Russia After the Ukraine War: A Challenge to Japanese Security Strategy

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Introduction

As of this writing, it is unforeseeable when and how Russia's aggression against Ukraine will end. However, any war eventually comes to an end. The objective of this article is to offer some analysis on the significance of post-war Russia for Japan's security in the aftermath of the Ukraine war, irrespective of how it may conclude.

How a country matters for Japan's security is determined, first and foremost, by its relation to Japan's national goals. It is necessary to consider whether that country will constitute an obstacle to Japan's national goals or will be helpful in achieving them.

Japan's current national goals are outlined in the three security documents published in December 2022. The National Security Strategy mentions Japan's top national interests as "maintain its sovereignty and independence, defend its territorial integrity, and secure the safety of life, person, and properties of its nationals."¹ In the meantime, the National Defense Strategy declares that "Japan's NDS and the United States' National Defense Strategy are well aligned in prioritizing the prevention of unilateral changes to the status quo by force through integrating all approaches and means."² As the present author argued elsewhere, the determination articulated repeatedly in the three documents not to allow "unilateral changes to the status quo by force" can be construed as demonstrating Japan's willingness to safeguard a (the three documents adopt the phrase "a free and open international order based on the rule of law"). Safeguarding a rules-based international order is now a top-priority challenge in Japan's security. The most notable point related to the 2022 three security documents is that a strong awareness prevails that Japan's two important security goals—safeguarding the international order and protecting the nation—are mutually complementary, or that neither of them is valid without the other, and that Japan's security strategy was conceived based on this recognition.³

In light of these two national goals, the 2022 National Security Strategy places Russia third, after China and North Korea, as a country posing threats to Japan's security. This seems to reflect the judgment that, as of the end of 2022, Russia was deemed less likely to pose a direct military threat to Japan. While the National Security Strategy acknowledges that North Korea's military actions are posing "an even more grave and imminent threat to Japan's national security than ever before,"⁴ the document positions China as a source of even greater concern for Japan, considering its challenge to the existing international order, and describes the country as "an unprecedented and the greatest strategic challenge."⁵

How does the National Security Strategy treat Russia compared to these two countries? The documents frequently mention the shock that Russia's invasion of Ukraine is inflicting on the international order. By contrast, with regard to Russia's direct military threat to Japan, although expressing concern about Russia's strengthening military ties with China following the start of the invasion, the three documents do not appear to regard the potential threat from Russia to be particularly imminent for Japan at the time of their publication. This is suggested, for example, in the description of Russia's military buildup in the Northern Territories as "presumably due to the background that the Sea of Okhotsk plays as an area of activity for strategic nuclear submarines, an important part in Russia's strategic nuclear forces."⁶

What is conceivable from the above is that, after Russia's aggression against Ukraine began, Japan viewed Russia primarily as a disturber of the international order that Japan seeks to safeguard. Consequently, to understand how Russia will matter for Japan's security following the end of the Ukraine war, it is necessary to discuss first what stance a post-war Russia would take toward the rules-based liberal international order.

1. Russia's View of the "Rules-Based Liberal International Order"

What should be borne in mind in discussing this topic is that the international community had been concerned about the destabilization of this order before the Ukraine war broke out. By the mid-2010s, it was widely accepted that Russia and China were undermining the rules-based liberal international order in Europe and Asia, respectively.

How does Russia view this order, and how does it look at the criticism, primarily from Western countries, of Russia for undermining it? In order to explore these questions, the present author conducted interviews in Moscow in October 2018 and December 2019 with mainstream intellectuals who take positions close to the Putin administration on Russian foreign and security policy, as well as liberal intellectuals critical of the administration's policies. Given that similar interviews became nearly impossible due to the Covid-19 pandemic from spring 2020 until the start of Russia's invasion of Ukraine,⁷ these interviews shed some light on Russia's view of the "rules-based liberal international order" at the pre-war time. In what follows, these interviews will serve as a reference point in considering Russia's attitude toward the rules-based liberal international order in the coming post-Ukraine war era.

In these interviews,⁸ mainstream intellectuals expressed almost unanimous views regarding Russia's stance toward the liberal international order, as described in the following sections. Even liberals critical of such views largely agreed that they represent the mainstream position.

The views expressed by several Western diplomats stationed in Russia, whom I also interviewed, regarding Russia's perspective on the existing international order largely coincided with those stated by Russian mainstream intellectuals and were generally consistent.

(1) Russia's Basic Perceptions Toward the International Order

President Vladimir Putin wants to reconstruct the existing international order so that Russia can act as a key player in international relations. There was no difference between mainstream and liberal interviewees in regarding this as the Putin administration's basic stance toward the international order.

Mainstream Russian intellectuals tended to view the current liberal international order as a unipolar, U.S.-centric state, or U.S. hegemonic rule. IMEMO Director Fyodor Voytolovski argued that what the West calls liberal international order merely represents a tool for justifying U.S. dominance. When building the post-Cold War international order, the United States positioned Russia as a loser of the Cold War and did not attempt to include Russia in this order. As a result, the post-Cold War international order has been dominated by the United States. This view was shared without exception by mainstream intellectuals whom I interviewed.

Russia however considers the current liberal international order to be waning due to China's rise and Russia's resurgence The mainstream interviewees believed that since any international order must be based on a balance of power, it was high time to make some adjustments to the order.

Duce to the lack of such adjustments, Russia's presence in the international community remains unjustly limited, a situation that lies at the root of Russia's discontent. This is the view shared by Russian intellectuals, whether mainstream or liberal. Russia deserves its rightful place at the table when addressing matters of international concern, yet such a place has not been granted. One Western diplomat stated that this is the essence of Russia's frustration, and this view coincides well with the mainstream's arguments―and with the liberals' analyses of the former's thinking.

In short, Russia's discontent with the liberal international order is not concerned with its liberal nature but is rather "interest-based complaints" (Dr. Andrei Zagorski). "It is not that Russians are trying to destroy the liberal order, but rather that they are trying to push back against the United States and the West in order to protect their own niche or to gain recognition from them. However, it is precisely this very nature of their actions that, as an unintended consequence, ends up undermining the order" (Dr. Dmitri V. Trenin).

Among Russia's "interest-based complaint," the most prominent, asserted Russia's mainstream voices unanimously, is that the West has failed to respect Russia's "legitimate national interests" in its "sphere of influence" centered on the regions that Russians refer to as the "post-Soviet space." They argued that because of the lack of this due respect, Russia would not accept the liberal international order.

(2) What the World Should Look Like and Russia's Discontent with the Current Order

What then does Russia think the world and the international order should look like?

Dr. Zagorski stated that the Russian government and the mainstream's discontent with the current liberal international order can be recapitulated by two words: "non-inclusive" and "non-representative." "Non-inclusive" refers to the current international order, too centered on the United States and Western countries to be sufficiently inclusive of other countries. "Non-representative" refers to the present international order, too representative of the interests of the United States and Western countries to adequately represent those of other countries.

The Russian government and the mainstream believe that the future world needs a more inclusive and representative global governance system. That said, the more inclusive and representative system that Russia conceives is not a global governance system open to all nations, including small and medium-sized ones. Dr. Zagorski said that Russia's vision of a future global system assumes that only major powers should occupy the center stage.

Russia harbors resentment toward the West because, under the Western-centered liberal international order, it has been excluded from crucial international decision-making since the end of the Cold War. This analysis was expressed by all the Russian intellectuals whom I met. In the 1990s, Russia hoped to gradually integrate with the West through its participation in the G8, for example. However, what Russia actually experienced was not "true integration" with the West. The G8 was ultimately anything but a venue where Russia could have a say about decision-making on security issues that carried crucial significance to it. Russia found itself being imposed with the will of the Washington-centered West, and its interests were not sufficiently respected.

Both mainstream and liberal Russian intellectuals said unanimously that Russia's frustration is not value- or ideology-based, but dissatisfaction that Russia is not allowed to play a major role in significant decision-making in the world and that the West does not hesitate to make decisions that disregard Russia's interests, such as NATO's eastward expansion. In this sense, a common view among the Russian intellectuals whom I interviewed, regardless of their political positions, is that Russia's discontent is interests-based.

In other words, Russia is not dissatisfied with the liberal nature of the liberal international order itself. Regardless of whether it is liberal or not, any order in which Russia's voice is sufficiently reflected in crucial decision-making is acceptable to it. Russia's discontent turns on the fact that the current international order is excessively US- and Western-centric. Accordingly, the position of the Russian government and the mainstream intellectuals is anticipating that, reflecting recent changes in the international balance of power favorable (as such they sees) to Russia, the international order will become more inclusive and representative, and that Russia can increase its presence and influence, which have been downplayed since the Cold War, in proportion to its status as a member of the great powers.

If this were to happen, Russia would deepen its ties with other countries, including the West, but mainstream Russian intellectuals argued that such a linkage would be based on common interests, not shared values. The fact that the linkage is not based on common values means that differences between Russia and other major powers, particularly the West, would remain regarding fundamental values and ideals. Traditionally, when the West referred to the liberal international order, it was usually accompanied by pressure on Russia to accept Western values and ideals. However, mainstream Russian intellectuals argued that the Russian government would demand that the West accept the "distance" or differences between them. Russia's message to the West, they said, is "not to try to westernize Russia."

Dr. Trenin pointed out in this connection that Russia is a "status-conscious" country. Russia harbors a desire to be on a par with world's great powers, particularly the United States. However, Russians cannot help but recognize the gap in national power between Russia and other major powers. According to Dr. Trenin's analysis, this recognition has led to claims that Russia should be given a larger "place" in the future international order and that the United States and the West should respect Russia's "sphere of influence."

Dr. Zagorski suggested that the future worldview desired by mainstream Russians could be described as a "poly-hegemonic" one. Namely, the United States, China, and several other great powers stand on a par with each other, jointly managing the world while accepting each other's distance and differences. In this envisioned world, Russia would be recognized as one of the global great powers and play its part in world politics, without being taken in by the West or China.

Dr. Dmitry Suslov, a mainstreamer, also expressed a similar view regarding Russia's stance on the concept of a "Free and Open Indo-Pacific". He said that Russia seeks to build a "balanced partnership in Asia." This means that in Asia (the Indo-Pacific), the major powers, including Russia, aim to maintain partnerships based on a multipolar balance of power rather than on any single power having a dominant say. Dr. Suslov commented that Russia aims for such a situation because it could play an independent and autonomous role there. He added that this recognition is widely shared within the Russian government.

(3) Russia's Attitude Toward the West and Its thinking that Safeguarding Interests in the Spheres of Influence is Only Natural

As mentioned in the previous section, in Russia from the 1990s until the early years of the Putin administration, there was a strong atmosphere that, while recognizing various differences in values and ideals from the West, Russia should be eventually integrated into the West to constitute its "part." However, Russian intellectuals unanimously agreed that such "optimism" did not last long. Russians came to hold a sense of victimization that the West was infringing on Russia's national interests, exploiting its weakness after the Cold War, when its national power declined. They cited NATO's eastward expansion, which brought Russia into direct confrontation with NATO, as the foremost reason for changing the Russian people's consciousness.

According to Russian intellectuals, by the time of President Putin's "Munich speech" in February 2007, Russia had realized that it did not need to be liberal to achieve success in the international community, observing China's rise. Russia also gained the perspective that the world was shifting in a non-Western, non-liberal direction. As a result, Russia abandoned the idea of becoming "part of the West" and began to more blatantly express its dissatisfaction with the West and to take action to resolve it.

One of Russia's principal complaints against the West is that Western countries have failed to duly respect Russia's "legitimate national interests" in the "post-Soviet space," which Russia regards as its typical "sphere of influence." The year after the Munich speech, in 2008, Russia took its first step to protect these interests: it invaded Georgia. Russia saw the invasion as a success and concluded that force was the best way to protect its interests in the "post-Soviet space." As of 2018 and 2019, both mainstream and liberal intellectuals widely agreed that Russia's use of force in Crimea and Ukraine since 2014 was a sequel to its invasion of Georgia.

As mentioned earlier, Russia's recognition is that by these actions, it is simply pushing back against the United States and the West in an attempt to protect its own niche. Therefore, Russia is not acting with the subjective intent of destroying the existing liberal order, but such effects are occurring as unintended consequences, according to Dr. Trenin and other liberal intellectuals.

(4) Obtained Insights

Based on the above findings, the insights obtained regarding Russia's stance toward the "rules-based liberal international order" before its aggression against Ukraine can be summarized as follows:

President Putin was willing to rebuild the international order in a way that Russia was a major player in international relations.
The fundamental reason for this was Russia's understanding of the liberal international order as hegemonic domination by the United States. The Russian mainstream believed that this order was in decline and needed to be adjusted to respond to the shifting balance of power resulting from China's rise and Russia's resurgence.
Russia is not irritated with the liberal nature of the current international order, but by its failure to be given its due place as a great power in the international community.
The Russian mainstream is also irritated with Russia's sphere of influence (especially the "post-Soviet space") not being duly respected under the current Western- and US-centered international order.
Because of these reasons, Russia does not accept the liberal international order, not because the nature of the current international order is liberal. Russia is a "status-conscious" country with a strong desire to be treated as on a par with the world's most powerful countries, particularly the United States.

2. Russia's Traditional "Sense of Mission" and the Possibility of Russia-China Alignment

It is noteworthy here that Dr. Trenin expressed the view that Russia's stance as such is heavily influenced by Russia's traditional "sense of mission."

What is Russia's sense of mission? According to Dr. Trenin, it is the sense of Russia's role shared since the imperial era by the Russian leadership, including President Putin. At the root of the sense lies the conviction that, as the only Orthodox country to maintain freedom and independence, Russia must be the leader of Orthodox countries and cannot accept being subject to the will of foreign countries or a foreign-led international order. Specifically, since the imperial era, Russia has recognized that it should strive to be on a par with the world's great powers. This awareness also accounts for the post-Cold War Russia's refusal to admit the United States as a global leader. With this sense of mission, President Putin and other Russian leaders believe that Russia's diplomatic mission today is to refuse to come under the global or the regional influence of any single nation and "stand up against any hegemony of any country" (Dr. Trenin).

Is Russia then not wary of China's growing assertiveness and seemingly hegemonic behavior in recent times? According to Dr. Trenin, Russia has the latent will to oppose Chinese hegemony but does not currently feel compelled to do so. For now, China restrains its ambitions and shows no signs of seeking hegemony, especially in Central Asia, part of the "post-Soviet space." From Russia's perspective, it is the United States—rather than China—that it needs to challenge.

Far from it, believes Dr. Trenin. He argued that Russia may go so far as to team up with China, even if the move involves some risk, to counter US moves to build global hegemony. Citing the history of medieval Russian hero Alexander Nevsky, who submitted to the Mongols in the east to repel Germans and Swedes from the west, he added that it is conceivable that Russia could end up with a similar "difficult choice." To prevent Russia from becoming subjugated by the Catholic world, Nevsky chose submission to the Mongols, thereby protecting the "soul" of the Russian people. Since then, Russians have cultivated a "tradition that puts more value on protecting the soul than on the body." Dr. Trenin maintained that if contemporary Russia felt that the United States is trying to westernize Russia by imposing certain values and ideals on its people, it might, as a workaround for that, partner with China to protect the autonomy of the Russian soul. ⁹ This is a suggestive observation indeed, given Russia's subsequent stance as if admitting itself as a junior partner to China, as well as its recent equal-status approach toward North Korea, ordinally a subordinate nation, treating it as a de facto ally.

3. Post-War Russia's Stance to the International Order and Japan's Security

If Russia's dissatisfaction with the existing rules-based liberal international order is interest-based rather than value- or ideology-based, it follows that a post-Ukraine war Russia will not necessarily become a principled opponent of the liberal international order. This is a major difference from China, which is increasingly opposed to the liberal international order for value-related and ideological reasons. If Russia's dissatisfaction with the current international order is not due to its liberal nature but rather to the fact that it has not been given its due place as a great power there, then it is theoretically not impossible for the West, including Japan, to search for a compromise that would persuade Russia to agree to the continuation of the existing international order.

However, even if the estimate that Russia's dissatisfaction is not value- or ideology-based but interest-driven is correct, resolving or significantly alleviating that discontent will not be easy in practice. This is because the West will need to create an environment capable of accommodating Russia (to a greater extent than now) in at least the following four respects.

Satisfying, to a certain extent, "status-conscious" Russia's great power consciousness.
Placating Russia's victimhood consciousness that its legitimate national interests have been compromised by the West since the end of the Cold War.
Acknowledging, to a certain extent, Russia's special position, particularly in the "post-Soviet space," taking into account the concept of "sphere of influence," which strongly influences Russia's view of its "legitimate national interests."
Showing some consideration for the Russian sentiment that "No matter what country they might be, we cannot tolerate hegemony by others."

However, it will be hard, or even undesirable, for the West to create a situation that meets these conditions. First, to satisfy its "status consciousness," Russia will claim to be treated as a great power in the international community and as a major player in international decision-making. In fact, however, Russia is already treated as a great power in the world. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia enjoys the privilege of veto power, thereby holding significant influence in numerous international decision-making processes. At the UN Security Council sessions in recent years, Russia's opposition has repeatedly constituted a major obstacle to making necessary decisions on important issues, including North Korea's nuclear and missile programs. If Russia's will had to be reflected in decisions on all global issues to an even greater extent in the future, it is feared that Russia's opposition could significantly impair the function of international decision making.

Second, Western countries, including Japan, may not necessarily admit Russia's view that its national interests have been "unjustly" harmed by the West since the end of the Cold War. For instance, Russian intellectuals point to NATO's eastward expansion as a prime example of such a violation of Russia's national interests; yet, the mainstream view in the West is that NATO's eastward expansion was the result of meeting the wishes of many countries in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia's claim that NATO's eastward expansion was an unjust damage to Russia's national interests, exploiting Russia's decline in national power following the Cold War, is decisively at odds with Western understanding of the facts. Thus, if Russia claims that the West has unjustly infringed upon its national interests, but the West does not recognize this as unjust, Russia's victimhood consciousness will not be placated in a way that responds to Russia's claims.

Third, Western countries, including Japan, will be unable to acknowledge Russia's special status, particularly in the "post-Soviet space," while esteeming the idea of "sphere of influence," which strongly influences Russia's view of its "legitimate national interests." The concept of "sphere of influence" may be "a profoundly traditionalist idea" for Russians (Dr. Trenin). Mainstream Russians no doubt take for granted that the "post-Soviet space" means Russia's sphere of influence. Yet, Western countries cannot approve of the thinking that Russia is allowed to use force to protect Russia's special status and its "legitimate national interests" in the "post-Soviet space." Such a view is fundamentally incompatible with the West's desire to maintain a rules-based international order. Some may argue that such an order has vanished. But Japan maintains its national goal of upholding a rules-based international order, as outlined in the 2022 three security documents. This is evident in Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi's consistent emphasis since taking office on maintaining and strengthening a "free and open international order based on the rule of law." Japan must also seriously consider what message it would send to China if Japan acknowledged the claim that a great power are entitled to use force in areas it considers its "sphere of influence."

Lastly, it will be difficult for the West to fathom the sentiments of Russians that "No matter what country they might be, we cannot tolerate hegemony by others." The world, or at least Western countries, still need American leadership, with the proviso that Trump 2.0 does not go wild anymore. Reconciling this reality with Russia's unwillingness to tolerate hegemony by other countries will be anything but easy.

The above brief discussion suggests the unfortunate reality that, regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine, it is unlikely that a post-war Russia will join the camp upholding the existing international order based on interest-based motives. This means that unless Japan fundamentally changes its national goal of safeguarding a rules-based liberal international order, there will be no choice but to continue confronting Russia as a long-standing disruptor to the international order that Japan seeks to uphold in the post-Ukraine world.

4. Direct Threat from Post-war Russia to Japan

What kind of entity is a post-Ukraine war Russia likely to become for Japan in terms of direct military threat?

During the Cold War, Japan focused its national defense on the Soviet threat from the north. In recent years, however, the Russian military threat has not been seen as imminent. This was reflected in the above-mentioned description from the 2022 National Security Strategy, and the recent shift of defense capabilities to the southwest islands was based on this situational assessment. However, when considering a post-Ukraine war Russia, this assessment will need to be reviewed to some extent.

Japan is now listed by Russia as one of its "unfriendly countries" that cooperate with the United States. The possibility is undeniable that, after the end of the war with Ukraine, Russia could redirect its surplus military strength not only westward but also toward Japan.

Japan's efforts to maintain a rules-based, liberal international order may be seen by Russia as a signal that Japan, along with the United States and other Western countries, is pressuring Russia to accept Western values and ideals. If that is the case, Russia is likely to pursue a contemporary version of the "difficult choice" (Dr. Trenin)—the one Nevsky made in the Middle Ages—to protect the "soul" of the Russian people, without relaxing after the Ukraine war. As Nevsky submitted to the Mongols in the East to repel the threat of the Germans and Swedes from the West, Russia will predictably seek to further strengthen its cooperation with China, even if it means condescending to become the latter's de facto junior partner, to counter threats from the West, including Japan. In addition, the de facto military alliance between Russia and North Korea established under the 2024 Treaty of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership may not simply be a temporary alliance to fight the war in Ukraine. Strengthening an equal partner alliance with North Korea, which Russia would ordinarily regard as an inferior partner, to counter threats from the West, including Japan, can be considered another contemporary version of Nevsky's "difficult choice."

Strengthening military cooperation between Russia and China, or Russia and North Korea, will not increase the likelihood that Russia would attack Japan single-handedly, because Russia could gain virtually nothing from such an attack. However, even if the prospect of such an attack is low, Japan must still be prepared for Russian actions in the event of a contingency around it involving China or North Korea. For example, in the event of a Taiwan contingency, Russia could take hostile actions against Japan in tune with China or North Korea's moves. The possibility of Russia taking coordinated actions against Japan in the event of a Korean Peninsula contingency or a missile attack by North Korea against Japan cannot be ruled out.

In this sense, Japan must recognize that the era when it did not have to envisage Russian military threats is over and that an era in which it must re-strengthen its northern defense posture is approaching. In particular, in the event of a Taiwan contingency, the government plans to deploy a large number of Self-Defense Forces units from Hokkaido and Honshu to Kyushu and the Nansei Islands; yet it is inevitable to conclude that the necessity of maintaining a reasonable level of preparedness in the north, with Russia in mind, is increasing. To confront North Korean military action, Japan will also have to pay more attention to Russia's military movements toward Japan and implement measures such as strengthening deterrence.

In Lieu of Conclusion

For a long time after the Cold War ended, Japan did not consider Russia a serious security threat. There used to be a time when Japan and Russia even held 2+2 foreign and defense ministerial consultations and explored bilateral security cooperation; such a period lasted even after Russia's unilateral annexation of Crimea. Even after Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, at least with respect to Russia's direct military threat to Japan, it was not perceived as imminent. However, as the analysis in this paper suggests, in a post-Ukraine-war context, Japan must view Russia differently from such earlier perceptions.

Upon taking office, Prime Minister Takaichi announced plans to revise the three security documents ahead of schedule, to be completed during 2026. Although the content of those revisions is unknown as of this writing, judging from the prime minister's stance of advocating the maintenance and strengthening of a "free and open international order based on the rule of law," it seems likely that the basic structure of the current three documents, which enumerate the safeguarding of a rules-based international order and national defense as Japan's two most important security goals, will remain intact. If that is the case, then Russia's threats cannot be overlooked with respect to either of these goals. This represents the modest conclusion of this paper.

(Matake Kamiya, Professor, The National Defense Academy)

[1] National Security Strategy of Japan (English translation), December 2022, p. 4.
[2] National Defense Strategy (English translation), December 2022, pp. 18-19.
[3] Matake Kamiya, "Rūru-kiban no Kokusai-chitsujo wo Mamoru Ketsui: Anzenhoshou Shin-senryaku no Igi to Jikkousei wo Kangaeru" [Resolve to Uphold the Rules-Based International Order: Considering the Significance and Practicability of the New Security Strategy], Gaiko (Diplomacy), Vol. 77 (Jan./Feb. 2023).
[4] National Security Strategy of Japan, p. 9.
[5] Ibid., p. 9
[6] Ibid., p. 10.
[7] The author was invited to the Primakov Readings scheduled for the summer of 2020 and he intended to conduct additional interviews at that time. However, this did not come to fruition as the event was canceled due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the author was included in the entry ban list announced by the Russian government on May 4, 2022, in retaliation for Japan's sanctions against Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, there is no prospect of conducting additional interviews in the future.
[8] The list of interviewees is as follows. Their titles and positions are as of the interview date. 【Mainstream】 October 15-16, 2018 ・Sergey Rogov, Director of the Institute of USA and Canada of the Russian Academy of Sciences ・Mirzayan Gevorg Valerievich, Associate Professor of the Political Science Department of the Financial University under the Russian Federation Government/Expert Magazine correspondent ・Dimitry Babich, Political Analyst, Sputnik News Agency December 23-24, 2019 ・Fyodor Voytolovski, Director, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO). ・Vitaly Shvydko, Head of Center for Asia Pacific Studies, IMEO. ・Dmitry Suslov, Vice-Director, National Research University, Higher School of Economics. 【Liberal】 October 15-16, 2018 ・Andrei Zagorski, Director of Arms Control and Conflict Resolution, IMEMO. ・Dmitri V. Trenin, Director, The Carnegie Moscow Center (Second interview on December 24, 2019). Additionally, the author interviewed a few diplomats from Western countries stationed in Russia.
[9] Alexander Nevsky's submission to the Mongols and his repulsion of the threat from the west, as well as the Russian emphasis on protecting the spirit over the body, are described in the final chapter, "Conclusion: Forever Russia," of Dmitri Trenin's Russia (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019).

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