proposal

What's Next for Japan-India Strategic Partnership

Kenji Hiramatsu

Since the inauguration of the second Trump administration, attention has increasingly focused on India amid the turmoil of the international situation. India has taken advantage of this, developing adroit diplomacy and solidifying its position as a major power. It will undoubtedly become the world's third-largest economy in a few years. This prospect is prompting companies from all over the world to enter its large market. India is increasingly aware of its traditional role as a leader in the Global South. As competition between the United States and China will likely dominate the international landscape for a considerable time, India will emerge as an entity on par with them. Even a G3 scenario may be envisaged.

How should Japan deal with such an India? Japan could not build a special relationship with India which captures world's attention by merely maintaining the traditional friendship that exists to date. For Japan to become an indispensable country for India, the public and private sectors must make further efforts. Japan must identify areas where it can make a unique contribution that no one else can. Japan should work to enhance its strategic and technological value. In this article, I will discuss how to strengthen the strategic relationship between Japan and India, focusing on areas other than military cooperation.

1. Sharing the Threat Perception of China

(1) For India, which shares a 3,500 km border with China and has an unmarked and controversial boundary, China is its biggest rival and threat. As evidenced by the 2020 border conflict, Chinese provocations are always possible. Additionally, the recent rise in tensions between India and Pakistan demonstrates that Pakistan, supported by China, poses a real threat to India. During the 2020 border conflict, India took a firm stance, refusing to make concessions unless China did the same. Very few countries can take such a firm stance against China.

(2) Indian diplomatic and military authorities constantly follow and analyze China's political and military trends, as well as the intentions of its leaders, with great concern. Naturally, they are also interested in China's activities in surrounding areas. Japanese analysis of Chinese military movements in the East China Sea, particularly around the Senkaku Islands and Taiwan, is invaluable for Indian security experts. Japan's in-depth analysis of China's political and economic situation, acquired during the long history of Japan-China relations, is also highly valuable to India. Conversely, Japan is interested in the movements of the Chinese military near the Sino-Indian border and the background reasons for these movements. Information on China's role in the recent military conflict between India and Pakistan and its cooperative relationship with Pakistan, in terms of, among other things, Pakistani armaments, is helpful for Japan to understand China's regional strategy.

(3) For some time, India had wished to engage in an in-depth strategic dialogue with Japan about China from various angles. Round upon round of penetrating discussion about China between PMs Abe and Modi, with maps spread on the table, left an indelible impression on the Indian side. Japan and India have so far discussed China through mechanisms such as the Japan-India Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue, the Japan-India Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (2+2), the Japan-India Defense Ministers' Meeting, Japan-India dialogues between national security advisors, and Japan-India dialogues between defense officials, including military personnel. However, discussions from now on should focus more on China than before. An additional option may be establishing a new dialogue mechanism joined by foreign and defense policy officials to hold regular comprehensive discussions on China.

2. Strengthening Indo-Pacific Cooperation Through the Quad (Japan, the United States, Australia, and India)

(1) Prime Minister Modi's keynote speech at the 2018 Shangri-La Dialogue was epoch-making because it was the first comprehensive expression of India's commitment to Indo-Pacific cooperation.1 Since then, the Quad framework has evolved steadily, beginning with the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in 2019 and culminating in the Summit in 2021. It is now functioning as an engine for promoting Indo-Pacific cooperation.

(2) India was initially reluctant to join such a framework. India's long-held credos of non-aligned neutrality and strategic autonomy, coupled with its self-designated position as a leader in the Global South, made India hesitate to join a developed countries-centered framework. India's reluctance to join the initiative was due to its consideration of not provoking China too much. China was too intractable for India to deal with. Additionally, India entertains some resistance to a framework embracing Australia, whose China policy sometimes fluctuates.

(3) Under these circumstances, the Japanese government persistently lobbied the Indian side: Prime Minister Abe, a strong proponent of the Quad, strongly approached Prime Minister Modi. As a result, the Indian government changed its policy to commit to Indo-Pacific cooperation and join the Quad―a feat of Japanese diplomacy that will remain a cornerstone of future Japan-India cooperation.

(4) Since then, India has been an active member of the Quad, and the initiative has progressed smoothly. The Quad is an important mechanism that keeps India—a power on par with the United States and China—firmly in the Japan-US camp. It is no exaggeration to say that this framework exists for India. Cooperation should continue at a pace comfortable for India. For now, the focus should be on economic security cooperation, such as strengthening the supply chain, rather than military security. To ensure the substantive presence of India, we should avoid expanding its membership. The Trump administration now favors promoting the Quad, but Japan and the United States must continue to reach a solid consensus on the Quad's significance and future direction. Shared values are a mainstay of Indo-Pacific cooperation. Although it may not be realistic to expect this from the Trump administration, Japan and India should always confirm the importance of universal values, such as the rule of law and democracy, within this framework.

3. Strengthening Economic Security Cooperation

(1) In recent years, economic security has been a principal concern in Japan and India. Traditionally, India is a highly competitive market that emphasizes price. However, due to ongoing tensions with China, India is eager to reduce its dependence on China for supply chains of crucial industries. The Indian government is becoming aware of the risks of relying on China for most of the storage batteries and rare earth resources essential for developing strategic industries associated with EVs and semiconductors.2

(2) Some years ago, I received a request from a high-ranking Indian official, with whom I had frequently exchanged views: the Indian side wanted to discuss economic security with the Japanese side, especially given the similar challenges both nations face concerning China, thereby advancing concrete bilateral cooperation. In response, the Japan Research Institute, Limited's Institute for International Strategy organized the "Japan-India Economic Security Study Group" in June 2023. Professor Kazuto Suzuki of the University of Tokyo, a leading expert in economic security, chaired this group, which included participation from experts, businesspeople, and government officials. Through extensive discussions, the study group compiled recommendations in November 2024.3 The recommendations identify promising areas for bilateral cooperation, such as semiconductors, batteries, rare earth/critical minerals, submarine cables, and pharmaceuticals. To further advance Japan-India cooperation on economic security, the recommendations propose the following points: 1) Strong commitment at the summit level is crucial; 2) Create from a strategic perspective a supervisory and comprehensive framework to facilitate discussions among public and private sector experts; 3) Implement cooperation through multilateral frameworks such as the Quad and trilateral cooperation among Japan, Taiwan, and India; 4) Utilize Indian talent in advanced technology fields, 5) Strengthen government support for Japanese companies investing in cutting-edge sectors. The study group also examined initiatives in each field.

(3) In late November 2024, a vice-ministerial level economic security dialogue was held between Japan and India.4 The government and private sectors are encouraged to continue this dialogue, as it is essential to enhance Japan-India security cooperation by developing as many tangible economic cooperation initiatives as possible.

4. Japan-India Cooperation in the Northeastern States of India

(1) The northeastern states of India encircle Bangladesh and are connected to the rest of India only by narrow land corridors. Many of these states, such as Arunachal Pradesh, over which China claims sovereignty, share borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar, which makes them strategically important. Due to limited connectivity with other Indian states, this region trails economically. Developing this region is vital for India's overall stability. Prime Minister Modi emphasizes this region and provides political and economic support.

(2) The Northeastern states of India are well known for including Kohima and Imphal, where Japan and Britain fought during World War II. Despite their memories of war, people in the region view Japan favorably. Ethnically, they are more akin to the Japanese than people in other parts of India. The Indian government requested Japan's active involvement in developing the northeastern states. It was true that the Indian government wanted to use Japan's ODA (Official Development Assistance) to improve infrastructure, especially roads and bridges, to strengthen connectivity among the northeastern states and between the northeastern states and the Bay of Bengal. Meanwhile, Japan wanted to contribute to developing the northeastern states, which have a historical connection to Japan. The two countries' aspirations coincided, and they agreed to include the development of the northeastern states in their bilateral cooperation agenda. To this end, the ACT EAST FORUM came into existence in 2017: it is participated in by representatives from the northeastern states, the Indian Ministry of External Affairs and other relevant ministries and agencies, and representatives from the Japanese embassy, JICA (Japan International Cooperation Agency), and JETRO (Japan External Trade Organization). I, the then Japanese ambassador to India, and Mr. Jaishankar, Foreign Secretary (currently Minister for External Affairs), initially co-chaired it. Since then, the forum has met many times and has become a significant venue for promoting concrete cooperation in the northeastern states. Incidentally, Japan is the only country that runs such a forum with India, focusing on the northeastern states. This is also a sign of India's trust in Japan.

(3) Thus far, various infrastructure-related projects have been implemented, and business cooperation opportunities have been explored. The number of people working in Japan in nursing and medical care is also increasing. Due to Japan's aid, road and bridge construction has progressed, and infrastructure in the northeastern states has improved significantly. These infrastructure projects are linked to similar projects ongoing in Bangladesh under cooperation from Japan and India to construct a land corridor leading to Matarbari Port in the Bay of Bengal. The Japanese government launched a new initiative called the Industrial Value Chain Initiative, which considers the northeastern states and Bangladesh as an integral economic zone and promotes infrastructure and industry development there. During Prime Minister Kishida's visit to India in 2023, he introduced this initiative as a central pillar of bilateral cooperation in his Indo-Pacific policy speech. This initiative envisages connecting the region to Southeast Asia and Japan through Matarbari Port; it could become the nucleus of the Indo-Pacific initiative.

(4) Many challenges await industrial development in the northeastern states, but the Indian government is making substantial efforts. Recently, the Tata Group decided to build a semiconductor factory in an industrial park in Assam. The Indian government aims to transform Assam into a hub for the semiconductor industry alongside Gujarat. Meanwhile, the Bhutanese government is attempting to attract industry by creating a special economic zone in Gelephu near the border with Assam.5 The Bhutanese government is working on this project under the special patronage of His Majesty King of Bhutan, although it is still in the planning stage. Due to its proximity to the Assam border, the Gelephu smart city could constitute part of an industrial corridor project. Strategically, it is significant to view the BIMSTEC6 member countries, including Nepal, integrally and aim for their integrated development.

(5) Manipur and Nagaland, whose state capitals are Imphal and Kohima, respectively, are home to various tribal communities. These communities can also be found in the neighboring nation of Myanmar. Sometimes, clashes occur between these tribes and the state governments. Even now, conflicts between tribes continue in Manipur, and public safety is deteriorating. For the Indian government, stability in the northeastern states is a vital security issue. Japan's contribution to the development of this region will be an important addition to security efforts.

5. Cooperation in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands

(Prepared by the JRI.)

(1) Viewed from a maritime perspective, the Indian Andaman and Nicobar Islands are a key outpost for FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) cooperation. Located along a vital sea lane connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the islands may be likened to a checkpoint for ships sailing from the West to the Strait of Malacca. Although the islands are more than 1,000 km distant from the Indian mainland, they are only about 150 km away from Indonesia. Just north of the islands are the Coco Islands, a Myanmar territory. Reportedly, a surveillance base was built in the Coco Islands by Chinese aid. Given the Andaman and Nicobar Islands' strategic importance, India established a unified command of the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the islands and has been reinforcing the naval air station there in recent years. As exemplified by the case of the Coco Islands, the presence of the Chinese PLA Navy is growing not only in the adjacent waters of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands but also across the Indian Ocean, which is causing concern to India.

(2) The Japanese military occupied the Andaman and Nicobar Islands for more than three years, from 1942 to 1945, during World War II. Traces of the occupation remain to this day. Since many Japan-bound ships from the Middle East pass near the islands before passing the Straits of Malacca, stability in this region is vital for Japan's security. Indigenous people still live on the islands and entry into some areas is restricted. The development, including infrastructure projects, is delayed. Given the islands' historical relation with Japan and their location along the sea lane to Japan, the Japanese and Indian governments discussed the possibility of cooperation involving Japan. I also had many in-depth discussions with Indian government officials regarding this matter. Since facilities such as airports and ports could serve for military purposes, coordination efforts were made to assign Japanese aid to facilities for civilian use infrastructure. As a result, a JICA cooperation project was launched in 2022 to construct structures to house storage batteries and related facilities on South Andaman Island. The project aims to use renewable energy efficiently and stabilize the power supply. It is an epoch-making event that Japan offers development assistance to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, a sensitive region for Indian security. The project symbolizes a trusting relationship with Japan and suggests the possibility of further Japan-India cooperation associated with the islands.

(3) It may be that some projects are not suitable to be funded by ODA. Using OSA (Official Security Assistance) should now be considered for such cases. Cooperation related to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is significant for advancing Japan-India security cooperation. Incidentally, with the endorsement of the Japanese government, NEC signed a supply contract in 2018 to lay undersea cables connecting the islands to mainland India. The construction of the undersea cables was completed in 2020. The fact that a Japanese company laid undersea cables in the strategically important Andaman and Nicobar Islands is instrumental to furthering Japan-India strategic cooperation.

6. Japan-India Cooperation in the Middle East and Africa

(Prepared by the JRI.)

(1) With a broader perspective encompassing the Indian Ocean region to the west of India, one could notice significant potential for Japan-India cooperation with Middle Eastern and African nations. This approach would expand Indo-Pacific cooperation westward with India at its nucleus.

(2) In recent years, India has emphasized its relations with the Middle East. Prime Minister Modi has frequently visited the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Gulf states; leaders of those countries often have also visited India. In 2022, the I2U2 group, a new partnership between India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and the United States (also known as the Middle Eastern version of the Quad) started. In 2023, the India-Middle East-Europe Corridor (IMEC) was also launched. This ambitious initiative will connect India to the Middle East and Europe via the Indian Ocean, aiming to counter the Belt and Road Initiative. Due to geographical proximity (a three-hour flight from Mumbai to Dubai) and massive Indian communities in the Gulf countries (approximately nine million people),7 relations between India and the Gulf states are politically, economically, and psychologically close.

(3) Many Indians, particularly businesspeople, have settled in African countries for a long time. They are known as Non-Resident Indians. Reportedly, about 1.5 million Indians live in South Africa and about 100,000 in Kenya. They have established themselves in those countries for many years and built extensive networks in the economic world, boasting a large presence. Japan should use those extensive networks to cultivate businesses in Africa. Japanese companies that lack sufficient knowledge or experience in Africa or the Middle East will benefit from selling products manufactured in India in these regions through Non-Resident Indian networks or by making joint venture investments with Non-Resident Indian businesspeople. The idea is to develop businesses by leveraging the economic corridor that India plans to build. This is also significant in the TICAD (Tokyo International Conference on African Development) context; it represents a concrete realization of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision. Since serving as the Japanese ambassador to India from 2015 to 2019, I have encouraged Japanese companies that are about to enter the Indian market to expand westward as they will find a gigantic market awaiting them beyond India. I am happy to see more and more people beginning to share my view.

(Chairman, Institute for International Strategy, the Japan Research Institute, Ltd.; Former Ambassador to India)

proposal
current topics
letter