proposal

The Russia-Ukraine War Viewed from War Termination Theory

Yasuaki Chijiwa

Introduction

The Russian forces invading Ukraine show no signs of withdrawing from the country; on the contrary, Russian President Vladimir Putin conditions the Ukrainian troops' withdrawal from the Russian-occupied Ukrainian territory on a ceasefire. Meanwhile, according to a Ukrainian public opinion poll conducted in June 2024, more than 80% of respondents "disagree" with the Russian ceasefire condition.1

This article aims to discuss what war termination theory could suggest in considering the consequences of this war, based on an analysis of the current situation two and a half years since Russia began its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

War Termination Theory: "The Dilemma between a Fundamental Resolution of Causes of Conflict and a Compromise Peace"

The author thinks wars end in either of the two modes: a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict" or a "compromise peace."2 First, let us look at a war between two warring countries from the perspective of the dominant one because this will facilitate argument as long as wars are a clash of military might.

For the winning belligerent of the war, it may be desirable to thoroughly defeat the losing belligerent, depriving it of any chance of recovery. This will dispense the former from another war with this opponent and eradicate the root of future trouble. In this paper, this mode of war termination is called "a fundamental resolution of causes of conflict."

For example, when the Allied Powers defeated Nazi Germany in World War II, they went so far as to capture Berlin, drive Hitler to suicide, and eliminate Germany's sovereignty. The termination of the Pacific War also falls under this category because it ended with Japan's "unconditional surrender."

However, the thorough defeat of the losing belligerent requires a reasonable cost on the part of the winning belligerent. If the latter wants to avoid sacrifice, especially the loss of life, it may compromise with the opponent and stop the war before the end―although the decision may plant the seed of future trouble. This way of ending a war is called in this paper a "compromise peace."

For example, in the Gulf War that began in January 1991, the Multinational Force stopped halfway in the attack on Iraqi forces encroaching on Kuwait, thus prolonging the Saddam Hussein regime, the invader of Kuwait. The decision was made to avoid sacrifice of the Multinational Force, which were likely to increase if it marched to Baghdad, the Iraqi capital.

Thus, every war ends by proceeding to either "a fundamental resolution of causes of conflict" or a "compromise peace." Adopting what mode of ending a war depends on how the winning belligerent weighs "future danger" and "present sacrifice."

In war, the winning belligerent may be concerned about "future danger" or the likelihood that allowing the adversary to remain alive will involve it in a more significant warfare with the same enemy. In such cases, if its "present sacrifice" are small, or if it judges that this sacrifice is tolerable, the winning belligerent will move toward a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict"—overthrowing the government or regime of the adversary. If the winning belligerent judges that "present sacrifice" is grave while "future danger" resulting from a compromise with the enemy are not so threatening, it will choose a "compromise peace."

The termination of war varies from the complete defeat of the enemy to a case short of such an extremity. On closer inspection, however, the termination of war depends ultimately on how the belligerents assess "future danger" and "present sacrifice."

The problem is that "future danger" and "present sacrifice" are in a trade-off relationship with each other. To eliminate "future danger," the belligerents must accept sacrifice in the war they are fighting. Conversely, to avoid "present sacrifice," the belligerents will have to live with potential dangers in the future—the compromise peace with which the United States emerged from the Gulf War ultimately proved disastrous for the country, involving it in the 2003 Iraq War. Facing such a dilemma, the warring parties must seek an "answer" on how to end the war. The mode of terminating a war is determined by dealing with the "dilemma between a fundamental resolution of causes of conflict and a compromise peace." Herein lies the genuine difficulty of ending a war. Fred C. Iklé, an international political scientist, discusses the tension involved in the dilemma of choosing between engaging in a prolonged war to establish lasting peace or accepting an unsatisfactory solution to bring the war to a swift end.3

Can the losing belligerent not affect the way a war ends? For example, in the Iraq War, unlike in the Gulf War, the US and coalition forces overthrew the Hussein regime in a very short time, thanks to their overwhelming military superiority. In similar cases, where the winning belligerent possesses military superiority or holds fast to a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict," only limited options are available for the losing belligerent once war breaks out. In the first place, the loser will not be able to force a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict" to the winner.

There are some cases where the losing belligerent can exert influence. The losing belligerent, who seeks a mode of war termination as close as possible to a "compromise peace," may choose to reduce "future danger" that the winning belligerent fears or to increase "present sacrifice" of the winning belligerent. In this case, the losing belligerent's behavior will affect the balance of "future danger" and "present sacrifice" perceived by the winning belligerent. As a result, the winning belligerent will have to decide whether to compromise with the adversary or not to compromise at the cost of present sacrifice.

In the Korean War that began in 1950, the communist camp (China and North Korea) could resist their superior adversaries―the US-led United Nations forces and the Republic of Korea forces―until the battle became deadlocked. From the UN's point of view, this situation could have been resolved by the use of nuclear weapons, as UN Commander MacArthur insisted. However, such an action would have obliged the US to confront an all-out war not only with China but also with the Soviet Union, incurring enormous casualties. Instead of accepting potential sacrifice that a full-scale war with China and the Soviet Union would have entailed, the US chose an armistice and a reluctant coexistence with "future danger" that could emanate from North Korea.

From the above, we can envisage a spectrum of war termination modes. At one "pole" of the spectrum lies a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict," which is a "Carthaginian peace" designed to hamstring the losing side permanently. At the other "pole" of the spectrum lies a "compromise peace." The latter represents a complete acceptance of the demands of the opponent.

As the war progresses, the balance of "future danger" and "present sacrifice" will be struck somewhere between the two "poles," and the war will end.

Fig. The Dilemma over the Different Modes of War Termination

Application of War Termination Analysis to the Russia-Ukraine War

The above empirical analysis helps to identify three patterns of the possible termination of the Russia-Ukraine war.

The first is a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict" (from the perspective of Russia, or the dominant belligerent in terms of overall military strength, including nuclear weapons). The exit strategy that President Putin initially conceived appears to be a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict" from Russia's perspective: the capture of the Ukrainian capital of Kyiv, the overthrow of the Zelensky government, and the demilitarization and neutralization of Ukraine, preventing the country's accession to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization). Behind this was Russia's obsessive way of thinking that considers Ukraine approaching the West as a "future danger." Given that Russia suffered few casualties in its invasion of Georgia (2008) and its unilateral annexation of Crimea (2014), Russia seems to have initially underestimated its "present sacrifice" in the ongoing war. To cite a historical precedent in this context: In World War II, Germany and France signed an armistice in June 1940, then Germany soon disarmed France and occupied three-fifths of its territory, including Paris.

Looking from Ukraine's point of view, if the country laid down its arms and surrendered to avoid "present sacrifice," it would be exposed to "future danger" such as massacres, rape, and forced deportation. Therefore, Ukraine had no choice but to continue fighting, even if incurring "present sacrifice." On March 8, 2022, President Zelensky addressed the British Parliament, stating, "We will fight in the forests, on the shores, in the streets,"4 citing a speech delivered by Winston Churchill before the British Parliament in June 1940, in which the British Prime Minister called for continuing war against Germany in the face of France's imminent departure from the Allied Forces.

Then, Russia temporarily abandoned a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict" and instead focused its war efforts on seizing the eastern and southern parts of Ukraine. This move represents the second pattern of war termination, which nears a "compromise peace" from Russia's viewpoint.

Ukraine's full restoration of its lost territory would bring the current war to an end following the third pattern of war termination or a "compromise peace pole" for Russia. In the Vietnam War, the US, supposed to have been the dominant belligerent, departed from this war by the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, and the war finally ended two years later with the fall of Saigon, the capital of US-backed South Vietnam.

Conditions for an Armistice Agreement

On March 29, 2022, during ceasefire talks in Istanbul, Turkey, Ukraine proposed a peace plan focusing two points: 1) Russian troops should withdraw to the border line before the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion; bilateral talks should continue regarding Crimea (territory), and 2) Ukraine would not join NATO; the countries concerned, including Russia, should guarantee its security (post-war security assurance). However, ceasefire negotiations were derailed when the "Bucha massacre" came to light on April 2. It is unclear to what extent President Putin was serious about the ceasefire negotiations. Russian troops did not withdraw, while Ukraine announced its application for NATO membership on September 30 of the same year.

It must be the most desirable scenario that Russia should choose a "compromised peace pole" ―the third pattern of war termination―considering "present sacrifice" unbearable. The fulfillment of the third pattern of war termination depends on the success or failure of Ukraine's counterattack, which has been losing momentum since the country launched a full-scale offensive in June 2023.

Meanwhile, there have been calls in the West for an early armistice in the war, as Russia declared on September 30, 2022, the annexation of four provinces in eastern and southern Ukraine―Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhia, and Herson. In the present circumstances, the second one of the above three patterns of war termination appears to be most applicable, which nears a "compromise peace" from Russia's viewpoint, eliminating Ukraine's sovereignty from the eastern and southern parts of the country.

However, it is premature to conclude so. Russia may find no advantage in an immediate armistice because if Ukraine's morale continues to decline and the momentum of support from the West wanes, Russia will be more likely to achieve a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict" that it originally envisioned, in addition to securing the currently occupied land. The only potential benefit of an armistice for Russia, if any, may be that it will allow Russia to use the armistice agreement to buy time, only to abandon it later. Russia's obsession with NATO is growing, as Russian Security Council Secretary Patrushev said on January 10, 2023, that "Moscow was now fighting the US-led NATO military alliance in Ukraine and that the West was trying to wipe Russia from the political map of the world."5 The Institute for the Study of War, a US think tank, indicated on July 4, 2024, that President Putin is demanding Ukraine's surrender.6 If the analysis is trustworthy, Ukraine could not agree to an armistice as long as there is a "future danger" that Russia would pull itself together, break the agreement, and invade the country again (the question of credible commitments).

As a result, a proposal has emerged to deal with such a "future danger" that Ukraine should give up the restoration of the occupied land and instead fulfill accession to NATO, thereby safeguarding the postwar security assurance of its remaining areas.7 In the Winter War that ended in 1940, it is said to have been the Soviet leader Stalin's fear of the Allied intervention that induced the Soviet Union to give up its occupation of all of Finland.8

However, Ukraine refuses to exchange its occupied territory for post-war security assurance because it means abandoning the former. Furthermore, it is questionable how realistic Ukraine's accession to NATO is. The NATO Summit Declaration adopted on July 11, 2024, mentioned Ukraine's future accession to NATO as irreversible. Yet, the Declaration failed to indicate any specific path to the goal.

The question of assuring Ukraine's postwar security will remain unresolved, even if the country recovers all its lost territory, including Crimea. Unlike Russia, Ukraine cannot overthrow the enemy's political regime to eliminate "future danger" by achieving a "fundamental resolution of causes of conflict." The country will have to coexist with various dangers in some way or other. Therefore, the NATO summit in July 2024 announced the creation of the "Ukraine Compact," a support framework joined by 26 countries and organizations, including Japan.

If Ukraine's NATO membership is not viable, it will be crucial for the countries concerned to provide Ukraine with the current level of support or more to ensure its security from another Russian invasion after the war. Deterrence will only be effective once Russia realizes that a second invasion of Ukraine is "impossible" given the current state of war.

The ongoing war could be transformed into a semblance of a so-called "frozen conflict," in which the fighting itself will continue―although its intensity will gradually decrease due to the exhaustion of both parties.

Conversely, the only plausible condition for realizing an armistice agreement would be that the battle situation turns drastically in favor of Ukraine, and Russia considers it better to conclude an armistice agreement and withdraw its troops of its own accord than to be expelled militarily. (The demilitarization of the front line will also be predicated on the Russian withdrawal.) Or, if the Russification of Ukraine's occupied territory progresses―undesirable a development as it is for Ukraine―while further Russian invasion is unlikely due to some changes on the Russian side, an armistice agreement will be concluded to confirm the status quo at that moment. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 was also affected by changes at home and in the international situation surrounding Russia.9

If the present war were to end following the first pattern of war termination, resistance movements might emerge in Russian-occupied Ukraine, similar to those in German-occupied France during World War II; the situation could spiral out of control.

If the present war were to end following the third pattern of war termination, there would be great concerns about the risk of escalation. If Ukraine and the West were to pursue a counteroffensive to eliminate "future danger" from Russia and cross a decisive line, Russia would regard this move as an intolerable danger, and the situation would escalate for worse with the possibility of using nuclear weapons and ultimately launching World War III.

Conclusion

On November 15, 2022, President Zelensky released a 10-point "Formula for Peace," stating, "When all the antiwar measures are implemented, when security and justice begin to be restored, a document confirming the end of the war should be signed by the parties."10 The "Peace Summit" held in Switzerland on June 15-16, 2024, reconfirmed the principles of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states, including Ukraine. Yet, as noted in this paper, prospects are grim for the conclusion of a formal armistice agreement and the termination of the ongoing war shortly.

If former US President Trump, now the Republican presidential candidate, wins the coming US presidential election in November 2024, and if the US calls for an armistice of the Russia-Ukraine war as of this moment or suspends its support for Ukraine, the damage to the country will be significant. Meanwhile, if, despite the Ukrainian people's continued willingness to resist, the international community gives up on Ukraine, and, as a result, the country becomes unable to maintain even its current front lines, the world will turn into a place where a strong nation will be allowed to "unilaterally change the status quo by force." Such is nothing but the "future danger" the international community will encounter.

(This article is the author's personal opinion and has nothing to do with the organization to which he belongs.)

(Chief Research Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies)

proposal
current topics
letter