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The India-China Border Issue and India's Military Strategy

Satoru Nagao

India is already the third-largest defense spender globally, behind only the United States and China, and is rapidly approaching the status of the third-largest global economy by GDP. With the intensifying rivalry between the United States and China—the world's top two powers—India's impending rise to the third position in terms of GDP makes its China policy, especially its military strategy toward China, absolutely critical to the future of international relations. A notable development occurred in October 2024, when India and China agreed to joint land border patrols to ease bilateral tensions. We must ask: What will be the practical implications of this policy? Where will India procure the armaments needed to counter China? What insights can Japan draw from these unfolding dynamics? These are the central themes we explore in this analysis.

1. The India-China land border viewed from India's military strategy and its current situation

(1) Three fronts: Pakistan, the India-China land border, and the Indian Ocean, alongside a shift against China

Where does India's military strategy place its emphasis? The Indian military deployment illustrates this. Figures 1 to 3, respectively, depict the deployment of the Indian Army, Navy, and Air Force.

First, regarding the Indian Army (Fig. 1), traditionally, tank units (armored divisions and RAPID divisions) have been deployed to counter Pakistan and mountain divisions to counter China. However, in recent years, changes have been noted. Indian Army units have been moving from the Pakistan border to the China border. The most symbolic is the Indian Army's 17 Corps. The 17 Corps is responsible for implementing offensive operations against China in case of warfare. It is a large unit consisting of two divisions, including support troops―a large force of about 90,000 strong. Assigned for operations on the Tibetan plateau at a high altitude, the 17 Corps is an airborne mobile corps using the Air Force's many transport aircraft and helicopters. For this reason, the corps possesses equipment, including armored vehicles and artillery, transportable by air.

Fig. 1: Location of Divisional Headquarters of the Indian Army

Prepared by the author.

Fig. 2 illustrates Indian naval deployment. The Indian Navy is also shifting from Pakistan to China. The Western and Eastern Fleets are the combat-deploying forces. The Western Fleet has been mainly

responsible for Pakistan, while the Eastern Fleet is for China. However, the Indian Navy built a new base in Karwar under the Western Fleet, beginning to move fleets under the Western Fleet

from Mumbai to Karwar. Compared to Mumbai, located closer to Pakistan, Karwar is assigned to cover broader areas in the Indian Ocean than the Pakistan Navy; this is a move toward de-Pakistanization. Additionally, a new underground submarine base has opened under the Eastern Fleet in Rambilli, where ballistic

Fig. 2: Indian Navy layout

Prepared by the author.

missile-equipped submarines deploy with China in mind. This is also an effort to switch from the traditional Pakistan-focused strategy to focusing on the Chinese Navy, which is advancing in the Indian Ocean.

Fig. 3 shows the deployment of Indian Air Force fighter squadrons. This figure also represents a shift in emphasis from Pakistan to China. Previously, the latest fighter jets were deployed primarily in the border areas with Pakistan. However, new fighter jets, including Rafale and Sukhoi-30, are more likely to be deployed along the India-China border. Fighter jets are deployed now in the Indian Ocean region, which was not the case before, suggesting that the Indian Air Force is wary of China's advance.

Fig. 3: Indian Air Force fighter squadron deployment

Prepared by the author.

Looking at the deployment of the Indian army, navy, and air force, the Indian military is gradually shifting its strategy from one focused on Pakistan to one focused on China. In particular, India, which has

a land border, places importance on the relocation of military forces with the India-China land border in mind.

(2) Easing of tensions in 2024 and its background

In 2020, a Chinese intrusion occurred on the India-China border; the Chinese ambushed and attacked Indian troops, resulting in 96 casualties on the Indian side alone (20 dead and 76 injured) and unknown casualties on the Chinese side (the Chinese government's official death toll is four, but some point out that this is too small). From 2020, the India-China confrontation went on deploying the latest equipment, including hypersonic missiles, stealth fighter jets, and long-range multiple rocket launchers, along the entire land border. The four-year-long tension eased in October 2024 due to the India-China summit held as a side event of a BRICS conference. The two countries agreed to the regional allocation of their border patrol forces and to endeavor to ease tensions.

There seem to be several reasons for this easing of tensions, among which the moves of the United States and India on the security front are particularly noteworthy. There were indications that in 2020-2024, India endeavored to establish the presence of US troops at the India-China border. In 2022, a joint military exercise between the US and Indian ground forces occurred near the India-China border. In spring 2023, the Japanese, US, and Indian air forces held a joint military exercise, during which US B-1 bombers arrived at the Kalaikunda base; the drill aimed to send a message to China. Incidentally, the Kalaikunda base in eastern India (Fig. 3) was an airbase where B-29 bombers were deployed during World War II to attack Japanese forces operating in China. B-1 bombers serve as launch platforms for conventional Tomahawk cruise missiles. They are primarily deployed in the Sea of Japan and other regions to put pressure on North Korea. In other words, deploying B-1 bombers at the Kalaikunda base puts the entire country of China within bombing range. In the mountainous Chinese territory along the India-China border, transportation depends on a limited number of tunnels and bridges. Therefore, weapons capable of precise attacks on infrastructure, such as cruise missiles, are highly effective. This puts enormous pressure on China.

In 2024, India hosted Exercise Tarang Shakti, a joint air force military drill involving all QUAD countries. Until then, India had limited joint military exercises involving all QUAD countries to naval exercises in the Indian Ocean: Exercises Malabar and Milan. India seems to have intended to avoid provoking China over the India-China land border by limiting international military exercises to the sea areas far from India-China's inland territory. However, by hosting Exercise Tarang Shakti in 2024, following 2022 and 2023, India has demonstrated that military cooperation with QUAD could also affect the India-China border issue.

Therefore, India's efforts to involve the United States in the India-China border issue seem to have had some effect. As October 2024 approached, it became increasingly likely that Mr. Trump would win the US presidential election. The incoming Trump administration was estimated to adopt a harsher policy toward China. In the meantime, India gradually involved the United States in the India-China border issue, thereby increasing pressure on China. China seems to have considered it expedient to ease tensions with India first and then focus on dealing with the new Trump administration. As a result, India and China agreed to ease tensions.

(3) The India-China relations to worsen over a long-term

Will this trend of detente continue for a long time? Unlikely. Rising tensions along the India-China border have been triggered by increased Chinese military deployments and intrusions, leading to frequent confrontations between the two armies. Even after the October 2024 agreement, the Chinese military maintained powerful forces, including hypersonic missiles and stealth fighter jets, which it began deploying in 2020. Along the India-China border, China is building infrastructure directly connected to military deployment. Currently, China is building 629 villages near the India-China border. However, the area is nearly 5,000 meters above sea level, with winter temperatures as low as minus 30 degrees. The area is almost uninhabited, and it was an unspoken agreement for both armies to withdraw during the winter. It is hard to imagine people living in such a place. China seems to be constructing these villages to use as military bases.

The number of Chinese intrusions has steadily increased. Fig. 4 shows the number of incursions by Chinese troops into Indian territory during the 2010s (2011–2019). The number of intrusions continued to increase, reaching three times the figure in 2011. This long-term trend suggests that, even if tensions temporarily ease, clashes will increase again in the long term.

Fig. 4: Number of intrusions by Chinese troops into India along the India-China border

Prepared by the author.

2. Changes in weapons procurement sources

As mentioned above, India has begun formulating a military strategy to counter China. As part of this effort, India is working to procure weapons domestically. In reality, however, no country can manufacture all the weapons it needs domestically. Even the United States imports or leases some equipment.

The import and export of weapons concerns a country's long-term foreign policy. Even high-tech weapons tend to be subject to rough handling. For example, a fighter jet performing intense maneuvers is subjected to a force several times greater than gravity. It is like using a computer that occasionally gets banged around. They break down frequently, requiring a supply of repair parts and constant maintenance. Weapons that use ammunition require regular replenishment. Since weapons are expensive, they are typically usable for decades. Therefore, arms trade is associated with a country's long-term diplomatic relations, as it entails a decades-long supply of repair parts and ammunition. India's supply sources of weapons are changing―a reflection of its efforts to counter China.

(1) Decrease of Russian-made weapons

The most notable change related to India's sources of weaponry is the declining share of Russian munitions. Fig. 5 shows the share of weapon exports to India from the Soviet Union and Russia (red solid line)

Fig. 5: Trends in share of arms exports to India

Crafted by the author from a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database.

compared to the combined share from the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Israel (blue double line), based on a Stockholm International Peace Research Institute database. Russia's share, close to 70-80% around 2010, has decreased to 30-40% around 2020.

(2) Increase of French- and Israeli-made weapons

Meanwhile, the share of weapons exports to India from France and Israel increased. In arms trade with France and Israel, a relatively broad scope of technology transfer is available under favorable conditions for India, which is promoting the domestic production of weapons. On top of this, both suppliers have a wide array of modified parts installable to Russian weapons—avionics for Russian-made Sukhoi 30 fighter jets, night vision devices for T-90 tanks, and anti-aircraft missiles for Russian-made vessels. Israel also sells weapons that nobody else can supply: ordinarily, for example, French fighter jets cannot fire Russian missiles, or vice versa, due to the existence of a preventive locking device. But Israel sells software that unlocks the device. The situation may be embarrassing for such weapons manufacturers as France and Russia. Nonetheless, such software is valuable for a country like India that possesses weapons of various origins.

(3) American arms trade in two specific areas

As India turns to the United States for help to counter China, what is the current state of the American arms trade with India? Although American-made weapons account for only a tiny portion of the Indian military's total weapons stock, sales center around two areas: anti-China strike capabilities along the India-China border and anti-submarine capabilities in the Indian Ocean. The anti-China strike capabilities along the India-China border include C-17 large transport aircraft, C-130 medium transport aircraft, CH-47 large transport helicopters, AH-64 attack helicopters operational at high altitudes, air transportable M777 howitzers, and SkyGuardian unmanned reconnaissance and strike drones. These are all the Army and Air Force's airborne equipment needed by the 17 Corps assigned for military operations on the Tibetan plateau. The United States has also proposed exporting air-transportable Stryker armored vehicles to India, which will also deploy at the 17 Corps. On the other hand, the United States sold P-8 anti-submarine patrol aircraft, MH-60R anti-submarine warfare helicopters, and SeaGuardian unmanned surveillance aircraft, all of which constitute anti-submarine countermeasure systems of the Indian Navy.

Historically, US arms exports have aimed at providing recipient countries with capabilities instrumental to the US strategy. For example, in the 1980s, the United States provided Japan with quite a few anti-submarine patrol aircraft and helicopters. In those days, the United States wanted to keep track of Soviet ballistic missile submarines that were hiding in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk, with their missiles targeted against the US mainland. The only ice-free port available for Soviet submarines hiding in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk for a long time was Vladivostok; therefore, they had to travel between Vladivostok and the Sea of ​​Okhotsk through either the Soya Strait, the Tsugaru Strait, or the Tsushima Strait. It was reasoned that if Japan possessed anti-submarine capabilities and provided relevant information to the United States, the latter could easily keep track of Soviet nuclear-armed submarines. Japan deployed nearly 100 anti-submarine patrol aircraft, extraordinarily numerous compared to the Chinese military, which had around twenty at most. This happened because the United States wanted to provide Japan with capabilities instrumental to the US strategy.

Currently, the United States wants India to develop the ability to counterattack China along the India-China border and to combat Chinese submarines in the Indian Ocean. This explains why US arms exports to India focus on these two areas.

The question is how India perceives the US motives. India's preference for American-made equipment in the above two areas, while favoring Russian, French, and Israeli equipment in others, signifies that India does not unconditionally trust the United States. In particular, what concerns India associated with military strategy is whether American weapons, confirmed to be effective in countering China, will be likewise effective against Pakistan. At the time of the second Indo-Pakistani war in 1965, the United States embargoed arms to both India and Pakistan. Since then, India has emphasized its relationship with the Soviet Union, while Pakistan has focused on its ties with China. Reportedly, when selling F-16 fighter jets to Pakistan, the United States conditioned the sale that the country should not use them to attack India. If a similar condition accompanies the US sale, India is unlikely to buy American-made weapons in preparation for warfare against Pakistan. In short, India seems to look more to American-made weapons to counter China and to French, Israeli, or Russian weapons to counter Pakistan.

3. Lessons for Japan

As seen above, India holds three fronts simultaneously: Pakistan, the India-China land border, and the Indian Ocean. It is now shifting its Pakistan-focused military strategy to a China-centric one. In this situation, India is promoting military cooperation with the United States with China in mind and is increasing its arms purchases from the United States. That said, India will not be free from the possibility of war with Pakistan. In such a war, India would not trust American-made weapons but look to French- or Israeli-made instead of Russian-made weapons that have lost credibility.

What does this situation signify for Japan? Japan is promoting security cooperation with India, with China in mind. Japan is also becoming more attentive to the arms trade, joint development, and production of weapons: it has completed a joint development project for unmanned vehicles; it is now sounding the willingness of India to participate in the joint development of fighter jets between Japan, Britain, and Italy. Since India is endeavoring to minimize its imports of finished products from other countries, there is a scarce possibility that it will purchase completed fighter jets. Yet, there is still a possibility that India will participate in the joint development of engines and other parts installable in domestically produced fighter jets. As India rises, arms trade relations have the potential to develop into long-term bilateral security cooperation; they are worthwhile for Japan to pursue actively.

Japan needs to understand in this connection that Japanese-made weapons could be employed along the India-China border, in the Indian Ocean, and in a war against Pakistan. The cooperative relationship between Pakistan and China is advancing: most of the weapons possessed by Pakistan are Chinese-made; the country owes a massive debt to China, and Chinese troops are stationed in Pakistan. Pakistan is no doubt aligned with China. Japan should not be too considerate of Pakistan to sell weapons to India, as India is key to Japan's China strategy. Even if India uses weapons jointly developed and produced with Japan in a war against Pakistan, Japan should hold fast to a stance that it will not question the move or will not stop supplying parts and ammunition to India.

(Research Fellow, Hudson Institute; Associate Professor, Tokyo International University)

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