proposal

The Impact of Russia-North Korea Military Cooperation on Regional Security

1. Impact on Security in the Korean Peninsula

Stability on the Korean Peninsula in the Short Term

Strengthened Russia-North Korea cooperation contributes to stability on the Korean Peninsula in the short term. North Korea earns billions of dollars in foreign currency through arms sales and troop deployments to Russia. As long as the war in Ukraine continues, Pyongyang will likely find it advantageous to maintain the current foreign currency acquisition model while preserving stability on the peninsula. Furthermore, supplying Russia with large quantities of weapons and ammunition is likely diminishing North Korea's military readiness. Consequently, North Korea is unlikely to welcome situations forcing it into military action on the Korean Peninsula. (South Korea is estimated to have gained an economic windfall worth about $1 billion in 1970s dollars, equivalent to approximately $24 billion today, from dispatching a total of 350,000 South Korean troops to Vietnam during the 1960s and 1970s. The deployment resulted in the deaths of about 5,000 South Korean soldiers.)

Furthermore, President Trump's proactive stance toward dialogue with Kim Jong-un, the fact that the Taiwan Strait—not the Korean Peninsula—has become the most critical security policy agenda for both Japan and the United States, and the emergence of a progressive administration in South Korea prioritizing improved relations with North Korea are all contributing to greater stability on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea's Military Capability Enhancement

While the situation on the Korean Peninsula is stable, North Korea's military capabilities are believed to be strengthening. Since November 2024, Russia is estimated to have provided North Korea with advanced electronic warfare systems, including short-range air defense systems and electronic jamming equipment. Russia is also supporting North Korea's ballistic missile development by providing data on missile performance and test results. This is considered a quid pro quo for North Korea's support to Russia, which has continued since 2023 to the present. Since September 2023, North Korea has supplied Russia with weapons, ammunition, and other items via over 20,000 containers. In 2024, it provided over 100 ballistic missiles, artillery necessary for three brigades, and anti-tank missiles. Weapons transfers from North Korea to Russia initially used railways but later involved Russian ships transporting large quantities of artillery shells. Meanwhile, critical equipment like ballistic missiles and transporter erector launchers (TELs) was transported via railways and Russian military cargo aircraft.

North Korea has also deployed over 10,000 soldiers to Russia, engaging them in combat operations. While suffering casualties, this deployment has also enhanced their military capabilities through training, lessons learned from actual combat, and the adoption of new tactics. North Korea sent over 11,000 soldiers to Russia starting late 2024, adding over 3,000 more between January and March 2025. Those soldiers received training from the Russian side in artillery, unmanned aerial vehicles, and basic infantry operations before participating in combat alongside Russian units.

Possibility of Limited Military Action by North Korea

While the likelihood of a military crisis erupting on the Korean Peninsula in the short term appears to have decreased, the strengthening of Russia-North Korea cooperation suggests that the possibility of limited military action by North Korea will increase in the medium to long term. In recent years, North and South Korea have engaged in actions like exchanging balloon launches and drone incursions. However, the participation of the Korean People's Army in the Ukraine War, where various new types of drones are being actively employed in diverse ways, suggests that North Korea is increasingly likely to undertake various forms of limited military action against South Korea in the future, including actions involving drones. The South Korean military has also expressed concern about the possibility of North Korea conducting provocative actions using drones.

Should North Korea engage in limited military actions against South Korea, it must deter South Korea and the United States from mounting a strong military response. For instance, it is conceivable that North Korea could conduct military actions against South Korea, such as artillery fire, rocket attacks, or missile strikes, followed by threats like, "If South Korea or the United States retaliates, we will be forced to carry out further attacks or use nuclear weapons to prevent the war from escalating." Enhanced equipment and operational cooperation with Russia will likely make it easier for North Korea to coerce South Korea into acquiescence after using force. Moreover, nuclear intimidation is one method to coerce South Korea into submission. Scenarios involving detonating a nuclear torpedo in the Sea of Japan off South Korea's east coast or detonating a nuclear weapon at sea are conceivable. In such cases, technical and operational intelligence from Russia—which has conducted underwater and atmospheric nuclear tests—holds critical significance for understanding the potential consequences of nuclear weapon use.

Furthermore, Russia's strong treaty-based support for North Korea also heightens the likelihood of North Korean military action. While it remains uncertain whether Russia would fully intervene in a military crisis on the Korean Peninsula, Article 4 of the "Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" signed in June 2024 states: "In the event that either Party is subjected to armed aggression by one or more states and enters a state of war, the other Party shall, without delay, provide military and other assistance using all means at its disposal, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and the laws of the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea." This provision suggests that the possibility of intervention has increased, or at least the perception of such a heightened possibility has grown. Moreover, the possibility of intervention by a major power like Russia is likely to influence the perception of another major power, the United States. Particularly, if there exists even a slight risk that a military clash between North and South Korea could escalate into a military confrontation between the United States and Russia, the United States would be compelled to respond more cautiously to North Korea's military actions.

Diminishing Effectiveness of Sanctions Against North Korea

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions against North Korea are becoming less effective due to Russia's growing proximity to Pyongyang as a permanent member of the Security Council. In March 2024, Russia exercised its veto against a resolution seeking to extend the mandate of the UNSC Panel of Experts monitoring sanctions against North Korea (the so-called 1718 Sanctions Committee). As a result, the Panel of Experts ceased operations in April of that year. Amid this situation, analysis indicates that Russia supplied over one million barrels of refined petroleum products to North Korea between March and October of that year, exceeding the annual cap of 500,000 barrels set by Security Council resolutions. Furthermore, in 2024, North Korea applied to Russia for visas for 8,000 workers, attempting to send laborers to Russia, and facilitated visits to Russia by individuals subject to UN sanctions, thereby habitualizing actions violating sanctions. Additionally, Russia and North Korea conducted financial transactions through the ruble-denominated accounts of the MRB (Mezhdunarodnyi Raschetnyi Bank) based in Georgia, utilizing Russia's Foreign Trade Bank (FTB) and North Korea's Kwangson Banking Corporation, both designated as sanctioned entities by the United Nations. While the effectiveness of sanctions against North Korea remains a subject of debate, it can be inferred that sanctions have had considerable impact. This is evidenced by Kim Jong-un's proposal during the 2019 Hanoi summit between the United States and North Korea to dismantle the nuclear facility in Nyongbyon, northwest North Korea, in exchange for the lifting of major sanctions.

While sanctions violations by Russia and North Korea intensified, the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team (MSMT) was established in October 2024 to replace the activities of the 1718 Sanctions Committee's Panel of Experts. The MSMT is an initiative independently organized by the United States, South Korea, Japan, Australia, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. It aims to ensure the effectiveness of Security Council resolutions by identifying and publicizing instances of sanctions violations and evasion by North Korea. The MSMT published its first report in May 2025 titled, "Unlawful Military Cooperation including Arms Transfers between North Korea and Russia," and its second report in October titled, "The DPRK's Violation and Evasion of UN Sanctions through Cyber and Information Technology Worker Activities." While the MSMT operates outside the Security Council framework and thus has less legitimacy than the previous Panel of Experts, it also has the positive aspect of being able to operate freely without facing the same constraints from Russia or China as before. This enabled the preparation of the first report on unlawful military cooperation between North Korea and Russia. The second report stated that North Korea had stolen at least $2.8 billion worth of cryptocurrency using IT workers, and pointed out that the overwhelming majority of these workers—approximately 1,000 to 1,500 individuals—operate from bases in China.

2. Impact on Peace and Stability across the Taiwan Strait

The deepening of Russia-North Korea cooperation could have several implications for Taiwan Strait security. While negative impacts are possible, positive effects may also arise.

Negative Impacts

First, the primary negative impact is that the prolonged Ukraine war could foster war fatigue and aid fatigue among Western nations. Public opinion in the United States regarding support to Ukraine is divided. According to a March 2025 CBS television survey, while 51% supported military aid, slightly exceeding opposition, support for aid has declined among Republican supporters. In major European countries, support for accepting refugees from Ukraine has also declined, falling from 88% in 2022 to 71% in 2024. Nevertheless, at the government level, support for Ukraine aid remains strong in many European nations. Recognizing the need for Europe to become the primary bearer of Ukraine support, partly in response to the United States scaling back its assistance, there are even signs of strengthening unity.

In Japan, support for Ukraine assistance remains strong. According to a 2025 public opinion survey conducted by the Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology Open Laboratory for Emergence Strategies (ROLES) at the University of Tokyo's Research Center for Advanced Science and Technology (RCAST), 43.5% supported economic aid to Ukraine, while 12.0% opposed it. Support for strengthening sanctions against Russia stood at 41.1%. Regarding the provision of surplus air defense missiles, while opposition was higher at 29.1%, support at 22.8% showed no significant gap. However, on the general issue of providing weapons or military supplies to Ukraine, support was 18.1% and opposition 31.1%. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has conveyed Japan's continued support to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, and no shift in public opinion has been observed.

Second, a more serious implication is the possibility that Russia and North Korea could jointly undertake military actions during a Taiwan contingency. By drawing Japanese and US forces northward, they might aim to limit the combat power deployable to the Taiwan Strait. Recently, discussions on "strategic flexibility"—deploying US forces stationed in South Korea to defend Taiwan in a contingency—have intensified. However, heightened Russian-North Korean military activity on or near the Korean Peninsula would likely impact the deployment and employment of US forces in South Korea. Also, while the United States and Japan would likely expect South Korea to play a role in defending sea lines of communication during a Taiwan contingency, heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula would constrain South Korea's actions. Furthermore, if North Korea is to permit Russian military operations within its airspace and territorial waters, not only the combined US-Japan forces (including US Forces, Korea) but also the South Korean military would be compelled to respond to developments on the peninsula, creating a significant impact. Indeed, North Korea permitted Soviet military aircraft to fly within its airspace during the 1980s. Consequently, the possibility cannot be ruled out that North Korea might in the future permit Russian military operations within its airspace and territorial waters, or grant access to its ports and airbases.

However, such actions by Russia and North Korea remain purely theoretical possibilities; it is not certain that either country would actually take such steps. Russia's national power has significantly diminished due to the impact of the war in Ukraine. While North Korea has temporarily benefited from the war-related demand, the effects of sanctions mean its position vis-à-vis China cannot be said to have strengthened. In September 2025, China invited Putin and Kim Jong Un to Beijing, creating an impression of strengthened Sino-Russian-North Korean ties. However, a trilateral summit did not occur, resulting in the close relationship between Putin and Kim Jong Un being the most noticeable outcome. While Russia would likely view a Taiwan contingency positively, as it would drain US national power, it would not wish for China to establish hegemony in Asia. In other words, the most desirable scenario for Russia would be for the United States and China to clash, inflicting significant damage to each other, thereby enhancing Russia's position in relative terms. Indeed, the current situation, where the Ukraine war has exhausted the United States, Europe, and Russia, leaving China as the sole winner, is likely bitter for Russia. North Korea's position, however, may differ subtly from Russia's. While North Korea likely also finds China's uncontested victory problematic, considering the competition with South Korea, the scenario of China winning in a Taiwan contingency and establishing hegemony in Asia might hold a certain appeal. It is already clear that South Korea has won the competition between the two Koreas, and it is difficult for North Korea alone to reverse this outcome. However, if China's establishment of hegemony fundamentally changes the order in Asia, this could represent North Korea's last chance for a reversal. In any case, detailed analysis will be necessary regarding what actions Russia and North Korea might take in the event of a Taiwan contingency, and to what extent that would impact the Taiwan defense operation.

Positive Impact

On the positive side, Russia's ability to continue fighting due to North Korea's military support has led Western nations to recognize the need to establish mutual support systems for equipment and military supplies, as well as to strengthen defense industrial cooperation. On that point, the United States and Japan signed the Security of Supply Arrangement (SoSA) in 2023, establishing a framework to mutually ensure stable supply of equipment and materials. In 2024, they initiated the US-Japan Defense Industrial Cooperation, Acquisition, and Sustainment Regular Consultations (DICAS) in 2024 to discuss joint development and production of defense equipment, maintenance of US military ships and aircraft in Japan, and strengthening supply chains. While recognition of the importance of military cooperation existed before full-scale Russia-North Korea military cooperation began, the visible results of that cooperation have undoubtedly reinforced this understanding.

3. Impact on the Korean Peninsula Unification

Legal and Institutional Impact

The deepening of Russia-North Korea cooperation has made unification of the Korean Peninsula even more difficult. Article 5 of the Russia-North Korea treaty states: "Each Party shall not conclude or participate in agreements with third countries that infringe upon the other Party's sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, political, social, and cultural systems, and shall not conclude agreements with third countries or participate in actions that infringe upon the other Party's other core interests." This can be interpreted as Russia promising North Korea that it will not participate in actions by the United States, South Korea, or UN member states that seek to infringe upon the sovereignty of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Kim Jong Un has already abandoned the traditional goal of Korean unification and increasingly interprets the peninsula as home to two independent sovereign states: the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea. This appears aimed at maintaining his regime by legally and institutionally cementing the peninsula's division. Consequently, if the North Korean regime becomes unstable, two countries—Russia and China—would be in the UN Security Council willing to support North Korea's regime preservation. While North Korean leaders could expect Russia and China to provide support should their regime falter, they could not rule out the possibility that, depending on circumstances, great power compromises might result in abandonment of the North Korean regime. Therefore, if Russia, in addition to China which has traditionally supported the North Korean regime, were to support it as a treaty obligation, the likelihood of securing support from one major power even if betrayed by the other would be high, significantly enhancing the regime's ability to survive a crisis. If support from at least two of the UN Security Council's permanent members can be anticipated, the possibility of the Security Council approving a South Korea-led reunification would be reduced to an absolute minimum. Of course, North Korea's leadership likely recognizes that its existence holds significant strategic value for China. However, given China's proposal to the United States for a "New Type of Great Power Relations" and Trump's use of the term "G2," it is also likely aware of the high risks inherent in relying solely on China.

Military Impact

Finally, deepening Russia-North Korea cooperation is likely to enhance the reliability of North Korea's nuclear deterrent, the ultimate means of regime survival. While the extent of Russia's provision of nuclear-related information and technology to North Korea remains unclear, North Korea's recent demonstrations of new solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) clearly indicate that Russia is providing substantial support. Should Russia continue supporting North Korea's development of ICBMs capable of reaching the United States and extend assistance to ballistic missile submarines with high survivability, or even nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, North Korea's nuclear deterrence capability would be significantly strengthened. Furthermore, Russia has conducted tests launching submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from piers and within ports, and has experience operating ballistic missile submarines from its coastal bastions. Should Russia provide this know-how to North Korea, it would offer Pyongyang an extremely important key to improving its nuclear force operational capabilities.

(Narushige Michishita, Vice President, National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies )

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