proposal

What Makes Modi 3.0 Distinct and a Future Outlook

Toru Ito

Modi's "Defeat" in the 2024 General Elections

On June 4, 2024, the votes for the 18th Lok Sabha General Elections were counted. Pre-election polls had predicted a landslide victory for Prime Minister Modi's ruling party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). However, it was not because the public was satisfied with the achievements of the Modi administration's two terms in office totaling 10 years. The economic growth rate during the 10 years of the Modi administration was lower than that during the previous 10 years of the Congress Party-led Manmohan Singh administration. Alongside the slowdown of economic growth, Indian society faced significant challenges, including rising prices and higher unemployment rates. According to a large-scale pre-election opinion poll, 62% of respondents said they had "become difficult to manage," while 54% said unemployment was "very serious." Nonetheless, Prime Minister Modi's personal approval rating remained as high as 61%; in popularity, he outperformed Rahul Gandhi of the main opposition Indian National Congress Party.1

The opposition camp formed an election alliance called "INDIA" to launch the campaign, but their activities encountered many difficulties. The main opposition INC underwent a tax investigation and had its accounts frozen. The Chief Minister of Delhi, Kejriwal, the leader of the Aam Aadmi Party was accused of corruption and temporarily detained. The ruling party's superiority over the opposition was evident from the sheer quantity of advertisements and campaign stars that the former could afford thanks to its financial power. During the election campaign, ruling party leaders, including Modi himself, were busy delivering pseudo-hate speeches. The Election Commission condoned them, and the ruling party's advantage was seen as unequivocal. Most exit polls released after the voting ended predicted that the ruling party would increase its seats.

However, the result was otherwise. Modi's BJP decreased its seats from 303 to 240, losing its single-handed majority in 543 Lok Sabha seats. Although the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), including its coalition partners, managed to maintain a narrow majority by securing 293 seats, Modi and the BJP faced a harsh reality. This was the first "defeat" for Modi, who had led the BJP to a single-handed majority in three times of Gujarat state assembly elections and twice General Elections, in all of which he stood at the forefront.

The high level of support for the person of Modi, the blatant crackdown on the opposition, and developments that called electoral fairness into question combined to urge voters to an ambivalent response―passing a harsh verdict, while evaluating in their own way the Modi administration's governance over the past 10 years. That said, compared to the 2019 General Elections, the voting percentage of the BJP across the country dropped by less than 1%. Although the BJP lost many seats, it remains the largest party, and the NDA maintains a Lok Sabha majority. The BJP/NDA lost by a narrow margin to the opposition coalition INDIA in key states with many constituency seats, such as Uttar Pradesh; nearly 60% of voters who voted for the opposition mentioned rising prices and unemployment as their voting motives.2

From the Modi to the NDA Administration?

The most notable aspect of Modi 3.0 is the shift in the administration's support base. Unlike the previous two terms, the BJP does not hold a majority in the Lok Sabha, which means that if it loses the support of its coalition partners, the administration could collapse at any time. Even Modi, known for top-down decision-making throughout his career, including his terms as state chief minister, is now obliged to listen to their voices.

The 2024 Union Budget, released after the 2024 General Elections, and the 2025 Union Budget reflect consideration for coalition regional parties. A range of financial support went to Andhra Pradesh, where the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), second only to the BJP in the NDA, has 16 seats, and to Bihar, where the Janata Dal United (JD(U)) holds 12 seats. In particular, Bihar was allocated a generous budget, as state assembly elections are scheduled for autumn 2025; budgeted projects included airports and a canal, as well as agricultural initiatives.3 The Modi administration also announced the launch of caste enumeration, which the state of Bihar had begun on its own and requested to conduct alongside the national census.4 It has been nearly a year since the Modi administration took office. There is no noticeable discord within the NDA.

Neither the nation's diplomacy nor security interests the coalition regional parties in the NDA unless it affects the interests of their respective states, although they will strongly oppose the reduction of tariffs on agricultural imports in response to the Trump tariffs.5 In Modi 3.0, the key ministers in these domains are under the monopoly of the BJP; the regional parties are not capable of influencing relevant national policies. Of course, policy decisions in areas that interest regional parties would require the government to devote more effort and time than before to gain their support. However, given the bitter experience that the Modi administration's forced passage of three agricultural bills, ignoring opposition from within the NDA, resulted in large-scale farmer demonstrations in 2020, which forced the government to repeal the bills the following year, careful coordination within the ruling parties may rather have a positive effect on policy implementation.

Many of these coalition regional parties are wary of the BJP's Hindu nationalism. In this sense, the Waqf Amendment Bill on managing Waqf properties in India attracted particular attention of those parties. The bill underwent debates in the 2025 budget session of the Lok Sabha; there was no dissent from the NDA in voting. Some believe that the BJP's successive victories in the state assembly elections in Maharashtra, Haryana, and Delhi, which took place after the defeat in the General Elections, have restored the BJP's hegemony within the NDA.6

Nonetheless, the introduction of a Uniform Civil Code, which the BJP pledged in its election manifesto, is bound to invite backlash from regional parties who fear losing the support of Muslims; it seems that this has been postponed for now. If Prime Minister Modi prioritizes staying in power, choosing the safest path may be the best option. However, he has positioned a Uniform Civil Code as essential for constructing the Hindu state that he and the BJP are aiming for. Consequently, we cannot rule out the possibility that, either following the Bihar State Assembly elections or at some point in the lead-up to the next General Election, the BJP will force through a Uniform Civil Code in an attempt to showcase the achievements of Prime Minister Modi and the party, even if sacrificing the unity of the NDA.

Post-Modi?

Throughout the last General Elections campaign, people liked discussing how long Modi would remain as prime minister. This is because in 2025, Modi will cross the BJP's retirement age of 75. Modi himself forced the party's influential persons into retirement with an excuse of this "internal rule." With Modi's high popularity as background, the BJP leadership went so far as to state during the election campaign that Modi would remain prime minister until the end of his current term in 2029, or even beyond that into Modi 4.0.7 If he completed not only his third term but also his fourth, he would become the longest-serving prime minister in Indian history, surpassing the first prime minister Nehru.

Meanwhile, the outcome of the last General Elections shows that even Modi's charismatic power could wane. The election result suggests a tactical failure of relying solely on Modi's popularity while ignoring the RSS, a right-wing Hindu nationalist volunteer paramilitary organization, which had long been supportive of Modi.8 After the General Elections, the BJP and RSS proceeded to mend their relationship. In response to the Yunus interim government's "Hindu oppression" in Bangladesh after Prime Minister Hasina's resignation in the summer of 2024, the RSS adopted a resolution calling on the Indian government and the international community to protect Hindus who are undergoing "inhumane treatment" and facing "existential crisis."9 This is consistent with the official position of the Modi administration on the issue. In March 2025, Prime Minister Modi became the first Indian prime minister to visit the RSS headquarters in Nagpur; following the Pahalgam terrorist attack in Kashmir in April 2025, RSS president Bhagwat paid a courtesy visit to the Prime Minister's official residence. Afterward, the Modi administration launched a retaliatory attack on Pakistan, "Operation Sindoor," which the RSS endorsed and commended.10 The RSS's influence over the BJP is being restored.

Home Minister Amit Shah and Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Yogi Adityanath are often considered possible candidates to succeed Modi. However, according to a public opinion poll on the next Indian Prime Minister conducted in early 2025, 51% of respondents wanted Modi to continue in his position, while only 2% chose Amit Shah, and none named Yogi Adityanath. When asked about the most suitable person to succeed Modi as the BJP leader, 27% of respondents chose Amit Shah, and 25% named Yogi Adityanath. Neither of them gained overwhelming support.11 If governance by a leader's attractiveness becomes difficult, the post-Modi BJP may instead try to maintain power by emphasizing Hindu ideology more in its party policy.

"Democracy" Rescued?

During the decade of the Modi administration, especially during Modi 2.0 since 2019, it has been pointed out that freedom and democracy regressed strikingly in India. The Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and its implementation, the inauguration ceremony of the Ram Temple at the Ayodhya mosque site, and attacks on Muslims by Hindu "vigilantes" in many of India are glaring violations of religious freedom, harming the country's constitution-guaranteed secularism or the idea of ​​national unity respected since the founding of India. For six consecutive years since the issuance of its 2020 report, the US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has recommended that India be designated a "Country of Particular Concern (CPC)."12 The Reporters Without Borders' press freedom index for India has almost halved in the 10 years of the Modi administration, and the country's ranking has dropped abysmally from 140th in 2014 to 159th in 2024. The 2025 RWB report warns that press freedom in India is in jeopardy due to violence against journalists, highly concentrated media ownership, and political alignment.13

The Modi administration's authoritarian tendencies have been criticized by Western media and, at times, foreign governments and parliaments. These tendencies are represented by the abolition of Jammu and Kashmir's autonomy in 2019 to put it under two Union Territories, despite opposition from opposition parties and regional forces, and the subsequent suppression and arrest of opposition leaders.14 In particular, people successively witnessed the administration's blatant interference in the electoral process—the foundation of democracy—and other cases that call electoral fairness into question. This is why the outcome of the 2024 General Elections, in which the Indian people effectively chastised the Modi administration, was welcomed with a sigh of relief by Western media and governments.15

However, it would be premature to conclude that India's democracy has been rescued or restored thanks to the voters' recent behavior. According to an international opinion poll, 67% of Indian respondents prefer a strong leader who is not subject to interference from parliament or the courts―the percentage is by far the highest among 24 counties surveyed. Moreover, 72% of Indian respondents are satisfied with their country's current level of democracy―the second highest percentage after Sweden.16 Another Pew Research Centre survey on the freedom of the press with respondents from 35 countries reports that only 68% of Indian respondents are aware of the importance of press freedom, the second lowest percentage after Kenya; 80% of Indian respondents believe that Indian media is allowed free coverage of anything they wish.17

These suggest that the Indian people believe that if a leader chosen by them were to rule in an authoritarian manner, overriding the opposition and the judiciary, this would not contradict democracy but would rather be considered desirable. Despite the RWB's warnings, many Indians do not believe that the press is being controlled or manipulated by the administration. It might be better to see the results of the 2024 General Elections as not so much the people's criticism of Modi's style of governance as of their severe assessment of his governing performance.

In Modi 2.0, as if linked with the retreat of freedom and democracy in the country, some incidents raised doubt about whether India respects and abides by the rules-based liberal international order. In 2023, first Canada and then the United States came forward with the allegation that India was involved in the assassination plots and the attempted assassination of a Sikh separatist in their countries. It is an open secret that India's intelligence agency, Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has been engaged in various clandestine activities in Pakistan. However, it is an unusual and novel development that India plotted the murder of individuals it considers "terrorists" in liberal democratic countries that are friendly to India and developed Western nations. Although the Modi administration strongly opposed and denied the unilateral claims made by Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau, it indicated a willingness to cooperate with an investigation when the United States presented evidence and indicted not only an Indian directly involved but also a former RAW official alleged to have given the orders.18 The Modi administration's core members, such as National Security Advisor Doval, were reportedly involved in the plots.19 India behaved evasively throughout and, just before the inauguration of the second Trump administration, released a report admitting the involvement of "individuals" who were former RAW officials, in an attempt to draw a curtain on the matter.20 Ultimately, the United States is likely to try to end this issue while sending a message to India that it will never tolerate any acts that violate its sovereignty.

What is of concern in this context is that such voices are heard in India, particularly in social media, that India should have the right to do the same as the United States. Behind this, it is likely that there is a rise in national consciousness as the country is soon expected to become the world's third-largest economy, along with a backlash against Western views on freedom and democracy. It will be necessary to pay attention to the impact the domestic situation in India should have on its future external actions.21

Affinity with Trump's America

Given these peculiarities of the Modi administration, it is no wonder that India welcomed Trump's return to the White House after the 2024 US presidential election. The good chemistry between the two leaders has been well known since Trump 1.0. The Indian side embraced the hope that bilateral frictions during the Biden administration regarding freedom, democracy, and human rights, as well as concerns about RAW's activities in the United States, would be reduced, or even eliminated, if Trump, indifferent to the issues of values, were the counterpart.22 Trump is reluctant to support Ukraine's war efforts and does not hide his willingness to help realize an early end to the Ukraine war. His position aligns with Indian interests, as the country values its strategic relationship with Russia. The Indian side anticipated that with the advent of Trump 2.0, US criticism of India, which has not participated in sanctions against Russia and has instead increased its purchases of crude oil, fertilizer, etc. from Russia, would subside in some way or other.

"Trump 2.0," characterized by its aggressive pursuit of "deals" to secure profits—downplaying existing values and rules at home and abroad—was seen as similar to the Modi administration's political style and thus a good match. The question is whether the "deal" will work, but optimism prevails in India. Following Prime Minister Ishiba and others, Modi was invited to the White House in February 2025 for a summit meeting with Trump. Trump did not hide his dissatisfaction with India's high tariffs and the massive US trade deficit caused by other non-tariff barriers on the Indian side. Modi agreed to finalize a bilateral trade agreement by fall 2025 to address US concerns. The two countries immediately began negotiations to that end. After that, Trump unilaterally announced "reciprocal tariffs" for many countries. India would be subject to a 26% tariff. Yet, Indian government officials expressed confidence that a preliminary agreement would be reached during the 90-day grace period.23 Their confident reasoning seems to be that, as long as Trump considers China to be a primary threat and tries to create a global supply chain decoupling from China, the United States will welcome 1.4 billion-populated India with a large consumer and labor market, along with Indian immigrants specializing in advanced IT technology, as an indispensable partner.

India will certainly not want to see the collapse of the rules-based liberal international order and the return of international relations to a state of nature where "might is right." Should that happen, China would further expand and strengthen its influence over India's neighbors; the obstacles to its military action against India would be reduced. Instead of lamenting the current international order being in crisis, India seems to believe that its unique realism, or pragmatic foreign policy, is vital to secure its practical interests in today's imperialistic world.24

What is most important in this context is further enhancing India's cherished "strategic autonomy."25 India will likely seek to establish a network of relations that is not dependent on any particular partner, strengthening its political, diplomatic, security, and economic ties with the United States, Russia, Europe (including the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), and Japan.

(Professor, The National Defense Academy)

proposal
current topics
letter