proposal

China's Strategic Gains and Losses from the Ukraine and Middle Eastern Conflicts and Its Military Partnership with Russia

Introduction

The international security environment has become increasingly unstable over the past few years. The Ukraine war, which began in February 2022 with a large-scale Russian military invasion of Ukraine, has continued to this day, with the aborting of Russia's design to score a quick victory due to strong-willed Ukrainian resistance. NATO countries began providing full-scale military support to Ukraine; Western democracies, including Japan, imposed severe sanctions on Russia. Meanwhile, Russia has hinted at possible nuclear retaliation; the conflict between Western nations and Russia continues to escalate to an unprecedented level.

On the other hand, in the Middle East, in October 2023, the Islamic extremist group Hamas, based in the Gaza Strip in Palestine, invaded Israel and carried out a major terrorist attack, killing approximately 1,200 people and taking 251 hostages. In response, Israeli forces invaded Gaza with the aim of destroying Hamas and releasing the hostages. This action erupted into the Gaza war.1 Israeli military operations in Gaza still continue, reportedly resulting in over 60,000 civilian casualties. In June 2025, Israel launched an attack on Iran. Iran's retaliation led to US airstrikes on Iranian nuclear development facilities.

The Ukraine war and the recent Middle Eastern conflicts will likely have a significant impact on China, which is engaged in strategic competition with the United States over the international order. This is because the United States, China's rival, is deeply involved in the Ukraine war and the Gaza war, while Russia, with whom China is strengthening its strategic ties, is responsible for the Ukraine war. The purpose of this paper is to examine what gains or losses the Ukraine war and the Gaza war have brought to China, amid its competition with the United States. It first reviews the strategic goals of the Xi Jinping administration's foreign policy and the progress of cooperation with Russia toward achieving those goals, and then discusses the positive and negative influences of the Ukraine war and the Gaza war on China in achieving its foreign strategic goals. Lastly, it offers a perspective on the future direction of China's foreign policy, referring to its future relationship with Russia.

1. China's Foreign Strategy Aiming to Transform the International Order and Alignment with Russia

The Xi Jinping administration, inaugurated at the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (18th Party Congress) held in November 2012, invigorated its diplomatic activities toward neighboring regions, such as Central Asia and Southeast Asia. In September 2013, President Xi Jinping visited Kazakhstan and delivered a speech at Nazarbayev University. In this speech, President Xi proposed building a "Silk Road Economic Belt" as a new model for strengthening economic ties and cooperation among Eurasian nations. Specifically, he advocated the development of a major logistics artery connecting East Asia, West Asia, and South Asia, stretching from the Pacific Ocean to the Baltic Sea.2 In October of the same year, Xi Jinping visited Indonesia and delivered a speech at the Indonesian parliament. He expressed his intention to establish an "Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank" (AIIB) and to promote infrastructure links with ASEAN countries. He also expressed his desire to utilize the China-ASEAN Maritime Cooperation Fund financed by China to build a "21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" between China and ASEAN countries, thereby significantly expanding trade.3 The "Silk Road Economic Belt" and "21st-Century Maritime Silk Road" proposed by Xi Jinping were subsequently incorporated into the "Belt and Road Initiative" (BRI) and designated as important policy tools in Xi Jinping's diplomacy.

The Xi Jinping administration thus adopted a foreign strategy to expand China's influence in the surrounding region chiefly through the promotion of the BRI. In October 2013, the CPC held a Conference on Work Related to Peripheral Diplomacy in Beijing.4 In his speech at the seminar, Xi Jinping emphasized that "to realize China's dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, we need to do well the work of peripheral diplomacy" and that "we must win a favorable peripheral environment for our country's development." As the strategic goals of peripheral diplomacy, he cited: utilizing strategic opportunities favorable to China's development by comprehensively developing relations with neighboring countries; protecting sovereignty, security, and development interests; and consolidating friendly relations with neighboring countries, making them economically more closely tied, and deepening security cooperation. Xi also added that "a sense of a shared future must take firm root in peripheral countries," indicating China's intention to play a leading role in the region.

Subsequently, the Xi Jinping administration shifted its foreign strategy toward reforming not only the regional order but also the existing international order. In a speech at the Central Conference on Work Related to Foreign Affairs held in November 2014, Xi Jinping pointed out that "the multipolarization of the world will continue into the future" and "the international system is also heading for reform." He then showed an understanding of the situation that in the world today, "the international system and international order are going through deep adjustment" and that "the international power balance is undergoing serious changes, shifting in a direction favorable to peace and development." He also emphasized the importance of: establishing a "peripheral community with a shared future" through "peripheral diplomacy"; strengthening cooperation with developing countries; promoting reforms in the international system and global governance; and increasing the representation and voice of China and developing countries. Xi made the point that China should "promote a new type of international relations featuring win-win cooperation," positioning this new foreign strategy as a "major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics."5 At the group study session on global governance by the Politburo of the CPC Central Committee held in October 2015, Xi Jinping remarked that the growing international influence of emerging and developing countries "marks the most revolutionary shift in the international power balance that has existed in the modern era." He also stressed the need to "promote reform in the unjust and improper arrangements in the global governance system" and to "establish a community with a shared future for mankind."6

The Xi Jinping administration, committed to the strategic goal of transforming the existing international order, has come to view Russia as a vital partner in achieving this goal. In March 2013, President Xi Jinping traveled to Russia on his first overseas trip as the Chinese president. In his speech at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, Xi noted that the rise of developing countries is "shifting the international balance of power in a direction favorable to peace and development," and that growing interdependence among nations is transforming them into "more and more a community of shared destiny." At the same time, Xi argued that countries should "jointly promote the construction of a new type of international relations focusing on win-win cooperation." In other words, in Russia, Xi Jinping first advocated a "community with a shared future for mankind" and a "new type of international relations," which would later become pillars of "major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics." Furthermore, Xi pointed out that strong Sino-Russian relations "provide an important guarantee for maintaining the international strategic balance and world peace and stability," and made the point that joint development between China and Russia "will positively energize the fair and rational development of the international order and international system."7

Subsequently, China and Russia intensified their criticism of the existing international order, which they deemed to be Western-led and unfair. They opposed it jointly. For example, in the "Joint Statement on the Current World Situation and Major International Issues" issued in July 2017, the two countries confirmed their positions of "opposing interference in other countries' internal affairs under the pretext of human rights" and "pushing forward the international order towards a fairer and more rational direction."8 The "Joint Statement on Developing a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for a New Era" issued in June 2019 outlined China and Russia's joint commitment to building "a new type of international relations based on mutual respect, fairness, justice, and win-win cooperation" and "a community with a shared future for mankind."9 On top of these, in a joint statement issued during President Putin's visit to China just before Russia began its invasion of Ukraine, Russia "positively assesses China's idea of building a community with a shared future for mankind," while China "positively assesses Russia's efforts to promote the construction of a fair and multipolar international relations system," stressing that "friendship between the two States has no limits, there are no forbidden areas of cooperation."10

2. Gains and Losses for China from the Ukraine War

What are the gains and losses for China from Russia's invasion of Ukraine? China, as outlined above, had deepened its strategic cooperation with Russia, aiming to reform the existing Western-led international order. Three and a half years have passed since the outbreak of the Ukraine war, and so far, the conflict appears to affect China more negatively than positively.

One of the major losses from China's perspective is that Russia has reduced its national power and international influence. Russia's military invasion of Ukraine was an apparent violation of the UN Charter and international law, drawing strong criticism from other countries. A resolution condemning Russia at the UN Security Council in February 2022 was rejected by Russia, which holds a permanent seat on the Council, but it was passed at the UN General Assembly with 141 countries voting in favor. Only five countries, including Russia, voted against the resolution, and 35 abstained. The overwhelming majority of countries condemned Russia's aggression.11 The United States, Western European countries, and Japan not only condemned Russia at the UN sessions but also imposed severe sanctions against Russia. Major Russian banks were excluded from the international payment system SWIFT, and a trade embargo was placed on Russia's main exports, crude oil and natural gas. The assets of the Russian central bank and oligarchs were frozen. Russia attempted to mitigate the damage caused by the sanctions, but the negative implications for the Russian economy are inevitable. Russia's economic growth rate turned negative in 2022. Although it recovered to 4.1% in 2024, it is expected to slow to around 1% in the future.12

As the war with Ukraine drags on, Russian military losses are also increasing. According to a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Russian military death toll will reach 250,000 and casualties one million around the summer of 2025.13 The Russian military is also suffering significant losses in terms of equipment. The CSIS report estimates that between January 2024 and April 2025, the Russian military lost 1,233 armored fighting vehicles, 3,238 infantry fighting vehicles, 1,946 tanks, and 320 pieces of self-propelled artillery.14 Other losses include the sinking of the Black Sea Fleet's flagship cruiser Moskva, and the destruction of Tu-95 and Tu-22M strategic bombers and A-50 early warning and control aircraft due to Ukrainian drone offensives. Russia's military exhaustion due to the Ukraine war appears to confront the country with difficulties in maintaining its international influence. In December 2024, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whom Russia supported militarily, defected to Russia following an attack by anti-government forces. Russia was unable to maintain the Assad regime and lost its influence in Syria. Russia's declining national power and international influence due to its war in Ukraine is a significant loss for China because the war has weakened its most important partner in reforming the existing international order.

Another loss for China is that the Ukraine war has made Western countries wary of Russia and more vigilant toward China. Russia's invasion of Ukraine, one by an authoritarian military power with nuclear capabilities, has raised concerns that China, another nuclear-armed authoritarian regime, would also resort to force to change the status quo. The Xi Jinping administration is mounting pressure on Japan, the Philippines, and other countries in the East and South China Seas, repeatedly articulating that it would not exclude the possibility of using military force against Taiwan. This has led to the growing perception that the likelihood of a "Taiwan crisis," in which China would use military force against Taiwan, is increasing. In a testimony at a Senate hearing in March 2024, Admiral John Aquilino, commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command, expressed the view that President Xi Jinping had ordered the People's Liberation Army to acquire the capability to launch a military attack on Taiwan by 2027.15 Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida, who visited Ukraine in September 2024 and met with President Zelensky, conveyed his intention to do his utmost to support Ukraine, feeling a strong sense of crisis that "the fate of today's Ukraine could be that of tomorrow's East Asia."16

Not only Japan and the United States, but also European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), are increasingly wary of China. Facing a direct threat from Russia, NATO members view China, which supports Russia, as an indirect threat. The July 2024 NATO summit issued a joint statement condemning China as a "decisive enabler" of Russia's war against Ukraine and noting that China "continues to pose systemic challenges to Euro-Atlantic security" through "cyber and hybrid activities, including disinformation."17 Sharing this recognition, NATO is strengthening its ties with like-minded countries in the Indo-Pacific region. NATO designates Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea as its Indo-Pacific Partners (IP4), deepening cooperation on areas such as support for Ukraine, cyber defense, countering disinformation, and artificial intelligence.18 The June 2025 meeting between NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte and the IP4 defense ministers was the first to issue a joint statement, in which they recognized that "the security of the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific is interconnected" and confirmed their policy of cooperation to maintain a "rules-based international order."19 As a result, the Ukraine war has heightened Western nations' vigilance toward China and strengthened their unity in countering China's challenges to the rules-based international order.

On the other hand, the Ukraine war has benefited China because it has made Russia more dependent on China. China not only provides diplomatic support to Russia, the aggressor of Ukraine, but also plays an essential role for Russia to continue its war efforts, purchasing from Russia large quantities of crude oil and natural gas embargoed by Western nations and supplying dual-use materials indispensable for Russia's weapons production. Russia's growing dependence on China has led to deeper strategic cooperation between the two countries. For example, regarding their militaries' joint bomber flights that started in 2019, notable was the June 2023 joint flights, which first took a course toward Guam. Likewise, in their joint naval operations that began in 2021, the two navies, for the first time, conducted joint operations in the South China Sea in July 2024.20 Both regions are areas where China is competing with the United States; the picture is that China takes the lead, and Russia follows suit.

Another move from China is expanding its influence in Central Asian countries, where Russian influence had been dominant until recent years. In May 2023, China held the first China-Central Asia Summit in Xi'an, with the attendance of the leaders of five Central Asian countries. In his speech at the summit, President Xi Jinping announced his willingness to promote building a "China-Central Asia community with a shared future" through propelling the joint construction of the BRI and concerted opposition to foreign interference in internal affairs of a nation and "color revolutions." He also expressed his willingness to help Central Asian countries in strengthening their law enforcement, security, and defense capabilities.21 The Central Asian countries' approach to China is believed to be a result of Russia's weakened influence in the region because of its declining national power. As Russia becomes increasingly dependent on China, it cannot help but tolerate China's growing influence in Central Asia.

3. Gains and Losses for China from the Middle Eastern Conflicts

The current Middle Eastern conflicts have brought a lot of benefits to China, competing with the United States over the international order. First, the Gaza war has significantly damaged the United States' reputation in the international community. At the outset of the war, Hamas' terrorist attacks killed many Israeli citizens, temporarily increasing international sympathy and support for Israel. However, the Benjamin Netanyahu administration's subsequent invasion of Gaza and harsh military actions disregarding Palestinian lives has caused growing international criticism of Israel. On September 18, 2024, the United Nations General Assembly held an emergency special session to deliberate a resolution demanding that "Israel bring to an end without delay its unlawful presence… no later than 12 months" from its adoption.22 This resolution was adopted with the support of 124 countries, including China, Russia, Japan, and France. Fourteen countries, including Israel and the United States, opposed the resolution, while 43 countries, including the United Kingdom, Germany, and Ukraine, abstained.23

Even as international criticism of Israel grew, the United States has consistently supported Israel. President Joseph Biden visited Israel on October 18, 2023, shortly after the Israeli-Hamas conflict began, and met with Prime Minister Netanyahu. During the meeting, President Biden emphasized that "the United States stands with Israel." He "reiterated his steadfast support for Israel and reaffirmed US determination to provide the Israeli government with what it needs to protect its citizens."24 Although the Biden administration later demonstrated efforts to improve the humanitarian situation in Gaza and to negotiate a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas, it held fast to defending Israel under international criticism.

The Gaza war caused a rift between the United States and other Western nations. As previously mentioned, Western countries were sharply divided in their responses to the September 2024 UN General Assembly resolution: the United States opposed it, Japan and France supported it, and the United Kingdom and Germany abstained. On June 4, 2025, at the UN Security Council, a resolution co-sponsored by the 10 non-permanent member states calling for an "immediate, unconditional, and permanent ceasefire" in Gaza was rejected by a US veto.25 The United Kingdom and France supported this resolution, highlighting the differences in position between the United States and some other Western nations. As a new development, France, Germany, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and other nations expressed their willingness to recognize a Palestinian state, at significant variance with the position of the United States, which strongly opposes it. The United States' stance supporting Israel not only provokes dissatisfaction with the United States among the international community, but it also negatively affects its leadership among Western nations. This stance benefits China, which is engaged in a strategic rivalry with the United States.

At the same time, the Gaza war provided China with an opportunity to strengthen its ties with the Middle Eastern and Islamic countries. From the very beginning of the Gaza war, China clarified its support for Palestine and its criticism of Israel. In a telephone conversation with Palestinian Foreign Minister Nouri al-Maliki on October 23, 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi pledged continued support for residents in Gaza and stressed that "the only way to resolve the Palestinian issue lies in implementing the ‘two-state solution' and realizing the Palestinian people's right to existence, statehood, and return." Meanwhile, in a telephone conversation with Israeli Foreign Minister Eli Cohen on the same day, Wang Yi stated, "all countries have the right to self-defense, but they should abide by international humanitarian law and protect the safety of civilians," expressing his concern about the Israeli military's actions in Gaza and urging Israel to accept a "two-state solution."26

China wielded its influence over Middle Eastern and Islamic countries regarding the Gaza war. In November 2023, it published a position paper titled "Position Paper of the People's Republic of China on Resolving the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict," calling for an immediate ceasefire, protecting civilians effectively, enhancing diplomatic mediation, and seeking a political settlement based on the "two-state solution."27 In the same month, Wang Yi held a meeting in New York with the foreign ministers of Middle Eastern countries, including Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Egypt, as well as those of Indonesia and Malaysia. He expressed his concern about the humanitarian situation in Gaza, emphasizing the need to realize a "two-state solution." He also stated that "China highly aligns its position with that of the vast majority of Arab and Islamic countries," and that "China is willing… to listen more closely to the voices of Arab and Islamic countries, and take further meaningful actions."28 In July 2024, China invited representatives of 14 conflicting Palestinian factions, including Fatah and Hamas, to Beijing and had the Beijing Declaration successfully signed by them.29 The declaration called for ending Palestine's internal division and Palestinian national unity. By propelling Palestinian unity, China is taking a more adversarial stand against Israel and the United States that supports it.

China strongly condemned the US attack on Iran's nuclear development facilities in June 2025. At an emergency session of the UN Security Council held on June 22, China's UN Ambassador Fu Cong criticized the US attack on Iran, stating, "the US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities are a serious violation of the purposes and principles of the UN Charter and international law, infringing upon Iran's sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, escalating tensions in the Middle East, and severely impacting the international nuclear non-proliferation regime."30 In other words, he argued that the US attack on Iran's nuclear development facilities violated the UN Charter, which prohibits armed attacks against UN member states; that such an attack could also undermine the credibility of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by neglecting the right of non-nuclear-weapon states to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In short, the new conflict over Iran provides China with a valuable opportunity to increase international criticism of the United States for jeopardizing the current international order.

Conclusion

As discussed above, China, engaged in strategic competition with the United States over a new international order, is adversely affected by the Ukraine war, while benefiting much from the Middle Eastern conflicts. Since the inauguration of Trump 2.0 in January 2025, the rift between the United States and other Western nations has widened, and the international situation surrounding China appears to be gradually evolving in its favor.

The Xi Jinping administration's future foreign strategy will seek further strategic cooperation with Russia. In July 2025, during a meeting with EU Foreign Policy Chief Kaja Kallas, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reportedly said that China does not want to see Russia lose the war in Ukraine, and that "the Russia-Ukraine war would keep the US distracted from its rivalry with China."31 Russia's defeat in the Ukraine war could deprive China of its vital strategic partner in its competition with the United States. If Russia were able to end the war on advantageous terms, such as acquiring territory from Ukraine, it would set a favorable precedent for China, for it would mean the international community admitting a change in the status quo by force. China will likely provide various forms of support to ensure that Russia does not lose the Ukraine war and continue to deepen military cooperation with Russia. The Chinese and Russian militaries are expected to increasingly activate their joint exercises and operations.

In parallel, the Xi Jinping administration will seek to strengthen ties with neighboring nations. In early April 2025, it held a Central Conference on Work Related to Neighboring Countries, where Xi Jinping stated that China's "relations with its neighbors are currently at their best since modern times" and announced the policies of promoting the BRI and of establishing an "Asian security model" with the aim of building "a community with a shared future for neighboring countries."32 In mid-April, Xi Jinping visited Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia. In May, Chinese Premier Li Qiang participated in the first-ever summit between ASEAN, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and China held in Malaysia. In June, the second China-Central Asia Summit was held in Kazakhstan with the attendance of Xi Jinping. The Xi Jinping administration's swift series of actions aimed at fortifying ties with neighboring nations appears to be driven by a strategic ambition to take the lead in the regional order surrounding China by further expanding its influence over these countries. It is believed that China aims to gain an advantage in its competition with the United States over global order by leveraging its regional leadership in Asia.

(Masafumi Iida, Director, Security Studies Department, The National Institute for Defense Studies)

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