proposal

"Pax China" from the Global South's Perspective: Does China Respect Their Agency?

Introduction

This paper will examine whether the Global South supports a China-centric order — a crucial point in considering the theme of the current issue of Security Studies, "Pax China on the Horizon?" Specifically, it will discuss what order China is trying to create, how the "Global South" is positioned within it, and how China's stance and policies are evaluated by the so-called Global South nations.

In two previous issues of Securities Studies, I discussed China's relationship with the Global South.1 I pointed out that China, with a self-image as a developing power, recognizes itself as a leader of developing countries and envisions a future world in which it represents non-developed countries and confronts developed ones. This vision aligns with China's goal of overtaking the United States by 2049 (or taking center stage in the world). Although the amount of its foreign aid has levelled off since the late 2010s due to stagnant domestic economic growth, China has continued to make massive infrastructure investments around the world. Although China's controversial "debt trap" diplomacy constitutes a source of concern, developing countries, as many point out, frequently choose to partner with China of their own volition.

However, it has recently been pointed out that China's challenge to developed countries, particularly the United States, entails significant problems. The term "Global South," which China originally disliked, is now used by many emerging and developing countries, including India, and India did not invite China to the Voice of the Global South Summit it hosted. "Non-developed countries" do not unite as China wishes.2

With these considerations in mind, this article will first outline China's perception of the global order, discuss recent situational changes, consider Global South countries' evaluation of China, and discuss whether those countries support a China-centric order.

1. The World Order Envisaged by China and Relevant Adjustment Efforts

As is well known, unlike the Hu Jintao administration, the Xi Jinping administration positions itself as the creator of an international order. At the 19th Party Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping stated that by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, China would "take center stage in the world," replacing the United States. He also mentioned the realization of the nation's dream. Given that the national dream is a set phrase on the unification of Taiwan with mainland China, China's ultimate goal associated with Taiwan seems to be set for the mid-21st century.

China schedules the emergence of a new type of international relations no later than 2049. This new type of international relations is precisely the international order China envisions. According to China, it would be grounded on economic relations and develop into a partnership, into a bloc of friendly nations, and ultimately into a community of shared destiny. China defines it as a concrete manifestation of the UN Charter, and the Belt and Road Initiative as its testing ground. The advocacy of this new type of international relations was followed by the Global Development Initiative and the Global Security Initiative, both of which may be components of the former. What is notable about this new type of international relations is that it does not adopt any Western concept of international relations (ex., democratic peace) but envisages inter-state relationships based on the economy. Yet, this does not mean excluding the realms of politics and security. Primarily emphasizing economic relations, the new type of international relations would ultimately also consider security and other factors. This is related to the phrase "security is the prerequisite for economic development" that is circulating in China. This phrase is understandable given that the above-mentioned Global Security Initiative is linked to the logic of the new type of international relations.

Assuming close trade relations between China and countries around the world, the new type of international relations presupposes creating a system for resolving trade disputes. Examples are the China International Commercial Courts in Shenzhen and Beijing. In this sense, China is attempting to leverage its economic power to shape an international order. That said, it would be difficult for China to establish norms that could replace the GATT-IMF system. China would encounter particular challenges in establishing a new financial order. China does not have a policy of encouraging other countries to increase their yuan holdings at the expense of its trade deficit. Currently, China is unable to replicate the United States' efforts to maintain the dollar as the world's reserve currency.

China strongly criticizes the current international order established by the United States and other developed countries as incapable of resolving international issues at hand.3 For this reason, China, along with Russia, criticizes developed countries as an outdated minority, and seeks to expand the membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS into fora for non-developed countries. The configuration of conflict envisioned here is one of "developed countries vs. non-developed countries." It is widely removed from the worldview entertained by developed countries, which posits "developed countries vs. rogue states" conflicts, while sidelining the Global South. China sees the United Nations as a forum where non-developed countries can exert their influence; therefore, it strongly claims support for the United Nations. China recognizes itself as representing non-developed countries. However, as seen from its failure to be invited to the Voice of the Global South Summit of January 2023, China is forced not only to confront developed countries but also to deal with India and other emerging countries. Like China, emerging countries have their worldviews, seeking to create new regional orders.4

2. From "Global South" to Global South

As the term "Global South" began to circulate worldwide, removed from its original academic connotation, and was employed officially at, for instance, the Voice of the Global South Summit (January 2023), China, which had originally disliked the term, changed its mind and began to use it with quotation marks from the summer of 2023. My article, "The Global South Viewed from China's Perspective," elaborated on this change. Since China recognizes itself as representing the voice of the "South," it belatedly redefined itself as maintaining its roots in the Global South. However, the addition of quotation marks indicates that China does not want to use the term.

At the end of 2024, China changed its way and ceased to place quotation marks around the term Global South. In a letter by Xi Jinping addressed to a conference on November 11, 2024, which invited representatives from think tanks in Global South countries, the term still bore quotation marks.5 But in Wang Yi's statement at the "Symposium on International Situation and China Diplomacy" on December 17, 2024, the term appeared without quotation marks.6 Although the quotation-marked Global South appeared in subsequent official Chinese documents from time to time, and the usage of the term is not free from ambiguity, China appears to be ready to unconditionally accept the term Global South with no quotation marks.

In this connection, it is important to note two specific events. First, at the United Nations in September 2024, Foreign Minister Wang Yi spoke about the importance of cooperation between China and the Global South.7 Second, at the 16th BRICS Summit held the following month, a new "BRICS+" framework was established by introducing a "partner country" system. What is particularly significant is that during this summit, Xi Jinping delivered a speech that highlighted the Global South.8 Xi Jinping stated that "The collective rise of the ‘Global South' is a clear sign of the great changes in the world." While praising this as "an unprecedented feat in the process of human civilization," he warned that "the road to revitalization of the ‘Global South' is destined to be uneven" and called for demonstrating "our" collective wisdom and strength. In Xi's context, the rise of the Global South is considered to be synonymous with China's efforts to build a community with a shared future for mankind.

In his remarks at the "Symposium on International Situation and China Diplomacy" on December 17, 2024, Wang Yi echoed Xi's language at the 16th BRICS Summit, emphasizing the need to unite the joint forces of the Global South, which would lead to the creation of what China calls a community with a shared future. He also stressed the strong relationships China has built with emerging and developing countries in respective regions of the world.9 The serial statements of Xi Jinping and Wang Yi during the latter half of 2024 were compiled and published in the QIUSHI magazine in 2025 (quotation marks were not placed around the term Global South).10 Chinese leaders' frequent mention of the Global South is due not only to the emergence of an international environment advantageous to China, symbolized by the inauguration of Trump 2.0, but also to the moves of India and other emerging powers attempting to position themselves at the center of the Global South. Wang Yi emphasized China's presence, stating that "no matter how the international situation changes," China will always stand with the Global South.11 Thus, China perceives the world as a configuration of "developed countries versus non-developed countries" and seeks to build a "new type of international relations" by overthrowing the order led by developed countries. To this end, China must strategically cooperate with non-developed countries (the Global South) and take the lead among them.

3. Focus on the Neighboring Diplomacy

In April 2025, the Xi Jinping administration held the "Central Peripheral Work Conference,"12 which was elevated in prestige from the previous "symposium on neighboring diplomacy." Why did "peripheral work" matter? A possible interpretation from the previous section is that the "periphery" was the initial focus in achieving unity in the Global South. Another interpretation is that with the inauguration of Trump 2.0 and growing instability across the globe, China sought to consolidate its neighboring region to address unforeseen events. Meanwhile, a white paper on "China's National Security in the New Era," released in May 2025, focused on the Asia-Pacific region as facing "severe challenges in overall stability."13 Undoubtedly, this reflects China's awareness of its relationship with the United States. China's criticism is directed at American allies, including Japan and South Korea, as well as countries such as the Philippines, which value military cooperation with the United States. The Asia-Pacific region will constitute the foremost focus in the long-term US-China rivalry into 2049. In this sense, the periphery or neighboring region, particularly neighboring lands, will be of crucial importance for China. From the perspective of Global South countries, China's engagement with them varies in intensity depending on their geography. For China, the periphery or neighboring region is the key focus in its Global South strategy.

This is discernible from the actions of Chinese leaders. Following the "Central Peripheral Work Conference" in April 2025, Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, Cambodia, and Malaysia; Premier Li Qiang traveled to Malaysia to participate in a summit with ASEAN and GSS countries hosted by Prime Minister Anwar. Xi also met with Central Asian leaders in Kazakhstan. They helped strengthen China's relations with its neighboring countries on land. It is important here to note that South Asia was excluded. Due to longstanding border disputes between China and India, as well as a recent conflict between India and Pakistan (a country friendly with China), Sino-Indian relations have worsened further. China's relations with its neighbors are fraught with challenges. As noted above, India's efforts to become a leader in the Global South have strained its relationship with China. However, the current is now changing: Trump 2.0's tough India policy provided a precious opportunity for China. In August 2025, Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited India. In turn, Prime Minister Modi attended the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Tianjin.

4. Global South Countries' Evaluation of China

Will China's engagement with the Global South be instrumental to the formation of a new type of international relations and that of a community of shared destiny, which China propounds? This point is related to the theme dealt with in the current issue of Security Studies, "Pax China." It would be impossible to answer this question without considering the Global South's evaluation of China. As many discourses have already pointed out, the majority of Global South countries dislike the configuration of "developed countries versus China, Russia, North Korea, Iran/Global South" adopted by developed countries, or that of "developed countries versus non-developed countries" asserted by China. In particular, the less developed a country is, the more its national policy emphasizes economic development; for this reason, developing countries favor such countries, developed or non-developed, that make investment in them and provide assistance for their infrastructure construction. Developing countries under authoritarian regimes tend to avoid depending exclusively on aid from any specific country to maintain their authority. Consequently, they seek to expand their national interests while maintaining a balance.14

This is also true of, among other countries, Cambodia, which is alleged to be highly dependent on China. The country, fully aware of the notoriety of "debt traps," though, has no choice but to approach China, the only country willing to make massive infrastructure investments in Cambodia. The Hun Manet administration is building a canal to connect the Mekong River to the Gulf of Thailand with aid from China. It built the Ream naval port, also with Chinese support, but it intentionally invited Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force vessels to the completed port. This represents the administration's effort to strike a balance.15

How significant is China's presence to Global South countries? Affirmative answers to this question may depend on whether China can provide projects that meet the national interests of developing countries or emerging powers, as well as the interests of their leaders, politicians, bureaucracies, and local communities. In other words, the question may hinge upon whether Global South countries will choose to partner with China. If China understands and respects the agency of those countries, it will be chosen. Naturally, Global South countries may be careful not to depend on China for everything, yet they will choose China as their primary donor.16 In the meantime, support from Global South countries is essential for China to realize a new type of international relations and a community with a shared future. To achieve this, China must continue to provide infrastructure aid tailored to the needs of those countries.

Conclusion: Pax China Is on the Horizon?

Lastly, I want to consider the theme of the current issue of Security Studies: "Pax China is on the Horizon?" Unlike the Hu Jintao administration, the Xi Jinping administration seeks to build an international order, criticizing developed countries as "outdated" and defining non-developed countries as its creators. The Chinese vision remains vague when it comes to, for example, a new type of international relations. Yet, China is developing economy-focused relations with Global South nations following the policy of building economy-focused partnerships and elevating them to a community of shared destiny. In that sense, China appears to be attempting to build a "Pax China." This is evident from its leader's pledge to take center stage in the world no later than 2049.

However, China's actions are far from making one believe in Pax China, as, for instance, it is not fully prepared to make the yuan the global reserve currency. Chinese society is facing various structural problems: on the one hand, "affluence" has not been fully realized, and on the other hand, the population is aging. That said, it may go too far to conclude that China's setting future objectives is meaningless or unrealistic. As the white paper on "China's National Security in the New Era" describes, China sets flexible objectives in response to international and domestic circumstances, striving to achieve its long-term goals.

The greatest challenge for "Pax China" lies in whether China can gain broad support from many countries. The country, with no allies to align with, could not realize a new type of international relations or a community with a shared destiny without cooperating with emerging powers and receiving support from developing countries. For the time being, China must confront developed countries, compete with emerging powers that aim to lead the Global South, and, last but not least, secure ongoing support from developing countries. Since a China-centric "order" could not emerge from economic relations alone, China must establish rules and invent values to sustain them. Historically, China had a tributary system and engaged in tribute trade. These practices assumed China's unrivaled dominance under heaven, but they represented relationships formed only between China and its neighbors. In the first place, it is not necessarily true that the neighboring countries accepted Sinocentrism, shared Chinese institutions, and engaged in tribute trade under the tributary system. The challenges China faces today are historically unprecedented and belong to uncharted domains.

(Shin Kawashima, Professor, The University of Tokyo)

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