proposal

China's Military Power as It Celebrates Its Centennial

Introduction

According to the "DEFENSE OF JAPAN (Annual White Paper) 2025," China possesses 690 naval vessels with a total displacement of 2.37 million tons and 3,370 combat aircraft. The Army of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is advancing its modernization, having a total strength of 960,000. The PLA also has a roughly 40,000-strong marine corps. Nonetheless, China does not appear to be satisfied with its current military capabilities. It is in haste to build naval ships and to develop and manufacture military aircraft.

A video produced by the Eastern Theater Command (ETC) Media Center, featuring the "Strait Thunder-2025A" exercise conducted by the PLA on April 2, 2025, highlights some combat aspects currently envisioned by the PLA. The ETC Media Center has released several other videos, including one with the motif of a popular game "Black Myth," which features some of the capabilities that the PLA seeks or claims to possess, capabilities which were nicknamed after the wizardry employed by Sun Wukong, the main character of the computer game.

For example, in the video, numerous aircraft and rocket launchers are represented as analogous to Sun Wukong's cloning technique, while J-20 and J-35 fighter jets, stealth unmanned surface vessels, and submarines are represented as analogous to his hiding technique. This video appears to suggest that China will adopt a tactic of suppressing its enemies by overwhelming them with a large number of advanced weapons. However, since the video was produced for others to view, there is a likelihood that it contains exaggerations and deceptions in portraying an image of the PLA that China wants to show off. This article provides an overview of the actual state of China's military buildup and organizational restructuring.

1. The Development of the PLA

Changes in military doctrine and accompanying changes in combat aspects are demanding the restructuring of not only the weapons systems of the PLA Army, Navy, and Air Force, but also of the military system as a whole. This is particularly true for the militaries of developed countries, which were structured with joint army, navy, and air force operations in mind. However, no country could replace its entire military equipment, including weapons systems, all at once. Generally speaking, weapon systems are very expensive; once commissioned, main battle tanks and other combat vehicles, naval vessels, aircraft, and ballistic missiles remain in service for more than two decades.

Whenever a nation's military doctrine changes, those changes are only gradually reflected in military equipment, and it takes time for a new military doctrine to emerge. Consequently, when predicting the future of a particular country's military power, it is important to understand the course of development of the military. This article outlines the development of the PLA.

The Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927 marked the birth of the PLA. The infantry units of the PLA, led by the Communist Party of China, fought and maneuvered characteristically "on foot." The Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, the predecessor of the PLA, consisted entirely of soldiers, more than 95% of whom were infantry. The infantry's mobility, operations, and supplies were all dependent on human power.1 In the mid-1950s, the PLA realized "cavalrization"―generals and other commanders rode horses, soldiers operated on foot, and heavy weapons and equipment were transported by livestock, such as cattle and horses.

In February 1969, the PLA began to "motorize" its infantry divisions. Motorization involves deploying all infantry and equipment aboard vehicles equipped with engines and rubber tires. In parallel, China has also been promoting the "mechanization" of its army. Mechanized units refer to highly integrated units whose primary equipment is powered by internal combustion engines or turbines, also equipped with crawlers (sometimes referred to as "caterpillars," a registered trade good of Caterpillar Inc.) to travel. The units are characterized by their ability to adapt to a variety of advanced technologies. China established its first mechanized unit in April 1955 and inaugurated its mechanized group army in April 1984.

Ultimately, China embarked on "informationization." At the 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (16th Congress) held in October 2002, the PLA announced its strategic goal, stating, "Efforts should be made to accomplish the historical tasks of mechanization and IT application, thereby bringing about leapfrog development in the modernization of our army." Informationized forces refer to a new generation of combat forces adapting to the requirements of future information warfare; their main equipment consists of digital electronic intelligence equipment and mechanized combat weapons; they achieve command and control, intelligence reconnaissance, early warning and detection, communications, and information integration between electronic countermeasures and main combat weapons.

In his report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (19th National Congress) in 2017, General Secretary of the Central Committee Xi Jinping stated, "We will adapt to the trend of a new global military revolution and to national security needs; we will upgrade our military capabilities, and see that, by the year 2020, mechanization is basically achieved, IT application has come a long way, and strategic capabilities have seen a big improvement. In step with our country's modernization process, we will modernize our military across the board in terms of theory, organizational structure, service personnel, and weaponry. We will make it our mission to see that by 2035, the modernization of our national defense and our forces is basically completed; and that by the mid-21st century our people's armed forces have been fully transformed into world-class forces."

However, China's 2019 defense white paper, "China's National Defense in the New Era," stated that "Great progress has been made in the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) with Chinese characteristics. However, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has yet to complete the task of mechanization and is in urgent need of improving its informationization. China's military security is confronted by risks from technological surprise and a growing technological generation gap. Greater efforts have to be invested in military modernization to meet national security demands. The PLA still lags far behind the world's leading militaries." It emphasized the need to continuingly advance the PLA's mechanization and informationization.

The Chinese defense white paper also stated, "Driven by the new round of technological and industrial revolution, the application of cutting-edge technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum information, big data, cloud computing, and the Internet of Things is gathering pace in the military field. International military competition is undergoing historic changes. New and high-tech military technologies based on IT are developing rapidly. There is a prevailing trend to develop long-range precision, intelligent, stealthy, or unmanned weaponry and equipment. War is evolving in form towards informationized warfare, and intelligent warfare is on the horizon." The PLA has since actively pursued intelligentization. China's current active development of various autonomous unmanned aerial vehicles for combat use is following this trend.

2. China's Nuclear Forces

Since its founding, China has consistently sought to deter Russia (the Soviet Union) and the United States from taking military action against it. As its economy grows and its influence in the international community increases, China fears that the United States, which has come to see China as a threat, would resort to military intervention to disrupt its actions. Although one of the foremost goals of China's military buildup is to deter the United States and Russia, that does not mean that China will not resort to its military power. China is trying to deter the United States because it wants to avoid US military intervention if it invades Taiwan in a last-resort attempt to "unify" the Chinese mainland and Taiwan.

In the event of an escalation in the conflict between the United States and China, strategic nuclear weapons―weapons of mass destruction―would serve as the ultimate deterrent. At the time of its founding, China's economic strength did not allow it to expand its conventional and nuclear forces simultaneously. Therefore, it focused domestic resources on strengthening its nuclear deterrent. In February 1960, the Central Military Commission articulated a policy that "two types of bombs (missiles and nukes) shall be our main weapons, but missiles shall come first" and advanced research and development of nuclear-tipped missiles. In 1966, China successfully conducted a "two-bomb" test (mounting a nuclear warhead on a missile).2

Nonetheless, China feared that its nuclear deterrence against the United States could fail because it believed that there was a large disparity between the two countries in the number of nuclear warheads and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers. According to the SIPRI Yearbook 2025, as of June 2025, the United States had 1,770 deployed nuclear warheads, while China had 600.3 Deterrence is a question of perception. If the United States perceives China's strategic nuclear forces as powerful enough, then China's deterrence strategy against the United States will work. Yet, China cannot know exactly how the United States perceives its military capabilities. China's lack of confidence in its nuclear capabilities compared to those of the United States has prompted the country to equip missiles with multiple warheads and to build more ICBM silos.

Despite significant improvements in its nuclear power, China's official position on nuclear strategy and disarmament remains unchanged. It advocates no first use of nuclear weapons and no use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states, supporting the elimination of nuclear weapons. China's arms control/disarmament white paper, "China's Arms Control, Disarmament and Non-proliferation Efforts," published by the Information Office of the State Council on September 1, 2005, states, "The complete elimination of nuclear weapons and the realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world is the common aspiration of the international community and China's goal... Before achieving the goal of total prohibition and total elimination of nuclear weapons, nuclear-weapon States should undertake not to use nuclear weapons first and to unconditionally refrain from using or threatening to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones."4

China's official position remains intact today. At a regular press conference held by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 16, 2025, in response to a question about SIPRI Yearbook 2025 concerning the number of China's deployed nuclear warheads, a Foreign Ministry spokesperson reiterated China's previous position, saying, "I would like to emphasize that China has always adhered to a nuclear strategy of self-defense, maintaining its nuclear forces at the minimum level required for national security, and not participating in an arms race. China adheres to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances, and is unconditionally committed not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones."

On the other hand, some argue that China's nuclear strategy has shifted from "minimum deterrence" to "mutually assured destruction" as its nuclear arsenal and capabilities have dramatically improved. However, China has not necessarily developed its nuclear forces based on ideas such as "minimum deterrence" and "mutually assured destruction"―ideas invented by the United States. China's claim to "maintain its nuclear forces at the minimum level" is conditioned as "required for national security." China has consistently sought to possess nuclear forces at a level necessary for its security; the question is how the Chinese leadership understands the "level required for national security."

The CPC makes the point that Mao Zedong possessed a heroic spirit expressed figuratively as "you hit the atomic bomb, I hit the grenade" and a foresight to "make an atomic bomb." "This dialectical unity of revolutionary romantic spirit and rational and pragmatic attitude is a clear embodiment of Mao Zedong's strategic contempt for the enemy and tactical emphasis on the enemy."5 In an interview on January 23, 1965, Mao also stated, "What the enemy has, we must have; what the enemy doesn't have, we must also have. We must have the atomic bomb, and we must develop the hydrogen bomb quickly."6

The above-mentioned arms control/disarmament white paper also states, "The two countries with the largest nuclear arsenals have special and priority responsibilities for nuclear disarmament." China makes the point that the United States and Russia should first work on nuclear disarmament. These discourses suggest that China is pursuing a nuclear arsenal equal to or greater than that of the United States, whether its goal is minimum deterrence or mutually assured destruction. The US Department of Defense estimates that China possessed more than 600 operationally deployed nuclear warheads as of mid-2024 and will possess over 1,000 operational nuclear warheads by 2030.7 This means that China is annually producing more than 100 nuclear warheads. Even if China maintains its current pace of production until 2035, as predicted by the US Department of Defense, China's deployed nuclear warheads will only number around 1,500, falling short of the current US deployed nuclear warheads, 1,770. Meanwhile, the total number of US nuclear warheads is estimated to be 5,328 (as of January 2024); China will unlikely be satisfied with only 1,500 warheads.

Analysis of satellite imagery suggests that China is expanding its missile force's ammunition depots to accommodate an increasing number of nuclear warheads. Likewise, satellite images show that additional construction work is underway at the Lop Nur nuclear test site. The development of multiple warheads hinges upon the miniaturization of warheads; these moves can be seen as preparation for forthcoming nuclear tests with miniaturized warheads. Although it is hard at this moment to predict China's nuclear forces in 2049, China will, as long as its economic and social situation permits, aim to build a nuclear arsenal on a par with that of the United States.

3. China's Efforts to Strengthen Its Conventional Forces

Even if China caught up with the United States in nuclear capabilities, it would not necessarily stop there. China is aware that the United States is now capable of attacking the Chinese mainland with conventional forces, while China is not. The following illustrates the current situation on the Chinese side: on June 7 and 8, 2025, two Chinese aircraft carriers invaded the Japanese exclusive economic zones around Minamitorishima and Okinotorishima, respectively, and in the waters around Okinotorishima, a Chinese fighter jet from the aircraft carrier Shandong had an abnormal approach to a Japanese P-3C patrol plane. When questioned by the media about a relevant Japanese protest, a Chinese military expert justified China's expansion into the Pacific by pointing out that "the United States Navy has been crossing the so-called ‘third island chain' and ‘second island chain' for years, entering the Western Pacific Ocean and even China's immediate sea area to conduct military exercises, reconnaissance patrols and show of force."8

It appears that China is increasing its conventional forces due to concerns that its nuclear deterrent against the United States may fail. This means that China aims to rival the United States in both nuclear and conventional forces. Should China attack the US mainland or threaten it with conventional forces, it would use intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with conventional warheads or cruise missiles launched from aircraft carriers or surface ships.

The possibility that China may mount conventional warheads on ICBMs has been pointed out since the early 2020s.9 However, it would be hard for China to strike the US mainland with conventionally armed ICBMs. If China launches an ICBM toward the US mainland, the United States will effectively be unable to distinguish whether the warhead aboard the missile is nuclear or conventional; then, the idea of mutual assured destruction would likely urge the United States to retaliate with a nuclear ICBM. For the reasons mentioned earlier, a conventional ICBM could potentially have a similar deterrent as a nuclear ICBM.

If China were to actually attempt an attack on the US mainland with conventional forces, it would likely employ cruise missiles launched from aircraft carrier jets or from surface ships. China's support for building dual-use ports in Latin America and the Caribbean is exacerbating the United States' sense of crisis.10

The Chinese Navy is expediting the construction of aircraft carriers. China's first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, was commissioned in September 2012, and its second, the Shandong, followed suit in December 2019. China claims that the Shandong is China's first domestically built aircraft carrier. Additionally, on June 17, 2022, the Fujian, an aircraft carrier equipped with an electromagnetic catapult and the PLA Navy's first to employ the Catapult Assisted Take Off But Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) system, was launched at the Shanghai Jiangnan Shipyard. A TV program titled "Breakthrough—Determined to Strengthen the Army and Strive for Excellence" broadcast by China Central Television on August 3, 2025 shows the Fujian testing the launch of a J-15 fighter jet using the electromagnetic catapult. The aircraft carrier's sea trials appear to be in the final stages.

The aircraft carriers Liaoning and Shandong are not equipped with catapults but instead launch fighter jets using jump ramps, which reportedly prevent the fighter jets from being fully loaded with fuel or ammunition. China will plan its military operations mainly with catapult-equipped aircraft carriers succeeding the Fujian. It was the way followed by the Chinese Navy to build the first vessel of a new type, operate it for a while to identify defects, solve those defects, and then build the second vessel or the second batch of vessels of the same type.

The aircraft carrier Fujian is the PLA Navy's first vessel to employ an electromagnetic catapult. It will be subject to various verification tests during sea trials and operation after commissioning, before the PLA Navy constructs its fourth aircraft carrier. The so-called "aircraft carrier building" within the premises of China State Shipbuilding Corporation, Limited (CSSC) 701st Research Institute in Wuhan is the venue where the structure and various equipment of aircraft carriers are verified. Satellite imagery reveals that as of April 2025, the building was undergoing large-scale renovations to resemble a catapult-equipped aircraft carrier. This suggests that some issues still require verification before the construction of the fourth aircraft carrier begins.

Construction of other surface vessels that will make up a carrier strike group is also underway. Within a carrier strike group, Type 055 destroyers constitute the main force escorting the carrier. The Type 055 destroyer is said to have a full load displacement of over 13,000 tons; reportedly, its construction began in December 2014. The PLA Navy stated that "the operational mission of the Type 055 destroyer is different from the previous PLA Navy destroyers performing operational missions within the island chain or limited breakthrough of the island chain; it should be deployed to serve the distant sea and even global strategy beyond the second island chain... At the same time, it is also the main battle destroyer supporting China's aircraft carrier battle groups."11 This suggests that the Type 055 destroyer will accompany Chinese aircraft carriers around the world even to the waters surrounding the United States.

4. Military Operations for the "Unification" of Taiwan with Mainland China

The primary goal of the PLA's military buildup is to acquire military power equal to or greater than that of the US military. China's attitude toward the United States suggests that it does not currently want outright war with the United States, but rather aims to deter US military intervention in response to Chinese military actions by acquiring military power comparable to or superior to that of the United States. The scenario that most concerns China is US military intervention to address a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan.

China is believed to be planning several military operations for unifying Taiwan. A full-scale amphibious landing might result in significant losses on the Chinese side; therefore, it may be considered a last resort. However, even if China hopes to unify Taiwan without a large-scale military conflict, it must be capable of carrying out a full-scale amphibious landing. No matter how much military pressure China applies to Taiwan, if Taiwan downplays China's military capabilities, that pressure will have no effect. Various pressures, including military pressure, can only be effective when China can demonstrate the ability to carry out actions up to the ultimate means.

In April 2025, US media reported the existence of several special Chinese barges believed to be used for amphibious landings.12 Given their shape, however, these barges could only be used after Taiwanese military forces capable of striking the landing beaches have been neutralized. They are likely to be employed to land heavy vehicles and supplies following the landing operation.

Before using these barges to land many main tanks and armored vehicles, China must neutralize Taiwanese military forces and air bases near the landing areas. China will employ extensively unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) from this stage to reduce its troop losses. China's goal is intelligent warfare, which primarily refers to a war characterized by combat aspects using lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) that combine UAVs with AI.

China has been aware of intelligent warfare since the mid-2010s. Autonomous UAVs will transform combat aspects from "human-to-man" to "machine-to-machine" or "machine-to-man." The modes of combat to be adopted by China will also include autonomous cluster attrition warfare, autonomous latent raid warfare, autonomous cross-domain mobile warfare, and autonomous cognitive control warfare. At the 2024 Zhuhai Air Show, a large-sized UAV Jiu Tian with a 25-meter wingspan, also known as an "aerial mothership," was unveiled. The Jiu Tian can not merely carry a variety of missiles and bombs, but it also has a storage space sectioned in a grid pattern, thereby launching as many as 100 small UAVs and firing cruise missiles from its fuselage sides. Attacks by numerous autonomous UAVs constitute a combat aspect of what China designates as autonomous cluster attrition warfare.

New UAVs are expected to make their appearance at the "Events Commemorating the 80th Anniversary of the Victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War" to be held on September 3, 2025. Several veiled unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and large, torpedo-like unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) were seen during a recent rehearsal. The torpedo-like UUV is equipped with four metal fittings on the back, presumably for hooking, suggesting that the UUV is assumed to be released into the sea by a crane on board a surface vessel, instead of being launched from a torpedo tube. If this is the case, the UUV may not be used for immediate attacks, but rather as an autonomous attack weapon that can identify targets and decide the timing of attacks. This mode of combat is considered to represent an aspect of what China designates as autonomous latent raid warfare. During the dry run, unmanned ground combat armored vehicles mounted on trucks were also discerned.

Conclusion

This paper has elucidated some trends of China's military buildup. By the centennial of the founding of the People's Republic of China (2049), it is mandatory for Beijing to complete the "great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation." At that point, the country will possess additional aircraft carrier strike groups and high-performance nuclear-powered strategic and attack submarines. These capabilities will be used to deter potential US military intervention. The country will also possess a great variety of UAVs. These will reduce its military attrition rate and enable a successful invasion of Taiwan. However, it is unclear how long China's current trend of military buildup will continue, because it is likewise unclear how much military power and intelligence China believes it needs for its security.

Meanwhile, the PLA's recent force reorganization does not appear to be necessarily efficient from an operational perspective. The PLA has been reorganizing its forces since December 2015, streamlining its command system by separating force users and force providers, and integrating various functions. As part of these efforts, a Strategic Support Force was established to integrate functions such as space operations, cyberspace operations, radio space operations, and psychological warfare.

However, on April 19, 2024, a Chinese media reported that the inaugural meeting of the PLA Information Support Force was held in Beijing, stating, "The number of the strategic support force will be abolished, and the leadership and management relationship of the military aerospace force and the cyberspace force will be adjusted accordingly."13 This means a re-division of functions that were integrated with difficulty. Moreover, only the Information Support Force received wide coverage, while the Military Aerospace Force and the Cyberspace Force were only mentioned in connection with the adjustment of their leadership and management relationship. The reasons for the disbandment of the Strategic Support Force and the difference in treatment between the Information Support Force, the Military Aerospace Force, and the Cyberspace Force remain unanswered questions.

The reorganization of forces may have been necessary for the PLA to address changing combat aspects, but this move may have been associated with Xi Jinping's acquisition of power. There is also a likelihood that the Space Systems Department of the Strategic Support Force was involved in a series of corruption cases involving the Rocket Force and the Equipment Department. Whether there are operational or political challenges, the PLA is organizationally in flux. We must continue to analyze what challenges the PLA will face, besides increasing its weapons and equipment, and by when the PLA can overcome those challenges.

(Bonji Ohara, Founder & Rep. Director, DEEP DIVE)

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