proposal

Germany's Arms Assistance for Ukraine:
Has Its Culture of Self-Restraint Been Overcome?

Norihide Miyoshi

This paper will focus on Germany's military assistance for Ukraine. Germany is the most influential country in Europe; European security depends on it. Yet, consideration of the Nazi era from its history has made Germany adopt a self-restrained foreign and security policy. Has the war in Ukraine brought about a change in Germany's behavior?

Major Shift in German Security Policy

Chancellor Olaf Scholz's speech to the Bundestag on February 27, 2022, three days after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, marked a turning point for German politics, as suggested by his repetition of the word "Zeitenwende" (turning point).

Scholz set forth the following new policies: (1) arms assistance for Ukraine, (2) sanctions against Russia, (3) defense spending equal to 2% of GDP, (4) a €100 billion-worth "special asset" for upgrading military equipment, (5) the introduction of the F35 as a tactical nuclear-capable fighter jet, and (6) the promotion of energy security, etc.

Defense spending equal to 2% of GDP and establishing the special asset attracted attention as Germany's first step to its full-scale military buildup since the end of the Cold War. However, arms assistance for Ukraine that Scholz first mentioned was also an epoch-making policy change.

In the post-WWII period, West Germany evolved a foreign policy based on lessons from the devastation wrought on Europe by Nazi Germany. It had two pillars.

The first is multilateral cooperation through dialogue. Post-Cold War Germany enlarged its participation in peacekeeping operations involving the use of force; yet, it held fast to its principle of not providing lethal weapons to countries in conflict.

The second pillar is "Eastern diplomacy," which emphasizes relations with Russia (the Soviet Union) while prioritizing relationships with Western nations as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Germany strengthened relations with Russia along the policy of "change through trade" (Wandel durch Handel)―deepening interdependence will democratize Russia. As a result, the German economy has benefited from the procurement of cheap energy from Russia.

Germany maintained these basic stances in the face of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and aggression in eastern Ukraine. Around the fall of 2021, concerns about a Russian invasion of Ukraine increased, but Germany remained committed to a diplomatic solution.

The crisis deepened into 2022, and the United States, Britain, the Baltic states, and Poland announced their arms support for Ukraine. In response to mounting international pressure, on January 26, German Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht announced the provision of 5,000 helmets for Ukraine, without forgetting to add, "This is equipment, not weapons, but it helps." The response from Ukraine and other countries involved was a disappointment or rather a sneer.

Since Germany clung to "peace diplomacy" and showed consideration for Russia until the last moment before its aggression on February 24, 2022, the full-scale invasion by Russian forces has had all the greater impact on German politics.

Too late as it was, on February 26, Germany announced the first-ever lethal weapons provision to Ukraine of 1,000 anti-tank firearms and 500 Stingers. This was followed by Chancellor Scholz's speech to the Bundestag, cited at the beginning of this paper.

Pressure from the International Community

Germany, supposed to have marked a Zeitenwende in its foreign and security policy, was slow in providing arms support for Ukraine.

The German government began deliberations as pressure mounted at home and internationally. However, time passed due to differing opinions in the ruling coalition parties; in the meantime, pressure increased further as the fighting intensified in Ukraine; finally, the government made a decision―a similar pattern was repeated every time Germany decided on arms aid for Ukraine.

The first question was whether or not to provide heavy weapons that Ukraine strongly requested. Even within the ruling coalition, the Greens and the Free Democratic Party (FDP) favored granting such weapons, while the leftists in Scholz's party, the Social Democratic Party (SPD), opposed, making it difficult to reach a consensus.

Among the countries concerned, an atmosphere in favor of providing full-scale arms assistance for Ukraine, including heavy weapons, grew following a string of developments, including the failure of Russian attacks on Kyiv in March-April 2022 due to Ukrainian resistance and the massacre of civilians by Russian troops in Bucha near Kyiv.

As a leading European state, Germany could no longer afford to be passive; on April 26, 2022, Defense Minister Lambrecht announced the provision of Gepard anti-aircraft artillery systems at a military aid coordination meeting among the countries concerned, held at Ramstein Air Base in southwestern Germany.

This was followed by the German government's announcement of the provision of PzH2000 self-propelled howitzers in May, IRIS-T air defense systems in June, and Mars-II multi-launch rocket systems in July.

In September, after a brief pause, Ukraine sought to regain its lost territory by renewing its request for Western-made tanks. German arms aid to Ukraine entered a new phase.

Again, the German government hesitated for a while. But on January 5, 2023, Scholz finally announced the provision of Marder infantry fighting vehicles and the Patriot surface-to-air missile system, pushed by the announcements of Britain, France, etc., that they would provide tanks of their own making.

On January 25, Scholz reported to the Cabinet about the provision of 14 Leopard II tanks to Ukraine and approved the provision of the same-model tanks to Ukraine by their owner countries. To avoid giving the impression that Germany was outshining other countries in arms aid, Scholz arranged it so that the Leopard II provision coincided with the US provision of M1 Abrams tanks.

Earlier Scholz declared "red lines" that Germany should not cross―the provision of "heavy weapons" and "tanks," but ignored them as circumstances dictated. This behavior drew criticism that "slow decision-making wasted time" (public broadcaster ARD). Nonetheless, a positive assessment may also be possible that Germany eventually showed good flexibility.

In January 2023, Scholz refused to provide F-16 fighter jets, and in April 2024, he declared that he would not grant the long-range cruise missile Taurus either. The German supply of high-quality weapons reached its limits, suggesting that Scholz drew new red lines.

A senior official of the German Foreign Ministry who visited Japan in August 2024 stated that "the attrition war in Ukraine will continue for the time being… Things to happen in a 1-2 year span are unpredictable." He did not deny that the "red lines" could be further reviewed.

Why Was Germany Criticized?

In two and a half years since the start of the Russian invasion, Germany's arms assistance for Ukraine totaled 10.2 billion euros (January 2022-June 2024), second only to the United States in both arms aid and the value of total assistance (Japan was fourth in total amount).

This is a commendable contribution, but actually it was accompanied by harsh criticism that it was "too little too late." Considering political "pacifism" dominant in pre-invasion Germany, the Scholz administration's efforts should be properly evaluated. Yet, in the light of whether German aid has been commensurate with Germany's ability or has led to some breakthrough in the war situation, it could be assessed as insufficient.

It is apparent that the Scholz administration spent much time making necessary decisions; this is presumably the primary reason for its failure to dispel the negative image of indecisive Germany.

Even though administration leadership wants to rush arms assistance, pacifism and pro-Russian sentiments are still deep-seated. The SPD's leftist faction, led by Rolf Mützenich, Chairman of the SPD parliamentary group in the Bundestag, resisted, appealing to fears of conflict escalation and for a solution through diplomatic negotiations. Scholz, who is not the SPD leader and whose administration's power base is weak, has no choice but to consider opinions in his party.

To the contrary, the Greens, also a pacifist party, emphasizes human rights and upholds strong values that distinguish right and wrong; the party believes that the use of force is unavoidable to resolve situations of injustice. The current war, which is nothing other than Russian aggression on Ukraine, is easy to understand in the Greens' worldview. Unsurprisingly, the Greens most ardently claimed arms aid for Ukraine.

Disagreements within the governing parties have often emerged as confrontations between Chancellor Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock (the Greens).

A diplomatic legacy of West Germany that emphasizes cooperation with allies and avoids "going alone" (Alleingang), based on the lessons of the Nazi era, is ingrained in the Scholz administration. The administration made sure not to give Russia the impression that its support for Ukraine was outstanding. This attitude was evident from its request to the United States that the latter should provide American tanks to Ukraine concurrently with Germany's granting of Leopard IIs. This consideration to avoid Alleingang was also responsible for making the administration's decision-making process time-consuming.

Second, Chancellor Scholz's political style matters. Instead of taking the lead in implementing policies through strong leadership, he proceeded cautiously, examining reactions. Scholz has repeatedly warned against the escalation of the ongoing conflict to a NATO-Russia war and especially against Russia's use of nuclear weapons.

Third, the German Constitution stipulates a "debt brake" that circumscribes government borrowing within certain limits; this always serves as a strong constraint on fiscal spending. Moreover, the financial situation in Germany is becoming increasingly stringent; according to German media, the 2024 budget for aid for Ukraine is almost completely used, whereas no additional budgetary measures are available. As a result, the government is considering appropriating Russian-frozen assets as a source of funds. The expansion of arms production will take time, including the construction of new production lines. These constitute another bottleneck that will hinder the enlargement of aid for Ukraine.

Lastly, Germany and Russia have historically a profound relationship (political, economic, and human); although they fought major wars, theirs is an ambivalent relationship mingled with intimacy. Germany may no longer consider President Putin a dialogue partner. But, in the long run, it wants to preserve its relationship with Russia. Germany may be influenced unconsciously by the thought that it should not completely undermine the Russian people's feelings toward Germany.

Germany's Awareness of Its Leading Role

Since the "Ukraine Shock," Germany's foreign and security policy has shifted its emphasis from diplomacy, dialogue, and engagement to military, deterrence, and derisking.

Germany not only increased its military buildup but also provided full-scale military assistance to one of the belligerent parties, breaking the long-standing taboo for post-war Germany. The Ukraine war has no doubt marked a Zeitenwende for Germany.

However, this shift was generally a heteronomous one, under pressure from Ukraine and other countries concerned.

Following the 2009 eurozone crisis, there were arguments that Germany should play a "leading role" (Führungsrolle) in resolving the financial crisis in a manner befitting its national strength. The "reluctant hegemon" was often mentioned to ridicule Germany for its reluctance to play such a role.

The Ukraine war has thus far demonstrated that Germany was not ready to play a leading role on the security front either. The country has not yet dispelled its "reluctance" (Zurückhaltung) stemming from the negative history of Nazi Germany.

However, Foreign Minister Baerbock stated, "As the largest economy in the heart of Europe, Germany bears special responsibility." A sense of crisis about the current state of Germany concerns the German diplomatic community.

These changes in Germany deserve close watch by Japan, which has traced a similar path, currently facing a harsh security environment.

(Served for The Japan News)

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