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China's Approach to "Kill ‘Three' Birds with One Stone" in Deep-Seabed Mining: International Marine Governance in the Absence of the United States

Introduction

In December 2024, the Chinese government announced that Beijing Pioneer Hi-Tech Development Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "BPC"), a Chinese state-owned enterprise established in 1993, would conduct a 20-day trial mining in the summer of 2025 to extract up to 7,500 tons of manganese nodules in international waters near Minamitorishima, the easternmost point of Japan. The mining site spreads on the deep seabed at depths of 5,000 meters or greater. China's mining area is marked along Japan's exclusive economic zone (EEZ).1 Since manganese nodules are rich in rare metals and relatively easy to mine, their future commercial development is considered promising. Earlier in October 2019, the BPC signed exploration contracts for the same area with the International Seabed Authority (ISA).2

Just as Trump's tariff offensive against China was blunted by China's rare earth embargo, the possession of scarce resources has a significant impact on the destiny of each nation in today's increasingly opaque international situation. China's focus on the deep seabed is often viewed purely in economic terms. However, its implications extend to the military and security realms as well.

According to well-informed sources in China, a People's Liberation Army fleet will accompany the coming trial mining by the BPC. Military escorts for resource exploration are not specifically prohibited under international law. Yet, there is information that the PLA team will conduct a detailed survey in the sea area, from the surface down to the deep seabed.

Looking at the relevant map to identify the mining area reveals an interesting fact. The mining area is located approximately halfway between Hawaii and Taiwan. In other words, if an emergency arises in Taiwan and US Indo-Pacific forces try to rush in from Hawaii, they must almost certainly pass through these waters. Regardless of whether it is collected by the PLA or the BPC, data from this area is, therefore, crucial for China to prepare for potential submarine warfare with the United States. The test mining, which is ostensibly aimed at exploring rare metal resources, is considered to serve for "Military-Civil Fusion" that the Xi Jinping administration has been advocating since 2015.

This speculation becomes even more plausible when considering the PLA's recent actions. In June 2025, with the BPC manganese nodule mining approaching, the PLA Navy conducted large-scale exercises in the Pacific. On June 7, the aircraft carrier Liaoning and other vessels entered Japan's EEZ around Minamitorishima. On June 9, the aircraft carrier Shandong and others also entered Japan's EEZ around Okinotorishima (China does not admit Okinotorishima as an island nor, therefore, admits the EEZ surrounding it). This was the first time that two Chinese aircraft carriers operated simultaneously in the Pacific, and also the first time that one crossed the so-called "second island chain" and advanced to the area around Minamitorishima. In other words, China began expanding its military activities into the waters including the BPC mining site around the same time as the BPC conducted a deep-seabed resources exploration. It seems that China is combining both military and economic means to expand its presence in the Pacific.

This article examines the trends of China's development of deep-seabed resources and discusses its international implications, considering China's cross-cutting pattern of behavior.

1. International Regimes Associated with the Deep Seabed

The current law of the sea is based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which was adopted in 1982. It allowed littoral states to establish their exclusive economic zones (EEZs), bringing approximately one-third of the world's sea areas under their jurisdiction. Since then, international focus has shifted to the order of the high seas, excluding those sea areas. All activities related to deep-seabed mineral resources under the high seas are controlled by the International Seabed Authority (ISA), established in Jamaica in 1994 based on UNCLOS.

The United States, which did not ratify UNCLOS, is not a member of the ISA either. At the time UNCLOS was signed, the United States was effectively the only nation in the world capable of developing the deep seabed. Since it was an irrational option for the United States to have its actions bound by an international organization like the ISA, the United States chose not to ratify UNCLOS. In other words, global governance over deep-seabed resources was established without involving the United States, making it institutionally easier for China to exert influence in the ISA.

Currently, the ISA manages three types of resources promising for commercial development: polymetallic/manganese nodules, polymetallic sulphides, and cobalt-rich ferromanganese crusts. It has been working on the formulation of regulations regarding the exploration and exploitation of each resource. Advancements in deep-seabed exploitation technology have shifted recent focus to the formulation of a mining code. In June 2021, the resource exploitation-oriented government of Nauru sent a letter to the ISA requesting the formulation of a mining code within two years.3 However, some NGOs expressed concerns about environmental and ecological damage to the deep seabed, which is an unknown field for humans. This move urged France to call for a ban on seabed exploitation, and other countries, including Canada and Mexico, claimed a moratorium (temporary suspension of discussion). As a result, a discordance has emerged between these nations and others, including China, in favor of a swift adoption of a mining code.4 A draft mining code is already at hand, but it was not adopted at the ISA general assembly in July 2025. Japan, likewise concerned with resource development, is taking a middle-ground position.

Deep seabed exploitation is accompanied by interstate competition, not only over the formulation of ISA rules, but also over premised technological superiority. In 2022, Nauru Ocean Resources Inc. (NORI), a subsidiary of Canada's The Metals Company (TMC), and Allseas of the Netherlands successfully test-collected and lifted 3,000 tons of polymetallic nodules from a depth of 4,000 meters in the Clarion-Clipperton Zone (CCZ) of the Pacific Ocean. For the first time since the 1970s, polymetallic nodules scattered on the seafloor were collected on a commercial scale.5 In February 2025, Japan's Pacific Metals Co., Ltd. (PAMCO) successfully conducted a test to produce 35 tons of high-quality nickel-copper-cobalt alloy and 320 tons of manganese silicate by using 2,000 tons of polymetallic nodules collected by NORI and Allseas.6 Following in the footsteps of the West, China announced its deep-seabed test mining off Minamitorishima.

The United States, a non-ISA member state, has no means of participating in these international trends. On April 25, 2025, President Trump issued a presidential order emphasizing the importance of rare earth resources in the deep seabed. The order announced a policy to improve capabilities for developing these resources.7 The United States is growing uneasy about the accelerating international momentum concerning the deep seabed. However, what it can do, as a non-UNCLOS country, is institutionally limited within relevant international organizations. On the other hand, it is relatively easy for China to manipulate the course of global governance regarding deep-seabed resource mining if unable to completely control it.

2. China's Efforts to Secure Its Maritime Interests in the High Seas

This section provides an overview of China's historical efforts to secure its maritime interests in the high seas.

So far, three Chinese organizations have entered into five exploration contracts with the ISA. Of the three of them, the longest-standing deep seabed development organization is the China Ocean Mineral Resource R&D Association (COMRA), which entered into exploration contracts with the ISA for a 75,000 km² polymetallic nodule mining area in the CCZ of the North Pacific in 2001, a 10,000 km² polymetallic sulfide mining area in the southwest Indian Ocean in 2011, and a 3,000 km² cobalt-rich crust mining area in the Northeast Pacific (Mariana Trench) in 2014. The COMRA, established by the State Council of China in 1990 for resource research and development in the international deep seabed, became the first organization in the world to secure mining areas for all three mineral resources.8

In addition, in 2017, China Minmetals Corporation, a major Chinese resource developer established in 1950, signed an exploration contract with the ISA for a 7.3 km² polymetallic nodule mining area in the CCZ.9 In 2021, as mentioned at the beginning of this article, the BPC was awarded by the ISA an exploration license for a 7.4 km² polymetallic nodule mining area in the Western Pacific Ocean (off Minamitorishima).10 All three entities are Chinese state-owned organizations.

China's emergence as a maritime power is relatively new, but the country has shown a strong interest in seabed resources from an early stage. It was as late as 1972 that China joined the United Nations; until then, it had been excluded from international discussions leading up to the establishment of UNCLOS. When China finally joined the United Nations with the support of developing countries, resource nationalism was on the rise in those countries. Their discontent was directed at developed countries. From the outset, China participated in international maritime frameworks fearing not to lose out on the North-South issue. For this reason, China opposed the "hegemonic," unilateral deep-seabed development by the United States and supported the ISA's "single regime" for the international management of deep-seabed resources. It also sought to secure its own maritime interests within international frameworks through efforts to conduct surveys for polymetallic nodules in the Pacific Ocean as early as from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s.11 Since the 1980s, Chinese literature on maritime strategy has always emphasized securing the country's interests in the high seas.

Until the 2010s, China's focus on marine development had been placed on strengthening control over the sea areas it claimed as within its jurisdiction. In recent years, however, it has been shifted to the open ocean and the deep seabed. China possesses the world's largest marine scientific expedition fleet. Ten vessels of four types belong to the Chinese Academy of Sciences alone.12 Among other innovations are the "Striver" deep-sea manned submersible, which can dive to depths of over 10,000 meters and conducted 1,433 deep-sea surveys by the end of 2024, and the deep-sea autonomous underwater robot "Qianlong 3," which can dive to depths of 4,500 meters and conduct mineral mapping.13 With these pieces of equipment, China is frequently conducting marine surveys in the vast waters from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean; the confirmed number of such surveys far exceeds that of other countries.14

3. Deep Seabed Development under Xi Jinping

At its 12th Party Congress in November 2012, the Communist Party of China advocated becoming a maritime power. Xi Jinping was inaugurated as General Secretary at that conference. Beijing-born Xi served as a local leader in the coastal Fujian Province from 1985 and in the coastal Zhejiang Province from 2002. These positions familiarized him with the sea. While exploring provincial economic development as a local leader, Xi frequently advocated for the promotion of the maritime economy from 1989, when he was Party Secretary of Ningde County, Fujian Province. In 2003, he called on party and government leaders in Zhejiang Province to implement "unified planning and integrated consideration of maritime economic development and national defense construction." At the time, the idea of unified planning of the maritime economy with national defense and incorporating it into a nation's maritime strategy was not common. These ideas seem to have represented Xi's personal commitment.15 Xi fully embodied the uniqueness of his ideas in efforts to make China a maritime power.

Xi Jinping's drive to establish China as a maritime power tends to formulate and implement integrated, cross-cutting policies under the supreme leader's guidance with watchwords such as "Lu-hai Tongchou" (Land and Sea Coordination) and "Military-Civil Fusion." The July 2015 revision of the National Security Law included provisions for ensuring national security in the oceans and international space. The Law on the Exploration and Development of Deep Seabed Resources, enacted in February 2016, provides for China's resource development in international waters; it obliges the state to formulate plans for resource exploration and exploitation. The 13th Five-Year Plan, released shortly afterward, defined "ocean" as a strategic industry and decided to pursue Military-Civil Fusion projects related to "ocean, space, and cyberspace." Over the five years that followed, China built various marine observation equipment, such as buoys and mooring facilities, as well as a satellite network for marine observation and monitoring. Based on these developments, the 13th Five-Year Plan, which began in 2021, identified "ships and marine project equipment" as an advanced manufacturing industry; marine equipment development was to receive key state support as a "strategically important emerging industry." Since then, many Chinese enterprises, including private firms, have actively entered the field of marine technology development. Furthermore, China launched new National Territorial and Spatial Programs by integrating national geographical plans to launch a nationwide digital governance system from fiscal year 2021. However, this reform was so radical that the first five years were devoted to preparation. The implementation phase will begin in fiscal year 2026 and continue until 2035.

In this context, the significance of the present timing is evident. China's maritime power initiative will enter a new phase with the 15th Five-Year Plan, which will be announced in March next year. Over the past five years, China has set up four national ocean comprehensive test sites across the country, including a site specializing in deep-sea technology testing off the coast of Sanya in Hainan Province. In addition, a deep-sea "space station" is scheduled for launch in the South China Sea by 2030, and its main facilities are currently under construction. Alongside, Chinese research institutes and universities have accelerated research into deep-sea mining equipment, developing an unmanned electric mining vehicle capable of operating at depths of 5,000-6,000 meters. It is highly likely that these machines will be put into practical use during the next Five-Year Plan period.

What is described above is supported by a document released in February 2025 by the Ministry of Natural Resources and other organizations that instructs the realization of a large-scale use of marine energy. In this context, marine energy includes tidal power generation (including tidal difference power generation and tidal current power generation), wave power generation, ocean temperature difference power generation, and salt difference power generation. The document called for combining these different power sources to ensure a stable power supply not only for coastal areas but also for islands and the deep sea.16 Starting next year, China will likely begin fully operating the marine equipment it has so far developed.

4. China's Approach to Developing Countries

As mentioned at the beginning of this article, China plans to conduct trial mining of manganese nodules off Minamitorishima in August 2025. China has recently dispatched an aircraft carrier to the area. Following its Military-Civil Fusion strategy, the country is advancing not only in the Northern Pacific but also in the Southern Pacific.

In February 2025, China conducted a military exercise for the first time in the Tasman Sea between Australia and New Zealand without prior notice to the countries concerned. This news heightened Australia and New Zealand's vigilance toward China. Shortly after the military drill, China and the Cook Islands signed a comprehensive agreement on, among other things, bilateral cooperation in exploring seabed mineral resources. In March 2025, Kiribati announced it would begin negotiations with China to conclude a similar agreement; reportedly, Nauru may follow suit. China is seeking to increase its presence in the South Pacific through a hard and soft power approach combining military and economic influence. New Zealand once administered the Cook Islands and continued to provide financial support after the latter's independence. In June, New Zealand suspended all aid (approximately US$11 million) to it, citing a complete lack of prior consultation regarding the agreement between the Cook Islands and China.

Notably, China is diplomatically approaching developing countries to involve them in deep-sea resource exploration. China appears to be investing huge national finances in deep-sea-bed resources development, as if attempting to acquire a new technological base for the deep ocean, which has long been out of human reach, will thereby expand its influence. With the US-China competition in mind, if China pursues relevant technological development and the commercial mining of seabed resources, putting economic efficiency aside, then strengthening diplomatic ties with island nations that have vast exclusive economic zones (EEZs) would be valuable. If China could develop new resources and distribute a portion of the returns to island nations, this would provide financing for those small nations and gain China international political support, enabling it to enhance its international monopoly on rare metals and rare earths. In short, the development of deep-seabed resources benefits China not only economically and militarily, but also diplomatically.

Consistent with this move, China is expanding its influence over developing countries through the ISA. In 2023, China's contribution to the ISA was US$1.691 million, accounting for 36.4% of the total contributions from member states, outshining second-place Japan (16.0%). China's presence was overwhelming.17 Since 1998, China has had its ambassador to the ISA stationed at the Chinese Embassy in Kingston. According to the embassy's website, the incumbent Chen Daojiang frequently meets with Brazilian Leticia Carvalho, who became ISA Secretary-General in January 2025, stressing the significance of "south-south cooperation." Back in November 2020, China inaugurated an ISA-China Joint Training and Research Center within the National Deep Sea Center in Qingdao under the Ministry of Natural Resources. Since then, China has hosted training every year to nurture marine engineers from developing countries. A total of twenty participants from twenty countries—Argentina, Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Papua New Guinea, Benin, Peru, Togo, Fiji, Ghana, Bangladesh, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, South Africa, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Indonesia—along with four from China, took part in the FY 2024 training.18

The ISA is embroiled in an intense internal conflict over which to prioritize: environmental protection or development. The China-sponsored training program, using the leverage of the ISA as an international organization, is effective in spreading deep-sea exploration/exploitation technologies and pro-China thinking to developing countries. The training program also contributes to strengthening personal relationships between China and developing countries. China's long-term investment, represented by the training program, could significantly change the competitive dynamics surrounding ISA rulemaking.

Conclusion

Due to its poor economic profitability, deep-sea resources development is rarely given serious consideration in Japan. However, China, a polity that emphasizes competition with the United States, national security, and establishing the firm hold of the Chinese leadership at home and abroad, differs radically from Japan in terms of cost calculation. Pioneering the development of technologies for exploring the uncharted territory of the deep seabed and building a new international order in this field with the support of developing countries would benefit China in three ways: economically, militarily, and diplomatically. A similar configuration exists for the development of space and cyberspace, but because the United States is not part of the relevant international order associated with the deep seabed, China regards it as a more promising space.

The biggest challenge Japan faces regarding China's maritime expansion is safeguarding the Senkaku Islands. Japanese citizens' concerns have not extended beyond the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. However, as previously mentioned, China's maritime expansion is expected to enter a new phase beginning in fiscal year 2026; China will likely embark on large-scale activities in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. In this context, China's deep-seabed resources exploration is a topic that deserves particular attention. To prevent China from monopolizing the international governance of deep-seabed resources, Japan should improve its maritime technology and contribute to promoting international cooperation and formulating related rules by joining forces with other Western and developed countries.

(Chisako T. Masuo, Professor, Kyushu University)

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