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India, a Leader in the Global South - What Is It Really Like?

Tomoko Kiyota

Introduction

When India took over the G20 presidency in December 2022, the term "Global South" became a keyword of Indian diplomacy. In January 2023, India hosted the "Voices of the Global South Summit" online, in which 125 countries participated. As G20 president, India succeeded in having the African Union (AU) access the G20, highlighting its leadership in the Global South domestically and internationally.

Many experts are discussing why the Modi administration, which has, in recent years, remained aloof from non-aligned gatherings, is now attempting to work with "Global South" countries. For example, Toru Ito tries to explain this move as 1) a response to Western criticism of India's neutral stance on Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 2) a countermeasure against China's growing influence, and 3) an attempt to focus on the issues facing the Global South to prevent the G20 from becoming dysfunctional due to the Ukraine issue.1

Kazutoshi Tamari notes, "For India, the Global South is merely a diplomatic tool to raise its presence by exploiting the fragmentation of the world." He adds that the Global South is not necessarily the centerpiece of India's overall foreign policy strategy. According to Tamari, India's external strategy is predicated on geopolitical conflict with China in the extended neighborhood (Asia, excluding Russia, the Indian Ocean coasts, and the Western Pacific), while the Global South is lower in priority from the perspective of India.2 It can be inferred that India has introduced a broader geopolitical concept of the Global South, as it has been outperformed by China in their geopolitical rivalry in South Asia and the extended neighborhood.

Not only Ito and Tamari but also other experts point out that India's geopolitical conflict with China has made the country turn its attention to the Global South. This article will discuss how substantially India behaves as a leader in the Global South compared to China and what specific actions India has taken to solve the challenges for Global South countries.

To state the conclusion first, India is expanding its development aid to and military engagement with other countries, although it trails China in terms of volume. Nonetheless, it is not that countries loyal to India are increasing due to such aid and engagement. It will take India some time to become a true leader in the Global South.

China as a leader in the Global South

The NIDS' China Security Report 2025 features "The Rising Global South and China," discussing what support China provides to the Global South to increase its influence.

  1. Exercising influence over the external actions of Global South countries through foreign aid and loans.
  2. Digital technology support and security cooperation contribute to the development and social stability in the Global South by improving their governance capabilities. However, they also contribute to the consolidation and survival of authoritarian regimes.
  3. Expanding military engagement by establishing overseas military outposts, increasing military exchanges, and providing military education to soldiers in developing countries. China may strengthen its "constructive intervention" in political and military domains to protect its overseas interests.
  4. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China "seeks to consolidate support from developing countries as their representative, and seize discourse power in the international community by leveraging UN agencies and multilateral platforms."
  5. As the US-China conflict intensifies, "China is developing assertive propaganda campaigns and diplomatic offensives toward the Global South to defend its ‘core interests.'"

Regarding 1) and 2), India is also actively providing foreign aid, loans, and technical assistance to the Global South, although outperformed by China in volume. The same is true for 3). Currently, the Indian government focuses most of its efforts on assertive propaganda campaigns and diplomatic offensives toward Global South countries. Yet, these activities fail to aim for definite goals like seizing discourse power, merely emphasizing its activities as a leader in the Global South. In the following, we will first review "foreign aid, loans, and technical assistance" India is currently providing to Global South countries, then give an overview of its "military engagement," and lastly, discuss its "propaganda campaigns and diplomatic offensives" and its real stature as a leader in the Global South.

Foreign aid, loans, technical assistance

According to Masaaki Nakatsu, who discussed India's development aid and its ambitions as a world power, India has provided development aid to other countries since Nehru's time, when India was a recipient of aid. India's ambition to improve its international status and its defeat in the 1962 India-China border war, coupled with the shocking fact that only a few countries supported India then, are said to have decisively urged India to promote development cooperation as a countermeasure against China. India's development aid differs from those of the member countries of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), considered "traditional donors," in that it features 1) a request-based principle and 2) attaching no conditionality. Fundamentally, Indian aid is available according to the 1954 Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, particularly the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. In fact, under the cover of development cooperation, India has meddled with the internal affairs of Nepal and Bhutan, situated along the border with China. Due to the absence of fundamental laws and strategic documents, India's strategic vision of development cooperation is obscure. It is largely circumscribed by political ideology and foreign policy, therefore described as "politically motivated development cooperation without strategy."3

As shown in the table below, the amount of aid budgeted by the Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) varies considerably from year to year. Additionally, there are significant differences between budget estimates (budget estimate allocations) and actual expenditures. According to the MEA's explanation to the Indian Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee, these discrepancies are attributed to the fact that India's aid is based on requests from recipient countries and budgetary execution is often delayed due to the slow progress of aided projects in those countries. Changing situations in Afghanistan and Myanmar are cited as examples.4

For example, the amount of India's aid for FY2023 reached 54 billion rupees, equivalent to approximately US$640 million (with an exchange rate of US$1.00 = 84.63 rupees). Although a simple comparison is not adequate, a research report based on the "White Paper on China's International Development Cooperation in the New Era," released in January 2021, states that China's foreign aid from 2013 to 2018 totaled 270.2 billion yuan (about US$42 billion), 127.8 billion yuan (47.3%) of which was grant aid.5 Given the total grant aid over six years being around US$19.8 billion, or US$3.3 billion per year, the amount of China's aid is more than five times India's.

Table 1. Country-Wise Development Aid: The MEA's Budget Estimate Allocations and Actual Expenditures (FY2021-FY2023)6

(Rs. in crores/10 million)

2021-22 2022-23 2023-24
Budget Heads BE Allocation Actual Exp. BE Allocation Actual Exp. BE Allocation Actual Exp.
Aid to Bangladesh 200.00 219.53 300.00 133.88 200.00 157.63
Aid to Bhutan 3004.95 1646.57 2266.24 2467.31 2400.58 2332.17
Aid to Nepal 992.00 446.43 750.00 434.27 550.00 657.38
Aid to Sri Lanka 200.00 48.56 200.00 126.04 150.00 119.37
Aid to Maldives 250.00 246.10 360.00 183.17 400.00 832.83
Aid to Myanmar 400.00 598.25 600.00 454.62 400.00 352.96
Aid to Other Developing Countries 130.00 83.70 150.00 89.99 150.00 112.85
Aid to African Countries 300.00 141.92 250.00 153.31 250.00 184.76
Aid to Eurasian Countries 100.00 83.96 140.00 54.75 75.00 28.75
Aid to Latin American Countries 40.00 37.69 40.00 2.79 50.00 51.13
Aid to Afghanistan 350.00 166.37 200.00 279.37 200.00 207.26
Aid to Mongolia 2.00 0.00 12.00 0.00 7.00 3.45
Aid to Mauritius 900.00 839.16 900.00 56.08 460.79 358.87
Aid to Seychelles 160 18.46 14.06 6.05 10.00 6.18
Total (Calculated by the Author) 7028.95 4576.7 6182.3 4441.63 5303.37 5405.59

According to the MEA's annual report, the incumbent Indian government emphasizes the Line of Credit (LoC) program, which is equivalent to Japan's loan support program or described as preferential or soft loans. Following the guidelines jointly formulated by the MEA and the Indian Ministry of Finance, 308 LoCs were approved over the past few years, amounting to approximately US$32 billion loaned to various countries. The breakdown is as follows: US$12 billion to African countries, US$17 billion to Asian countries, and US$ 2.8 billion to Latin American and CIS countries. These loans are used for infrastructure development, power generation, agriculture, industry, education, and healthcare. The total amount of new LoCs for 2023 was US$100 million.7

Regarding reduced budget allocations for technical and economic cooperation, the March 2020 Foreign Affairs Committee report noted that the MEA's expansion of LoCs is commendable but that more efforts are needed, given China's burgeoning "Belt and Road" initiative.8 Considering that India's national budget is increasing, the amount of LoCs will, no doubt, increase in the future.

India, which cannot compete with China in volume, is beginning to demonstrate international leadership through such initiatives that would be universally endorsed. Examples include the International Solar Alliance (ISA) and the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), both of which stemmed from Prime Minister Modi's leadership. India announced funding for both initiatives. Looking back to the years of the COVID-19 pandemic, India provided domestically produced vaccines to other countries. Although India had already made these efforts before it declared itself a leader in the Global South, they are now emphasized as significant contributions to the Global South.9

Military engagement

Like China, India is, as part of its commitments to the Global South, increasing its overseas military outposts, promoting military exchanges, and providing military education to soldiers from developing countries in the Global South.

First, regarding the establishment of overseas military outposts, in addition to its training facilities in Bhutan, India has recently created its outposts outside the region. For instance, the Indian Air Force operates a base called "Gissar Military Aerodrome (GMA)" in Ayni, near Dushanbe, Tajikistan. India has been operating this base, commonly known as the Ayni Air Base, with Tajikistan for approximately 20 years. During the turmoil in Afghanistan caused by the US troop withdrawal in August 2021, the Indian Air Force sent a C-17 from this base to Kabul to rescue 120 Indian nationals. There is another Indian Air Force base in Tajikistan, Farkhor Air Base. In Farkhor, there was originally an Indian medical facility; in the early 2000s, an air base building began to take over the functions of the GMA in Ayni. It was reported that Russian-made MiG-29s would be deployed at Farkhor Air Base; yet, no latest official announcement on this topic has been released by the Indian government or military.10 Tajikistan shares borders with China and Afghanistan and has easy access to Pakistan. During the recent India-Pakistan conflict, some newspaper articles went so far as to suggest the possibility that India may use its bases in Tajikistan to launch attacks on Pakistan.11

Meanwhile, in Madagascar and Oman, Indian Ocean coastal countries, there are, by many accounts, reconnaissance and patrol facilities for the Indian Navy. India has proposed to the Seychelles the construction of port facilities for joint use but is facing strong opposition in the country. Neither the 2015 agreement nor its amended 2018 version has been approved by the Seychelles parliament.12 As will be discussed later, the newly inaugurated Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu requires the Indian government to withdraw the Indian garrison, less than a military outpost, assigned to maintain and operate rescue and reconnaissance helicopters and small aircraft.

India is never behind China in promoting military exchanges, actively improving its presence through hosting joint training exercises and accepting military personnel from other countries. The Indian military hosts international security cooperation frameworks, such as the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) and MILAN. MILAN ("meeting" in Hindi) is a multinational joint training exercise initiated by the Indian Navy in 1995. It is held every two years, inviting chiefly neighboring countries. Held in the Bay of Bengal, MILAN 2024 was one of the largest exercises to date. Fifty countries participated, including the US military and the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.13 The IONS, conceived by India and launched in February 2008, is another international security cooperation framework. The IONS has an official membership of 25 littoral states of the Indian Ocean Region, participated also by nine observer countries, including Japan. There are three working groups in the IONS: that focus on humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), maritime security, and information sharing and interoperability. These groups hold regular meetings to advance cooperation.14

Recently, India and Tanzania hosted the joint exercise "Africa India Key Maritime Engagement (AIKEYME)," inviting navies from African countries. The term AIKEYME means "unity" in Sanskrit. The exercise was held off the coast of Tanzania for six days in April 2025, with the participation of the host countries, Comoros, Djibouti, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, and South Africa.15 While the Indian government's press release on the drill does not mention the "Global South," India's military cooperation with African countries around the Indian Ocean may help India to take the lead among Global South countries.

In 2024, the Indian Air Force hosted its first multinational exercise, "Tarang Shakti," in Rajasthan, inviting the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, Germany, Greece, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and the UAE. Eighteen countries also participated as observers; nearly 70 fighter jets joined the drill.16 The Indian Navy has so far traditionally played a pivotal role in promoting India's international military cooperation. India appears to be also ready to enhance its air presence.

Additionally, India, alongside China, is gradually being listed as a weapons supplier. According to SIPRI data, during the 25 years from 2000 to 2024, China sold and provided weapons worth $30.7 billion to other countries, while India sold only about $734 million of weapons. Most of the arms India supplied used to be secondhand, but over the past two decades, India has come to provide more new weapons. Most of the countries to which India supplies arms are in the Global South. Outside of South Asia, India sells or provides helicopters, patrol boats, and missiles to Armenia, Ecuador, Mauritius, Mozambique, Myanmar, the Seychelles, and Suriname.17

Propaganda campaigns and diplomatic offensives

As mentioned above, the Indian government is enhancing its aid to and military engagement with the Global South. It emphatically serves as the mouthpiece of the Global South and is actively pursuing propaganda campaigns and diplomatic offensives. Unlike China, which aims to seize discourse power to create an international order and rules that it desires, India is at best appealing to the outside world about its activities as a leader in the Global South.

For example, at the East Asia Summit (EAS) held in Laos in October 2024, Prime Minister Modi stated, "The most negatively affected countries, due to ongoing conflicts in various parts of the world, are those from the Global South. There is a collective desire for the restoration of peace and stability in regions such as Eurasia and the Middle East as soon as possible."18

In his closing remarks at the October 2024 BRICS Summit in Russia, Prime Minister Modi made a somewhat far-fetched reference to the Global South:

The hopes, aspirations and expectations of the countries of the Global south must also be kept in mind. During our Voice of Global South Summits and G20 Presidency, India put the voices of these countries on the global stage. I am pleased that these efforts are being strengthened under BRICS as well. Last year, countries of Africa were integrated into BRICS. This year, as well, several countries of the Global south have been invited by Russia.19

Furthermore, at the second India-CARICOM Summit, held in Guyana in November 2024, CARICOM countries extolled India's international influence and leadership in a joint statement:

They recognised India's significant global influence and its leadership as an advocate for the interests of the Global South, and applauded the commendable achievements of India, in its capacity as recent President of the G20 in pushing for economic growth, focusing on debt, bringing ambition on climate finance, technology and several areas of paramount importance to developing countries, including CARICOM.20

In his new book, Why Bharat Matters, Indian External Affairs Minister Jaishankar discusses how massive support India is providing to Global South countries, which in turn enhances India's international standing. The following is an excerpt from the book:

During this period, the footprint of India's international partnerships has also expanded perceptibly. It now ranges from renewable energy in the Pacific to community projects in the Caribbean. It could be the refinery in Mongolia, the Metro Express in Mauritius, a textile factory in Kenya or water supply in Tanzania, many India-supported endeavours have been game-changers for the partner countries.21

In an interview in Tokyo, Indian Ambassador to Japan Sibi George also stated as follows:

The Global South faces tremendous challenges... globalization contributed to them; a lot of difficulties are related to climate change, debt issues, price rise, and terrorism... The Global South needs to have a platform to raise their voice. India wanted to understand the issues by hearing from them and working with them so that these issues can be appropriately taken up at the G20 summit.22

Unlike China, India is not a permanent member of the UN Security Council; however, like Japan, it aims to achieve that status. During the 17th Lok Sabha, the Indian Parliamentary Committee on External Affairs questioned the MEA, "whether the aspect of inviting African Union, or their being part and parcel of the G20, will help India's aspiration for a permanent membership in the UN Security Council." The Ministry responded, "While we cannot make a direct linkage in the United National Security Council, what we can definitely say is that there will be a lot of goodwill for India. We have given a huge support by giving permanent membership to African Union in Delhi and we will be able to strengthen Africa's support for India in a very big way."23 The MEA's response is intriguing because it explains why India is seeking to take in the Global South rather than what India has done as a leader within it.

Conclusion: India, a leader in the Global South - What is it really like?

How much have India's aid and military cooperation contributed to expanding its diplomatic influence? The reality is that India's diplomatic influence has yet to outweigh China's. Developing countries welcome India's development cooperation following the principle of non-interference in internal affairs. However, China's munificent funds, as some researchers argue, have an irresistible appeal to developing countries with high development demands.24 Likewise, as for India's military engagement, more countries than now will be willing to agree to host Indian military bases only if India can provide them with ample funding.

This became apparent in the case of the Maldives. India, designating itself as a "net security provider" for the Maldives, has provided the country with substantial aid. However, pro-China President Mohamed Muizzu launched "India Out" campaigns during the latest election period, calling for the withdrawal of Indian troops from the Maldives. He fulfilled that election pledge when he was elected President in November 2023. Only about 80 Indian soldiers were stationed in the Maldives to maintain and operate helicopters and small aircraft for rescue and reconnaissance purposes. President Muizzu's demand that India withdraw its troops worsened India-Maldives relations. Reportedly, President Muizzu visited China soon after he took office and signed a military assistance pact with Beijing, despite his earlier declaration that the Maldives would not allow any country to station its troops in the country.25 However, debt-ridden Maldives ended up asking India for loans; President Muizzu was obliged to repeat visiting India. The Maldives' ultimate recourse to India means that Indian aid is making a difference. However, these developments suggest that even small countries like the Maldives do not always pledge loyalty to India.

India's disgust with its neighboring countries, which try to keep on good terms with both India and China, no matter how much aid India gives them, may account for India's shift from its "Neighborhood First Policy" to the Global South. Burry Buzan also points out that India is trying to become an Asian and world power before establishing hegemony in South Asia26. India boasts overwhelming national power in South Asia, but Chinese influence has prevented it from becoming a regional hegemon. The India-Pakistan conflict in May 2025 has made it clear that India's military power does not necessarily overwhelm Pakistan's.

To what extent will countries outside of South Asia accept India as a leader in the Global South? The countries that fall under the Global South are not subject to a similar grouping as South Asian countries; each of them has a different perception.27 Additionally, besides India and China, several other countries, such as Indonesia and Saudi Arabia, call themselves leaders in the Global South. Although the Global South Summit gained support from many countries, none of the national leaders attended, except the opening and closing sessions. The India-Africa Forum Summit, a summit-level meeting between India and African nations, has not been held since 2015. As mentioned above, the construction of port facilities in the Seychelles remains deadlocked.

In my opinion, India's overriding goal is to increase its national interests by becoming a great power. Its weakness may be its inability to show the Global South how to steer global society as a great power. Due to its commitment to omnidirectional diplomacy, India cannot be anti-Western, anti-China, or anti-Russia; it cannot develop a grouping with specific countries into an alliance. India does not have a diplomatic agenda to spread, such as American democracy and capitalism. At present, India lacks the financial and military capabilities to lead the Global South. Even within India, some argue that money be spent on tackling domestic poverty rather than on increasing India's prestige through hosting international conferences such as the G20.28 The government's efforts to lift India's global image are questioned for their cost-effectiveness. It will take India some more time and toil to be recognized as a true leader in the Global South.

(Associate Professor, Nagasaki University)

(Translation by Tsutomu Inuzuka)

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