proposal

India's Diplomacy with the United States and Russia
(The transcript of the Lecture)

Mari Izuyama

Introduction

This paper discusses the balance between India's relationships with the United States and Russia in India's diplomacy, as highlighted by the war in Ukraine. First, it examines India's balancing diplomacy and the concept of "strategic autonomy." Then, it explains why Russia is important to India, both geopolitically and as a weapons supplier. Comparing India-Russia relations with those between India and the United States leads us to conclude that India's trust-based relationship with the United States is still a "work in progress."

The "strategic autonomy" is not often explicitly stated in Indian official documents. However, the 2018 Annual Report of India's Ministry of External Affairs articulates the idea and India's commitment to "its engagement with all the major powers of the world, taking independent decisions in the national interest." This notion of strategic autonomy, implying distancing from alliances, was not well-received by the US strategic community. Consequently, it became nearly obsolete after Prime Minister Modi mentioned it at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018. Modi's Shangri-La speech enumerates India's engagement with Russia, China, and the United States, respectively, as examples demonstrating India's "strategic autonomy," which researchers and experts termed "multi-alignment."

Why does India believe that there is much point in engaging with Russia? Firstly, India's geopolitical outlook plays a significant role. India perceives international relations as fundamentally shaped by the relationships between the three great powers: the United States, China, and Russia. Therefore, India carefully observes the power configuration among these three nations and seeks to influence it in a way favorable to India. It aims to adroitly manage the Russia-China-India trilateral relationship, which is subordinate to the broader US-China-Russia relationship. India appears to be striving to act as a "balancer" by preventing Russia and China from confronting the United States too aggressively on the one hand and by ensuring that it should not be isolated within the Russia-India-China framework on the other hand. By embracing this role as a "balancer," India, as a maritime power, collaborates with the Quad to uphold a "rules-based order," whereas, as a continental power, it continues to need the presence of Russia to deter Chinese aggression in border areas. For instance, India and China reached an agreement to withdraw their troops along parts of the India-China border at a sideline event of the BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024. Russia is believed to have contributed to it in some way or other. It is undeniable that Russia acts as a buffer between China and India.

The second reason India is valuing Russia stems from their strong military equipment bonds and profitable, cheap oil imports from Russia. As of 2020, arms imports from Russia had already fallen to less than half of India's total arms imports. Yet, according to Lalwani and Sagerstrom's estimates (2021), the proportion of Russian-made weapons in India's existing arsenal remains high. Although "de-Russification" has progressed in the Navy, with Russian-made weapons accounting for about 40% of its arsenal, Russian-made weapons still constitute 80% of the Army's arsenal and 60% of the Air Force's arsenal. While arms imports from the United States have increased in the naval air force, over 60% of navy vessels are still Russian-made. In the Air Force, US imports are limited to transport and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) aircraft like the C-130, C-17, and P-8, with no fighter jets yet.

Evolution of the US-India Strategic Partnership

The US-India strategic partnership began with President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000 (Clinton-Vajpayee Joint Statement).

This partnership emerged as India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, and the Kargil Crisis, a large-scale confrontation just short of war that erupted between the two effective atomic powers in 1999. The United States intervened to prevent further escalation, concluded that Pakistan was responsible for the crisis, and demanded the withdrawal of its troops. At the time, the United States commended India for its restraint in not conducting airstrikes across the Line of Control (LOC) into Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. This event led India to perceive, for the first time, that the United States was treating it fairly. As a result, after 9/11, India participated in Operation Enduring Freedom (e.g., escorting US naval vessels through the Strait of Malacca).

From the US-India strategic partnership that began this way, India anticipated the transfer of technology from the United States more than a shared strategic vision. For example, the "Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)" joint statement issued in September 2004 highlighted enhanced cooperation in three areas: nuclear, space, and high-tech trade (the so-called "Trinity"). This implies that India wants sanctions due to its atomic tests lifted or the transfer of US technology to India unblocked rather than cooperating with the United States on an equal footing.

US discontent with India's prioritizing weapon performance and technology over shared strategic interests with its partners is captured succinctly by Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. In 2011, India excluded the US F-16 and F-18 from its selection process for 126 medium multi-role combat aircraft (MMRCA). Then, Tellis remarked, "India settled for an airplane rather than a relationship." (Ashley Tellis 2011).

The US-India strategic partnership progressed alongside negotiations for a civilian nuclear cooperation agreement, as well as for the lifting of sanctions and technology transfer restrictions resulting from India's past nuclear tests. Significant arms transfers began following the US-India civilian nuclear cooperation agreement in 2008.

In 2016, the United States designated India as a Major Defense Partner, opening the way for technology transfers comparable to those with its allies. In the same year, the two countries also signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), equivalent to an ACSA. The conclusion of two information security agreements followed suit in 2018 and 2022.

The relaxation of US domestic regulations regarding technology transfers to India, coupled with successive agreements ensuring interoperability between the US and Indian militaries, has accelerated US arms transfers to India. SIPRI statistics show that arms transfers, which had carried only a few small-amount deals in the 1990s, ultimately began to increase in the 2000s. Prompted by the Indian Ocean tsunami cooperation among Japan, the United States, Australia, and India, the United States transferred to India landing platform docks in 2006, which was the first big deal to be followed by a contract to sell C-130 transport aircraft in 2008, the same year the US-India nuclear cooperation agreement was concluded. Then, in 2009, the two countries signed a sales contract to sell P-8 maritime patrol aircraft, followed by a C-17 (transport aircraft) sales contract in 2011 and a C-130 sales contract in 2013. The sale of the AH-64 Apache attack helicopters in 2015 was the first instance of transferring combat weapons. However, deploying the lot contracted in 2015 did not occur until 2020. This suggests that the history of the US-India arms supply relationship is very short compared to that of Russia and India.

US-India Relations Following the Ukraine War

After the Ukraine War began, US-India relations initially saw some discord due to the two countries' different stances on sanctions against Russia. However, in 2023, both countries came to share the same recognition that India's strategic value to the United States remains unchanged amidst intensifying US-China competition.

The joint statement issued during Prime Minister Modi's visit to the United States in February 2025 suggests a revitalization of defense cooperation, particularly defense-industrial cooperation. The statement mentions defense cooperation in precedence of technological collaboration and uses the term "interoperability," which was not used commonly in the past. Furthermore, in addition to listing specific names of previously supplied weapons, it also mentions unlocking fifth-generation fighter jet technology. A new development is the commitment of both countries to the joint development of autonomous weapons. The joint statement specifies concrete joint ventures between Anduril and Mahindra and between L3 Harris and Bharat Electronics.

The joint statement also refers to logistics cooperation and information sharing to support the deployment of both militaries in the Indo-Pacific. This description and the 2023 joint statement suggest that India is expected to provide MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) service in the Indo-Pacific. In 2024, Lockheed Martin and Tata Advanced Systems announced their agreement to establish a C-130 MRO facility.

Another noteworthy development is a joint venture between Tata Advanced Systems and Lockheed Martin that is constructing C-130 tail sections in Hyderabad. In addition, a Tata-Boeing joint venture is constructing fuselage components for the AH-64 (Apache) attack helicopter. This suggests that India is forming a crucial part of the US defense supply chain and is becoming increasingly indispensable to the United States.

Should US investment in India advance not only in weapon production but also in semiconductor manufacturing, India might become an integral part of the semiconductor supply chain.

The above joint statement also touches upon multilateral cooperation, with the FOIP (Free and Open Indo-Pacific) and the Quad mentioned first, followed by I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, and US). Regarding India's particular concern about Pakistan-based terrorism, the statement includes language that names Pakistan and demands the extradition of terrorists.

Trump Tariffs and India

While economics is not my specialty, it appears to me that India is relatively optimistic about Trump tariffs. The reasons for this optimism include that the total value of trade accounts for a relatively small percentage of India's GDP to begin with, the not-so-large trade surplus with the United States compared to China, and India's experience of tariff wars during the first Trump administration, which imposed high tariffs on steel and aluminum imports from India. A look at some fact sheets on the US economy suggests that, regarding reducing the trade deficit with India, the United States will likely ask India to increase its purchasing of oil, natural gas, and weapons. The related deals could profit India, depending on the course of negotiations.

In the recent India-Pakistan crisis, India does not acknowledge that the Trump administration brokered its ceasefire. Since the 1999 Kargil Crisis, the United States has repeatedly intervened whenever Pakistan has threatened to use nuclear weapons. However, India's position is that it accepts mediation for crisis management to control Pakistan but opposes mediation regarding the Kashmir issue.

(Chief Research Fellow, National Institute for Defense Studies)

(Edited by the SSDP Secretariat from the transcript of the same titled lecture.)

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