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Where the India-Pakistan Conflict Is Headed

Satoru Nagao

1. The Terrorist Attack in Kashmir and Pakistan's Involvement

A terrorist attack in Kashmir on April 22, 2025, triggered a relatively large-scale military confrontation between India and Pakistan from May 7 to 10, 2025. In this incident, 26 tourists—25 Indians and one Nepali—were executed in front of their families and friends after being identified by the terrorists as non-Muslims. Among the victims was a bridegroom on his honeymoon. The sight of his grief-stricken bride, crouched beside his dead body, sparked fierce anger across India.

Several circumstantial pieces of evidence were available to suggest foreign involvement in this attack rather than having been designed by local Kashmir residents. Above all, targeting tourists was unusual. Terrorist activities have been ongoing in Kashmir since the late 1980s, but tourists have rarely been targets. From what the present author heard in Kashmir, local residents do not attack tourists, who are their source of income.

Historically, Pakistan has been significantly involved in terrorism in Kashmir. Since its independence following the carnage involving India and Pakistan, the latter has been obsessed with the idea that India intends to destroy it. Its defeat in the 1971 Third Indo-Pakistani War made Pakistan aware that it could not defeat India with conventional forces. It has since pursued a strategy focusing on developing nuclear weapons and the "Bleed India with a Thousand Cuts" doctrine, which is based on supporting terrorists. This strategy posits that even a strong enemy could be weakened by inflicting a thousand minor wounds. This approach was developed by incorporating American military expertise Pakistan acquired when it supported anti-Soviet guerrillas during the 1979-89 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The Pakistani military's Inter-services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), which has commanded such operations, is known for its aggressive actions, at times uncontrollable by the Pakistani government.

The trend in yearly casualties in Kashmir also suggests Pakistan's involvement. This is because the Kashmir and Afghanistan situations are areas of security concern for Pakistan, and the terrorist activities in both regions are deeply connected. Terrorist activities in Kashmir intensified after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, declined after the US military deployed in Afghanistan following the 9/11 attacks in 2001, and are now almost controlled. The peculiar situation is that terrorists trained in Pakistan—located between Afghanistan and Kashmir—move to Afghanistan when there is fighting there and to Kashmir when there is no fighting in Afghanistan. Viewed against this background, the recent attack also points to the possibility that terrorists trained by Pakistan infiltrated Kashmir.

Given this context, Indian Prime Minister Modi declared that he would hunt attackers and their supporters "to the ends of the Earth." Two weeks after the incident, on May 7, 2025, India launched airstrikes against five terrorist-related facilities in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and four in Pakistan proper.

Trend in Terrorism Casualties in India-Administered Kashmir

Crafted from the Institute for Conflict Management database ( https://www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/fatalities/india-jammukashmir ).

2. The Recent Indo-Pakistan Engagement

The Indian Air Force launched long-range missiles, bombs, and drones from within Indian territory. The rockets used had a range of approximately 50 to 500 km, allowing India to strike from its airspace all nine terrorist-related facilities within 110 km of the border. Initially, India's attacks were limited to terrorist-related facilities alone and did not target Pakistani military installations.

In response, Pakistan countered by scrambling fighter jets to fire from Pakistani airspace long-range missiles at Indian aircraft. Indian jets reciprocated by firing from Indian airspace long-range missiles at Pakistani aircraft. Both sides engaged in a large-scale aerial battle involving 125 aircraft without either side's fighters crossing into the other's territory. India claimed that none of its aircraft missed, whereas Pakistan asserted that they shot down five Indian jets. According to sources from the United States and France, at least one Indian Rafale fighter jet was destroyed by a Pakistani J-10, a Chinese-made fighter jet. India's attacks on terrorist facilities in Pakistan escalated into direct engagement between the Indian and Pakistani militaries.

Pakistan launched retaliatory strikes against India. They bombed an Indian Air Force base in Kashmir and conducted cross-border shelling of Kashmiri villages. The following day, Pakistan executed drone attacks on 36 Indian targets with a fleet of 300 to 400 drones. India responded with massive airstrikes and drone attacks, launching numerous drones toward key Pakistani air force bases and neutralizing Chinese-made air defense radars. Pakistani Prime Minister Sharif declared they would "fight to the last drop of blood."

An assessment was that Pakistan had no advantage in the exchange of airstrikes. The military expenditure ratio between India and Pakistan was significantly in India's favor, at 9 to 1. In addition, Pakistan was facing insolvency, borrowing funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Domestically, fighting with the Taliban and the Balochistan Liberation Army was intensifying. On top of these, Pakistan was exporting ammunition to Ukraine. The country could not use up all its ammunition in warfare with India. If discovering that Pakistan had almost exhausted its munitions, India, which initially sought to minimize military action, might change its mind to deal a fatal blow to an ammunition-depleted Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan wanted to secure a ceasefire before its ammunition ran out. To this end, Pakistan could have resorted to nuclear saber-rattling at an early stage of the conflict.

On May 10, 2025, Pakistan launched a ballistic missile; reportedly, the National Command Authority, the highest decision-making organ for nuclear weapons operations, was convened. Instead of issuing a direct threat, Pakistan began releasing news hinting at its preparedness to use nuclear weapons.

On the same day, May 10, 2025, US President Trump tweeted that India and Pakistan agreed to a full and immediate ceasefire after mediation by the United States. Almost concurrently, India and Pakistan announced a ceasefire. Despite subsequent cross-border attacks by Pakistan and retaliatory attacks of a similar scale by India, attacks by both sides largely ceased, leading to an armistice. The Pakistani military appears to have directly proposed a truce to the Indian counterpart. The extent of the Trump administration's involvement remains a matter of debate, but many agree in admitting some contribution of the United States. Pakistan, unable to exhaust its ammunition, sought a ceasefire from India while insinuating nuclear threats, and India accepted.

3. Future Implications

The recent India-Pakistan conflict is estimated to have various implications.

The recent India-Pakistan military engagement may have already had some impact on China. During this conflict, Pakistan emphasized the excellent quality of its Chinese-made weaponry. It claimed that its J-10 fighter jets shot down three of India's much more expensive French-made Rafale fighter jets. It has so far been confirmed that one Rafale jet is missing. However, it remains uncertain whether the Indian fighter jet was shot down by a Chinese-made fighter jet. In any case, the reputation of the Chinese-made weapon has grown.

China's growing reputation for manufacturing high-quality weapons could lead to an expansion of its influence. Even high-tech weapons may be subject to occasional rough handling. It is like using a PC and accidentally banging it now and again. This naturally causes frequent breakdowns, requiring repairs and spare parts supply. For weapons that fire ammunition, resupply is crucial. If Chinese-made weapons are favored and sold globally, more countries will buy spare parts and ammunition from China. This will allow China to learn about the military capabilities of those countries through acquiring information on weaponry maintenance and ammunition consumption. The long life of weapons may also contribute to a prolonged dependence on China for weapons supply. As a result, China's influence would expand. Previously, Chinese weapons had a relatively small amount of usage in actual combat situations, and their performance has not undergone assessment. From this point on, the expansion of China's influence as a weapons supplier may be a topic of concern.

Next, let us consider the implications for India. In recent years, India has been shifting its military forces from the India-Pakistan border to the India-China border. This was a welcome development for Japan's China strategy. However, India might now consider restraining this movement of its armed forces.

If India can significantly increase its defense spending in the future, expenditures for the recent India-Pakistan conflict may not matter. During the recent conflict, India used a large volume of ammunition, which required replenishment; in addition, both sides conducted combat operations with "massive fleets of drones" to appeal to their citizens, which could potentially help foster a nationwide understanding in each country of the direction of increasing defense spending. Since, at this moment, India has designated defense spending worth only less than 2% of GDP, there is room for multiplying it. Assuming that India's overall defense spending increases, even if India slows down the shift of its armed forces from the India-Pakistan border to the India-China border, its anti-China capability would continue to be strengthened, posing no problem. However, if India's defense spending does not increase sufficiently, its further commitment to fighting Pakistan will likely strain the budget and resources earmarked for a potential confrontation with China.

The recent India-Pakistan conflict could affect the relationship between the Modi and Trump administrations. President Trump suggested his actions led to a truce. Yet, India asserts that the ceasefire was directly proposed by the Pakistani military to the Indian counterpart, not mediated by the United States. Trump himself, during a visit to a US military base in Qatar, stated, "I don't want to say I did, but I sure as hell helped settle the problem between Pakistan and India last week," slightly adjusting his stance that his administration directly brokered the ceasefire.

India, a goliath compared to Pakistan, potentially holds an advantageous position in bilateral negotiations and, therefore, does not desire US mediation. Conversely, Pakistan desires support from the United States and China to compensate for its weaker position. Given that Vice President Vance and Secretary of State Rubio had repeatedly worked on both India and Pakistan, it is likely that their contact encouraged Pakistan to call India for a ceasefire.

Considering this, while it may be an exaggeration to say that the Trump administration brokered the India-Pakistan ceasefire, it possibly contributed somehow. Ultimately, the implications for US-India relations will depend on what position Prime Minister Modi will take. He keeps silent on the Trump administration's mediation, likely attempting to say nothing on the matter as the best way to avoid embarrassing the Trump administration.

In any case, to persuade India to align with the anti-China strategies of Japan, the United States, and Australia, the three nations need to support India's Pakistan strategy. Although Pakistan does not wish to be entirely dependent on a specific country, 80% of its weapons are already Chinese-made, it owes significant debt to China, and it is hosting Chinese troops in its territory. It is reasonable to conclude that the significance of maintaining amicable relations with Pakistan has already diminished for Japan, the United States, and Australia. The challenge for the three nations may be how far they can shift their policy toward Pakistan to one more advantageous to India.

Lastly, the implications for Japan. The missile and drone attacks in the recent India-Pakistan conflict were aimed for political rather than military gains. They reflect a latest trend in warfare: with the prevalence of social media, conflicting sides launch missiles and drones aiming for "instagrammable" shots. A similar situation has just occurred between Israel and Iran. It requires no stretch of the imagination to suggest that similar conflicts could happen between Japan and China or Japan and North Korea. It is vital for Japan not to view the recent missile and drone strikes as something happening in a distant country but to keep in mind that such events could occur around Japan, demanding us to consider the use of "counter-strike capabilities."

(Research Fellow, Hudson Institute; Associate Professor, Tokyo International University)

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