to the ‘Indo-Pacific'

Professor Ito identified that like the former government, the Modi government, was also careful to avoid officially adopting the term ‘Indo-Pacific' as a strategic concept of the U.S. for more than one year after its founding. Nonetheless, Modi was keen to develop much closer ties with major advocators of ‘Indo-Pacific' from the beginning. And progressive steps towards adopting the term ‘Indo-Pacific', were to be seen.

For example, Modi selected Japan as his first trip outside of South Asia. In September 2014, during his visit to Tokyo, he agreed to upgrade India-Japan relations to a ‘Special' Strategic and Global Partnership. The significance of the term ‘Special' can be gauged by the fact that just two months prior to this meeting, Japan and Australia in their joint statement had also adopted that term.

In November 2014, Modi also became the first Indian prime minister to visit Australia. The following year, Modi went on to welcome former U.S. President, Obama as the Chief Guest for India's Republic Day parade. Finally, in September 2015, amid increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea, the Modi government officially adopted the term ‘Indo-Pacific'. This was done in a joint media note, after the inaugural U.S.-India-Japan Trilateral Ministerial Dialogue held in New York. Since then, professor Ito stated that the Modi government has had no hesitation in using and referencing the term.

In 2015, India welcomed the Japanese Maritime Defense Force to participate as a regular/ permanent member in the Malabar exercise. Following the inaugural India-U.S. 2+2 dialogue last September, Modi also promised to establish an India-Japan 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue. In November 2017, the Quadrilateral framework, an idea originally proposed by Abe as the ‘Security Diamond' was revitalized at a senior official's meeting in Manila. Finally, on the sideline of the G 20 last November, Modi, Abe and Trump met for the first trilateral summit meeting.

Modi's emphasis on ‘strategic autonomy'

Albeit this steady progress, Professor Ito stressed that there should be no misunderstanding that India under the Modi administration is willing to join the alliance with the U.S., Japan or Australia. Indeed, right after the leaders met in Manila in 2017, Mr. S. Jaishankar - Modi's close aide and the former Foreign Secretary – down played the significance of the ‘Quad' and clearly stated that ‘rigid alliances will be avoided'. Despite this, the BJP manifesto in 2014 did emphasize the necessity of building a ‘web of allies', but not any specific alliance.

Thereafter, Modi himself assured the international community that India would never see the ‘Indo-Pacific' as a strategic concept for containing China and that India would never join any alliances. Emphasizing this position, his keynote address at the Shangri-la Dialogue last June, reiterated the term "strategic autonomy". Professor Ito assessed that given the Trump administration's protectionist economic policies and unilateralism in security issues, it is becoming more important for India to maintain strategic relations with China and Russia. This can be seen as last year, Modi accepted the offer to take part in an ‘informal summit' at Wuhan and Sochi, as well as the RIC (Russia-India-China) trilateral summit meeting held on the sidelines of the G20 summit.

New prospects for India-Japan cooperation in the ‘Indo-Pacific'

Professor Ito argued that against this background, Abe's visit to Beijing last October - which was the first time a Japanese Prime Minister had visited China in the last seven years - and his approach to mend relations with China, should be seen as good moves for India-Japan relations. As mentioned by Indian Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale, the Indian viewpoint is that improved Japan-China relations would create a conducive environment for boosting ties with Japan without affecting its relations with China.

Considering that Japan's military contribution to peace and stability is constrained by its constitution, Professor Ito posed the question as to what would be the most promising and beneficial areas of cooperation between India and Japan in the ‘Indo-Pacific'? At this point, it would be beneficial to keep in mind that most of India's immediate and extended neighbors in the Indo-Pacific, especially in Indian Ocean are fragile, financially and politically. And it is with many of these states that China is expanding its influence by making use of its enormous wealth.

Professor Ito highlighted that in this process, some nations have been caught in the so-called Chinese ‘debt trap'. A good example of this being the port at Hambantota, Sri Lanka. Further, it is not clear whether the new ‘pro-India' administration in the Maldives will see a way out of their debt with China, although the Modi government decided to provide financial assistance worth $1.4 billion. This is equivalent to over one-third of its total debt with China.

Thus, in order to realize the vision of a ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific', it is essential to provide these fragile Indian neighbours with an alternative for their development. Professor Ito emphasized the 2017 India-Japan joint initiative - the ‘Asia-Africa Growth Corridor' (AAGC) as a good way forward. While the AAGC is yet to be substantialized, the ‘Fact Sheet' on ‘India-Japan Development Cooperation' in the Indo-Pacific, including Africa, did highlight limited examples of cooperation, such as LNG-related infrastructure in Sri Lanka. As such, it would be beneficial for India and Japan to cooperate with each other in order to extricate Indian neighbours from the ‘debt trap', but also to offer open and transparent financing and development projects.

Professor Ito concluded by stating that fortunately for Japan, it has maintained friendly relations with almost all nations in the Indian Ocean region. Japan has not been seen as a power with an aim to establish its hegemony amongst some of the ‘fragile' Indian Ocean states. This makes it possible and essential for Japan to contribute financially and politically to welfare, stability and democratization in the region. This kind of cooperation will be a step to ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific' order.

Abhijit Singh

Mr. Singh began his presentation by stating that he would focus on three main issues –

  • When we talk about the Indo-Pacific, how does it fair as a maritime security construct? We know that it fares well as a geopolitical construct and that it has relevance as an economic construct. However, how is this as a pure deterrence security idea?
  • When we refer to India-Japan security cooperation, are both countries on the same page., i.e., is there a convergence or are we talking about different concepts?
  • What are the challenges in this relationship? We always address opportunities, but unless we really address the hurdles in the relationship, there will not be much progress in the relationship.

Mr. Singh stated that it is clear by now that the term Indo-Pacific has been accepted in the strategic discourse as a legitimate geopolitical construct. For many observers, the term recognizes deepened connections between the Indian Ocean region and the Western Pacific, and frames these two seemingly diverse political geographies as a unitary, interconnected strategic space. Even so, analysts and policymakers are gradually coming around to the view there is not one, but many conceptions of the Indo-Pacific, especially when seen through the prism of maritime security. Thus, in the security sense the Indo-Pacific is the new framework in which we look at maritime security.

This concept is also a call to arms, in the sense that it is a way to bring light to the fact that there are serious non-traditional security issues in the region. And countries have to come together in a collaborative and integrative fashion such that they can deal with those challenges.

Having said that, Mr. Singh stated that there are three interpretations to the Free and Open Indo-Pacific. For India, arguably, the clearest articulation of India's conception of the Indo Pacific came from Modi's speech at the Shangri La dialogue earlier last year. Mr. Modi suggested that India does not see the Indo-Pacific region as a strategy or as a club of limited members. It is not a grouping that seeks to dominate, he said, and by no means directed against any country. The Prime Minister spoke of India's deepening ties with Indo-Pacific powers, particularly the United States; Russia, Singapore and Japan (the relationship with Tokyo, he noted, is the cornerstone of India's Act East policy), and also stressed the need for greater trust and confidence in the India-China relationship. The burden of his message was that all sides need put their differences aside and work with each other.

The second one is Japan's ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific' concept. This concept is similar to India's and as such Mr. Singh argued that these two interpretations can be referred to as the conciliatory model. This model is different from the one posed by the U.S. which has adopted a more confrontational model.

When these two models are contrasted, what appears is that there seems to be an equation that needs to be leveled between two opposing needs. One is the need to create opportunity and the other is the need to create deterrence. However, if one creates deterrence, there is less opportunity to collaborate. Thus, if you follow the confrontational model, it becomes difficult to cooperate with China.

On the other hand, Mr. Singh contended that if one subscribes to the conciliatory model, then there is not much space for deterrence against what the Chinese are doing in the South China Sea and what they are beginning to do in the Indian Ocean Region. Thus, there is this trade off in this equation that needs to be properly acknowledged.

For Japan and India which subscribe to the conciliatory model, there is a need to address how they can create deterrence. In essence, in pursuing this conciliatory model, what can India and Japan do if another country does not abide by the rules?

The third model is the consociation-al model, and this can be used to explain ASEAN which has not quite signed up to the Indo-Pacific. Mr. Singh stated that ASEAN has not done so for two reasons. The first is because the Indo-Pacific takes away from ASEAN centrality. ASEAN was happy with the Asia-Pacific concept because it recognized ASEAN as a core region, but the Indo-Pacific concept does not necessarily do so. The second reason is that ASEAN also sees the Indo-Pacific as a possible China containment policy, and ASEAN states have stakes in China. ASEAN looks to China for investments and infrastructure development. Thus, they are not prepared to confront China in the same way the quad countries would. Hence, for ASEAN Indo-Pacific equals the Quadrilateral, and this is not a good idea.

India-Japan operational cooperation

Mr. Singh went on to address issue regarding operational cooperation.

  • Interoperability - One important aspect to look at is that interoperability between India and Japan continues to be an issue. India has not been able to prove its interoperability with Japan, the same way that it has done with the U.S. Therefore, this requires attention. Without interoperability, there are no standard operating procedures with which one can fight common threats in the region.
  • Capacity Building - Mr. Singh highlighted that Japan has now become active in the Bay of Bengal. Not only in the maritime connectivity sense where Japan has played a big role in improving connectivity in the region. But there has also been a new proposal for Japan to be involved in maritime capacity building in the Bay of Bengal with countries such as Bangladesh, Thailand, Myanmar and Sri Lanka. This is good for India, as India has always argued the case for maritime capacity building.
  • Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) - According to Mr. Singh another aspect that India has stressed is MDA. Increasingly, Japan has shown interest in building up India's Maritime Domain Awareness capability. The Indian Navy has set up an Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC- IOR) in Gurgaon in 2018 and the Japanese have been the primary patrons to that endeavor. In a good move, Japan has also promised to send a liaison officer to visit the center.
  • Underwater detection capability - this is also important for India, and this is one area that has not received the attention that it should. India expects Japan and the U.S. to help in improving India's capability, primarily because a lot of anxiety in the Indian system is about not having an idea regarding the Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean region.
Vindu Mai Chotani

As a discussant in the first session, Ms. Chotani made three comments and one policy recommendation.

Connectivity and Infrastructure

In the last couple of years, there has been successful collaboration between India and Japan in Sri Lanka (Trincomalee port) and along the Thailand – Myanmar border (Dawei port). However, in Africa, there is yet to be any formal announcements on joint infrastructure and connectivity projects. Until now, collaboration has only been proposed with regards to health services and an SME development seminar in Kenya.

In order to boost the relevance of the AAGC, Ms. Chotani asked whether it was possible for India and Japan to jointly work on three key ports that Japan is building in Africa - Nacala, Mozambique; Mombasa, Kenya; and Toamasina, Madagascar?


Further, Ms. Chotani pointed out that bilateral trade between both states continues to underperform: the stark reality is that in just four years, Indian exports to Japan have almost halved to $3.85 billion in 2016-17, from $6.81 billion in 2013-14. And while it has been reported that Japanese investments in India during 2016-17 reached $ 4.7 billion registering a substantial jump from $ 2.6 billion during 2015-16, if one compares this to Japanese Foreign Direct Investment in Asia – primarily with China and many ASEAN states – India is still at the bottom of Japan's FDI ladder. This is another area to consider carefully with regards to boosting India-Japan cooperation.

The Future leadership

India and Japan are both democracies which have seen a growth trajectory since the early 2000s. However, this democratic status means there will be an eventual change in leadership. This possibility of change highlights the delicate position of leaders. While time and again the undeniable personal chemistry/rapport between Modi and Abe is highlighted. As scholar and researchers, looking into the future of the Indo-Pacific and specifically the India-Japan partnership, Ms. Chotani stated that we have to ask, can and will this partnership sustain at this consistency and growth beyond Abe and/or Modi. This is where building ties deeper than leaders is important, and the India-Japan partnership should be able to do this.

Policy recommendation

As a key step to deepening defence and security ties, Ms. Chotani highlighted the importance of improving military education between India and Japan. For example, if one looks at Japan's National Defence Academy (NDA), it has long-term cadet exchange program with other military academies, and receive cadets from a number of ASEAN countries, the Republic of Korea and the U.S. These exchanges range from 4 months – five years. However, there are no Indian cadets in these programmes. Further, the NDA only sends its cadets to India, for a one week exchange programme.

While there are exchanges between India and Japan at senior levels, it is a good idea for the SDF to strengthen defense exchange ties at all levels with India, especially starting at the basic cadet level.

Q&A and Comments

Q. What was the reason for the Australian government to finally chose the French submarines over the Japanese? Did this have anything to do with China, or was there another economic reason?

Commodore Anil Jai Singh from the audience stated that with regards to this submarine deal, this was a question of transfer of technology. That is, how much technology was Japan willing to give to Australia. As it was not up to the standard that the Australians wanted, the deal was unable to come through and instead was given to the French.

Another reason for this failure, was pointed out by Mr. Singh. He stated that Japan does not agree to producing parts at local units. Referencing a hypothetical example, if there was to be an India-Japan US 2i deal or a submarine deal, Japan would not allow parts to be manufactured in India. Japan wants to take whole and sole responsibility for what is constructed, because their companies are very sensitive about what goes out as a product. This was thus not acceptable to Australia, as this was an important way for the Australians to create jobs.

Contrary to the Japanese, Commodore Singh pointed out a big difference regarding how the French make deals. There is indeed an understanding that the French allow parts to be produced at local units. Indeed, the French are extremely flexible when it comes to such conditions. Additionally, he highlighted that India signs a lot of deals with the French, because the French know how to navigate the Indian market. Compared to the Japanese who currently are comparatively new.

Finally, if deals are to be signed between India and Japan, India for its part would need to have greater clarity on the procedures they will follow, such that they can assure their Japanese counterparts that they are indeed looking forward to the Japanese investing in the defense industrial realm.

Q. Is it possible for India and Japan to jointly work on three key ports that Japan is building in Africa?

Professor Ito stated that he visited Mauritius and Seychelles and there was no Japanese presence there. Further, Kenya has only limited Japanese presence. However, he found that there is a lot of Indian presence in Mauritius. Professor Ito now has a project regarding how to cooperate with the Indian diaspora in this region to proceed on infrastructure development in the Indo-Pacific region. Thus, although there is no conclusion yet, research is currently underway.

To connectivity and Infrastructure, Mr. Singh concluded by stating that this is a capacity problem and both sides need to be given some time to address this problem.

Q. To what extent has export of connectivity and infrastructure been driven by economic or security considerations?

Mr. Singh stated that a lot of what is seen has been couched as commercial or strategic proposals, for both the U.S. and Japan.

From a strategic point of view, he made one observation with regards to China – it has become a bit of a complication in the relationship. If we study both India's and Japan's policies to China, there seems to have been a bit of a re-set that has happened. India now talks about the Wuhan spirit, and has not addressed the South China Sea issue at all after PM Modi's visit to China. There seems to have been an understanding with China that "you don't step on our toes, we don't step on your toes".

With regards to Japan, the same thing is visible. After PM Abe's visit to China, there has been a close down on all antagonistic talk with regards to China.

The Indo-Pacific was a prosperity concept for both India and Japan, and it is not a deterrence concept. However, the reason that the Indo-Pacific concept came about, was for deterrence purposes and not prosperity. Therefore, although the concept of the Indo-Pacific has been called strategic, Mr. Singh argued that we are now going back to the old way of looking at things, i.e., that the Indo-Pacific should add to prosperity and create opportunity.

Session 2: India-Japan defense cooperation

Japan-India Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific Context –Operationalizing the Security Aspect of the Indo-Pacific Vision –
Hideshi Tokuchi
The concept of "Indo-Pacific"

Mr. Tokuchi started his talk by stating that the concept of the Indo-Pacific is fast replacing the concept of the Asia-Pacific. In the late twentieth century, people began to use the term "Asia-Pacific" against the backdrop of first, the start of East Asia as an engine of growth in the world growth, and second the necessity to fully integrate the U.S. into Asian affairs and to indicate that the U.S. is an integral part of the region.

Now, the new term "Indo-Pacific" is rapidly replacing the "Asia-Pacific." If you compare these two terms, two points are notable in the new one. First, the "Indo-Pacific" clearly portrays that the two oceans are naturally connected. It is an honest expression of geography. Prime Minister Modi at the Shangri-La dialogue was exactly right in stating that the Indo-Pacific is a natural region. Second, more importantly, it is a clear expression of the rise of India as an integral part of the region and it corresponds to its "Act East" policy. Obviously, the weight of India in the new nomenclature is much greater than that of the U.S. in the old moniker, despite Trump's reluctance to accept this on occasion. The new expression epitomizes this new reality.

Japan's Vision of the Indo-Pacific

Mr. Tokuchi stated that Japan's vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) is based on the recognition that the key to the stability and prosperity of the international community is the dynamism created by the synergy between the two continents – Asia and Africa – and two oceans – the Pacific and the Indian. However, it is quite clear that the emphasis of FOIP is on the maritime sphere. As such, when Japan declares its intention to help improve connectivity between Asia, the Middle East and Africa to promote the regional peace and stability, this "connectivity" that it refers to is maritime connectivity.

Mr. Tokuchi highlighted that Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) notes that the "Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy is open to every country that supports this idea and is ready to work with us." As such, he believes that this is an important message to describe the two facets of FOIP, namely, competition and cooperation.

However, the concept also has a number of faces – diplomatic, security, economic, but it is not yet well articulated or elaborated in security terms. In fact, till now there has been no mention of the Indo-Pacific in Japan's 2013 National Security Strategy. Though the 2018 National Defense Guidelines of Japan slightly mentions the concept of the Indo-Pacific. But the linkage between the FOIP and the new defense guideline is not clearly defined.

Mr. Tokuchi went on to highlight three points regarding the concept of the Indo-Pacific –

Strategic importance of the connectivity of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean is not new. It was obvious even in the Cold War days to ensure free flow of forces between the Asia-Pacific region, which is the home of the U.S. Pacific Forces and the turbulent Middle East. However, contemporary importance of the Indian Ocean comes from different considerations, particularly, China's maritime expansion and non-traditional security challenges including international terrorism and proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). In this sense, the concept "Indo-Pacific" represents both geographical and eternal truth, as well as new realities of the contemporary world.

Further, the Indo-Pacific is not an institution, it is a strategic concept. However, there is no single, well-articulated strategy of the Indo-Pacific; indeed, it is an emerging concept. Like-minded countries can cooperate with each other under the banner of the Indo-Pacific as far as their interests and the principles they uphold overlap. As India and Japan share large interests in restoring and preserving the peace and stability of the entire region, the imperative of bilateral security cooperation is inevitable and its potential is enormous.

Finally, in spite of the indisputability of the maritime domain's interconnected character, the importance of the Indian Ocean could not be overstated. Looking back at history, one can say that Japan was opened to the world in the mid-nineteenth century through the Indian Ocean because both Commodore Mathew Perry and Townsend Harris sailed over from the U.S. to Japan; this was done not across the Pacific, but through the Indian Ocean. Before arriving in Japan, Commodore Perry had been titled Commander-in-Chief, U.S. "East India" Squadron. During the Napoleonic War in Europe, even half a century in advance of Commodore Perry's voyage to Japan, the Dutch "East India" Company had contracted neutral American vessels to avoid British interference with their Nagasaki trade.

Policy Recommendations –

Alongside the rise of China and Africa, Mr. Tokuchi stressed that we must remember that the weight of India in the Indo-Pacific is much greater than the weight of the U.S. in the concept of the Asia Pacific. Stemming from this, Mr. Tokuchi touched upon how we could capitalize on the rise of India, as well as the rise of the greater Indian Ocean Region, and also how we should capitalize on the institutionalization of security and military relations between India and Japan.

The "Indo-Pacific" is instrumental to highlight the strategic importance of the South China Sea as the nexus of the two oceans. This point is worthy of mention particularly today, now that the political momentum to condemn China's disregard of the rules-based maritime order of the South China Sea is being lost. As such it would be important for both India and Japan to promote security and military cooperation and operationalize the common region of the free and open Indo-Pacific region. To highlight these possibilities, Mr. Tokuchi brought out two policy recommendations.

First, the South China Sea is not just about territorial disputes or about China and the Philippines. The South China Sea is a testing ground for the basic norm of international law: "Agreements are binding." Thus, unwavering efforts to keep the issue alive and to raise China's reputation cost are a must. In this regard, those who uphold the rule of law must watch out for China's assertion that more than 100,000 merchant ships pass through the South China Sea every year and that none has ever run into any difficulty with freedom of navigation. Advocates of the rules-based order must unite in disclosing the fallacy of this bogus argument.

The second important recommendation put forth by Mr. Tokuchi was with regard to crisis management. He stressed that workable mechanisms for crisis management at sea should be established as competition which possibly turns to confrontation is inevitable. From a whole-of-government perspective, both military and law enforcement organizations must be involved in a larger inclusive mechanism for crisis management at sea. In this context, collaboration between Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) and Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) would be worthy of exploring in pursuing such an inclusive mechanism. Expertise of the two symposiums, including WPNS's expertise on Code forUnplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES) should be fully shared and effectively utilized.

Finally, in conclusion Mr. Tokuchi touched upon the issue of non-proliferation. He stated that when we discuss the Indo-Pacific, the major point of concentration is always China. However, it is also important to understand that one of the main viewpoints on FOIP from Japan is on non-proliferation, particularly with regards to North Korean actions. If one looks at the Indo-Pacific maps, it can be seen that the North Korean Nuclear issue is marginalized, and this is not good. Thus, when dealing with the Indo-Pacific it would be beneficial to focus on non-proliferation issues, as well as maritime issues.

Titli Basu

Ms. Basu began her presentation by stating that Prime Minister Abe's strategy of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific has created space for India in Japan's grand strategic vision. As such, India has been identified as one of the key variables. There has been alignment between India and Japan regarding their interests in their action oriented partnership. Given the regional fluidity in terms of geopolitics and geo-economics, alongside the uncertainty that is present today, these two democracies have engaged in forward thinking in terms of how to shape this regional order.

Ms. Basu stressed that Maritime security has been one of the key identified areas of cooperation and both countries have focused on joint trainings, HA/DR, joint exercises etc. The shared responsibility in protecting the Sea Lanes of Communication by both states, is one of the primary goals in maritime cooperation.

Further, Ms. Basu highlighted that there is also a robust institutional framework between both states. The 2+2 has been upgraded to the ministerial level, there is an annual defense dialogue, NSA level dialogues, robust exchanges between the three services and there is also a robust maritime affairs dialogue that deals with both traditional and non-traditional issues. Beyond the bilateral framework, India and Japan are also engaged in trilateral frameworks with the U.S. and Australia.

Addressing the operational part of it, Ms. Basu stated that India and Japan are currently negotiating the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), which is a good step in terms of reciprocal support for logistics. There is also the MALABAR exercise which Japan became a regular member of in 2015 and the Japan-India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX).

Defense technology cooperation

Ms. Basu stated that India is trying to add more qualitative depth into cooperation with Japan, and defense technology cooperation is one key area. India's Make in India initiative converges with the security policy orientation that is unfolding in Japan. India has identified Japan as a privileged partner in this Make in India program. Further, India's former Defense Minister has stated that Defense Technology cooperation holds the potential to become a key pillar in the India-Japan bilateral partnership.

Adding to this, Ms. Basu highlighted that the industry lobby from the India Japan Business Forum and the Keidanren's policy papers have also consistently argued in favor of high technology cooperation in the defense sector.

India is one of the largest importers of defense equipment, catering for almost 13 percent of the global share. India is also pursuing defense modernization and is simultaneously looking to diversify its sources of acquisition. As such, Japan has emerged as a partner and India looks to Japan to source high end technology.

However, when dealing with Japan, Ms. Basu cautioned that India has to keep certain sensitivities in mind. For example, there are certain cultural differences. When India pursues arms trade, it approaches it as a buyer-seller type of model. However, the Japanese side pursues arms trade through the prism of the larger security conceptualization of Japan's policy of being a proactive contributor to peace. Hence, when one assess the three principles for transfer of defense technology and cooperation, there are certain limits, despite easing of laws. This needs to be navigated cautiously.

Ms. Basu stated that if we study Japan, it can be seen that Japan is slowly emerging from their decades old arms export ban which started during the 1960s. Japan is also trying to operate in a complicated military industrial complex that is present in the market.

Japan also has a robust manufacturing base and is a repository for dual use technologies. However, with regards to how Japan operates in the arms market, since they are relatively new, there issues regarding economies of scale, as well as an hiatus problem.

Regarding the former, cost competitiveness is an issue, especially when trying to sell technologies to developing markets such as India or Southeast Asia. One of the reasons why Japanese equipment is relatively more expensive compared to their European counterparts is that there are plenty of structural constraints on the Japanese defense industry. For example, before 2014, the defense industry in Japan was solely catering to the needs of its Self Defense Forces. Thus, the quantum of procurement was quite low, and this added to the cost of production.

Regarding the later, i.e., the hiatus problem – since coming out of its hiatus in the 1960s, the first deal Japan tried to make was with Australia regarding the possible sale of Japanese submarines. However, this was mainly based on Abe's close personal rapport with former Australian PM Abbot. It was this more of a political deal. As there was a turn of events when Turnbull succeeded Abbot, questions began to be raised as to whether this deal would actually create jobs for Australians. As the deal eventually fell through, Ms. Basu believes that Japan did learn a lot from this.

This can be seen from Japan's 2014 Japans defense production and industrial base strategy, which addresses how Japan can get back into the competitive of element of the defense market through joint production and co-development. Joint production and co-development has been the pattern adopted by all global competitors. In this strategy, Japan identifies several countries with which Japan is looking to pursue joint ventures with in terms of developing technologies. Here, the U.S., EU, UK, France, Australia and India are identified.

Concluding her talk, Ms. Basu state that there are institutional structures to facilitate Japan-India joint technological cooperation in the defense sector. For example, there is a working group on defense technology equipment cooperation, a dialogue between ATLA and DRDO, and the India-Japan defense industry forum which came about in 2017. The idea is for either country to come together and understand each other's defense industries and sectors, and identify the requirements of each.

However, Ms. Basu stressed that it would be wise not to immediately focus on big ticket items such as submarines. Instead, India and Japan should first pursue joint cooperation on smaller technologies such as surveillance radars.

India-US-Japan Defense Cooperation: What's next?
Satoru Nagao

Dr. Nagao's presentation focused on the defense cooperation between India-U.S. – Japan. Since the 2000s, India-U.S.-Japan security cooperation has intensified quite significantly, and developed over the years. However, one must ask what should the next steps be? In answering this question, Dr. Nagao posed three sub-questions, i.e., (1) What is the purpose of India-U.S.-Japan security cooperation? (2) How can we achieve that purpose? (3) What problems might get in the way of greater cooperation?

What is the purpose of India-U.S.-Japan security cooperation?

Dr. Nagao stated that the immediate answer is China!

India-U.S.-Japan security cooperation has advanced in the aftermath of problems with China. Maintaining a military balance to counter China's expansion is a top priority of all three countries and cannot be overlooked. For example, if India cooperates with the U.S. and Japan, it will create a bulwark against Chinese fighter jet superiority because China would be likely to keep some of its fighter jets in the east to counter the U.S. and Japan, and vice versa.

Second, if India has the required will and capabilities, the U.S. and Japan will be able to release themselves from the heavy burden of safeguarding security in the Indian Ocean and can deploy more military forces in the East China Sea and South China Sea to maintain a military balance.

Third, if India, the U.S., and Japan collaborate successfully, they can support countries around the South China Sea more effectively. Creating a situation that maintains military balance in the region will be the purpose of this defense cooperation.

In order to achieve these goals, what needs to be done?

Dr. Nagao argued that with the aim to maintain a military balance against China, there are three methods that can be adopted. First, the three countries should coordinate their political messages. What happened in the Doklam incident in 2017 was a good example. When Indo-China border tension rose on August 15, the Japanese ambassador to India, Kenji Hiramatsu, stated that no side should seek to change the status quo by force. This remark signaled unequivocal support for India and Bhutan. Similarly, after the Pulwama terrorist attack in India on February 14, 2019, the White House issued a statement calling on Pakistan "to end immediately the support and safe haven provided to all terrorist groups operating on its soil." This statement indicated that the US stands with India in condemning Pakistan. If India, the US, and Japan can coordinate their political messages toward China or Pakistan, their stances will be stronger and more effective.

Second, India, the U.S., and Japan can coordinate military activities against China. If we try such a collaboration, India, the US, and Japan might coordinate more deeply and build more trust going forward. Can we do that successfully? India and the US, and India and Japan have already signed bilateral agreements to share sensitive information (General Security of Military Information Agreements, or GSOMIA). During the Doklam incident, the US provided information to India regarding the movements of Chinese armed forces. The US has also provided information related to Chinese submarine activities in the Indian Ocean.

The US and India have already signed two agreements related to logistics (the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement, or LEMOA) and secure communications (the Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement, or COMCASA). And now India and Japan are negotiating a logistics support agreement (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, or ACSA).

Building military-related infrastructure is also useful for security cooperation. For example, Japan is investing in a strategic road-building project in northeast India, and in the future Japan will also coordinate on Andaman and Nicobar Island projects.

Third, the three countries should share equipment and infrastructure to strengthen their long-term relationship. To do so, India, the U.S., and Japan should increase arms trade and implement joint weapons-development projects. In the case of India and the U.S., India has already imported equipment such as transport planes, helicopters, and airlift howitzers related to the creation of the 17 Corps of the Indian Army. The Indian Navy has also imported anti-submarine equipment such as P-8 anti-submarine patrol planes. In the case of India and Japan, the agreement for cooperative research on the Visual Simultaneous Localization and Mapping (SLAM) Based Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Augmentation Technology for UGV/robotics, signed in July 2018, represents the first collaborative research arrangement between the two defense ministries. And Japan has long sought a ShinMaywa US-2 amphibious plane deal with the Indian Navy. According to Dr. Nagao this is a good step.

In addition, if India and the U.S. start joint development of a sea-based missile defense system, it is expected that Japan will join, because Japan develops important parts for the system. This would be the first India-U.S.-Japan joint development project.

What are the problems that might get in the way of stronger cooperation?

Dr. Nagao pointed out that both India and Japan have problems to overcome. In the case of India, because its defense relationship with Russia is still strong, the U.S. and Japan have hesitated to share sensitive military technology with it. For example, Japan was reluctant to export Soryu-class submarines to India because these submarines are its main line of defense against Russia. India also tends to spend too long deciding on important military matters. The GSOMIA, LEMOA and COMCASA negotiation with the U.S., took India more than 14 years to conclude the agreement.

In the case of Japan, there are a number of issues as well. For a long time, Japan has tried to avoid intervening in foreign conflicts, and the Japanese government has not possessed enough capability to obtain the necessary information to decide its stance. Even if Japan were to intervene, there would be another problem. Because Japan's armed forces do not have offensive and power-projection capabilities, its diplomatic choices are very limited.

Also, because Japan government has not exported weapons for a long time, there is no export system in place. And the Japanese defense industry does not have any real motivation to export. Currently, less than 10 percent of the total income of each company comes from the defense sector. Under such a situation, companies are not reliant on arms exports to increase their income. In addition, the cost of Japan's defense equipment is too high to be competitive in the international market. These weak points can potentially limit coordination between India, the US, and Japan.

Conclusion: How should we solve the problem?

Finally, in concluding his presentation, Dr. Nagao asked how should we solve the problem?

In the case of India, it is obvious that it needs to increase the speed of military modernization. But at the same time, the three countries should still coordinate on emergency scenarios and hold joint exercises. In addition, to improve its weapons development capability, India needs to draw on its considerable pool of high-level scientific talent (both domestic and Non-Resident Indian).

In the case of Japan, it is seeking to join the Five Eyes intelligence alliance with the U.S., U.K., Canada, Australia and New Zealand in order to increase its access to sensitive information. To increase its offensive capability and power-projection capability, Japan decided to modify its Izumo-class helicopter carriers to be small aircraft carriers. Since 2017, these Izumo-class aircraft carriers have come to the Indian Ocean every year to train with the Indian Navy. Even if these small aircraft carriers do not give Japan enough power-projection capability, dispatching an aircraft carrier can show Japan's national will in times of crisis.

Lastly, Japan has had little success trying to sell expensive arms to other countries, so it should use the Official Development Assistance system to donate its equipment first. After that, Japan will gain insight and know-how about selling weapons. Perhaps in the near future Japan can create a defense company where 100 percent of income comes from the defense sector. And Japan also can use dual-use technologies to strengthen relations with India and the U.S.

Q&A and Comments

A member of the audience started the discussion by making two clarifications. First, he pointed out that donating defense/military equipment to other countries under the title of ODA is not possible, as it would not be classified as ODA. Australia in the past has tried to do the same thing, but was unsuccessful. Second, there was also never a direct commitment by the Australian government for the Japanese submarines.

Professor Kesavan commented on Mr. Tokuchi's reference to non-proliferation in the Indo-Pacific. He highlighted that every joint communique statement made by the Government of India from 2015 onwards has indeed mentioned the importance of denuclearization as well as the importance of non-proliferation in the region. The one issued in 2017 was actually a very strong statement regarding this.

Rebutting this point, Mr. Tokuchi pointed out that statements by the three countries, i.e, Australia, Japan and the U.S., specifically mention North Korea. However, India does not make a specific reference to North Korea, although it may mention denuclearization and non-proliferation. Furthermore, from the statements released after the Quadrilateral dialogue consultations, it can be seen that India does not make any mention on Freedom of Navigation.

Q. Is there a specific reason that India does not mention Freedom of Navigation in the statement issued after the Quadrilateral dialogue? Is there a certain connotation that can be gauged?

Ms. Basu pointed out that regarding the Quad statements, there are several inconsistencies with the statements from all four Quad nations, and not just India's statement. For example, Japan's statement made no mention of connectivity. And addressing these inconsistencies in all countries statements would be important in shaping a coherent dialogue on the Indo-Pacific region.

Q. What are the opportunities for Japan to invest in the Defense industry? Especially since the rules have been made more flexible in recent years.

Ms. Basu stated that with regard to general investments India is trying to improve the investment climate. However, when it comes to defence investments in India, on many occasions due to the complexity of offset policies and the fact that they happen in so many different ways, the Japanese could get very confused. This can make negotiations very difficult.

Adding to this discussion on defence procurement between India and Japan, an audience member made two comments. First, is understanding the procedures and policies, for example, with offsets. The Indian procurement system is complicated, however, there is a method in the madness. There are issues regarding transparency, which cannot be negated. The Japanese side was welcoming to sit down with the Indian side to go through these policies and procedures, and this is key to breaking through these challenges.

Second, is with regard to Japan's sanctions, and their unwillingness to give out technologies. To address this, if the Japanese side could decide in advance as to what things they are ready to business with India on, this would be helpful. The issue is that the Indian system asks for an RFI or an RFC and gives you four weeks to respond. And four weeks is generally not sufficient for a country to provide their stance. Thus, if there were pre-approvals, this would ease the process.

Finally, Ms. Chotani commented that there was no mention of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which in more recent years has become very important part of India-Japan cooperation. While previous statements such as the 2016 statement did not make any reference to ‘smart islands', more recent statements such as the one in 2018 have indeed mentioned this concept. However, there is no clarity on what smart islands actually entail, and this is something important to question.

Additionally, in terms of Maritime Domain Awareness, or the possibility of evolving the recently signed ACSA between India and Japan, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands could play a key role in improving interoperability between either nation by providing a good logistical support base.

Dinner Session: The Future of India-Japan Relations

Nobuyuki Hiraizumi

The Dinner session was hosted by the SSDP for dialogue speakers. During this session, Mr. Nobuyuki Hiraizumi, Chairman of the Kajima Institute of International Peace gave a presentation on the ‘Future of India-Japan relations'.

A brief introduction to KIIP

The KIIP was established in 1966 by Mr. Hiraizumi's grandfather, Dr. Morinosuke Kajima. He was a former Diplomat, Member of Parliament and Kajima Corporations Chairman. Alarmed that Japan was at the forefront of the cold war, and in order for Japan to avoid that situation were going to actual war again, Dr. Kajima launched this institution with his own fund.

Succeeding Dr. Kajima in 1982 was his son-in-law, Mr. Wataru Hiraizumi. Once again, a former diplomat and member of parliament. Upon his death in 2015, Mr. Mobuyuki Hiraizumi succeeded his father and was elected Chairman of the KIIP. With no prior experience as a policy maker, Mr. Hiraizumi's goal for the KIIP is to look for good ideas, and channels to promote those ideas. As such, KIIP supports a number of projects -

Moving forward, Mr. Hiraizumi quoted Jawaharlal Nehru, from his historic speech on the eve of India's independence in 1947 – he stated that India is on the cusp of a "tryst with destiny". Explaining the reference to this quote with the help of the graph in figure 1, Mr. Hiraizumi stated that the graph highlights that for the first time in 200 years Asia is going to take over Western Europe. As can be seen, India is overtaking the UK this year and Germany and France in a few years, and by 2028, India would catch up with Japan.

Figure 1
Source - U.S. Department of Agriculture

Further, as demonstrated by GDP data, it has become clear that Japan has stagnated. Alongside this, another big change that can be seen if one studies the global top ten firms in market capital (figure 2) is that Japanese firms are no longer in the top ten. For example, in 1989, at least seven Japanese companies were amongst the top ten firms. Fast forward to 2018, none of Japanese companies remain, with only Toyota in 35th place, and we can also see the entry of two Chinese firms in the top ten. In these thirty years, there has been such a significant change – as Mr. Hiraizumi stated, Japan "lost 30 years of the Heisei era both in a micro and in a macro".

Figure 2
Source: Author

In reflecting these significant changes, Mr. Hiraizumi assessed Japan's life cycle, which he divided into two phases –

  1. Meiji restoration – during this period the stated goal was amendment of an unequal treaty with the super powers of that time. Japan was successful in amending the Unequal Treaty. Japan, however, pushed into the devastating wars after victories against China and Russia.
  2. Post the second world war, saw Japan aiming to build its economy once again by exporting manufactured good. Thirty years later, the success of Japan's economic growth was captured by American historian, Ezra Vogel, in his book "Japan as number one". Then Japan went through a phase where an economic bubble was formed. However, in 1992, this bubble burst. Since then, Japan's economy has been in the doldrums.

A reflection of these phases led Mr. Hiraizumi to conclude that Japan needs a new strategy; it needs a new scenario. The phase of the Meiji restoration saw the creation of a centralized nation state for the first time. The post second World War phase, saw Japan successfully import democracy. 70 years later, is it possible to ask if this is the time for an Indian cycle?

Japan has to now survive China and U.S. at the same time, and this has never been the case before. As it is impossible to challenge both at the same time, Mr. Hiraizumi argued that Japan would need to hedge bets. In doing so, Japan could learn a lot from India.

Further, if you look at the complementarities, both India and Japan are a perfect match. That is, what India is good at, Japan is not, and vice-versa. One key example is, Japan is looking for places to invest, and India is looking for investment.


Q. India needs investments while Japan can provide it – what are the obstacles to this? How has Kajima corporation been trying to challenge these obstacles or trying to invest?

Mr. Hiraizumi argued that when it comes to investments, the problem in India is one that is deeply rooted. To illustrate this, he introduced the concept of an –ism, that is anything that is related to an –ism is a philosophy which cannot be bought and sold because, it becomes a way which is adhered too. It then becomes as obstacle if this -ism is not shared with anyone else, as getting involved in trading becomes difficult. And this is what is deeply rooted in India.

(This report was made by Ms. Vindu Mai Chotani, Ph.D. Student, Graduate School of Public Policy, Tokyo University, Tokyo; Visiting Associate, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. The secretary of the SSDP is responsible for this paper.)

Annex 1: Dialogue Programme

2:45 – 4:00 p.m. | Session 1: India-Japan cooperation in the Indo-Pacific
Tsuneo Watanabe • Toru Ito • Abhijit Singh • Vindu Mai Chotani • K.V. Kesavan (Chair)

4:15 – 5:30 p.m. | Session 2: India-Japan defence cooperation
Hideshi Tokuchi • Satoru Nagao • Titli Basu • Masahiro Akiyama (Chair)

6:30 – 8:30 p.m. | Session 3: The Future of India-Japan Relations
Nobuyuki Hiraizumi • Tsuneo Watanabe (Chair)

Annex 2: List of Speakers

Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow, ORF

Hideshi Tokuchi, Senior Fellow, The National Graduate Institute for Policy studies (GRIPS)

K.V. Kesavan, Distinguished Fellow, ORF

Masahiro Akiyama, President, Society of Security and Diplomatic Policy Studies (SSDP), Former Vice Defense Secretary

Satoru Nagao, Visiting Fellow, Hudson Institute

Titli Basu, Research Associate, Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses (IDSA)

Tsuneo Watanabe, Senior Fellow, Sasakawa Peace Foundation

Toru Ito, Associate Professor, National Defense Academy of Japan

Vindu Mai Chotani, Ph.D. candidate, The University of Tokyo

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