proposal

Has U.S.–China Competition Eased under Trump 2.0?

1. Introduction

The China policy of the second Trump administration (hereafter "Trump 2.0") is often described as a "Big Tent." The term denotes a composite arrangement in which diverse—sometimes competing—views of China coexist. Trump 2.0's personnel configuration underscores this heterogeneity: alongside China hardliners aligned with the traditional Republican mainstream, such as Secretary of State Marco Rubio, President Trump himself—at least for the moment—prioritizes negotiation with Beijing and is at times even portrayed as dovish. At the same time, a camp represented by figures such as Vice President J.D. Vance views China as an adversary on the basis of religious and moral convictions.

This juxtaposition—hardline sentiment toward China broadly shared for varied reasons, coupled with a negotiation-oriented posture by the President and his inner circle—produces the highly complex configuration captured by the "Big Tent" label. It suggests that Trump 2.0's China policy is less a coherent strategy than the outcome of competing motivations and priorities.

Kurt Campbell, who served as Deputy Secretary of State under the Biden administration, highlighted this tension in a New York Times op-ed dated January 28, 2026. Campbell argued that Trump 2.0's China policy appears riddled with contradictions: the administration imposes tariffs and authorizes large-scale arms sales to Taiwan, yet the President repeatedly praises Xi Jinping and has partially relaxed semiconductor restrictions. Campbell cautioned that such a blend of toughness and accommodation may be manageable if strategically grounded, but could have serious consequences if merely improvised. 1

To be sure, the first Trump administration also combined negotiation and coercion. The U.S.–China trade negotiations launched in 2018 reached a broad agreement in January 2020—a dual-track pattern that is often underappreciated in Japan. Yet 2020 also saw relations sink to a nadir: four cabinet-level officials delivered successive hardline speeches on China, even as momentum grew for policy responses such as supply-chain and ICTs restructuring.2 In structural terms, the contrast between 2020 and the present is stark. Under Trump 2.0, a consistently negotiation-forward posture remains prominent, while hardline rhetoric has receded.

The contrast with the Biden administration is likewise noteworthy. The Biden administration took economic-security instruments such as export controls—tools that the first Trump administration had wielded "like a hammer"—and refined them into measures applied "with surgical precision." It mobilized alliances and "mini-lateral" cooperation at full scale, framing China as a challenge to the international order. At the same time, it emphasized crisis management and global cooperation, culminating late in the term in a meeting between the Vice Chairman of China's Central Military Commission Zhang Youxia and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan. This followed major sources of tension, including Speaker Nancy Pelosi's 2022 visit to Taiwan and the 2023 surveillance balloon incident. Biden institutionalized a hardline China policy through the twin pillars of traditional and economic security while also engaging in serious diplomacy.3 This logically constructed framework is now being fundamentally transformed under Trump 2.0, as a preference for transactional deal-making with China increasingly takes precedence over coordination with allies.

2. Developments in 2025

U.S.–China relations under Trump 2.0 began in the worst possible manner. Between February and March 2025, a succession of additional tariffs was imposed under the pretext of addressing synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. In April, sweeping tariff measures branded as "Liberation Day" were rolled out, plunging both countries into a full-scale tariff escalation. The start of Trump's first term also featured tension—most notably the post-election phone call between Trump and Taiwan's then–President Tsai Ing-wen—but the turbulence at the outset of Trump 2.0 was driven above all by tariffs.

Yet this disastrous opening was alleviated relatively quickly. From May 2025 onward, following ministerial-level talks in Geneva and elsewhere, the United States and China agreed to mutual tariff reductions. A major factor was China's use of rare earth export controls as bargaining leverage. A CSIS expert survey likewise indicates that an overwhelming majority of specialists recognized that rare-earth pressure had a substantial impact on the trade dispute, and that resolving the problem would take several years—indeed, for many respondents, up to five years or more.4

If the ministerial-level breakthrough marked the beginning of a truce, its consolidation was signaled by the U.S.–China summit in Busan.5 The United States agreed to partial tariff easing and to pause or defer measures including export controls and port fees, while China agreed to suspend rare-earth restrictions and resume purchases of agricultural products. The Busan summit is widely assessed as having secured a measure of short-term stabilization in bilateral relations.

3. The Persistence of "Negotiation Mode"

For the time being, the basic configuration—both countries operating in a negotiation mode—is unlikely to change. The clearest evidence is the unusually dense schedule of U.S.–China leader-level engagements in 2026. As Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent, who frequently participates in China negotiations, stated shortly after the Busan summit, 2026 may be an exceptional year featuring up to four summits: Trump's visit to China in April, Xi Jinping's state visit to the United States6, the APEC leaders' meeting in Shenzhen, and a U.S.-hosted G20. While the coincidence of hosting responsibilities plays some role, the mutual exchange of state visits is highly unusual. This negotiation mode represents a major diplomatic thrust that was possible precisely because the temporary truce was consolidated in Busan.

The Trump administration is expending considerable effort to sustain this mode. One key figure is Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller. With Secretary Rubio concurrently serving as head of the NSC, Deputy National Security Advisor Andy Baker is also believed to play an important role in policy formulation and coordination.7 A telling symbol of Miller's emphasis on negotiation is his profile photo on X (formerly Twitter), which shows him shaking hands with Xi Jinping while President Trump smiles in the background (this photo has been kept in his account as of February 21, 2026). Campbell has also noted that Trump's surrounding circle lacks a robust layer of officials who deeply understand China and Asia, producing an imbalance between experience and confidence; it appears evident that Asia specialists are not exerting influence at the core of policymaking.8

A degree of consideration for China can also be inferred from the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Defense Strategy (NDS) released between December 2025 and January 2026. The NSS frames China primarily in economic terms and—unlike the Biden NSS—does not explicitly name China in ways that signal heightened alarm regarding its expanding influence in the Western Hemisphere. The NDS does not include the word "Taiwan" even once, and instead employs language such as "not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them" and calling for a "decent peace." 9

It is important not to read this as simple appeasement. The repeated appearance of the term "First Island Chain (FIC)" in the NDS indicates that security vigilance has not been abandoned. The present NDS is best interpreted as a document centered on the Western Hemisphere and China. In retrospect, the first Trump NSS listed China and Russia together as revisionist powers, while the Biden NSS singled out China as the central competitor in the international order. Under Trump 2.0, this has shifted to a framework structured around the Western Hemisphere and China. Vigilance has not disappeared, yet it is also clear that substantial restraint is being displayed to facilitate negotiations.

The summit scheduled from March 31st to April 2nd, 2026, may move beyond trade and fentanyl to address Taiwan and China's investment to the U.S. Regarding Taiwan, there are strong indications that a proposed large-scale arms sale—reportedly totaling $20 billion—may be shelved before the meeting. In the talks, a first hurdle is likely to be whether China can press the United States to shift its long-standing formula from "not supporting Taiwan independence" to "opposing Taiwan independence." Efforts to persuade Trump and block such concessions will likely intensify both within and outside the government; nevertheless, it cannot be ruled out that Trump—who styles himself a "peacemaker"—may be attracted to the idea of adjusting the Taiwan-independence language and jointly managing regional peace with China.10

On investment, acceptance of Chinese investment in the United States is also on the agenda. Although President Trump has already publicly raised the possibility, substantive implementation is difficult given CFIUS review and congressional opposition, making it far from straightforward for the United States to accept investment projects that would be sufficiently attractive to Chinese firms. Still, committing to headline figures is widely regarded as a negotiating tactic with the Trump administration, and the acceptance of Chinese investment could be framed as an achievement of improved U.S.–China relations.

Overall, President Trump is fundamentally transactional, and the influence of corporate lobbies cannot be discounted.11 Although bipartisan opposition maintains that constraining China's technological progress through semiconductor export controls better serves U.S. interests, the administration has proceeded by presenting limited accommodation as a means of keeping China dependent on U.S. technology.

From China's perspective, mid- to long-term preparations and vigilance remain intact. With a perception that the longer the Trump administration lasts the more favorable the international environment becomes for China, Beijing has adopted a strategy of pursuing short-term stability while waiting for erosion of the U.S.-led international order from within. Foreign Minister Wang Yi's December 2025 speech on "major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics" also placed emphasis on stabilizing relations with the United States.12

4. Has U.S.–China Competition Eased?

Evan Medeiros, a Georgetown University professor who served as Senior Director for Asia at the Obama White House, argues that the current relationship amounts to "the direction of accommodating Beijing than US President Richard Nixon's détente of the 1970s," yet that a hardline "snapback" could occur with relative ease.13 Potential triggers include a Republican defeat in the House in the midterm elections and intensified Democratic criticism of the administration's diplomatic stance, inadequate implementation of agreements by China, or a scenario in which Trump—after extracting negotiating gains—claims he was "deceived" and seeks to turn the situation to his political advantage. While many triggers are conceivable, their plausibility stems not only from Trump's unpredictable decision-making, but also from the fact that the United States has multiple reasons that push it toward confrontation with China.

Setting aside trade frictions and the fentanyl issue, at least three principal fault lines persist in U.S.–China rivalry: structural, geopolitical, and ideological. Across all three, vigilance and hardline sentiment toward China have not wavered in the slightest.

On structural rivalry, concerns about China's scientific and technological capabilities remain unchanged. Despite U.S. sanctions, the pace of Chinese technological innovation has retained momentum; as exemplified by DeepSeek, China has continued to strengthen its capabilities even in AI, the domain where the United States has placed the greatest emphasis. The United States enjoys an overwhelming advantage in computing power, but China possesses a measure of advantage in the volume of data. Concern over China's technological strength—and the military power it underwrites—has not diminished at all.14 This is the core of structural rivalry understood as a collision of power with power.

On geopolitical rivalry, vigilance regarding the First Island Chain remains strong. In addition, from the U.S. perspective, key points include China's activities within Latin America, the strengthening of ties with Cuba, and China's growing visibility in Greenland. On ideological rivalry, a Trump administration shaped by a deep-seated Christian worldview is attentive to a civilizational and ideological confrontation with China.

Moreover, hardline positions in Congress and the military remain unchanged, as the CSIS expert survey also makes clear. Hardline sentiment persists beneath the surface within the government and could readily reemerge given a trigger.

To reiterate, however, despite the existence of these rivalry drivers, President Trump himself is operating in a negotiation mode grounded in the logic of great-power deal-making. Medeiros warns accordingly: "Both feel vulnerable, both have some advantages, both are willing to weaponize their interdependence, and both are unsure of the costs associated with the former. Washington and Beijing also have their own domestic politics that complicate these calculations."15 It is therefore plausible to interpret China as viewing the present as an opportunity and adopting tactics aimed at extracting as much as possible.

5. Conclusion

With respect to China, the messages emerging from Trump 2.0's "Big Tent" are confused. One can, of course, interpret the current conciliatory negotiating posture as merely buying time until the United States can reduce its dependence on China for strategic materials such as rare earths. As noted above, shifts in the political environment could readily produce a return to a confrontational stance toward China; yet the difficulty of anticipating Washington's moves and the resulting high uncertainty are likely to persist.

This uncertainty, moreover, accelerates preparations for multiple scenarios not only in China but across many countries. Zack Cooper of the American Enterprise Institute, in a Foreign Affairs essay titled "Asia After America," argues that the regional order is changing dramatically, driven both by marked U.S. neglect of Asia and by Washington's inability to provide economic benefits. The point extends beyond shifts in ASEAN countries' posture toward China: it also suggests that U.S. allies such as South Korea and Japan may consider possibilities that do not remain confined within the U.S. nuclear umbrella.16

In debates over a Taiwan contingency, Yun Sun of the Stimson Center warns that the combination of the Trump administration's uncertain security commitments and China's domestic circumstances could produce a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait in 2026.17 While some observers characterize this as a minority view, many Washington experts nonetheless harbor strong concerns that once the current temporary truce expires—perhaps after 2027—U.S.–China relations could pivot toward full-scale confrontation. Even so, the uncertainty inherent in the Trump administration may push both partners and China toward excessive pursuit of their own interests. Such uncertainty is better viewed not as an asset in a madman-theory sense, but as a "strategic liability."

More fundamentally, many question how much benefit the United States' negotiation-first posture brings to the world. China's economic coercion has recurred repeatedly, and overcapacity remains a major challenge for the global economy. Both are serious problems; yet the U.S. negotiating posture has not translated into internationally coordinated responses.

China's global influence is growing, while U.S. influence and the international order are weakening—and the United States remains indifferent. If this trajectory continues, by around 2027 it is highly likely that international cohesion on China policy will have weakened substantially. In Europe today, alongside efforts to secure "Plan B" strategic autonomy from the United States, what the author terms "Plan C (Plan China)"—a turn toward rapprochement with China—has become a major current.

For Japan, it is imperative to consider, with full seriousness and starting now, how many countries would stand with us if U.S.–China relations were to become tense once again.

(Ryo Sahashi, Professor, The University of Tokyo)

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