proposal

A Perspective on Russia's National Security Strategy: Focusing on the ‘Multipolar World,' ‘Anti-Westernism,' and ‘Nuclear Status'

Introduction

Russia's aggression against Ukraine is approaching its fourth year. The inauguration of the Trump administration raised hopes for an end to the war, but Trump's ceasefire efforts failed, and President Putin shows no willingness to stop fighting. In addition to battling over territory along the front lines, both belligerents are intensifying drone and missile attacks deep into the territory of the adversary. Is President Putin seeking a swift end to the war and the improvement of relations with the West? To explore this, we need to examine Russia's national security strategy following its aggression against Ukraine.

Documents to examine to this end include the current "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation," revised in July 2021 before the war; the "annual State of the Union address," delivered for the first time in February 2023 after the outbreak of the war; and recent national security trends. By collating the "strategic document," "Putin's addresses," and "latest security trends," this paper aims to understand President Putin's thinking, including his outlook for the end of the war.

At the Munich Security Conference on February 10, 2007, President Putin publicly voiced Russia's dissatisfaction with the post-Cold War international order.1 His address shocked Western nations. Viewed in hindsight, it seems to have foreshadowed the Georgia conflict in the following year of 2008 and the Russian aggression in Crimea in 2014. In his speech, Putin strongly criticized the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for having threatened Russia's security and called for a shift to a multipolar world order. Since then, three key words have frequently appeared in Putin's national security vision: "multipolar world," "anti-Westernism," and "nuclear status." This article discusses how these three elements have been changing in Russia's national security strategy.

1. The "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation," Revised Before the Ukraine War (July 2021)

First, we examine how these three elements are incorporated into the current "National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (from here referred to as the Security Strategy)." The "Security Strategy" is Russia's highest-level strategic document, codifying its official views on national security in a broad sense. Although its title includes the wording "national security," its content encompasses not only military but also all policy areas, including the economy, society, technology, and the environment. Based on this document, individual sub-documents such as the Foreign Policy Concept and Military Doctrine are formulated. The former "National Security Concept" was renamed the "National Security Strategy to 2020" in 2009, which was replaced by the "Security Strategy" in 2015. The "Security Strategy" was revised to the current version on July 2, 2021.2

Around the same time, on July 12, 2021, a paper titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians" was published under the name of Putin.3 In the paper, Putin argues that "The Western authors of the anti-Russia project set up the Ukrainian political system in such a way that... the attitude of separation from and enmity with Russia would remain." He concludes that "I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia... For we are one people." Perusal of the two documents, released almost simultaneously seven months before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, makes one suspect that subsequent military action had already been in the sight of Russia.

The "Security Strategy" outlines Russia's self-perception, stating, "The Russian Federation's consistent policy... has strengthened Russia's sovereign statehood as a country capable of pursuing an independent foreign and domestic policy, effectively resisting attempts at external pressure." As for Western sanctions that followed Russia's aggression in Crimea, the document states, "The Russian Federation has demonstrated its economic resilience to the world and has proven its ability to withstand external sanctions pressure." Russia perceives itself as having already regained the national strength necessary to withstand external pressure.

Regarding the strategic environment, the document perceives that "Increasing the number of centers of world economic and political development, strengthening the positions of new global and regional leaders lead to a change in the structure of the world order, the formation of new architectures, rules and principles of world order", indicating the recognition that a "multipolar world" is taking shape. The document also states that the fundamentals of Russia's national security policy is to increase its "internal stability" and to strengthen "its role as one of the most influential centers of the modern world," articulating a policy of strengthening Russia's role as one pole of a "multipolar world."

As for "anti-Westernism," the document recounts: "a number of states exert open political and economic pressure on Russia and its partners"; "a number of states call Russia a threat and even a military adversary"; "the desire to isolate the Russian Federation and the use of double standards in international politics prevent multilateral cooperation from improving on areas important to the world community"; and "unfriendly countries are trying to... divide Russian society", indicating Russia's recognition that deepening conflicts with unfriendly Western countries are undermining multilateral cooperation.

Regarding "strategic national priorities,"4 the utmost priorities are "protecting Russian citizens" and "strengthening the country's defense," while placing a new emphasis on "protection of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, culture, and historical memory." As for national security, the document adds the phrase "saving the people of Russia and developing human potential", manifesting for the first time the stance of protecting not only the national security but also citizens (humans). This expression is employed to justify the "special military operations" still going on under the pretext of protecting ethnic Russian residents and Russian speakers.

As for the national defense policy, the document reads that "the military and political situation in the world is characterized by the formation of new global and regional centers of power, the growing struggle between them for spheres of influence. The importance of military force as a tool for the actors of international relations to achieve their geopolitical goals is growing" and that "attempts to exert pressure on Russia, its allies and partners, to build up the military infrastructure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization near the Russian borders... are contributing to the increase in military dangers and military threats of the Russian Federation." Russia's imminent national defense challenges include "maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrence capability", "ensuring a given degree of readiness for combat use of the Armed Forces, other troops, military formations and bodies", "protecting the national interests and citizens of the Russian Federation outside its territory", "military-patriotic education and preparation for military service of citizens". The document clarifies Russia's stance of "maintaining and strengthening nuclear capabilities" to counter NATO.

Diplomatic objectives enumerated in the "Security Strategy" include deepening cooperation with CIS states, developing partnerships with China and India, deepening multidisciplinary cooperation with foreign countries through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS, assisting the development of countries in Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Africa, and strengthening fraternal ties between the Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian peoples. The document also emphasizes expanding China-Russia-led influence and winning over the Global South to its side.

2. The State of the Union Address Delivered First after the Outbreak of the Ukraine War (February 2023)

Next, we discuss the contents of the state of the Union address, delivered on February 21, 2023, one year after the start of Russia's armed aggression across Ukraine. The state of the Union address is an annual policy speech to the Federal Assembly. As it was not given in 2022 when hostilities began between Russia and Ukraine, the 2023 address was the first comprehensive speech after the start of the aggression. What follows from here is the key contents:5

A War Initiated by the West

"...to protect the people in our historical lands, to ensure the security of our country and to eliminate the threat coming from the neo-Nazi regime that had taken hold in Ukraine after the 2014 coup, it was decided to begin the special military operation. "

"The United States and NATO quickly deployed their army bases and secret biological laboratories near Russian borders. They mastered the future theatre of war during war games, and they prepared the Kiev regime which they controlled and Ukraine which they had enslaved for a large-scale war."

"...they were the ones who started this war, while we used force and are using it to stop the war... It has already spent over $150 billion on helping and arming the Kiev regime."

"In the 1930s, the West had virtually paved the way to power for the Nazis in Germany. In our time, they started turning Ukraine into an ‘anti-Russia.'"

Anti-Russian Policies of the West

"NATO's expansion to our borders, the creation of new deployment areas for missile defence in Europe and Asia – they decided to take cover from us under an ‘umbrella.'"

"The whole world witnessed how they withdrew from fundamental agreements on weapons, including the treaty on intermediate and shorter-range missiles, unilaterally tearing up the fundamental agreements that maintain world peace. For some reason, they did it."

"In fact, the anti-Russia project is part of the revanchist policy towards our country to create flashpoints of instability and conflicts next to our borders. Back then, in the 1930s, and now the design remains the same and it is to direct aggression to the East, to spark a war in Europe, and to eliminate competitors by using a proxy force."

"The Western elite make no secret of their goal, which is, I quote, "Russia's strategic defeat." What does this mean to us? This means they plan to finish us once and for all. In other words, they plan to grow a local conflict into a global confrontation. This is how we understand it and we will respond accordingly, because this represents an existential threat to our country."

Military Buildup

"...future development of the Armed Forces must be based on actual combat experience gained during the special military operation, which is extremely important, I would even say absolutely invaluable to us. For example, the latest systems account for over 91 percent, 91.3 percent, of Russia's nuclear deterrence forces."

"...the Defence Ministry and Rosatom must make everything ready for Russia to conduct nuclear tests. We will not be the first to proceed with these tests, but if the United States goes ahead with them, we will as well."

Unity of the Russian People

"It is the people of Russia that are the foundation of our national sovereignty and our source of power. The rights and freedoms of our citizens are immutable―they are guaranteed by the Constitution and we will not depart from this despite the external challenges and threats."

"Russia will meet any challenges because we are all one country, a big and united nation. We are confident in ourselves and confident in our strength. The truth is on our side."

To summarize the above, the core narrative is that Russia is fighting a war initiated by the West, with the very existence of our nation at stake, and "anti-Western" rhetoric prevails through it. By overlapping Nazi Germany and present-day Ukraine, the document legitimizes special military operations and calls for national unity, and mentions strengthening nuclear deterrence from the perspective of countering the West.

3. Russia's Recent National Security Trends

Finally, we examine how much the three elements are underlined in current national security trends. The theme of the 22nd Annual Meeting of the Valdai Discussion Club, held in Sochi in October 2025 with participation of Russian and foreign experts, was "The Polycentric World: Instructions for Use." President Putin asserted that the Western liberal model has collapsed, the era of absolute dominance by the United States and its allies is coming to an end, and the world is shifting toward a balanced multipolar system. He stated that Western countries were trying to isolate Russia to maintain their hegemony.6 In his speech, Putin mentioned the rhetoric of a "multipolar world" and "anti-Westernism" many times. At the Victory over Japan Day event held in Beijing on September 3, 2025, the leaders of China, Russia, and North Korea, who share the narrative of a "multipolar world" and "anti-Westernism," gathered together. Following the outbreak of the Ukraine war, Russia has become more dependent on China and North Korea. It is clear that the conflict between authoritarian and democratic powers is intensifying.

In a sense, President Putin is using the Ukraine war politically to maintain his own power. In the past, when his approval ratings fell, Putin perpetrated aggression against Crimea (2014) and the entire Ukraine (2022), only to witness a sharp rebound in his approval ratings immediately afterward. Prominent Russian scholar Gabuev of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues that President Putin sets "conflict with the West" as a fundamental principle of Russia's behavior, that "anti-Western" sentiment has already been embedded as part of Russia's domestic mechanisms, and that any future ceasefire in Ukraine will not overthrow this domestic mechanism.7 Putin is well aware that the domestic-use narrative that Russia is fighting a war initiated by the West, with its very existence at stake, is effective in boosting national prestige and patriotism. Once the war in Ukraine ends, the toll of Russian war victims will be revealed, making it hard for Putin to justify his authoritarian rule. Consequently, given that the relevant constitutional provision qualifies Putin to remain in power until 2036 at most, concerns have been raised that the Ukraine war could be prolonged due to Russia's domestic politics.

There is also a noticeable trend toward emphasizing Russia's status as a "nuclear power."8 Russia's nuclear weapons compensate for the country's inferior conventional military capabilities compared to NATO's, represent the only realm in which Russia can negotiate on an equal footing with the United States on the diplomatic front, and domestically constitute the last emblem as a major power left to today's Russia. It is essential for Russia to strengthen its nuclear capabilities in pursuing a "multipolar world" and an "anti-Westernism." Recently, Russia has been testing and deploying new weapons, including the new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) "Sarmat," the nuclear-powered underwater drone "Poseidon," and the cruise missile "Burevestnik."

The development of these new weapons was announced by President Putin in his annual State of the Union address to the nation just before the presidential election in March 2018. This move is considered to encompass two objectives: checking the United States and evoking nostalgia for the Soviet era at home, when Russia was a "nuclear power."

In the Ukraine war, Russia attempted to deter Western countries from military intervention by suggesting that it might use tactical nuclear weapons in combat. President Putin declared strengthening the "nuclear triad" (ground-launched ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and strategic bombers); since the start of its aggression against Ukraine, Russia has conducted strategic nuclear exercises annually. To ensure the effectiveness of "nuclear intimidation" in relation to the Ukraine war, Russia revised its "nuclear doctrine" in November 2024, lowering the threshold for nuclear use.

Conclusion

The Putin administration's national security strategy has steadily strengthened the three elements: a "multipolar world," "anti-Westernism," and "nuclear status." Since Russia began its aggression against Ukraine, these three elements have been tied to "domestic narratives" intended to justify the war, bolster domestic unity, and consolidate Putin's power. Even if the external environment surrounding Russia changes, it is unlikely that these three elements will weaken in the future, if they have already been intermingled with various domestic factors.

On the other hand, Putin's efforts to maintain power by continuing the war will weaken Russia's national strength over the medium- to long-term and lead to an unintended deepening of dependence on China and North Korea. Nevertheless, if Putin still wants to continue the war, it suggests that maintaining domestic power matters to him much more than we could possibly imagine from the outside.

(Shinji Hyodo, Vice President for Academic Affairs, National Institute for Defense Studies)

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