proposal

Assessment of Russia's Military Strength, Stockpiles, and Defense Production Base: Evaluating Russia's Capability to Continue Warfare

Yu Koizumi

Introduction

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has already gone on for more than two and a half years. The termination of this war will depend largely on political factors; it is not easy to predict.

This paper focuses on a factor easier to measure quantitatively, namely Russia's capability to continue warfare, and examines how long Russia could carry it on. Specifically, it will discuss Russia's military strength, including its ability to mobilize reserves, its stockpile of weapons and ammunition, and related production/ maintenance capacities. That said, the scope of any examination is broad. Therefore, this paper has chosen and discussed topics, where information is relatively easy to obtain.

Soldier Replenishment and Troop Losses

According to the 2021 edition of The Military Balance, published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Russian Federation Armed Forces (referred from here to as the "Russian military" or "Russian forces") was estimated to have an actual strength of about 900,000 troops before the outbreak of the current war (as of early 2021). Given that Russia had set the number of its soldiers at around one million1 and released a 92-93% fill rate,2 this Military Balance estimate seems to be close enough. According to the Military Balance assessment, the Russian ground forces that were to play a central role in the 2022 aggression on Ukraine consisted of 280,000 army troops, 45,000 airborne troops (a Russian military branch independent of the army), and 35,000 naval infantry troops (the Marines in other countries)―a total of 360,000 troops. The 2021 edition of The Military Balance also estimated the number of citizens who had completed their military service in the past five years and were in the reserves at approximately two million.

After the Russian aggression on Ukraine began in 2022, and when signs of a prolonged war emerged, contrary to Russia's initial blitz strategy, the above situation surrounding Russian forces underwent notable changes. First, the Russian military upsized significantly: Presidential Decree No. 575 of August 25, 2022 decided to increase the strength from January 1, 2023 to 1,156,628, and Presidential Decree No. 915 of December 1, 2023 renewed the strength to 1,320,000 (effective on the same day as the announcement). Thus, the Russian military's strength increased by nearly 310,000 in less than two years after the outbreak of the war. In short, successive measures were taken to address the shortage of soldiers.

What about the Russian military's actual strength? According to President Vladimir Putin, the partial mobilization order issued in September 2022 covered 300,000, while an additional 18,000 volunteers were recruited by October 2022.3 This is the only mobilization decree issued by the Russian government up to the time of this writing. Therefore, the number of volunteers matters when considering troop sufficiency in 2023 and beyond, but there are discrepancies between different speakers on this matter. For example, in February 2024, then-Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu told the TASS news agency that 540,000 volunteers had been recruited during 2023,4 while Putin mentioned a rather different figure of "more than 300,000."5

In 2024, Dmitry Medvedev, Vice Chairman of the National Security Council (former President), made a similar remark that 190,000 men were recruited during the "first few months" of the year.6 If we trust these statements, Russia has replenished 800,000-1,000,000 new troops by mid-2024.

What matters more is how much damage Russia has so far incurred in the Ukraine war. According to a joint survey conducted by the Russian online media "Mediazona" and the BBC, the estimated number of Russian war dead was 61,831 as of early August 2024, while estimates of excess male mortality suggest that about twice that number (about 120,000) may have been killed in the war.7 The US Department of Defense also estimates human losses of Russian forces (killed and wounded combined) at between 462,000 and 728,000, based on the assumption that three to four times as many seriously wounded as killed will occur with standard battlefield medicine of a modern military.8

Should we subtract the above estimates of human losses from the sum of the number of the ground troops Russia had before the war began (360,000) and the number of replenishment soldiers recruited after the outbreak of the war (800,000-1,000,000), we will have the figure 450,000-900,000. However, the gap is too large to help estimate the current Russian ground forces.9 The 2024 edition of The Military Balance estimates the Russian ground forces in early 2024 to be 560,000 (army 500,000; airborne 35,000 and naval infantry 25,000), but this too cannot serve as more than an estimate.

The Russian Military's Ability to Train and Command Soldiers

Another topic to consider is Russia's ability to train and command mobilized/volunteer soldiers. According to estimates by the Estonian Ministry of Defense, Russia can train 130,000 recruits every six months (260,000 per year) unless otherwise hindered for some reasons. Conversely, any number of soldiers exceeding the limit would have to be put into actual combat, lacking sufficient military training. The Estonian Ministry of Defense also estimates that as the war with Ukraine continues, the Russian military's soldier training capacity has dropped to about 40,000 men every six months. Furthermore, the same Ministry assesses that soldiers exceeding the limit number of 40,000 could not acquire enough skills, which qualify them to be deployed in offensive operations, and will only serve as "rapidly expendable gap fillers" to compensate for attrition.10

On top of this, the pace of increase in the Russian military's mobilized/volunteer soldiers is not commensurate with the pace of improvement in its command ability. More specifically, there is the likelihood of a shortage of junior officers.

Until the 2000s, the Russian military had a massive officer corps to ensure command ability to address large-scale emergency mobilization. For example, when then-Defense Minister Anatoly Serzhukov launched major military reforms in 2008, the officer corps had a strength of 355,000 officers (an actual strength of 315,000). Given that the Russian military at that time had a strength of 1,134,800, it had a top-heavy personnel structure, in which officers accounted for more than 30% of the whole.

In the large officer corps, the number of junior officers (mainly company grade officers) who were to command platoons and companies was about 140,000, while the majority of the remainder were senior officers (and 1,100-odd general officers). In Serzhkov's words, the officer corps was structured "like an egg" with a bulge in the middle.11

The reason why there were more senior officers than junior officers, meant to directly address contingencies, was the assumption that junior officers would be replenished with reserve officers in an emergency. At that time, 21% of all Russian military officers (30% for the army) were civilian reserve officers who entered military service after completing a college reserve officer program.12 It was assumed that reserve officers would command reserve soldiers mobilized in an emergency and that the former would be supported by about 140,000 warrant officers (прапорщик).13

However, Serzhkov's military reforms drastically reduced room for reinforcing emergency command ability. Those reforms presupposed that Russia was unlikely to counter a major war in the foreseeable future that would require a large-scale mobilization of reserve soldiers. As a result, he diminished the officer corps to 150,000 men. As for company-grade officers, lieutenants and junior lieutenants increased by 10,000. On the other hand, captains and above were drastically reduced, and the civilian- and warrant-officer systems were abolished. Later, in response to backlash from the military, the officer corps was increased to a strength of 220,000, and the warrant-officer system was restored—the civilian officer system was not.

Serzhkov's Plan to Streamline the Russian Officer Corps
Rank As of 2008* Streamlining Goals by 2012*
General Officers 1,107 886
Colonel 25,665 9,114
Major 99,550 2,5000
Captain 90,000 40,000
Lieutenant, Junior Lieutenant 50,000 60,000

Prepared by the Author based on Гаврилов, op. cit., 2008.

* The figures cited above are only those mentioned in Гаврилов's article. Therefore, the sum of these figures is not identical to the actual number of officers at the respective points in time.

The above constitute the reasons for the speculation that the Russian military lacks command ability. As long as the reserve officer program continues, it must be possible to mobilize officers from among civilians. Yet, the General Staff's Organization and Mobilization Directorate were quick to announce that those who had completed the reserve officer program would not be eligible for mobilization in the 2022 partial mobilization.14 As noted above, the replenishment of troops since 2023 has been implemented through the recruitment of volunteer soldiers, which, however, does not seem to have contributed much to the replenishment of officers. Meanwhile, more than 3,800 Russian officers have thus far been killed in action. Applying the above death/wounded ratio to the death toll, more than 10,000 officers may have withdrawn from active service.15 The above may account for testimony from captured Russian soldiers to the effect that they had no platoon leader to command them.

New Production Capacity for Armored Combat Vehicles and Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) Performance

It is well known that Russian forces suffered significant equipment losses during the two and a half years of the ongoing war. As of the end of August 2024, Russia's equipment losses confirmed by satellite image analysis were enormous―3,337 tanks, 4,457 infantry fighting vehicles, 480 armored personnel carriers, and 1,518 other armored fighting vehicles.16

It is no doubt impossible to replenish these losses with new productions alone. Taking tank production for example, Ural Vagon Zavod (UVZ) in Nizhny Tagil is the only company currently producing new tanks in Russia. Yet, its production capacity is only 120-180 cars per year as of mid-2023.17 If the number of newly produced tanks had doubled due to increased wartime production, it would still be 240-360 cars per year, far short of making up for annual average losses of over 1,300 cars. Another tank manufacturer (currently undertaking repair and refurbishment work), Omsktransmash (OTM), is reportedly planning to resume the production of T-80 series tanks.18 But even if the company could achieve the same level of production capacity as UVZ, Russia's total new tank production will be 500-700 cars per year at maximum (and it will take several years to reach this level). A similar situation applies to the production of infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers.

Consequently, for the Russian military to maintain a proper equipment ratio of armored fighting vehicles in the future, the following is relevant: (1) the maintenance capability to maintain existing weapons in good condition, (2) the capability to retrieve and repair weapons damaged on the battlefield and redeploy them again to active service, and (3) the overhaul capability to return weapons in reserve storage to active service. These performance indicators, collectively called MRO (maintenance, repair, and overhaul), are positioned as one of the cardinal elements of military logistics19 but are extremely difficult to quantify. MRO performance depends largely on such elements hard to comprehend without access to military intelligence as the amount of military engineering equipment, including tank recovery vehicles, and its operational skills, and the capacities and labor productivity of repair and overhaul plants.

Nonetheless, at an enlarged meeting of the Board of the Russian Ministry of Defense held at the end of 2023, Defense Minister Shoigu reported that compared to February 2022, the "productions" of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers had increased by 5.6, 3.6, and 3.5 times, respectively.20 However, it is unrealistic to anticipate such an increase in new production capacity in a short time; therefore, the actual increase should have included overhauling old vehicles kept in reserve storage and redeploying them to active service. This view is endorsed by Shoigu's statement in the latter half of his report that 1,530 "newly produced, modernized, or refurbished" tanks, 2,518 infantry fighting vehicles, and armored personnel carriers were deployed in Russian forces. If these figures are reliable, Russia can compensate for combat losses (at least in numbers) through new production and by returning weapons kept in reserve storage to active service.

Volumes of Weapons in Reserve Storage

What is the volume of Russia's reserve weapons?

The Russian Army has not discarded retired armored fighting vehicles and artillery but has rather adopted a system of storing them in facilities called the Repair and Storage Base for Reserve Equipment (BKhRVT) and the Reserve Tank Storage Base (TsBRT). Taking tanks for example, the 2017 and previous editions of The "Military Balance" estimate that the Russian military had 17,500 cars in reserve (2,800 T-55s, 2,500 T-62s, 2,000 T-64A/Bs, 7,000 T-72/72A/Bs, 3,000 T-80B/BV/Us, and 200 T-90s). Together with the 2,700 cars in active service (1,100 T-72B/BAs, 800 T-72B3s, 350 T-80BV/Us, and 350 T-90/90As), the total was estimated to be just under 20,000 cars. Meanwhile, in the 2018 and subsequent editions of The Military Balance, the first/second generation tanks of T-55, T-62, and T-64A/B are no longer counted as reserves; instead, only the third generation tanks of T-72, T-80, and T-90, just over 10,000 in total, are considered to be in reserve storage.

However, since the Russian aggression on Ukraine began, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) has confirmed that not only 3rd generation tanks but also 1st/2nd generation tanks have been returned to active service and into actual combat. As these old-fashioned tanks are considered to have deteriorated to a great extent, it would be impossible to return all similar tanks in storage to active service. Should mechanical parts of deteriorated tanks be used for repairing ones in tolerable conditions, the make-shift measures, coupled with new productions, could help continue supplying Russian forces with about 1,500 tanks annually for several years. High-resolution satellite imagery of BKhRVTs/TsBRT in Russia's Eastern Military District confirms that numerous tanks and other armored fighting vehicles have disappeared from these facilities.21

Stockpile and Supply of Firepower Projection Means and Artillery Ammunition

Finally, we will examine firepower projection means and the stockpile and supply of artillery shells, which support the firepower of Russian forces.

As of 2021, before the current war began, The Military Balance estimated that Russian forces possessed more than 5,689 firepower projection means (howitzers, mortars, multiple rocket launchers, etc.). The number of firepower projection means lost after the outbreak of the war was estimated at 1,623,22 suggesting that about 70% of them have survived. Given additional productions and the return to active service of reserve weapons until today, it is hard to believe that there is a significant shortage of firepower projection means.

In addition, Russia's munition production capacity to supply artillery shells and rockets for use in these firepower projection means is quite high. In the first year of the ongoing war, Russia produced two million artillery and rocket rounds and fired 10 million rounds in one year, including its stockpile.23 Estimates released by the Estonian Ministry of Defense at the end of 2023 put Russia's annual shell production capacity at 3.5 million rounds, predicting that it would reach 4.5 million rounds in 2024.24

Nonetheless, even if the above estimates are correct, Russia cannot maintain an annual shelling capacity of 10 million rounds on its own. This may explain why Russia began importing North Korean artillery shells around the summer of 2023. The number of artillery shells and rockets that Russia acquired from North Korea during the rest of the year is estimated to have reached just under five million.25 Conversely, Russia's firepower projection ability depends heavily on North Korea's artillery shell supply capacity; in this context, there is no reliable information to judge whether North Korea achieved this massive supply of five million shells through a temporary drawdown of its stockpile or because the country could continue to provide a stable supply to Russia. US officials state that the number of shells fired by Russian forces has decreased to around 10,000 per day in 2024; if this is true, Russia may not maintain the capacity to supply as many shells as at the beginning of the war.26

Lastly, the supply capacity of artillery barrels will matter for the Russian artillery to continue to work. The longevity of artillery barrels possessed by Russian forces is not manifest. An artillery barrel's estimated accuracy life is ordinarily several thousand rounds, or about 20,000 rounds at most. For Russian forces to continue to wield firepower of the same level as at the beginning of the war, many replacement barrels will be needed. However, in today's Russia, only two factories can manufacture them, each with an annual production capacity of about 100 pieces.27 Reportedly, Russian forces are removing artillery barrels from old equipment in reserve storage to fill the shortage. Yet, it is unclear how much longer the life of firepower projection means could be extended by doing so.

Conclusion

The above discussion may lead to the following conclusion.

First, the Russian military appears to be capable of maintaining its current force size over the next several years. Due to the limitations of their skills and command ability, the quality of individual soldiers and their operational ability on a unit basis are likely to become very low, except in some elite units; yet, as seen from the battles of Bakhmut and Avdiivka, Russian forces tend to pay little regard to troop losses. The behavior pattern of Russian forces in this war has been to exhaust Ukrainian forces and capture strongholds at the cost of enormous troop losses. Given the above, Russia will maintain its capability to carry on warfare as long as its current force size is secured.

Second, Russia's weapon and artillery shell production capacity is very high. Its wartime production increase has been largely successful, and its production volumes far exceed those of the United States and the West. However, this production capacity is supplemented by the redeployment of reserve weapons to active service and procurement from foreign countries. There are also bottlenecks like artillery barrel production. Although there is no mention in this report, Russia depends substantially on the West for the supply of mother machines and electronic components, which may constitute a limiting factor for Russia's military-industrial capacity.

Capability to continue warfare is a social and relative question. In other words, the degree to which Russia could tolerate the loss of troops and weapons (damage tolerance) is a question of how far Russian society would accept the Russian government's war (human sacrifices and economic burdens); it is a competition with the limits of damage tolerance on the Ukrainian side, which decide in the same way as on the Russian side. This paper has focused on only one aspect of Russia's capability to continue warfare. It will be necessary to conduct a comprehensive examination again, taking into consideration many-faceted discussions in this issue of Security Studies.

(Associate Professor for RCAST, The University of Tokyo)

(Translation by Tsutomu Inuzuka)

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