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Latin American Diplomacy under Trump 2.0: The Scope and Effectiveness of the "Western Hemisphere" Policy

Introduction

As the year 2026 dawned, the US military launched an attack on Venezuela and detained President Nicolas Maduro and his spouse. This action, an obvious escalation from the ongoing attacks by the same military on "drug-trafficking vessels," seemed to endorse US commitment to the "Western Hemisphere" highlighted in the National Security Strategy (NSS) released last December.

This article reviews US diplomacy toward Latin America,1 particularly during the first year after the inauguration of the second Trump administration, and examines the scope and effectiveness of the "Western Hemisphere" policy advocated by the administration. Then, it discusses the current state of US-Latin American relations and their future outlook.

1. Overview of Latin American Policy under Trump 2.0

Shortly after the inauguration of the second Trump administration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio visited five countries in Central America and the Caribbean. It was unusual for a new US Secretary of State to choose this region as the destination of his first official overseas trip.

The results were instantaneous. Panama, the first stop on the trip, declared its withdrawal from China's Belt and Road Initiative, and Chinese companies were deprived of their operating rights for the ports of Balboa and Cristobal at each end of the canal, respectively. The two neighbors signed a memorandum regarding the strengthening of the US military presence for the defense of the canal.2 This seemed to be a sign of the Trump administration's determination to reduce China's influence in Latin America, where China had been active for years.

Thus, Trump 2.0's diplomacy toward Latin America attracted attention as part of its policy toward China; however, the administration focused mainly on countering the influx of drugs and illegal immigration, as well as securing access to strategically important locations.

Donald Trump immediately began curbing the inflow of illicit drugs as soon as he resumed his second term of presidency. His administration designated Latin American drug cartels as foreign terrorist organizations one after another, suspended aid to Colombia for failing to fulfill its drug control responsibilities, and imposed sanctions on President Gustavo Petro and his entourage.3 Furthermore, the Trump administration designated fentanyl as a "weapon of mass destruction"4 and designated 18 countries in the region, including Colombia, Panama, and Venezuela, as drug transit or drug-producing countries.5

In September 2025, the United States launched "Operation Southern Spear" and sank Venezuelan "drug-trafficking ships" one after another. This operation projected an unusually large force in the Caribbean, including the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Gerald R. Ford.

Meanwhile, the Trump administration announced the "One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA)," which allocates over $170 billion for border security and law enforcement over the next four years. The bill aims to forcibly repatriate one million immigrants annually.6 As a result, arrests at the southwestern border decreased by 87% from October 2024 to October 2025.7 Over 600,000 illegal immigrants were forcibly deported during the first year of the administration, while over 1.9 million reportedly left voluntarily.8 During this process, deportees were sent to countries like El Salvador and Panama, which have safe third-country agreements with the United States.9 Moreover, the Trump administration demanded that foreign countries take more effective measures to address illegal migration, as had been the case of imposing additional tariffs on Mexico for insufficient emigration control.10 These efforts reportedly led to the first net decrease in immigrants in about 50 years.

Securing access to strategically important locations has been implemented through the aforementioned response regarding the Panama Canal, renaming the Gulf of Mexico as the Gulf of America, and strengthening the US Coast Guard's presence in that gulf.11

In the NSS (NSS2025) released in December 2025, the description on the "Western Hemisphere"—which had previously been carried in latter pages of the past NSSs—is found at the top of region-wise descriptions. Incidentally, this region had been covered in just one page in the past editions, but it now occupies four pages.

Without explicitly naming China, the section on the "Western Hemisphere" in NSS2025 emphasizes strengthening counternarcotics and counter-illegal immigration efforts, securing access to strategically important locations, and adjusting the global military balance to enhance US dominance in the "Western Hemisphere." It also refers to the necessity of using force when necessary to achieve these goals. This section's declaration, titled "Western Hemisphere: The Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine," aims to deter external intervention while strengthening the commitment to the "Western Hemisphere." Like the original Monroe Doctrine, it appears to justify the aggressive pursuit of US interests in the region while dividing spheres of influence with other major powers.12

2. Trump 2.0's "Big Stick Diplomacy" and "Deal Diplomacy"

Looking back at history, Theodore Roosevelt, who similarly proposed the "Roosevelt Corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, promoted "Big Stick Diplomacy"—strengthening America's regional hegemony by military force. Roosevelt broadened the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine—which called for non-interference by Europe in the Americas and that by the United States in European affairs—thereby implementing "Big Stick Diplomacy." Thus, the United States made Panama independent and acquired the rights to build and operate the Panama Canal.

This approach is analogous to Trump 2.0. A prime example is the January 2026 detention of President Maduro and his wife based on "domestic law." Following the US invasion of Venezuela, Vice President Delcy Rodriguez, who became the new leader of the country, initially adopted a strong stance against the Trump administration but later became amenable to US demands.

The US attack on Venezuela kept other Latin American nations in check. In the wake of the US intervention, Nicaragua, which shared anti-Americanism with Venezuela, decided to grant amnesty to political prisoners. Additionally, Colombian President Petro softened his previously adamant stance toward the United States, visiting Washington in February 2026 to emphasize friendly relations with the United States. Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum held a phone conversation with Trump. While rejecting US intervention that demanded "compelling results" of Mexican efforts to eradicate drug cartels, she confirmed continued cooperation with the United States.13

Roosevelt's diplomacy toward Latin America included both "Big Stick Diplomacy" and "Dollar Diplomacy." Although the administration of his successor, William Taft, is often seen as the epitome of this approach, its origins can be traced back to the Roosevelt administration. For example, in 1905, the Roosevelt administration shouldered the Dominican Republic's foreign debt, thereby preventing European intervention while securing US interests.

This approach of leveraging economic power as a diplomatic tool parallels the Trump administration's attempt to alter the behavior of other nations through "Deal Diplomacy" utilizing tariffs. For instance, in August 2025, Trump issued an executive order imposing 50% tariffs on Brazilian exports in protest of the prosecution of former Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro. The current Lula administration responded by holding a summit talk with President Trump at the ASEAN Summit and has since sought to improve relations with the United States. The Trump administration also threatened to impose tariffs on Colombia, compelling the country to accommodate immigrants, which it was reluctant to do. Many other Latin American countries faced the pressure of the Trump administration's "Deal Diplomacy."

This "Deal Diplomacy" is a strategy that employs both the stick and the carrot. For instance, Argentine President Javier Milei, considered to be in a honeymoon phase with Trump, successfully secured US loans to stabilize the domestic currency market. This enabled him to win the midterm elections in October 2025 and to retain his political power.14 Right-wing governments emerged in Ecuador, Bolivia, Chile, and Honduras following the 2025 elections. While this trend cannot be attributed solely to US influence, good relations with a Trump 2.0 administration matter for Latin American nations.15

Thus, both "Big Stick Diplomacy" and "Deal Diplomacy" function as a kind of "chastisement" in the sense that they alter the behavior of Latin American nations.

3. Characteristics of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine

President Trump's hardline stance toward countries possessing strategically important locations, drug-producing or transit countries, or countries exporting emigrants and refugees appears to be a faithful implementation of the Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, as outlined in the NSS2025. His pursuit of national interests through military threats—"Big Stick Diplomacy"—and "Deal Diplomacy" leveraging economic power aligns with the Roosevelt Corollary.

Nonetheless, the Roosevelt Corollary and the Trump Corollary differ in two significant respects. First, while the former aimed to build a regional order beneficial to US national interests through intervention, the latter appears to show no interest in regional order. The Roosevelt Corollary, despite its tough stance, aimed to modernize Latin American militaries and to transform some countries into effective protectorates. The Roosevelt Corollary helped pro-American military regimes emerging in the region, contributing to Latin America's transformation into America's "backyard" through the subsequent establishment of the OAS (Organization of American States) and the conclusion of the Rio Pact (Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance).16 On the other hand, the Trump administration's diplomacy toward Latin America appears focused solely on short-term goals: resolving drug and illegal immigration issues, reviving domestic manufacturing by imposing high tariffs on imports, and eliminating the trade deficit, to meet what Trump supporters desire. The administration does not seem to be willing to build a regional order in the medium to long term. The "Trump Corollary to Monroe Doctrine" is emphasized as aligning with US national interests by both the NSS2025 and the NDS (National Defense Strategy) released in January 2026.17

Second, the targets of mutual non-interference are Europe for the Roosevelt Corollary and China for the Trump Corollary. Since around the 2000s, China has increased its influence in Latin America; the country has increased its engagement with the region in inverse proportion to the diminished US engagement. China is now the primary trading partner for Latin American countries, overshadowing the United States. As of 2025, China had incorporated 22 out of 33 Latin American countries into its Belt and Road Initiative, propelling economic and military exchanges.

Initially, the United States, which had reduced its engagement in Latin America following the 9/11 attacks and the global financial crisis, welcomed China's advent into the region. However, as China became involved in telecommunications and critical infrastructure, such as ports and harbors, the United States under Trump 1.0 began to seek to reduce China's regional influence in the configuration of US-China rivalry.

While Trump 1.0 aimed to reduce Chinese influence by bullying anti-American leftist governments, the Biden administration sought to win over Latin American nations, upholding democratic values.18 Their approaches were different. This policy difference resembles the fable of the North Wind and the Sun; such policy choices can be seen as rooted in domestic political polarization. Both Trump's 1.0 and 2.0 adopted hardline policies, seemingly rejecting the previous administration's ideological Latin America policies.

4. The "Western Hemisphere" Envisaged by Trump 2.0

What is the "Western Hemisphere" envisaged by Trump 2.0? Judging from the NSS2025, Trump 2.0's first year in office, and the countries Rubio visited, the current administration defines the "Western Hemisphere" strictly as an area related to US homeland security.19 This is confirmed by the fact that the NDS treats the Western Hemisphere in the same section as homeland security.20 In other words, counternarcotics and counter-illegal immigration efforts, the relevant attacks on Venezuela, and the hardline stance toward Panama are all linked to US homeland security.

Trump 2.0, like Trump 1.0, is concerned about issues like homeland security and China. To address these challenges, Trump 2.0 pillories Latin American countries, which are geographically proximate and the source of drug and illegal migration problems. In other words, Trump likely seeks to strengthen his support base by increasing influence over Latin American nations, which he views as easy to treat to achieve tangible results.

These points are important in examining US-Latin American relations under Trump 2.0. Trump's definition of the "Western Hemisphere" is focused on North and Central America, the Caribbean, and nations that border the United States across the sea (as of this writing, at least). His inclusion of Greenland in this vision clearly reveals a strategic intent. The NDS lists Greenland as a militarily and commercially significant place, alongside the Panama Canal and the American Gulf.21

5. The United States as Seen by Latin American Countries

Trump's perception of the "Western Hemisphere" also matters for Latin American countries. Latin American countries have long been wary of aggressive US intervention and have continued to resist it. Representative examples include the establishment of regional organizations excluding the United States—the CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), the UNASUR (Union of South American Nations), and the ALBA (Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas)—and the stranding of the US-led FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas). In these efforts, the wealthier nations of southern South America, such as Brazil and Argentina, took the lead, besides anti-American states like revolutionary Cuba and post-Chavez Venezuela. President Trump has so far shown little particular interest in southern South America, which is unrelated to US homeland security. Only Trump's tariffs are imposed on the region as part of the "Deal Diplomacy."

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has little incentive to implement "Big Stick Diplomacy" against countries like Brazil (or Argentina, which currently has a pro-Trump administration due to leaders' personal ties); "Deal Diplomacy" is less effective for these countries compared to North and Central America and the Caribbean. Trump tariffs directed to Brazil are said to have had a limited effect, as the US administration, facing domestic discontent over rising prices, has withdrawn or eased additional tariffs on items like beef and coffee beans.

Consequently, if Trump 2.0's "Western Hemisphere" encompassed southern South America, it would be unclear whether these countries will yield to Trump's hardline diplomacy as North and Central America and Caribbean nations have. It is noteworthy that the regions nicknamed America's "backyard" encompass North and Central America and the Caribbean.

Moreover, China's influence in Latin America is now irreversible. Aggressive US policies could even help strengthen Latin American countries' ties with China.22 Latin American nations maintain relations with extra-regional powers based on practical interests

Conclusion: Trump 2.0's First Year and the Future of US-Latin American Relations

As seen above, Trump-style "Big Stick Diplomacy" and "Deal Diplomacy" appear to have altered the behavior of some Latin American countries. Given changes in their responses to drug and illegal migration issues and the emergence of right-wing governments, the Trump administration's Latin American policy scored a certain "success." To his supporters, Trump worked seriously on the long-neglected drug and illegal immigration issues and showed results.23

However, the Trump administration has not yet succeeded in removing China's influence from the region. China has already become a major partner for Latin American countries in various fields, including digital technology; changing this trend appears impractical. As mentioned earlier, the hardline Trump Corollary could encourage Latin American countries to turn to China.

The upcoming political agenda in the region is worth noting. In 2026, presidential elections will be held in several countries, including Brazil.24 The 2025 elections showed a shift to the right. In 2026, resistance to US intervention could intensify depending on the political trends in those countries. Panama, which withdrew from the Belt and Road Initiative, is nonetheless seeking to maintain relations with China while asserting its autonomous governance of the canal and deepening security cooperation with the United States.25

Currently, the reality of excluding China from the region and the oft-discussed sphere of influence doctrine in the "Western Hemisphere" is uncertain. Certainly, US actions surrounding the Panama Canal and Venezuela, as well as the NSS2025's relevant description, appear to be aimed at checking China. Although the Trump administration aims to strengthen its presence in the "Western Hemisphere," it is not clear how much it intends to counter China in this context. Trump 2.0 has exerted influence not only over authoritarian states with deep ties to China, like Cuba and Venezuela, but also over nations like Mexico and Colombia, blamed as hotbeds of drug and illegal migration issues.

From a medium- to long-term perspective, future US diplomacy toward Latin America will be considered a dependent variable of domestic political conflict. Should a post-Trump administration be a Democratic one, it could potentially shift to a principled, non-interventionist foreign policy, unlike the current one. That said, the Biden administration also failed to win over Latin American nations due to overemphasis on its pet principles. Historically, US diplomacy that ignored regional contexts only served to deepen Latin American countries' distrust of the United States.26

Will Trump 2.0's "Western Hemisphere" policy transform the configuration of US-Latin American relations? Or is it merely a replay of the cyclical history of intervention and non-intervention? This question will claim ongoing attention.

(Suguru Osawa, Associate Professor, Aichi Gakuin University)

(Translation by Tsutomu Inuzuka)

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