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The Future of US-Russia Relations under Trump 2: Implications for Japan

It has been almost 11 months since the second Trump administration took office. One of the major diplomatic challenges to which this administration has devoted a significant amount of time and effort during this period is mediating a ceasefire and peace for the Russia-Ukraine war, and, as an extension of that, normalizing US-Russia relations.

In November 2025, the Trump administration released the "28-point peace plan," widely perceived as pro-Russian, invoking new developments in the Ukraine ceasefire and peace negotiations.

This article first examines the broad direction of the Trump administration's foreign and security strategy and Russia's position within it, then reviews the process of formulating this Plan, and predicts from it the trajectory of the US-Ukraine and US-Russia negotiations, which have suddenly gone into full swing.

Toward Building Major Power Relations Between the United States, China, and Russia in a Multipolar World

Let us look at two interviews and a speech to understand the broad direction of the Trump administration's foreign and security strategy and Russia's position within it.

The first is an interview with Secretary of State Marco Rubio on the American radio program "The Megyn Kelly Show" on January 30, 2025, in which he discussed the nature of US foreign policy in an era of global multipolarity.

"I think it really has to start with strategy: What is the strategic objective? What's the purpose, the mission? And I think the mission of American foreign policy – and this may sound sort of obvious, but I think it's been lost. The interest of American foreign policy is to further the national interest of the United States of America...that's the way the world has always worked... The way the world has always worked is that the Chinese will do what's in the best interests of China, the Russians will do what's in the best interest of Russia.., and the United States needs to do what's in the best interest of the United States. Where our interests align, that's where you have partnerships and alliances; where our differences are not aligned, that is where the job of diplomacy is to prevent conflict while still furthering our national interests and understanding they're going to further theirs. And that's been lost.

And I think that was lost at the end of the Cold War, because we were the only power in the world, and so we assumed this responsibility of sort of becoming the global government in many cases, trying to solve every problem... And then there are things that are terrible that impact our national interest directly, and we need to prioritize those again. So it's not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power... that was an anomaly. It was a product of the end of the Cold War, but eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multipolar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet. We face that now with China and to some extent Russia, and then you have rogue states like Iran and North Korea you have to deal with."1

After the end of the Cold War, the United States became the world's unipolar superpower and has served as the world's policeman. However, we have now entered a multipolar world comprising multiple major powers. In such a world, the United States will prioritize its national interests and reduce the scope of its traditional diplomatic and security engagement in regions low on its priority list. When there are conflicts of interest among major powers, the United States will seek to avoid excessive escalation through diplomacy while admitting that each power will pursue its national interests.

Then, how does the Trump administration prioritize US national interests? To understand this, it is helpful to look at a speech given by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth when he participated online in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group (commonly known as the Ramstein group) meeting held on February 12, 2025, in which he spoke about the Trump administration's approach to the war in Ukraine. The following is a summary of that speech.

"President Trump has been clear with the American people – and with many of your leaders – that stopping the fighting and reaching an enduring peace is a top priority. He intends to end this war by diplomacy... But we must start by recognizing that returning to Ukraine's pre-2014 borders is an unrealistic objective. Chasing this illusionary goal will only prolong the war and cause more suffering... the United States does not believe that NATO membership for Ukraine is a realistic outcome of a negotiated settlement. Instead any security guarantee must be backed by capable European and non-European troops. If these troops are deployed as peacekeepers to Ukraine at any point, they should be deployed as part of a non-NATO mission... To be clear, as part of any security guarantee, there will not be U.S. troops deployed to Ukraine... Safeguarding European security must be an imperative for European members of NATO. As part of this Europe must provide the overwhelming share of future lethal and nonlethal aid to Ukraine. Part of this is speaking frankly with your people about how this threat can only be met by spending more on defense. 2% is not enough; President Trump has called for 5%...

The United States remains committed to the NATO alliance and to the defense partnership with Europe. But the United States will no longer tolerate an imbalanced relationship which encourages dependency. Rather, our relationship will prioritize empowering Europe to own responsibility for its own security... President Trump looks forward to working together, to continuing this frank discussion amongst friends, and to achieve peace through strength – together...

The United States faces consequential threats to our homeland... We also face a peer competitor in the Communist Chinese with the capability and intent to threaten our homeland and core national interests in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. is prioritizing deterring war with China in the Pacific..."2

In other words, the United States' foreign and security policy is shifting priority from the European region, including Ukraine, toward US border security3 and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific.

An interview with Secretary of State Rubio posted on a MAGA-aligned internet media outlet, Breitbart's website, refers to the importance of improving relations with Russia in the context of deterring China.

"...the big story of the 21st century is going to be U.S.-Chinese relations, and if Russia becomes a permanent junior partner to China in the long term, well, now you're talking about two nuclear powers aligned against the United States. And even 10 years from now, five years from now, if this trend continues, we could find ourselves in a situation with – where whether Russia wants to improve its relations with the U.S. or not, they can't... So I don't know if that's a good outcome for us. I think a better outcome for us would be to have a (relation)... These are big, powerful countries with nuclear stockpiles, large militaries. They can project power globally, and I think we have lost a concept of maturity and sanity in diplomatic relations. ...part of diplomatic relations is the ability to communicate with and manage through problems with other great powers around the world to avoid war and to avoid conflict. But I think having a situation where the Russians are permanently a junior partner to China, having to do whatever China says they need to do because of their dependence on them – I don't think that's a good outcome for Russia and it's not a good outcome for America or for Europe or for the world."4

In other words, at the threshold of a multipolar world, the United States will reduce its engagement with Europe and shift its strategic resources toward border security and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific―objectives endowed with a high strategic priority. To this end, the United States must bring the Ukraine war to a ceasefire and peace, improve its relations with Russia, and prevent the latter from continuing to rely excessively on China.

The above outlines the broad direction of the second Trump administration's foreign and security strategy and Russia's position in it. Arguably, the strategy aims to build major power relations between the United States, China, and Russia in a multipolar world.

The Middle Eastern-Gulf Connections Linking the United States and Russia, Dating Back to Trump 1.0

Another key to understanding US-Russia relations under the second Trump administration is the Middle Eastern-Gulf connections.

A phone conversation between President Trump and President Putin, the first of the kind following the inauguration of the second Trump administration, took place on February 12, 2025. The day before, on February 11, the US government announced the release of Mark Fogel, an American citizen who had been detained in Russia. The US official who traveled to Russia for his protection was Steven Wikoff, serving as the Trump administration's Middle East envoy. This marked the first visit to Russia by a senior US government official since the outbreak of the Ukraine war in February 2022. On that occasion, Witkoff held talks with President Putin lasting three and a half hours, conveying President Trump's message to President Putin, and was entrusted with a message from President Putin to President Trump. These exchanges led to the US-Russia telephone summit the following day.

On February 20, 2025, Witkoff appeared at a Miami business forum sponsored by the Public Investment Fund, at a session moderated by Jared Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law. During their exchange, Witkoff revealed that Kirill Dmitriev, CEO of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, and Saudi government officials were deeply involved in the above hostage release. Witkoff notably told Kushner, "It was you [Kushner] who persuaded me to join the Trump administration," and referred to "Kirill, whom you know."

The relationship between Dmitriev and Kushner dates back to the first Trump administration. At that time, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE planned to reconcile the strained US-Russia relations that had worsened during the first Ukraine crisis in 2014, aiming to eliminate Iran's influence in Syria and to bring Russia into their camp. At that time, it was none other than Kirill Dmitriev, President of the RDIF, who, as a secret envoy of the Putin administration, built connections with Kushner and other people in the Trump administration, with support from Middle Eastern Gulf states.5

The RDIF, led by Dmitriev, had deep connections with the sovereign wealth funds of Middle Eastern Gulf states through joint investment projects. Meanwhile, Kushner played a leading role under the first Trump administration in realizing the Abraham Accords, which restored diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE and were later joined by Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan. Reportedly, the two men first met in Montreux in 2019, on the shores of Lake Geneva, to talk big-picture diplomacy in the Middle East.6

Thus, even during the second Trump administration, the Middle Eastern Gulf connections inherited from the first Trump administration, led by Dmitriev and Wikoff, Kushner's proxy, have come to the forefront to rebuild strained US-Russia relations over the Ukraine issue.

A readout released by the Russian presidential administration regarding the February 12 Trump-Putin telephone conversation reads as follows:7

"The leaders also discussed a possible Ukraine settlement. Donald Trump spoke in favour of stopping the hostilities as soon as possible and solving the crisis peacefully. In turn, Vladimir Putin pointed out it was necessary to eliminate the root causes of the conflict and agreed with Donald Trump in that a sustainable settlement could only be reached via peaceful negotiations... The issues of Middle East settlement, Iran's nuclear programme, and bilateral economic relations between Russia and the United States were also brought up during the conversation..."

It is noteworthy that there are mentions not only on the Ukraine ceasefire and peace process, but also on the Middle East peace process, Iran's nuclear development issue, and US-Russia economic issues.

Trump Vacillating Between Russia and Ukraine/Europe

Next, let us turn to the main topic of this article: the Ukraine ceasefire and peace process. Examining the above readout, it is already evident at that point that there was a significant divergence in the timeline regarding the Ukraine ceasefire and peace process between President Trump, "in favour of stopping the hostilities as soon as possible," and President Putin, who "pointed out it was necessary to eliminate the root causes of the conflict."

The second Trump administration appointed Keith Kellogg, a former Army lieutenant general who served as acting national security adviser for Vice President Mike Pence during the first Trump administration, as Presidential Envoy for Ukraine. However, since Russia disliked Kellogg for his pro-Ukraine stance, the Trump administration, while appointing Kellogg to be special envoy for Ukraine, also had Middle East Special Envoy Witkoff concurrently serve as special envoy for Russia, thereby adopting a pro-Russia stance and simultaneously demanding that both belligerents accept an immediate ceasefire at the current combat lines. Yet, President Putin, insisting on the need to "eliminate the root causes of the conflict," did not yield easily. Gradually, President Trump's frustration with President Putin grew.

Meanwhile, on February 28, 2025, Ukrainian President Zelensky came under fierce verbal attacks from President Trump and Vice President J. D. Vance at the White House. As a result, Ukraine faced US pressure threatening a temporary suspension of weapons and intelligence supplies. President Zelensky was obliged to accept President Trump's proposal for an immediate ceasefire. On April 30, 2025, Ukraine began to actively support President Trump's proposal for a swift ceasefire, building on the momentum of a mineral resources agreement with the United States and in cooperation with European countries. Ukraine urged the Trump administration to activate the economic sanctions against Russia that the US Congress was preparing, if Putin did not accept the proposal. Thus, Ukraine attempted to prevent President Trump from tilting toward Russia. Following May 2025 particularly, over the Ukraine ceasefire and peace issue, President Trump would vacillate between sending pro-Russia signals through Witkoff on the one hand and sending pro-Ukraine/Europe ones through Kellogg on the other hand.

A Turning Point: The US-Russia Summit in Alaska

The turning point that brought a clear shift in President Trump's approach to the Ukraine ceasefire and peace issue was a summit meeting in Alaska on August 15, 2025, where he met face-to-face with President Putin for the first time since his second administration was inaugurated.

President Trump posted on Truth Social the following day, August 16: "It was determined by all that the best way to end the horrific war between Russia and Ukraine is to go directly to a peace agreement, which would end the war, and not a mere ceasefire agreement, which often times do not hold up." This suggested that President Trump was moving closer to President Putin's position emphasizing the "need to eliminate the root causes of the conflict," drifting away from his earlier stance favoring an immediate ceasefire.

According to major media reports, President Putin pledged at the Alaska summit that if Ukraine handed over the entire remainder of the Donbas region (the uncontrolled areas) to Russia, Russia would stop the fighting on other fronts. President Trump supported this proposal. On August 17 at the White House, he explained the plan to President Zelensky and European leaders as a "realistic means to freeze the war," hinting at the possibility of pressuring President Zelensky to cede territory. However, Zelensky, backed by European nations, is reported to have adamantly rejected territorial concessions.8

Just days later on August 22, President Putin stated at a domestic meeting in Russia: "Regarding our relations with the United States, they are at their lowest level since World War II, and I have said it many times. But with President Trump's arrival, I believe we can see a glimmer at the end of the tunnel. He and I had a very good, constructive and frank discussion in Alaska. Contacts continue between our ministries, agencies and companies. I really hope that the first steps made are just the beginning of a full-scale recovery of Russia-US relations. However, it is not up to us but mainly to our Western partners in the broad sense of this term because the United States is also bound by certain obligations within various associations, including the North Atlantic bloc. This why the next steps depend on the US leadership. I am certain that President Trump's leadership skills are a good prerequisite for a potential recovery. I hope that we will maintain the pace of cooperation on this platform." He gave a positive assessment of the US-Russia summit in Alaska.9

Stalemate Following the Alaska Summit

Afterward, however, the Ukraine ceasefire and peace negotiations stalled for about two months. During this period, President Trump again expressed frustration over the lack of progress in the negotiations. On August 27, 2025, the United States announced that it would impose additional tariffs (25%) on top of existing mutual tariffs (25%) against India, totaling 50%, accusing that India's direct and indirect crude oil imports from Russia were helping Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

On September 23, 2025, President Zelensky requested the supply of long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles during his meeting with President Trump in New York. The media reported toward the end of September that the Trump administration was considering its possibility, and that the missile supply was almost decided, with the final approval of the US government contingent on how Kyiv planned to use the missiles. On October 11-12, President Trump held consecutive telephone conversations with President Zelensky to discuss the Tomahawk transfer issue. The Financial Times reported on October 14 that President Zelensky would visit Washington on October 17 for talks with President Trump.

On the eve of President Zelensky's visit to Washington, a phone call took place between President Putin and President Trump. According to a statement by Russian Presidential Aide Yuri Ushakov, President Putin expressed concern over the possibility of the US supply of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. He warned that while the missile supply would not alter the situation on the battlefield, it could cause serious damage to US-Russia relations and to the prospects for peace. According to statements from both governments, they agreed to immediately begin preparations for a face-to-face summit meeting in Budapest at their earliest convenience.

On October 17, President Zelensky visited Washington as scheduled and held talks with President Trump, but no announcement ensued on the spot regarding the supply of Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. Two days later, on October 19, President Trump stated: "We have to remember one thing; we need them for ourselves too. We can't give all of our weapons to Ukraine. I can't jeopardize the United States." He went on to say that US–Russia trade has great potential, that resolving the conflict in Ukraine will be difficult but achievable, and that Ukraine will lose some territory when the conflict ends, with Putin undoubtedly regaining some of it.

On October 20, Secretary of State Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov held a telephone conversation to prepare for a US-Russia summit in Budapest. Positive statements from both sides regarding this call suggested the summit would proceed as planned. However, the following day, October 21, CNN and NBC reported in succession that the planned US-Russia summit in Budapest was postponed indefinitely.

On October 23, President Trump announced that the US-Russia summit in Budapest had been canceled because he had "not seen enough interest in enough action in terms of moving the ball forward toward peace" from the Russian side, but that he intended to hold it in due course. At the same time, he announced economic sanctions against Russia's major oil companies, Lukoil and Rosneft. These were the first economic sanctions that the United States imposed against Russia since the start of the second Trump administration.

As the reason for the cancellation of the US-Russia summit in Budapest, Bloomberg reported on October 25, 2025, that Secretary of State Marco Rubio advised President Donald Trump to cancel the peace summit with President Putin and played a crucial role in shifting US policy toward Russia. Rubio concluded that Moscow was attempting to delay ceasefire negotiations without making any meaningful changes to its stance on Ukraine... Rubio canceled his face-to-face meeting with Foreign Minister Lavrov, which reflected tensions at the Alaska summit in August, where Putin insisted on negotiating over Ukrainian territory, and Trump nearly walked out.

In addition, the October 31 issue of the Financial Times reported: After a Russian memo holding fast to tough demands on Ukraine was sent to Washington, the top diplomats of both countries held tense telephone conversations, prompting the US government to cancel President Donald Trump's planned summit with Vladimir Putin in Budapest, according to well-informed sources... Russian demands included territorial concessions, a significant reduction in Ukraine's military forces, and the abandonment of Ukraine's NATO accession. Subsequently, Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary of State Rubio held a telephone conversation, and Rubio informed President Trump that Moscow had shown no willingness to negotiate. The United States canceled the summit meeting.

The "28-Point Peace Plan" as the Embodiment of the Alaska Summit

Following the US-Russia summit in Alaska, the Trump administration appeared to have significantly moved closer to Russia's position on a ceasefire and peace issue in Ukraine. Yet, this progress would stall almost instantly. What exactly was the August 15 US-Russia summit in Alaska?

In an October 15 interview with Russia's Kommersant newspaper, Foreign Minister Lavrov stated: "People present at these negotiations, for obvious reasons, cannot disclose the details. But the point was that in Alaska, President Putin brought a response to the proposals delivered a couple of weeks earlier by Steve Witkoff to Moscow. President Putin then took some time to think and in Alaska said that he was ready to accept the concept that Witkoff brought, since it primarily reflects the understanding of the root causes and is aimed at eliminating them. In fact, he explained how, by adopting this concept, it can be implemented. President Trump said he should be consulted in Washington. We are waiting for the reaction." Lavrov added that territorial issues and NATO issues were discussed in Alaska, and that Russia gained an understanding from the United States.10

Furthermore, in an interview with media people on November 11, Foreign Minister Lavrov referred to the Financial Times report dated October 31that "the American side canceled the meeting of Vladimir Putin and Donald Trump in Budapest after receiving from Moscow a ‘memorandum on Ukraine,' which contained ‘maximal demands'" and stated that Moscow sent an unofficial document, non-paper, to Washington a few days before the Putin-Trump telephone conversation on October 16 for the only purpose of reminding the American colleagues about what the presidents of Russia and the United States discussed and agreed upon during the summit meeting in Alaska.11

On November 18, 2025, the US internet media outlet AXIOS reported that "The Trump administration has been secretly working in consultation with Russia to draft a new plan to end the war in Ukraine. The 28-point US plan is inspired by President Trump's successful push for a deal in Gaza." The project was spearheaded by US Special Envoy Witkoff, who held extensive consultations with Russian Special Envoy Dmitriev. According to what Dmitriev recounted to AXIOS, its basic idea was to incorporate the principles agreed upon between President Trump and President Putin in Alaska in August, proposing a way to not only address the Ukraine conflict but to also restore US-Russia relations (and address Russia's security concerns).12

The plan provided for confirming Ukraine's sovereignty and offering security guarantees to the country. On the other hand, it stipulated that Ukraine should amend its constitution to renounce its accession to NATO; NATO should revise its stipulations to prevent Ukraine's accession; NATO forces should not be stationed on Ukrainian territory even after a ceasefire and peace agreement; the size of the Ukrainian military should be capped at 600,000 strong; Ukraine and the United States should recognize Crimea, Luhansk, and Donetsk as de facto Russian territory; fighting should be frozen at the current front lines in Kherson and Zaporizhzhia; both belligerents should mutually recognize the points of contact as a de facto border. It also mentioned the lifting of economic sanctions against Russia, and long-term US-Russia economic cooperation, thus incorporating the Putin administration's longstanding demands to the utmost.13

For Russia, this "28-point peace plan" would constitute the concrete plan to embody the common understanding reached between the US and Russian leaders at the Alaska summit. Subsequently, during consultations on November 23 between Secretary of State Rubio and officials from Ukraine and European nations, the proposal was revised as a "19-point peace plan," and a tentative agreement was reached that difficult issues such as territory, restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian military, and Ukraine's NATO membership should be discussed on subsequent occasions between President Zelensky and President Trump. However, President Trump declared that he would not meet with President Zelensky unless Russia and Ukraine reach agreements on all pending issues. Eventually, a delegation led by Ukrainian National Security and Defense Council Secretary Rustem Umerov met with Secretary Rubio, Presidential Envoy Witkoff, and Jared Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law, who was directly involved in drafting the "28-point peace plan" together with Witkoff. However, no agreement was reached on these issues.

On November 2, 2025, Witkoff and Kushner visited Moscow and held talks with President Putin, Presidential Aide Ushakov, and RDIF President Dmitriev. According to President Putin, what the US side presented at that meeting was a "27-point peace plan (a revised version of the 28-point peace plan)," which was split into four packages to be discussed separately.

It is noteworthy that Kushner, President Trump's son-in-law, has now stepped onto the main stage of negotiations concerning the Ukraine ceasefire and peace alongside Witkoff. As mentioned earlier, he was the very person who, during the first Trump administration, initiated contact with Dmitriev to normalize US-Russia relations, keeping in mind US-Russia cooperation in the Middle East. Incidentally, on November 20, immediately after AXIOS reported the existence of the "28-point peace plan," Reuters reported that Keith Kellogg, the Trump administration's special envoy for Ukraine, a key advocate for Ukraine and Europe in the Trump administration, would leave his post at the conclusion of his tenure in January 2026.14

Thus, at this stage, Russia is fully leveraging its connections with pro-Russian figures within the Trump administration, represented by Kushner and Witkoff, to secure an advantage in the Ukraine ceasefire and peace negotiations. In any case, it is unlikely that Ukraine's Zelensky administration and the European nations supporting it will accept the "27-point peace plan" as such. Russia and Ukraine/Europe will continue to compete for President Trump's support, which signifies that fighting in Ukraine is expected to continue for a while longer.

Implications for Japan

Amidst this intense tug-of-war between Russia and Ukraine/Europe over a ceasefire and peace in Ukraine, what stance should Japan adopt? Two options may be available:

1) Prioritize cooperation with Ukraine and European nations to check the Trump administration's pro-Russian moves regarding the Ukraine ceasefire and peace, while anticipating a policy shift under the post-Trump administration.

2) If a ceasefire and peace process led by the Trump administration is achieved in Ukraine in line with Russia's wishes, Japan should, together with the United States, shift its policy to normalizing relations with Russia, with a view to maintaining a strategic balance against China in the Indo-Pacific region. In this case, maintaining Japan's energy interests in Sakhalin15 will no doubt be a major prerequisite.

(Taisuke Abiru, Senior Research Fellow, the Sasakawa Peace Foundation)

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