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Japan-India Security Cooperation in India's Grand Strategy

Kazutoshi Tamari

Introduction

Japan and India, which have strengthened their intergovernmental cooperation since the beginning of the 21st century, are approaching a turning point in their security cooperation―the "Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation between Japan and India" that they announced in 2008 will be revised in 2025.1

This paper will first look at the overall picture of India's external strategy, then review the progress of Japan-India security cooperation to date and relevant issues, and consider the position of the Japan-India relationship in India's external relations.

Chronological Table of the Progress of Japan-India Security Cooperation

  • 1998: Indian nuclear tests. Economic sanctions by Japan, the US and Canada
  • 2000: Japan-India Security Dialogue
  • 2005: Global Partnership
  • 2006: Strategic and Global Partnership
  • 2008: Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation
  • 2009: Action Plan Based on the Joint Declaration
  • 2014: Special Strategic and Global Partnership, MOU on Defense Cooperation and Exchanges
  • 2015: Agreement on the Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology, Agreement on the Protection of Classified Military Information
  • 2016: Japan-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)" strategy
  • 2020: Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed
  • 2024: MOI for the joint development and production of the Unified Complex Radio Antenna (UNICORN), a naval ship communication antenna system
  • 2025: Revision is planned of the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation

Source: Prepared by the author.

1. India's Grand Strategy as Depicted in India's World

As the incumbent Chief of Defence Staff of India, Anil Chauhan, argued,2 even though the Indian government has not documented an equivalent of the "national security strategy" of the United States or Japan, India nonetheless possesses a coherent national strategy. Then, what are the contents of India's national security strategy, and how can we identify them? Here, I want to review the discussions on "India's Grand Strategy" carried in the inaugural issue of a foreign policy magazine India's World, which was inaugurated in 2024 to present India's perspective to the world.

C. Raja Mohan, chair of the editorial advisory board of the new magazine and a visiting professor at the National University of Singapore, points out four elements of India's Grand Strategy to aim for a "Viksit Bharat" in 2047, the 100th anniversary of the country's independence. First, as an inevitable consequence of its domestic economic system and geopolitical orientation, India's cooperation with the Soviet Union during the Cold War was influenced by its domestic socialist economic policies. However, now that India has shifted to economic liberalism, its relations with the West and Asia are more important.3 Second, the "strategic autonomy" that India currently articulates instead of non-alignment during the Cold War era was initially a strategy to avoid dependency on the United States. It now rather focuses on reducing dependency on China and Russia by strengthening ties with the West.4 Third, India "embarked on the project of constructing a multipolar world in the 1990s, in partnership with Russia and China" to counter the Western-led world order. However, as the threat of China became critical for India, it has chosen to cooperate with the United States to avoid Chinese domination of Asia, that is, to aim for a "multipolar Asia" rather than a "multipolar world."5 Finally, since the 2023 G20 summit, India has strengthened its commitment to the Global South: India is not attempting to provoke a backlash in the developing world against the Western-led international order but is rather aiming to maintain cooperation with the developed world and to enhance its presence bridging the two camps.6

Happymon Jacob, editor of India's World and an associate professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, argues that the characteristics of India's foreign policy are a "multi-alignment" approach in contrast to the former non-alignment, the promotion of economic partnerships such as FTA, and the pursuit of practical benefits over ideology.7 He then enumerates five paradoxes inherent to India's Grand Strategy. First, despite its global rise, India's influence in South Asia is declining dramatically.8 Second, different situations and partnerships are emerging on India's continental and maritime fronts. Regarding the Indo-Pacific region, India is doing well in forging collaboration and cooperative frameworks with principal countries. However, India finds no other major partner than Russia on the continental Asia, where it could encounter direct threats. Its maritime partners do not endorse India's alignment with Russia.9 Third, economic development is essential for India to counter China as a strategic challenge, but paradoxically, India's economy depends on China.10 Fourth, India is obliged to maneuver adroitly between the superpowers of China, the United States, and Russia.11 Finally, India is still a developing country prioritizing domestic development; it cannot allocate sufficient resources on the diplomatic front to behave as a great power.12

Rajesh Rajagopalan, a professor at Jawaharlal Nehru University, suggests that China, India's biggest adversary, is achieving economic development more rapidly than India in the long term, that the gap between the two in material capabilities widens, and that China also surpasses India in political influence in Asia. He argues that India has pursued alignment with the United States and its allies to counter China.13

Raja Mohan and Rajagopalan, in particular, are pro-American pundits, speaking for the Indian strategic community. They do not represent the strategic orientation of India as a whole, nor do they speak for the government. Yet, concepts such as strategic autonomy, multilateral cooperation, and multipolarity are employed officially by the Indian government; aside from their conclusion encouraging further collaboration with the United States, their discourse explains the Indian government's current policy.

The above discussions are helpful in summarizing India's current external strategy in its entirety. India consistently aims to become a great global power. However, it is not yet at a stage where it can independently envision a new world order. Its immediate strategic goal is to counter the imminent threat from China. Rather than committing to specific allies, it is attempting to ensure strategic autonomy through strengthening multilateral cooperation with all of the principal countries except China. In the maritime domain, India has succeeded in expanding cooperation within the Indo-Pacific region and along the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). On land, by contrast, India faces challenges in preparing for threats from China and Pakistan. Therefore, it is attempting to strengthen its national defense system by advancing cooperation with the West. This is a brief outline of India's current strategy.

2. Six Issues in Japan-India Security Cooperation

There is scarce mention of Japan in the above three essays on India's Grand Strategy. Japan is mentioned only as one of the US allies; none of the authors made a single substantive reference to India's relationship with Japan. The present author, currently living in New Delhi as of May 2025 for research purposes, conceives a similar impression that Japan keeps a low profile in the Indian strategic community's broader discussions about India's military security. On the other hand, looking at the question from a different angle, Japan-India cooperation has been steadily expanding; Japan is establishing itself as a trustworthy partner in India's external relations. Bilateral security cooperation covers a variety of areas. I will discuss it under six entries.

(1) China

Quite understandably, the rapid progress of Japan-India security cooperation has been based on, if not officially expressed, the common recognition that China is the overriding and most imminent threat to both countries.14

However, Japan's approach to India since the beginning of the 21st century appears to have initially followed the example of the United States rather than having been based on an independent strategic judgment. Following President Bill Clinton's visit to India in March 2000, which marked a turning point in the improvement of US-India relations, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori visited India in August of the same year.15

China's shadow was behind the development of strategic relations between Japan and India. A series of large-scale anti-Japanese demonstrations in China in 2005 led to a heightened threat perception of China among the Japanese people. India's long-standing wariness of China, dating back to the 1962 border conflict, was rekindled by the 2006 border dispute over the easternmost state of Arunachal Pradesh, in which India protested against China's hardline stance.16 With this worsened India-China relations as background, Japan and India forged a "Strategic and Global Partnership" in 2006.

However, the Japan-India relationship since then has not focused solely on hedging against China. Since 2014, before Japan proposed its "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy in 2016, both countries have been enhancing cooperation through their activities in the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, it seems to be out of consideration not to provoke China too much that India advocated for an "inclusive" Indo-Pacific while Japan altered its Indo-Pacific strategy to a "vision."17

Since then, the vicissitudes of Japan-China relations and those of India-China relations have been largely synchronized. In 2020, when the world was hit by the Corona pandemic, Japan-China relations quickly deteriorated, mirroring the situation with US-China relations. In the same year, Indian troops clashed with Chinese counterparts in the Galwan Valley in the northern Ladakh region, and India-China relations dipped to a new low after the 1962 border conflict. Afterward, as Japan and China improved their relations from the end of the Kishida administration to the Ishiba administration, India and China reached an agreement in October 2024 to end the border standoff between their militaries that had continued since 2020. They are working at a rapid pace to restore their relations.18

In this way, the Japan-India relationship stands on a shared recognition that China poses the greatest threat to both countries and on the need to avoid full-scale confrontation with China due to their inability to compete with it on their own. In the field of China studies, India appreciates Japan's many years of outstanding research efforts, and their academic circles are cooperating in China studies.

(2) Maritime Security

While the China issue forms the background to Japan-India security cooperation, the specifics of cooperation are chiefly related to maritime security.

Japan-India maritime security cooperation predates its progress after the turn of the twenty-first century. Its origins can go back to 1999, a time when Japan was imposing substantial economic sanctions on India due to its nuclear tests. In that year, a Japanese cargo ship was attacked by pirates in the Strait of Malacca, prompting the Indian Navy to conduct search operations in the Indian Ocean. This incident led to the first Japan-India Security Dialogue in July 2000.19 In short, bilateral maritime security cooperation had begun even before the two countries embarked on "strategic" cooperation with China in mind.

Since then, Japan and India have promoted multifaceted maritime security cooperation, not only to ensure the security of sea lanes but also to respond to disasters and terrorism and to counter China's maritime expansion. In 2007, Japan first participated as an observer in the joint maritime exercise Malabar; it has officially been participating in the drill since 2015. Bilateral naval joint exercises have also been conducted since 2012. The signing of the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in 2020 has further strengthened cooperation between the navies of the two countries. In 2018, the two militaries enlarged joint training to other branches than the Navy.

Japan-India maritime security cooperation developed into multilateral cooperation through various Indo-Pacific frameworks. Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" strategy, first proposed in 2016, stemmed from Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's "Confluence of the Two Seas" speech delivered at the Indian parliament in 2007. In 2014, Prime Minister Abe proposed cooperation associated with the Indo-Pacific to Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, paving the way for the current landscape of multilateral initiatives in the region.20

The Japan-US-Australia-India Strategic Dialogue (QUAD), which currently constitutes the nucleus of the Indo-Pacific cooperation, is a cooperation that began in 2007 in response to the off-Sumatra earthquake. It was temporarily suspended due to discord between India and Australia but went back on track in 2019. The QUAD is now a vital plurilateral framework for Japan and India. At the 2022 QUAD summit, the parties concerned agreed on the "Indo-Pacific Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness (IPMDA)."

Due to space limitations, I will refrain from offering further details. Yet, maritime security cooperation, built up through bilateral, Indo-Pacific, and QUAD frameworks, constitutes a substantial part of Japan-India security cooperation.21

(3) India's Defense Equipment

While Japan-India maritime security cooperation is an exemplary model of regional cooperation, bilateral cooperation on defense equipment has yet to be realized.

In 2014 or thereabout, when Japan abolished the "Three Principles on Arms Exports and Their Related Policy Guidelines" and formulated instead the "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology," negotiations were underway regarding the sale of the amphibious aircraft, US-2, to India. In 2015, the Japanese and Indian governments signed an agreement on the transfer of defense equipment and technology, as well as one on the protection of classified military information. These agreements aimed to facilitate the transfer of US-2. However, the US-2 sales vanished due to issues such as price.

Nonetheless, the interests regarding defense equipment cooperation coincided between India, seeking to diversify supply sources and domestically produce defense equipment, and Japan, aiming to promote the export of defense equipment under its new national security strategy. Both countries continued their efforts to explore the possibility of implementing defense equipment transfer.22 India, one of the world's largest arms importers, is eager to nurture its domestic defense industry and to promote arms exports under the economic policies of "Make in India" and "Self-reliant India (Atmanirbhar Bharat)." India is also endeavoring to invite Japanese and other foreign companies to operate in the country by lowering the upper limit of foreign direct investment (FDI) for defense sector companies.23

In 2018, the two countries agreed to initiate a collaborative research project aimed at developing an unmanned ground vehicle (UGV). In November 2024, they reached an agreement on the transfer of the UNICORN (Unified Complex Radio Antenna), a state-of-the-art naval ship communication antenna system.24 A smooth transfer of the UNICORN would mean that Japan-India security cooperation has overcome a long-standing challenge.

(4) Aid for Infrastructure Development in India

Although outside the bilateral security cooperation framework, Japan's support for infrastructure development in India is also related to security.

Since Japan initiated Official Development Assistance (ODA), it has continued to assist India to date. Since 2004, India has been the overriding recipient country of Japan's ODA.25 Japan cooperated on India's national infrastructure projects, such as the Delhi Metro, which opened in 2002 and transformed the lives of the citizens, and the Mumbai–Ahmedabad High-Speed Rail Corridor (under construction).

It is noteworthy in this context that Japan is involved in development projects in sensitive areas related to India's national security. In northeastern India, where the Indian government was reluctant to accept foreign involvement due to issues such as separatist movements and ethnic conflicts, Japan has been providing full-scale support for infrastructure development since the two countries launched the Act East Forum in 2017. Although Japan's assistance for northeastern India focuses on infrastructure support related to civic life, such as roads and water supply, it proceeds with the strategic aim of building connectivity in the Indo-Pacific region with an eye on China.26 For India, the development of the northeastern region is crucial to maintaining the country's integrity; improved road infrastructure is essential for a rapid deployment of troops on the eastern border with China.

Japan is also involved in infrastructure development in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, India's crucial outpost in the Indian Ocean. Power infrastructure development is underway as a Japanese ODA project;27 NEC laid optical undersea cables connecting the islands to the Indian mainland.28

The Indian government's decision to allow Japan to provide support for security-sensitive regions, which had previously been off-limits to foreign countries, is seen as a sign of India's particular trust in and expectations for Japan.

(5) Space and Cyberspace

Cyberspace and space are relatively new intensive areas of Japan-India security cooperation. Their significance in the security context is increasing, particularly as China, a common threat to both countries, is improving its capabilities in these domains.

The two countries launched a cyber ​​dialogue in 2012. For Japan, India was the second country to hold a bilateral cyber dialogue after the United Kingdom. As a result of these efforts, the two countries agreed on the "Japan-India Digital Partnership" in 2018 and on an MOU on cybersecurity cooperation in 2022, and also signed an agreement to launch a Quad Cybersecurity Partnership in the same year.

In the space field, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) signed an MOU on promoting space cooperation in 2016 and are working together on, among other initiatives, lunar exploration. Furthermore, based on the 2018 summit agreement, the Japan-India space dialogue has been held since the following year.

(6) Economic Security

Another new issue emerging between Japan and India is economic security. At the "2+2" meeting in August 2024, the two countries agreed on economic security cooperation, and the inaugural Japan-India dialogue on economic security took place in November of the same year. Although the Japanese government only provided for the initiative through the Economic Security Promotion Act in 2022, and the concept has only recently come into currency, Japan and India have been cooperating on issues now referred to as economic security for some time.

The foremost economic security issue between Japan and India is cooperation on scarce resources such as rare earth. Since 2010, when China's monopoly of rare earth resources was considered a grave problem, the two countries have been exploring cooperation, and in 2012, they signed an MOU on joint production.

Secondly, since the late 2010s, in addition to specific resources, issues of derisking and supply chain vulnerabilities have been recognized. The two countries, together with Australia, launched the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative in 2021.

The third issue is bilateral cooperation on strategic industries, such as the semiconductor industry, currently attracting the most attention. As the global shortage of semiconductors becomes a challenge, Japan is cooperating with India, whose goal is to produce semiconductors domestically to reduce its reliance on supplies from China. The two countries signed a memorandum of cooperation (MOC) on the Japan-India Semiconductor Supply Chain Partnership in 2023.

Conclusion

In early May 2025, India entered again into a confrontation with Pakistan, which, however, did not affect India's consistent recognition that China is the overriding threat to the country. With this threat perception as background, India has forged a strategic relationship with Japan. Yet, India does not expect direct contributions from Japan in dealing with land-based threats from China; Japan cannot supply India with vital defense equipment in the way Russia, the United States, Israel, and France do. Therefore, Japan keeps a low profile in discussions about India's foreign strategy.

Japan-India security cooperation has mainly progressed concerning sea areas, where India faces lesser or indirect threats than on land. A long history of Japanese development assistance helped foster a special trust in Japan among Indian people. Such trust is evident from India's acceptance of Japanese aid for infrastructure development in the northeastern region and the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—areas where India had previously refused foreign involvement, as well as for developing connectivity with other South Asian countries.

With the long-awaited transfer of defense equipment becoming a reality, Japan and India are expanding their bilateral cooperation to new areas, including cyberspace, space, and economic security. The soon-to-come revision of the 2008 Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation will usher in a new phase of Japan-India security cooperation. For India, which started reducing its reliance on Chinese supplies in 2020, cooperation with Japan as a reliable and comprehensive partner is becoming increasingly important.

This article primarily has discussed Japan-India security cooperation from the perspectives of the two countries. However, in the context of contemporary world politics, this cooperation has the potential to influence trends in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond. For this reason, bilateral security cooperation should adopt a broader perspective. Strengthening collaboration among Japan, India, the QUAD, and other Indo-Pacific nations could deter China's aggressive actions—which suggests that the Japan-India relationship could become a public good instrumental to global peace, transcending their respective national interests.

(Professor, Chukyo University)

(Translation by Tsutomu Inuzuka)

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